92-155
NO. ____

Supreme Court, U.S.
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In The

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1992

STATEWIDE REAPPORTIONMENT ADVISORY COMMITTEE, et al.,

Appellants,

v.

NICK THEODORE, et al.,

Appellees.

On Appeal From The United States District Court For The District Of South Carolina

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND APPENDIX VOLUME I, PAGES 1-223

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QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the district court of three judges erred in failing to fully apply the standards of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and conduct a full Section 2 hearing in adopting court ordered legislative redistricting plans to remedy violations of the one person, one vote principle?

2. Whether the court erred by fragmenting concentrations of minority population and dispersing them into separate legislative districts in areas of the state where voting was racially polarized and minority voters lacked the equal opportunity to elect candidates of their choice, and where reasonably compact and contiguous majority black districts could have been created?

3. Whether in considering if its plans complied with the Voting Rights Act, the court erred in applying a retrogression standard and comparing its plans only with the preexisting malapportioned plans, and not with plans that provided an undiluted level of minority voting strength?

4. Whether the court erred in giving greater deference to the state's policies of protecting incumbents and maintaining the integrity of county boundaries in the redistricting process than to federal policy of avoiding the unnecessary fragmentation of the black community and the dilution of minority voting strength?

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

The appellants are Statewide Reapportionment Advisory Committee, D. William Gibson, Bishop Frederick Calhoun James, Rev. Herbert Williams, Willie B. Owens, and South Carolina State Conference of the NAACP Branches. Carroll A. Campbell, Jr., Governor of South Carolina, is the cross-appellant. The appellees are Nick Theodore, Lieutenant Governor of South Carolina, Robert J. Sheheen, Speaker of the South Carolina House of Representatives, and James B. Ellisor, Executive Director of the South Carolina State Election Commission. Katharine I. Butler was amicus curiae in the court below.

In the consolidated case of *Burton v. Sheheen*, C.A. No. 3:91-2983-1, the plaintiffs were Michael G. Burton, William P. Collins, III, Earl Copeland, William Patrick Flack, Frank E. Gibson, III, Nancy D. Hawk, and Gus Roberts. Kimberly T. Burch was a plaintiff-intervenor. The defendants were Robert J. Sheheen, Nick Theodore, James B. Ellisor, and Carroll A. Campbell, Jr. The defendant-intervenors were Robin Tallon, Neil A. Vander Linden, Forrest E. Ott, Philip T. Jones, Ann Y. Hart, Peggy A. Dufek, Gwendolyn L. Grooms, the South Carolina Senate, and the Democratic Party of South Carolina. Katharine I. Butler was amicus curiae.

In the consolidated case of *Blanton v. Campbell*, C.A. No. 3:91-3635-1, the plaintiffs were Bufort Blanton, Neil A. Vander Linden, Forrest E. Ott, Ann Y. Hart, Peggy A. Dufek, and Vincent Johnson. The defendants were Carroll A. Campbell, Jr., Nick Theodore, Robert J. Sheheen, James B. Ellisor, Dorchester County Legislative Delegation, State of South Carolina, Sherry Martschink,

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING – Continued

Stephen E. Gonzales, Annette Young, Sandra S. Wofford, George H. Bailey, John W. Matthews, Jr., Michael T. Rose, and the South Carolina Senate.

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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

Opinions Below

The May 1, 1992 opinion of the three judge court for the District of South Carolina redistricting congressional and legislative districts in South Carolina, which appears in the appendix hereto, App. 1, *infra*, is unreported. The May 15, 1992 judgment of the three judge court, which appears in the appendix hereto, App. 464, *infra*, is unreported.

Jurisdiction

The order and judgment of the three judge court for the District of South Carolina were entered on May 1,

1992 and May 15, 1992 respectively. Appellants filed their notice of appeal on May 22, 1992. *See,* App. 469, *infra.*

This appeal is being docketed in this Court within 60 days after the filing of the notice of appeal in the district court. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. §1253.

Constitutional and Statutory Provisions Involved

The constitutional and statutory provisions involved in the case are the First, Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution of the United States, Sections 2 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§1973 and 1973c, and Article III, Section 3 of the Constitution of South Carolina, the pertinent texts of which are set out in the appendix hereto, App. 478-485, *infra.*

Statement of the Case

Appellants are black, or African-American, residents of South Carolina, the Statewide Reapportionment Advisory Committee, an unincorporated association of private individuals and organizations in South Carolina, and the South Carolina State Conference of NAACP Branches (hereinafter referred to collectively as "SRAC"). They brought this action (the "*SRAC*" case) on October 31, 1991 alleging that the existing congressional and legislative districts in South Carolina based upon the 1980 Census were malapportioned in violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and diluted minority voting strength in violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §1973.[1] They requested the district

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[1] SRAC also contended that the actions of the state violated their rights protected by the First, Thirteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution of the United States, and Article III, Section 3 of the Constitution of South Carolina.

court to order interim court ordered redistricting on the ground that the South Carolina General Assembly and the Governor had failed during the 1991 legislative session to redistrict the state's congressional and legislative districts following the 1990 Census,[2] and that there was not enough time prior to the 1992 elections for the state to redistrict and comply with the preclearance provisions of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §1973c. A three judge court was constituted to hear the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2284.[3]

The appellees are the Lieutenant Governor, who is President of the Senate, *ex officio*, the Speaker of the House, and the Executive Director of the State Election Commission, who has general supervisory authority over elections in the state. The Governor, a defendant below, is cross-appellant.

A similar case, *Burton v. Sheheen*, C.A. No. 3:91-2983-1 (D.S.C.) (the "*Burton*" case), had been filed on October 4, 1991, by the Republican Party.[4] *Burton* and this action were consolidated for trial on November 13, 1991. The

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[2] The Senate and House passed redistricting plans for their respective bodies but neither was able to approve the plan passed by the other before adjournment *sine die*. A concurrent resolution to extend the session failed, and the Governor declined to call a special session to consider redistricting.

[3] 28 U.S.C. §2284(a) provides:

> A district court of three judges shall be convened when otherwise required by Act of Congress, or when an action is filed challenging the constitutionality of the apportionment of congressional districts or the apportionment of any statewide body.

[4] On October 23, 1992 Congressman Robin A. Tallon moved to intervene as a plaintiff in *Burton*, and on October 28, 1991 Neil A. Vander Linden, et al. moved to intervene as defendants. On October 31, 1991 the South Carolina Senate also moved to intervene as a defendant. Joinder of the additional parties was ordered on November 13, 1991.

Democratic Party of South Carolina and Kimberly Burch moved to intervene in *Burton/SRAC*, and intervention was granted, although Burch was ultimately dismissed by consent of the parties.[5]

The General Assembly reconvened on January 14, 1992 and adopted redistricting plans for the Senate and House. The Governor vetoed the plans on January 29, 1992 on the ground that they did not comply with Section 2, and the vetoes were sustained. The Senate and House passed separate bills for congressional redistricting but no plan was enacted by the General Assembly.

After the Governor's veto was sustained, the parties agreed that the legislative process was deadlocked. The cases were set for trial beginning on February 18, 1992.

The Senate was last redistricted by the General Assembly in 1984, after a three judge panel ordered into effect an interim court ordered plan. *Graham v. South Carolina*, Civil Action No: 3:84-1430-15 (D.S.C. July 31, 1984). The House was redistricted in 1981 without judicial intervention. The state's congressional districts were last drawn in March, 1982 by a three judge court. *S.C. State Conference of Branches of the N.A.A.C.P. v. Riley*, 533 F.Supp. 1178, 1183 (D.S.C. 1982). The General Assembly never

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[5] On December 12, 1991, Bufort Blanton, et al. filed suit, *Blanton v. Campbell*, C.A. No. 2:91-3635-1 (D.S.C.) (the "*Blanton*" case) against the state officials named in *Burton/SRAC*, as well as various members of the General Assembly, alleging that the county legislative delegation system was unconstitutional. *Blanton* was consolidated with *Burton/SRAC* on January 14, 1992. Prior to trial, *Blanton* was bifurcated on the grounds that the issue of the constitutionality of the delegation system was not appropriate for consideration by a three judge court, and that resolution of the issues in *Blanton* would depend upon how, if at all, the court ordered plans affected county lines. None of the issues raised in *Blanton* are before this Court or involved in this appeal.

enacted a congressional plan of its own, and as a consequence the court ordered plan became the permanent plan.

According to the 1980 Census, the population of South Carolina was 3,121,820, of which 948,623 (30.4%) were black. Blacks were 27.3% of the voting age population (hereinafter "VAP"). The 1990 Census showed that the state's population has increased to 3,486,703. While the black population increased to 1,039,884, blacks are now a slightly smaller percentage of the total population (29.8%), as well as the VAP (26.9%). p. 63. There were also significant shifts in population from 1980 to 1990, particularly from rural and urban to resort and suburban areas of the state.

Summary of the Evidence at Trial

At the beginning of trial the parties stipulated that the existing congressional and legislative plans were malapportioned. Under the 1990 Census, the Senate plan had a total deviation among districts of 63.15%, the House plan had a deviation of 113.86%, and the Congressional plan had a deviation of 8.33%. During the three week trial the parties submitted evidence and various remedial redistricting plans.

SRAC contended that any plan adopted by the court must comply with Sections 2 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act and provide minorities the equal opportunity to participate in the political process and elect representatives of their choice. SRAC and the *Burton* plaintiffs submitted substantial evidence of the factors deemed probative of minority vote dilution identified in *Thornburg v. Gingles*, 478 U.S. 30, 37, 45 (1986), and the Senate Report that accompanied the 1982 amendment of Section 2, to wit: (1)

that blacks were geographically compact;[6] (2) that blacks were politically cohesive; (3) that voting was racially polarized; (4) that there was a history of official discrimination in the state that touched the rights of blacks to participate in the electoral process;[7] (5) the depressed socio-economic status of minorities;[8] (6) the extent to which minorities had been elected in congressional and legislative contests;[9] and (7) the use of voting practices, such as a majority vote requirement for primary elections, that may enhance the opportunity for discrimination against the minority group.

The evidence of political cohesiveness and racial bloc voting was extensive, and was unrebutted. SRAC's expert Dr. James Loewen analyzed, using standard ecological regression, 130 electoral contests (84 for county offices, 21

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[6] SRAC's evidence of geographic compactness, which is conceded by the parties and the court, showed that congressional and legislative plans could be drawn in which blacks were a majority in one or more districts.

[7] This evidence, which was uncontested, consisted primarily of statutes and state constitutional provisions requiring racial segregation or limiting the electoral opportunities of blacks, e.g. the literacy test and poll tax, legislative resolutions calling for the maintenance of segregation, and court decisions affirming or invalidating various discriminatory practices in the state, such as segregation of schools, parks and prisons. Plaintiffs' First Request for Judicial Notice.

[8] This evidence consisted primarily of Census data which showed by virtually every socio-economic indicator – income, employment, education, housing – that blacks were a disadvantaged minority.

[9] No black has been elected to Congress and no black has won a statewide office in South Carolina in this Century, though there have been numerous serious candidates for these offices. Most of the blacks who have been elected to the state Senate and House have been elected from districts which were majority black.

for the Senate, 19 for the House, 4 for Congress and 2 for statewide office) from 1972-1984 pitting black candidates against white candidates for a single office. He concluded that voting was polarized throughout the period under investigation. Overall, whites cast about 90% of their votes for white candidates, while blacks cast about 85% of their votes for black candidates.

Dr. Theodore Arrington, an expert for the *Burton* plaintiffs, presented ecological regression analysis of more recent black/white contests (4 for the House, 2 for the Senate, one for Congress, one for solicitor, and one for Governor) from 1982-1990. He concluded, as did Dr. Loewen, that "[v]oting for national and state office in South Carolina is extremely polarized . . . [and that b]lacks are very cohesive in their voting for black candidates." Exhibit 63A. SRAC presented additional statistical analysis of polarized voting in the cities of Orangeburg and Columbia prepared by Dr. Vernon Burton. Exhibits 117, 118.

SRAC also introduced 38 Section 5 letters from the Attorney General of the United States from 1974-1992 objecting to, or commenting upon, voting changes submitted by the state and various local jurisdictions based upon findings or evidence that voting was racially polarized.[10] SRAC requested the court to take judicial notice of orders in 18 cases involving cities and counties in the state in which the courts had found racial bloc

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[10] *E.g.*, February 14, 1980 letter commenting upon Senate redistricting and noting that "[o]ur analysis revealed a pattern of racial polarization in the voting of the white electorate and the black electorate that was so consistent as to render race the single most significant factor in predicting the outcome of such elections," and November 18, 1981 letter objecting to proposed House redistricting and finding "existing patterns of racial bloc voting in South Carolina." Exhibit 120.

voting or a violation of Section 2, or in which the defendants had consented to the abolition of an election procedure alleged to dilute minority voting strength.[11]

The two principal federal issues during the trial were the extent to which the plans proffered by the parties complied with the one person, one vote standard, and provided black voters the equal opportunity to elect candidates of their choice. There was no consensus among the parties as to the definition of an "opportunity" district. The court held that "a district may be considered a black opportunity district if the percentage of the black voting age population is greater than 50 percent." App. 48. SRAC contended that, based upon patterns and levels of racial bloc voting, black electoral success, district size and the presence of white incumbents, a black opportunity legislative district should ordinarily contain a minimum of approximately 57% black population.[12]

After trial, the court held that none of the plans proposed by the parties fully satisfied constitutional and statutory mandates and drew its own plans. App. 12.

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[11] *E.g.*, Jackson v. Edgefield County, South Carolina School District, 650 F.Supp. 1176, 1198 (D.S.C. 1986) ("racially polarized voting exists in Edgefield County"), and Reaves v. City Council of Mullins, Civ. No. 4:85-1533-2 (D.S.C. Aug. 5, 1988) (finding "racially polarized voting in Mullins and the general inability of the minority-preferred candidates to win elections"). Plaintiffs' Second Request for Judicial Notice.

[12] The court did not consider the extent to which so called "influence districts" had been or could have been created, *i.e.*, those "in which the minority population is sizeable but insufficient to comprise a majority of the voting age population." App. 50. The SRAC plan similarly concentrated on creating opportunity rather than influence districts.

Standards Applied by the District Court

In adopting its plans, the court ruled that the unenacted plans offered by various state officials or bodies were not entitled to deference as "state policy," but instead "may be considered evidence of 'proffered current policy,' " citing *Carstens v. Lamm*, 543 F.Supp. 68, 79 (D.Colo. 1982). App. 17. For purposes of complying with one person, one vote in court ordered state legislative redistricting, the court adopted a *de minimis* or "approximate population equality" standard. App. 21. Court ordered congressional redistricting was held to a strict standard of population equality.

A. Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act

The three judge court held that "this suit . . . is authorized under 42 U.S.C. §1973j(f) through 42 U.S.C. §1973c," App. 3, and repeatedly characterized the action as one "ari[sing] under §5 of the Voting Rights Act." App. 13, 38, 42. Although SRAC agreed that Section 5 standards were applicable to court ordered plans, and that any legislative plan implemented by the court would be subject to preclearance, *McDaniel v. Sanchez*, 452 U.S. 130, 138, 148-49 (1981), SRAC never asserted that the jurisdiction of the court was based upon Section 5 nor that the action was one involving preclearance.

The court fashioned its own plans rather than adopting plans proffered by the state, and accordingly held that Section 5 preclearance was not required. However, the court held that it "must be cognizant of §5 concerns that voting changes have neither the 'purpose . . . [nor] the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote' on the basis of race." App. 25.

In determining discriminatory effect under Section 5, the court adopted a retrogression standard, *i.e.* whether there was "diminution in minority opportunity from what it had been under an earlier plan." App. 26. In

assessing diminution, or retrogression, the court compared "the gross number of districts with minority population and voting majorities in the old plan [at the time the plan was originally drawn or at the time a new plan is proposed] and the number of such districts drawn in the proposed plan." *Id.* Thereafter, where such comparisons were meaningful or possible, the court compared the black population and voting age population in individual districts under the old and new plans.

The court rejected as a basis for determining retrogression, argued for by SRAC, the comparison of the court ordered plans with options for properly apportioned districts, or plans that provided an undiluted level of minority voting strength. According to the court, such a comparison has no basis in case law, the statutes, or Section 5 regulations, and "enshrines the notion that the Voting Rights Act insures proportional representation by race." App. 30-31.

B. Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act

Because the court viewed this case as "a proceeding under §5," it held "that it is not obligated to completely import the standards and requirements of §2," and "decided against conducting a full §2 inquiry."[13] App. 39, 44. The court justified its action on the additional grounds that: (1) there was "lack of a clear legislative intent or judicial interpretation" for fully applying Section 2; (2) "any testimony regarding the effect of the proposed plans is sheer speculation;" (3) any attempt to completely apply Section 2 standards "would impair the duality of remedies currently afforded aggrieved parties

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[13] The court also ruled from the bench during trial that it would not grant SRAC, or any other party, a subsequent Section 2 hearing on any plan it might adopt.

under principles of *res judicata* or separation of powers;" and, (4) "the evidentiary burden presented by a §2 challenge to each proposed plan in this case would have been staggering and would likely still be ongoing." App. 39, 42, 44.

Nonetheless, in order to "insure that the threshold requirements of a §2 action cannot be established under the adopted plan[s]," the court indicated that it considered "the extent to which reasonably compact and contiguous majority black districts were and could be drawn . . . the extent to which the minority group is politically cohesive . . . [and] the extent to which racially polarized voting patterns exist." App. 45-46. A district was reasonably compact, the court held, if it allowed for "effective representation," and not whether it achieved some aesthetic absolute, such as symmetry or attractiveness. App. 53. In determining the extent of racial bloc voting, the court concluded that "the parties' stipulation that since 1984 there is evidence of racially polarized voting in South Carolina is sufficient for our analysis of the plans." App. 56.

The court also considered "the extent to which the lines which have been drawn limit the number of majority-black single-member districts in light of the expressed state policies of the State of South Carolina." App. 46. According to the court, the state policy entitled to greatest deference was "the preservation of county lines."[14] App. 62. Cutting county lines to meet population requirements was deemed "necessary;" a cut of county lines for any other purpose, including creating black opportunity

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[14] The court stated that preservation of county lines was the "only cognizable state policy" it considered. App. 62. However, as appears from the opinion, discussed *infra*, the court in fact deferred to other state policies as well, particularly the protection of incumbents.

districts, was deemed to be an "excess" or "unnecessary" cut. App. 63.

Senate Redistricting Plans

The South Carolina Senate consists of 46 seats (single-member districts) with senators elected to serve 4 year terms. At the Senate phase of the trial, the parties presented 5 plans for consideration and adoption by the court, the SRAC plan, the Senate plan, the Lieutenant Governor's plan, the Governor's plan, and the Republican Party's plan.

The following table compares the 1984 Senate plan, the 5 proposed plans, and the court ordered plan, showing for each the total deviation among districts, and the number of majority black districts (by total population and VAP).

Senate Plans	Deviation	Dists. with Maj. Bl. POP	Dists. with Maj. Bl. VAP
1984 (1)[1]	9.96%	10	7
1984 (2)[2]	63.15%	10	9
SRAC	2.74%	14	12
Senate	3.92%	11	9
Lt. Gov.	3.85%	12	9
Gov.	.0106%	13	12
Repub.	.0145%	14	13
Court	1.95%	11	10

[1] Based upon 1980 Census.

[2] Based upon 1990 Census.

The court rejected the Senate plans proposed by the Governor and the Republican Party despite the fact that they had lower deviations because they contained more

excess county line cuts than did the court's plan.[15] According to the court, its plan was superior because "[c]learly we serve the state's policy better than the other two plans." App. 63. The SRAC plan, which had a deviation of 2.74% and was described by the court as "pushing the outer limits of the *de minimis* standard," had 101 excess cuts.[16] App. 61 n.58.

The court indicated that it must take into account "protecting constituent-representative relations," *i.e.* incumbency, in order to "act circumspectly and without taint of arbitrariness." App. 64-65. Thus, it rejected Senate plans proposed by SRAC and other parties because they pitted more incumbents against one another than did the court's plan.[17] According to the court, "there is nothing in either the Governor's plan or the Republican Party's plan to suggest even a casual observance of South Carolina's traditional and legitimate policies." App. 65.

The court held that its Senate plan was not retrogressive under Section 5 because it "contains 10 districts with voting age populations greater than 50 percent as compared to the 1984 plan which had 7 such districts and has

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[15] The Governor's plan had 52 excess cuts, the Republican Party's plan had 56, and the court's plan 30. App. 63. As far as precinct lines are concerned, the court's plan split 49, the Governor's plan 122, the Republican Party's plan 144, and the SRAC plan 63.

[16] The court also held, giving as an example the Republican Party's proposed District 10, that the court's Senate plan served the policies of compactness, contiguity and preserving established communities of interest as well as, or better than, the other plans. App. 63. But such findings, based upon isolated examples of particular districts or features, can be made of any of the proposed plans, including the court's.

[17] The courts plan pitted no incumbents against one another, the Governor's plan 10, the Republican Party's plan 12, and the SRAC plan 14.

9 districts using the 1990 census figures." App. 67. The court also held that its plan "enhances the other majority black districts where demography and practicability allow." *Id.* The court, as noted *supra*, in determining retrogression refused to compare its plans with plans submitted by SRAC and the other parties which showed that additional reasonably compact and contiguous majority black districts could have been created.[18]

The SRAC plan contained 12 districts with a black VAP majority, the Governor's plan 12, and the Republican Party's plan 13. Compared to the court ordered plan, the SRAC plan showed that three additional reasonably compact and contiguous majority black districts could have been created in the Abbeville, Aiken, Anderson, Edgefield, Greenwood, McCormick and Saluda Counties area, the Cherokee, Chester, Newberry, Spartanburg, Union and York Counties area, and the Georgetown, Horry, Marion and Williamsburg Counties area. The evidence showed that voting was racially polarized in these areas, and that black voters would not have an equal opportunity to elect candidates of their choice under the court ordered plan because of the fragmentation of concentrations of black population.

House Redistricting Plans

The South Carolina House consists of 124 seats (single-member districts) with representatives elected to serve 2 year terms. At the House phase of the trial, the parties presented 5 plans for consideration and adoption by the court, the SRAC plan, the House plan, the Sheheen

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[18] The court considered other plans in discussing the possibility of further increasing the percent of black population in specific districts, see, *e.g.*, App. 68 n.67, but it never compared its plan to the plans submitted by the parties in assessing overall retrogression.

plan, the Governor's plan, and the Republican Party's plan. The following table compares the 1981 House plan, the 5 proposed plans, and the court ordered plan, showing for each the total deviation among districts, and the number of majority black districts (by total population and VAP).

House Plans	Deviation	Dists. with Maj. Bl. POP	Dists. with Maj. Bl. VAP
1981 (1)[1]	9.879	26	20
1981 (2)[2]	113.9	24	21
SRAC	1.95	32	32
House	9.99	28	20
Sheheen	1.998	29	21
Gov.	.98	35	33
Repub.	.18	36	33
Court	1.98	28	23

[1] Based upon 1980 Census.

[2] Based upon 1990 Census.

Three of the plans presented by the parties contained deviations lower than the 1.98% deviation in the court ordered plan, the SRAC plan (1.952%), the Republican Party's plan (0.18%), and the Governor's plan (0.98%). In addition, each of the 3 plans created a larger number of districts with black VAP majorities than the 23 black VAP districts in the court ordered plan, the SRAC plan (32), the Republican Party's plan (33), and the Governor's plan (33). The court rejected these plans because they: (1) did not accommodate "the state policy of recognizing county lines;"[19] (2) had the effect of "the elimination of house

[19] As in Senate redistricting, the court stressed that it gave "due deference to established state policies, particularly the state constitutional policy of preserving the integrity of county

(Continued on following page)

incumbents;"[20] and (3) were "a particular political or racial agenda" which the court was not free to impose upon the state.[21] App. 73-75.

The evidence also showed that voting was racially polarized in the areas of the state in which additional majority black districts could have been drawn, and that blacks in those areas would not have the equal opportunity to elect candidates of their choice under the court ordered plan because of the fragmentation of black population.

The court held that its plan was not retrogressive for the reason that "[t]wenty-three of the districts in the court's plan contain a black voting-age population majority as opposed to the 1981 plan at present (21) or when drawn (20)." App. 72. Although the court acknowledged

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boundaries." App. 71. The court's plan, however, contains 20 "excess" cuts in county boundaries; the SRAC plan contains 48, the Governor's plan 38, and the Republican Party's plan 40.

[20] According to the court, "SRAC appears to seek to eliminate incumbents because of their race." App. 74. SRAC, however, did not learn of the exact residences of incumbents until after it had prepared its plan. The Governor and the Republican Party were described as seeking to eliminate Democrats. Under the Republican Party's plan, 6 sets of Democrats, one set of Republicans, and 2 sets of mixed political pairs were pitted against each other. Under the Governor's plan, 8 sets of Democrats, one set of Republicans, and 2 sets of mixed political pairs were pitted against each other. In the SRAC plan, 8 pairs of Democrats, 5 pairs of Republicans, and 7 mixed political pairs were pitted against each other.

[21] The court said that the Governor's plan and the Republican Party's plan were drawn "without regard to any factor except skin color and possibly political affiliation." App. 76. The SRAC plan "does not attempt, to the degree of the other plans, to create proportional representation. Nonetheless, the plan suffers some of the same infirmities as the other plans." App. 78.

that the SRAC plan was not itself retrogressive, it did not compare its plan with the SRAC plan, or any other plan submitted by the parties, for purposes of assessing overall retrogression.

Congressional Plans

Despite the opposition of the Senate, the Lt. Governor, the House and the Speaker to creating additional majority black Senate and House districts, at the congressional phase of trial all of the state policymakers agreed that a majority black congressional district could and should be drawn. Although the court did not decide if under the circumstances it was *"required"* to create a majority black district, it in fact did so. App. 82. The district contains a black VAP of 57.9%.

Although the court adhered to state policy of respecting county boundaries and refused to make "excess" cuts to create majority black districts in Senate and House redistricting, in congressional redistricting it made more excess cuts than did other plans submitted by the parties, and acknowledged that a majority of the cuts (8 out of 13) "were made to enhance black population within the districts."[22] App. 84 n.78.

The Questions Are Substantial

I. The Application of Section 2 to Court Ordered Redistricting Is a Substantial Question

The extent to which a court should apply the racial fairness standards of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §1973, to court ordered redistricting is a substantial question which should be resolved by the Court.

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[22] The Tallon plan split 7 counties, the House plan 11, the Lt. Governor's 14, the Governor's 15, the Senate's 25 and the SRAC plan 30.

The issue is one of exceptional national importance since it has the potential for affecting every jurisdiction required to redistrict. In addition, the issue presents itself with particular intensity at this time in the wake of the 1990 Census.

Stated succinctly, the three judge court was of the erroneous view that this was a case "under §5." App. 39. It did not undertake a meaningful analysis of minority vote dilution under Section 2 and *Thornburg v. Gingles*, 478 U.S. 30 (1986). Instead, it applied the Section 5 retrogression standard of *Beer v. United States*, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976), and compared its plans, not with plans showing undiluted minority voting strength proposed by SRAC, but with the pre-existing malapportioned plans.[23] Since the court's plans contained more majority black districts than the pre-existing plans, there was no retrogression. The main basis for the court's choice of plans was how well they maintained county lines and protected incumbents.

A. Measuring Minority Vote Dilution under Section 2

Section 2 prohibits the use of any voting procedure that "results" in a denial or abridgement of the right to vote on the basis of race. A violation of the statute may be

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[23] Even assuming a retrogression standard were applicable, the three judge court failed to apply the ruling in Wilkes County, Georgia v. United States, 450 F.Supp. 1171, 1178 (D.D.C. 1978), *aff'd mem.*, 439 U.S. 99 (1981), that where a preexisting plan is malapportioned, "it is appropriate, in measuring the effect of the voting changes, to compare the voting changes with options for properly apportioned single-member district plans." Since the preexisting plans in this case were malapportioned, retrogression should have been measured based upon the properly apportioned single member district plans proposed by SRAC.

shown by evidence that members of a protected minority "have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice." 42 U.S.C. §1973(b). In *Thornburg v. Gingles, supra,* 478 U.S. at 50-1, the Court held that the most important considerations in determining a Section 2 violation are: (1) whether the minority group is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in one or more single member districts; (2) whether the minority is politically cohesive, *i.e.* tends to vote as a bloc; and, (3) whether the majority also votes as a bloc "usually to defeat the minority's preferred candidate."[24]

While minorities have no right to proportional representation as measured by persons elected,[25] if, as *Gingles*

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[24] Although *Gingles* involved at-large voting in multi-member legislative districts, the opinion indicates that "[i]n a different kind of case . . . plaintiffs might allege that the minority group that is sufficiently large and compact to constitute a single-member district has been split between two or more multi-member or single-member districts, with the effect of diluting the potential strength of the minority vote." 478 U.S. at 50 n.16. Such is the nature of SRAC's allegations in this case.

[25] The statute provides that "nothing in this section establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population." 42 U.S.C. §1973(b). According to the Senate Report, the purpose of the disclaimer was to make clear that at-large elections were not unlawful *per se,* that minorities could not establish a violation merely by showing that they had not been elected in proportion to their numbers in the population, and that minorities were not entitled to quotas for office holding. S.Rep. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 23-4, 27, 31 (1982). The Court confirmed this interpretation of the disclaimer in Thornburg v. Gingles, supra, 478 U.S. at 46.

indicates, a redistricting plan limits the number of majority black districts, and reasonably compact and contiguous majority black districts could have been drawn, and if voting is racially polarized to the extent that black voters are denied the equal opportunity to elect candidates of their choice, then the redistricting plan fails to comply with Section 2. *See* part II-B of the Court's opinion, 478 U.S. at 46-51 (this part of Justice Brennan's opinion was joined by Justices White, Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens).

Justice O'Connor in a concurring opinion (joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell and Rehnquist) underscored this point in her discussion of the standard against which vote dilution under Section 2 is to be measured. According to Justice O'Connor:

> Third, the court could attempt to arrive at a plan that would maximize feasible minority electoral success, and use this degree of predicted success as its measure of 'undiluted' minority voting strength . . . .
>
> The Court today has adopted a variant of the third approach, to wit, undiluted minority voting strength means the maximum feasible minority voting strength.

478 U.S. at 89. The concurring opinion continues:

> If, under a particular multimember or single-member district plan, qualified minority groups usually cannot elect the representatives they would be likely to elect under the most favorable single-member districting plan, then §2 is violated.

478 U.S. at 91.

Here, the three judge court refused to compare its plans with the more favorable plans proposed by SRAC. It thus failed to apply the standard for measuring the dilution of minority voting strength required by Section 2.

B. Congressional Approval of Majority Black Districts

Congress has expressly validated the use of majority black districts in redistricting to remedy minority vote dilution. According to the Senate Report:

> The court should exercise its traditional equitable powers to fashion the relief so that it completely remedies the prior dilution of minority voting strength and fully provides equal opportunity for minority citizens to participate and to elect candidates of their choice.

S. Rep. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1982). Voting cases cited in the report as exemplifying this "complete remedy and full opportunity" standard were *Kirksey v. Board of Supervisors*, 554 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1977), and *In re Illinois Congressional Districts Reapportionment Cases*, No. 82-C 3915 (N.D. Ill. 1981), *aff'd sub nom. Ryan v. Otto*, 454 U.S. 1130 (1982).

Kirksey held that minorities were entitled to remedial plans that provided them a realistic opportunity to elect candidates of their choice, and that a district court "could not approve a plan which tended to carry forward into the future the long-lived denial of black access to the political process." *Kirksey*, 554 F.2d at 152. The court also rejected the argument that majority black districts would constitute an unlawful racial gerrymander. In reaching this conclusion the court relied on *United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburg, Inc. v. Carey*, 430 U.S. 144, 165 (1977), in which this Court held that a state may properly take race into account in reapportionment to create majority nonwhite districts as long as it does not stigmatize or fence out a racial minority or dilute its voting strength.

In re Illinois Congressional Districts Reapportionment Cases, supra, similarly approved the use of majority minority voting districts for congressional reapportionment in Illinois. *Also see, Gingles v. Edmisten*, 590 F.Supp.

345, 356-57 (E.D.N.C. 1984), *aff'd sub nom. Thornburg v. Gingles, supra,* citing both *Kirksey v. Board of Supervisor* and *In re Illinois Congressional Districts Reapportionment Cases,* and in which the district court concluded that Congress in amending Section 2 "necessarily took into account and rejected as unfounded, or assumed as outweighed, the risk that creating 'safe' black-majority single member districts would perpetuate . . . racial polarization in voting behavior."

C. The Court Erred in Refusing to Apply Section 2

The three judge court erroneously viewed this as a proceeding arising "under" Section 5 to which Section 2 was not fully applicable. Actions arising under Section 5 are of three kinds:

> First, of course, the State may institute a declaratory judgment action [for preclearance in the federal district court for the District of Columbia]. Second, an individual may bring a suit for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief [in the local federal district court], claiming that a state requirement is covered by §5, but has not been subjected to the required federal scrutiny. Third, the Attorney General may bring an injunctive action to prohibit the enforcement of a new regulation because of the State's failure to obtain approval under §5. All these suits may be viewed as being brought "under" §5.

Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 561 (1969). This action, by contrast, did not invoke the jurisdiction of the local district court under Section 5, nor did SRAC (or the *Burton* plaintiffs) claim that any state requirement covered by Section 5 had not been subjected to the required federal scrutiny. Instead, SRAC contended that the preexisting legislative plans were malapportioned, and violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and the

Constitutions of the United States and the State of South Carolina.

In an action under Section 5, the jurisdiction of the local three judge court is limited to questions of coverage, *i.e.*, whether the jurisdiction is covered by Section 5, whether the change is one affecting voting, and whether there has been preclearance. *United States v. Board of Supervisors of Warren County, Mississippi,* 429 U.S. 643, 645-46 (1977). The three judge court in this case did not limit itself to the sole issue of coverage, but its view of this action as arising under Section 5 caused it to refuse to conduct a meaningful analysis of vote dilution under Section 2. The court's error is fundamental and warrants review and correction by this Court.[26]

D. The Opinion Below Is Contrary to the Decisions of this Court and Lower Federal Courts

The three judge court erred in ignoring the prior decision of this Court that Section 2 vote dilution analysis is applicable to court ordered redistricting plans. In *Winter v. Brooks,* 461 U.S. 921 (1983), *vacating and remanding Jordan v. Winter,* 541 F.Supp. 1135 (N.D.Miss. 1982), this Court directed that a court ordered congressional redistricting plan for the State of Mississippi be returned to

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[26] SRAC also contended that even if this were an action under Section 5, Section 2 standards would be applicable by virtue of the 1982 amendments of the Voting Rights Act. According to the Senate Report, "[i]n light of the amendment to section 2, it is intended that a section 5 objection also follow if a new voting procedure so discriminates as to violate section 2." S.Rep. No. 417, supra, at 12 n.31. If SRAC is correct that Section 2 applies by its own force to court ordered plans, it would be unnecessary to reach the issue, which has not yet been decided by this Court or the lower federal courts, whether Section 2 standards were incorporated into Section 5 by virtue of the 1982 amendments.

the district court "for further consideration in light of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965," which had been amended in August two months after the district court's June 8, 1982 decision. The failure of the district court to follow a controlling decision of this Court is ground for reversal.

The decision of the three judge court also conflicts with decisions of other federal appellate and district courts. The court of appeals in *Edge v. Sumter County School District*, 775 F.2d 1509, 1510 (11th Cir. 1985), relying upon *Jordan v. Winter, supra*, held that it was error for the district court to fail to conduct a Section 2 hearing prior to implementing a court ordered redistricting plan for the board of education of Sumter County, Georgia. According to the court of appeals:

> We agree with both the appellants and the submission of the United States as *amicus curiae* that the district court could not validly adopt a reapportionment plan without determining whether the plan complied with Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §1973.

775 F.2d at 1510. *Accord, Hastert v. State Board of Elections*, 777 F.Supp. 634, 646 (N.D.Ill. 1991); *Dillard v. Crenshaw County*, 831 F.2d 246, 249 (11th Cir. 1987) (a court ordered plan to remedy a Section 2 violation "must itself conform with Section 2"); *United States v. Dallas County Commission*, 850 F.2d 1433, 1437-38 (11th Cir. 1988). This conflict among circuits warrants review.

Court ordered plans are in any event held to higher standards than legislatively adopted plans. *Chapman v. Meier*, 420 U.S. 1, 26 (1975). A court ordered plan must, among other things, be " 'free from any taint of arbitrariness or discrimination,' " *Connor v. Finch*, 431 U.S. 407, 415 (1977), *quoting Roman v. Sincock*, 377 U.S. 695, 710 (1964), and must meet "special standards . . . of racial fairness." *Upham v. Seamon*, 456 U.S. 37, 39 (1982). Under the circumstances, it would be anomalous and contrary to the decisions of this Court to hold that legislative plans

were subject to the full requirements of Section 2, but that court ordered plans were not.

E. The Court Improperly Refused to Consider the Extent and Level of Racial Bloc Voting

The three judge court refused to consider SRAC's extensive evidence of racial bloc voting because "we are not determining liability under §2 in this case." App. 56. Instead, the court found it "sufficient for our analysis of the plans" to rely upon "the parties stipulation that since 1984 there is evidence of racially polarized voting in South Carolina." *Id.* But without knowing the extent and level of racial bloc voting in the state, the three judge court could not reliably determine whether blacks "have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice." 42 U.S.C. §1973(b); *Thornburg v. Gingles, supra,* 478 U.S. at 55-6. Neither could the three judge court reliably determine the extent to which it was required to avoid the fragmentation of concentrations of minority population and construct majority black districts, nor the percent of minority population needed in a given district to provide the equal opportunity for minorities to elect candidates of their choice.

The court held that "a district may be considered a black opportunity district if the percentage of the black voting age population is greater than 50 percent." App. 48. SRAC's analysis, unlike the court's, was based upon the evidence of racial bloc voting and the actual electoral success of black candidates. It showed that an opportunity district was one in which blacks were at minimum 57% of the population. Under SRAC's analysis, only 8 of

the court's 11 Senate districts, and 19 of the court's 23 House districts are in fact minority opportunity districts.[27]

The refusal of the court to consider the level and extent of racial bloc voting was in violation of *Gingles* and Section 2.

F. Policy Considerations Asserted by the Three Judge Court Do not Support the Decision Below

The policy considerations advanced by the three judge court to justify its refusal to conduct a meaningful Section 2 vote dilution analysis are contrary to the law and are unpersuasive. According to the court, "in the broad spectrum of the 'results' test of §2, any testimony regarding the effect of the proposed plans is sheer speculation." App. 42. This standard effectively denies federal courts the authority to shape an effective remedy for any Section 2 violation.

A similar argument was made by opponents of amended Section 2 and was rejected by Congress. Senator Hatch, for example, argued that "[u]nder the results standard, there is no . . . workable threshold question for the court . . . . There is no core value under the results test." S.Rep. No. 417, *supra*, at 96 (Additional Views of Senator Orrin G. Hatch of Utah). The Senate as a whole rejected this view, noting that there was "an extensive, reliable and reassuring track record of court decisions using the very standard which the Committee bill would codify," *Id.*, at 32, while this Court validated use of the results standard in *Thornburg v. Gingles, supra*.

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[27] For a discussion of the percent of minority population needed to provide minorities a meaningful opportunity to elect a candidate of their choice, *see* Brace, Grofman, Handley & Niemi, "Minority Voting Equality: The 65 Percent Rule in Theory and Practice," 10 Law & Pol'y 43 (1988).

In addition, Congress mandated that Section 2 embodied a "functional," not a "speculative," view of the political process. *Id.*, at 48 n.15. Courts are not permitted simply to guess about the effect of voting practices, but are required to make an informed judgement of results based upon "a searching practical evaluation of the 'past and present reality,' " S.Rep. No. 417, *supra*, at 30, including "the totality of the circumstances," *Thornburg v. Gingles, supra*, 478 U.S. at 44 n. 8, and the factors identified in the legislative history as being probative of vote dilution. *Id.*, at 44-45. If the three judge court felt it had to speculate in this case, it was because it refused to conduct the kind of "searching practical evaluation of the 'past and present reality' " required by Congress and the decisions of this Court.

The court's claim that it would be too burdensome and time consuming to conduct a Section 2 analysis is similarly unpersuasive. While time constraints may well affect the nature and timing of remedies, judicial convenience cannot constitutionally justify the refusal to apply the full guarantees of the Voting Rights Act. A contrary conclusion would not only amount to repeal of the Act, but would undermine the rule of law.

The court's contention that "grafting the requirements of §2 into §5 . . . would impair the duality of remedies currently afforded aggrieved parties under principles of *res judicata* or separation of powers," App. 42, whatever its exact meaning, is inapplicable to the facts of this case. First, there is no Section 5 review of the court ordered plans in this case. Thus, "grafting" Section 2 into Section 5 would not impair the duality of remedies in any way. Second, since there is no Section 5 review, by refusing fully to apply Section 2 in the adoption of its plans or to hold a subsequent Section 2 hearing, the court has denied altogether, not merely "impaired," SRAC's remedies under the Voting Rights Act.

II. The Court Improperly Deferred to State Interests

The court below fragmented concentrations of minority population in areas of the state where voting was racially polarized and minorities lacked the equal opportunity to elect candidates of their choice, and where reasonably compact and contiguous majority black districts could have been drawn, because it chose to honor "South Carolina's traditional and legitimate policies" of protecting incumbents, or "protecting constituent-representative relations." App. 64-65. The court also deferred to "the state policy of recognizing county lines," and refused to impose "a particular . . . racial agenda" by drawing additional majority black districts. App. 73, 75.

A court is obligated in court ordered redistricting to defer to legitimate state interests, but only where those interests do not conflict with the requirements of federal law.

> Although a court must defer to legislative judgments on reapportionment as much as possible, it is forbidden to do so when the legislative plan would not meet the special standards of population equality and racial fairness that are applicable to court-ordered plans.

Upham v. Seamon, supra, 456 U.S. at 39. *Accord, White v. Weiser,* 412 U.S. 783, 795 (1973); *Connor v. Finch, supra,* 431 U.S. at 419. By deferring to state policies of protecting incumbents and recognizing county lines, and by refusing to draw additional majority black districts where it was possible to do so to avoid the fragmentation and dilution of minority voting strength, the Court deprived SRAC of the protection of the Voting Rights Act and the decisions of this Court. Review should be granted of the lower court's decision.

Conclusion

For these reasons this Court should note probable jurisdiction of this appeal.

Respectfully submitted,

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
COLUMBIA DIVISION

MICHAEL G. BURTON, as Executive Director and on behalf of the Republican Party, *et al.*, Plaintiffs,	C.A. No. 3:91-2983-1
KIMBERLY T. BURCH, Plaintiff-Intervenor,	
vs.	
ROBERT J. SHEHEEN, in his representative capacity as Speaker of the South Carolina House of representatives, *et al.*, Defendants,	
ROBIN TALLON, NEIL A. VANDER LINDEN, FORREST E. OTT, PHILIP T. JONES, ANN Y. HART, PEGGY A. DUFEK, GWENDOLYN L. GROOMS, THE SOUTH CAROLINA SENATE, THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF SOUTH CAROLINA, Defendant-Intervenors.	
KATHARINE I. BUTLER, Amicus Curiae.	

STATEWIDE REAPPORTIONMENT ADVISORY COMMITTEE, *et al.*, Plaintiffs, vs. CARROLL A. CAMPBELL, JR., *et al.*, Defendants. KATHARINE I. BUTLER, Amicus Curiae.	)	C.A. No. 3:91-3310-1
BUFORT BLANTON, NEIL A. VANDER LINDEN, FORREST E. OTT, ANN Y. HART, PEGGY A. DUFEK and VINCENT JOHNSON, Plaintiffs, vs. CARROLL A. CAMPBELL, JR., *et al.*, Defendants.	)	C.A. No. 3:91-3635-1

ORDER

(Filed May 1, 1992)

In these consolidated cases, the court is called upon to either adopt or create plans for the redistricting[1] of

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[1] In its technical sense "reapportionment" refers to the redistribution of seats in established units of government such as the United States House of Representatives. "Redistricting" signifies line-drawing to establish new districts within these

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South Carolina's Senate, House of Representatives, and Congressional districts. Following tabulation of the 1990 decennial census, it was apparent the existing Senate, House, and Congressional plans could not be continued.[2] Although the South Carolina General Assembly passed new Senate and House plans, those plans were vetoed by the Governor, the vetoes were sustained, and no compromise was reached. The General Assembly never passed a Congressional plan. These suits were filed in an effort to break the legislative impasse.

I

BACKGROUND

This court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(a)(4), and 2201; this suit being authorized under 42 U.S.C. § 1973j(f) through 42 U.S.C. § 1973c. The

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units. *Kilgarlin v. Martin*, 252 F.Supp. 404, 410 n.1 (S.D. Tex 1966) *rev'd in part and remanded sub nom. Kilgarlin v. Hill*, 386 U.S. 120 (1967). *See* Bickerstaff, *Reapportionment by State Legislatures: A Guide for the 1980's*, 34 Sw.L.J. 607, 608 (1980).

[2] At trial, all parties stipulated the existing plans were unconstitutionally apportioned because of gross population disparities among the districts in the respective plans. *See Reynolds v. Sims*, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); *See also, infra*, note 13 and pages 16-23. Because the existing districts violate constitutional norms, we need not reach the question of whether or not the existing districts also violate § 2 of the Voting Rights Act as amended in 1982. 42 U.S.C. § 1973.

three-judge panel was appointed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2284(a).[3]

The South Carolina General Assembly (General Assembly) consists of two bodies:[4] a Senate with forty-six (46) seats[5] and a House of Representatives with 124 seats.[6] Senators are elected to serve four-year terms,[7] while House members are elected to serve two-year

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[3] 28 U.S.C. § 2284(a) provides:

> A district court of three judges shall be convened when otherwise required by Act of Congress, or when an action is filed challenging the constitutionality of the apportionment of congressional districts or the apportionment of any statewide body.

On October 23, 1991, Chief United States Circuit Judge Sam J. Ervin, III, of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals issued an order appointing United States Circuit Judge Clyde H. Hamilton, of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, Chief United States District Judge Falcon B. Hawkins, of the District of South Carolina, and United States District Judge G. Ross Anderson, Jr., of the District of South Carolina to the panel.

[4] S.C. Const. Art. III, § 1.

[5] S.C. Const. Art. III, § 6; S.C. Const. Art. VIII, § 3; S.C. Code Ann. §§ 4-3-10 through 4-3-530 (1976). The forty-six counties in South Carolina are: Abbeville, Aiken, Allendale, Anderson, Bamberg, Barnwell, Beaufort, Berkeley, Calhoun, Charleston, Cherokee, Chester, Chesterfield, Clarendon, Colleton, Darlington, Dillon, Dorchester, Edgefield, Fairfield, Florence, Georgetown, Greenville, Greenwood, Hampton, Horry, Jasper, Kershaw, Lancaster, Laurens, Lee, Lexington, Marion, Marlboro, McCormick, Newberry, Oconee, Orangeburg, Pickens, Richland, Saluda, Spartanburg, Sumter, Union, Williamsburg, and York Counties.

[6] S.C. Const. Art. III, § 3.

[7] S.C. Const. Art. III, § 6.

terms.[8] According to the Office of the Clerk of the United States House of Representatives, South Carolina is entitled to six Congressional representatives.

It is primarily the responsibility of the General Assembly, subject to the approval of the Governor, to redistrict or reapportion the Senate, House, and Congressional districts. Redistricting is primarily a matter for legislative consideration and determination and judicial relief becomes appropriate only when a legislature fails to redistrict according to federal constitutional and statutory requisites in a timely fashion after having had an opportunity to do so. *White v. Weiser*, 412 U.S. 783, 794-95 (1973) (quoting *Reynolds v. Sims*, 377 U.S. 533, 586 (1964)); U.S. Const. Art. I, § 2; 2 U.S.C. § 2(c); S.C. Const. Art. III, § 3. We do not tread unreservedly into this "political thicket";[9] rather, we proceed in the knowledge that judicial intervention in the instant case is wholly unavoidable. In fact, judicial intervention in the South Carolina redistricting process has been frequently unavoidable. In 1984, the General Assembly ultimately fulfilled its constitutional obligation and passed a Senate redistricting plan only after a three-judge panel put an interim plan in place. *Graham v. South Carolina*, Civil Action No: 3:84-1430-15 (D.S.C. July 31, 1984).[10] South Carolina's

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[8] S.C. Const. Art. III, § 2.

[9] *Colegrove v. Green*, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946).

[10] *See O'Shields v. McNair*, 254 F.Supp. 708 (D.S.C. 1966)(three-judge court approved General Assembly plan for the Senate solely as an interim plan despite "grave doubts as to [its] validity under both state and federal constitutions" and approved the General Assembly's plan for the House of Representatives); *McCollum v. West*, Civil Action No. 71-1211 (D.S.C.

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Congressional districts were last drawn in March of 1982 by a three-judge panel. The General Assembly never passed its own plan; therefore, the court's plan became the state's plan. *S.C. State Conference of Branches of the N.A.A.C.P. v. Riley*, 533 F. Supp. 1178 (D.S.C. 1982). The House of Representatives was last redistricted in 1981 without judicial intervention.[11] This plan was precleared by the Department of Justice and has been used continuously since.[12]

The results of the 1990 census, issued in March 1991, showed South Carolina's population increased from 3,121,820 to 3,486,703 between 1980 and 1990. In addition to this increase, there were significant shifts in population, primarily from urban and rural areas to suburban and resort areas. Although there was, of course, no way the General Assembly could have foretold the actual results of the 1990 census, it can hardly be argued that the overarching result of the census – unconstitutional apportionment – was a surprise.[13] Both the Senate and the

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filed 12/7/71)(the Court struck down the General Assembly's plan for the reapportionment of the Senate).

[11] "In respect to the reapportionment of the House of Representatives, South Carolina's General Assembly is one of those which has faithfully complied with its constitutional obligations." *O'Shields*, 254 F.Supp. at 717.

[12] South Carolina is a covered jurisdiction under the Voting Rights Act. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c.

[13] Using the 1990 census figures, the present Senate plan has a total deviation of 63.15 percent, the present House plan a total deviation of 113.86 percent, and the present Congressional plan a total deviation of 8.33 percent.

House had sophisticated computer software and highly trained operators in place when the census figures were released. In addition, both branches were politically prepared, to the extent subcommittees were appointed, to study issues exclusively related to redistricting and ultimately to fashion plans on behalf of their respective bodies.

Despite this preparation, the General Assembly was unable to pass a redistricting bill before the 1990-91 Legislative Session adjourned.[14] The Senate had passed a redistricting plan for itself (S. 1003) as did the House (H. 3834), but neither body was able to consider the plan passed by the other before adjournment *sine die*. A concurrent resolution was introduced to extend the session, but it did not receive the two-thirds majority vote required by S.C. Code Ann. § 2-1-180 (1976). The Governor could have effectively extended the session by ordering a special session, S.C. Const. Art. IV, § 19, but he did not exercise this authority.

On October 4, 1991, Michael G. Burton, on behalf of the Republican Party and other registered voters of the state, filed suit (the "*Burton*" case)[15] against the Speaker of the House, the Lt. Governor, the Governor, and the Executive Director of the Election Commission[16] alleging

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[14] Under S.C. Code Ann. § 2-1-180, "[t]he regular session of the General Assembly shall adjourn *sine die* each year not later than 5:00 p.m. on the first Thursday in June."

[15] Civil Action No. 3:91-2983-1.

[16] Executive Director Ellisor was ultimately dismissed by agreement of the parties.

the present Senate, House, and Congressional plans were unconstitutional based on changes in population and that the plans violated 42 U.S.C. 1973c. The plaintiffs also alleged legislative impasse.

As a remedy for their claims, the plaintiffs requested that this court enjoin any future use of the existing plans and either approve the plans submitted by the plaintiffs or create new Senate, House, and Congressional plans which comport with federal constitutional and statutory requisites. In conjunction with the filing of their complaint, the plaintiffs requested a three-judge court be empaneled pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2284(a).

On October 23, 1991, Congressman Robin A. Tallon moved to intervene as a plaintiff and on October 28, 1991, Neil A. Vander Linden, Forrest E. Ott, Philip T. Jones, Ann Y. Hart, Peggy A. Dufek, and Gwendolyn L. Grooms (the "Vander Linden" defendants) moved to intervene as defendants. On October 31, 1991, the South Carolina Senate also moved to intervene as a defendant. These motions were granted by order on November 13, 1991 under the authority of Fed.R.Civ.P. 24 and *Newport News Shipbuilding and Drydock Co. v. Peninsula Shipbuilder's Ass'n*, 646 F.2d 117 (4th Cir. 1981).

On October 31, 1991, the Statewide Reapportionment Advisory Committee and others filed a suit (the "*SRAC*" case)[17] substantially similar to the *Burton* case and moved, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 42(a), to consolidate the two cases. Consolidation was ordered November 13, 1991. The subsequent requests to intervene in the *Burton/*

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[17] Civil Action No. 3:91-3310-1.

SRAC case by the Democratic Party of South Carolina and Kimberly Burch were also granted.[18]

On December 12, 1991, Bufort Blanton, Neil A. Vander Linden, Forrest E. Ott, Ann Y. Hart, Peggy A. Dufek, and Vincent Johnson filed suit (the *"Blanton"* case)[19] against the state government officers named in the *Burton/SRAC* case, as well as various members of the General Assembly, alleging the county legislative delegation system is constitutionally flawed.[20] The *Blanton* plaintiffs moved to consolidate their case with the *Burton/SRAC* case and consolidation was ordered January 14, 1992. It was agreed before the commencement of the instant trial that the *Blanton* case would be bifurcated from the *Burton/SRAC* case insomuch as any claims involving the constitutionality of the state's county legislative delegation system would necessarily depend upon how, if at all, the new Senate and House plans affected county lines. In addition, this court noted the causes of action raised in the Blanton case were not appropriate for consideration by a three-judge panel.[21]

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[18] Ultimately, Burch was dismissed by consent of the parties.

[19] Civil Action No. 2:91-3635-1.

[20] In South Carolina, certain positions and vacancies on state and county commissions and boards are filled by that county's legislative delegation, which is comprised of Senate and House members who represent any part of that county. *E.g.*, S.C. Code Ann. §§ 4-27-520, 43-3-10, 50-13-70, 51-13-22 (1976).

[21] Since the court has developed our own plans for both state legislative bodies, we order that the issue of the

(Continued on following page)

Motions to dismiss and to stay the proceedings were filed by various parties throughout the pre-trial stage on grounds the controversy was not ripe.[22] Essentially the moving parties argued the Senate and House were not at an impasse with one another nor collectively with the Governor and hope remained that plans acceptable to both the General Assembly and the Governor might yet be passed.

When the session reconvened,[23] under cloud of judicial intervention, both S. 1003 and H. 3834 were passed, separately, by the General Assembly. On January 29, 1992,

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(Continued from previous page)

constitutionality of the county delegation system in South Carolina be deconsolidated from this action and a separate trial before a single judge of the district court be conducted on that issue if the plaintiffs still intend to pursue their cause of action in light of the court's holding today. Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 42(b) and in view of the changed circumstances upon which the *Blanton* plaintiffs' claim is based, such an action is conducive to expedition and judicial economy. Further, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 54 and given the impending elections, this court makes an express determination that there is no just cause for delay and expressly orders an entry of judgment as to all other claims in these consolidated actions.

[22] "Ripeness is an amorphous legal concept subject to many 'subtle pressures including the appropriateness of the issues for decision by this Court and the actual hardship to the litigants of denying them the relief sought.' " *Carstens v. Lamm*, 543 F. Supp. 68, 76 (D.Colo. 1982) (quoting *Poe v. Ullman*, 367 U.S. 497, 508 (1961)).

[23] S.C. Const. Art. III, § 9 provides "[t]he first session of the General Assembly elected under this Constitution shall convene in Columbia on the second Tuesday in January, in the year Eighteen hundred and Ninety-seven, and thereafter annually at the same time and place."

Governor Campbell vetoed both bills. His veto messages urged the Senate and House to create more minority districts in their respective bodies and urged the Senate to enhance the minority districts which had been drawn in S. 1003. The veto message went on to express, ostensibly, the Governor's desire to meet with leaders of the Senate and the House to discuss proposed changes to the two bills.[24] The Governor's vetoes were sustained. As for the Congressional redistricting plans, both the Senate and the House passed separate bills and a conference committee was formed to study the differences with an eye towards compromise; however, no Congressional redistricting plan was ever passed by the General Assembly.

All motions to dismiss or stay were either withdrawn or resolved as moot at the February 10, 1992 pre-trial conference, and the cases were set for trial to commence February 18, 1992. On the morning of the 18th, confronted with the novel circumstance of hearing testimony and receiving evidence on the redistricting of three distinct legislative bodies, the court separated the trial into three phases: the Senate phase, the House phase, and the Congressional phase to be tried in turn. Confronted further with the unusual complexity and difficulty surrounding computer generated redistricting plans and faced with the prospects of drawing and generating its own plan, the court appointed Bobby M. Bowers, Director

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[24] Like the Senate and the House, Governor Campbell had access to sophisticated computer software and employed a trained operator; the results of which are the Governor's proposed plans for redistricting the Senate, House, and Congress discussed more fully *infra*.

of the Division of Research of Statistical Services of the State Budget and Control Board, as technical advisor to the court pursuant to the inherent discretion of the court and under the authority of *Reilly v. U.S.*, 863 F.2d 149 (1st Cir. 1988).[25]

Five plans were proposed during the Senate phase as well as the House phase. To be expedient, certain portions of testimony offered during the Senate phase were incorporated by reference into the record of the House and Congressional phases.

Trial concluded March 6, 1992. This court has considered the testimony and evidence received and concludes none of the plans proposed for the redistricting of South Carolina's Senate, House, and Congressional districts fully comports with the objectives and criteria which should be incorporated in a judicially approved plan. Consequently, the court has drawn its own plans which satisfy all relevant constitutional and statutory requisites. The plan for each body is set forth narratively, numerically, and demographically following a discussion of the law applicable to this case.

II

SECTION 5 of the VOTING RIGHTS ACT

Before discussing the individual plans proposed by the parties or the plans this court has chosen as an interim remedy, the court sets forth certain principles of

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[25] Mr. Bowers was not appointed as an expert under Fed.R.Evid. 706 or a special master under Fed.R.Civ.P. 53.

law which guide our evaluation of the proposed plans and the choice of remedy.

When enacted in 1965, Congress intended the Voting Rights Act to "banish the blight of racial discrimination in voting"[26] by increasing the ability of racial minorities, primarily Southern blacks, to participate in the electoral process. At first, the goal of enfranchising Southern blacks was achieved through increased voter registration among minorities. Since 1965, however, the focus of the Voting Rights Act has shifted from providing minorities with equal access to the voting booth to providing minorities with an equal opportunity to elect the candidates of their choice. This shift is evident in the cases which have interpreted the Voting Rights Act and in the legislative history of the 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act.[27] Since this proceeding arises under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act, we begin with a discussion of the law under that section.

A

Deference to State Policies

Redistricting of the South Carolina General Assembly and the South Carolina Congressional delegation is, first and foremost, a state legislative responsibility rather than a federal judicial task. *Wise v. Lipscomb*, 437 U.S. 535, 539

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[26] *South Carolina v. Katzenbach*, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966), *quoted in* S. Rep. No. 97-417, 97th Cong. 2d Sess. 118 (1982) (hereinafter "Senate Report").

[27] Senate Report at 119.

(1978). Nonetheless, as noted above, the court has concluded, based on the representations of the parties and the evidence of record, that the legislative process was and is irretrievably deadlocked with respect to redistricting and that no plans could be enacted and properly precleared through the United States Department of Justice in time to hold regularly scheduled elections. It is, therefore, necessary for this court to assume the "unwelcome obligation" of devising and approving redistricting plans for the General Assembly and the Congressional delegation pending some resolution of the legislative deadlock at a later time. *Connor v. Finch*, 431 U.S. 407, 415 (1977); *Wise*, 437 U.S. at 540.

Discharge of the duty thrust upon this court requires us to adhere more strictly than state legislatures to those constitutional and statutory standards governing the redistricting process. *Wise*, 437 U.S. at 540. A federal court must act "circumspectly, and in a manner 'free from any taint of arbitrariness or discrimination.' " *Finch*, 431 U.S. at 415 (quoting *Roman v. Sincock*, 377 U.S. 695, 710 (1964)).

In fashioning interim relief where state political actors have failed to produce redistricting plans, this court, in both legislative and congressional redistricting, "should follow the policies and preferences or the State, expressed in statutory and constitutional provisions or in reapportionment plans proposed by the state legislature, whenever adherence to state policy does not detract from the requirements of the Federal Constitution." *White v. Weiser*, 412 U.S. 783, 795 (1973); *see also Upham v. Seamon*, 456 U.S. 37 (1982)(per curiam). Decisions made by "the legislature in pursuit of what are deemed important state interests . . . should not be unnecessarily put aside in the

course of fashioning relief. . . . ", *Weiser*, 412 U.S. at 796. While "[t]he remedial powers of an equity court must be adequate to the task . . . they are not unlimited." *Whitcomb v. Chavis*, 403 U.S. 124, 161 (1971).

State policy may be found in a state's constitution or in the legislative enactments of the state. S.C. Const., Art. VII, § 13, which provides "[t]he General Assembly may at any time arrange the various counties into Judicial Circuits, and into Congressional Districts . . . as it may deem wise and proper . . . ," reflects a state policy of maintaining the integrity of county boundaries in the redistricting process. *See South Carolina State Conf. of Branches of the NAACP v. Riley*, 533 F.Supp. 1178 (D.S.C. 1982); *McLure v. McElroy*, 44 S.E.2d 101, 105 (S.C. 1947). A historical analysis of the redistricting efforts of the South Carolina Senate also evidences this policy.

In 1966, in the wake of the seminal Voting Rights Act case of *Reynolds v. Sims*, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), the General Assembly was first confronted with the task of redistricting itself on the basis of population. The result was passage of a compromise plan which "divide[d] the state, *along county lines*, into 27 election districts from which fifty senators [would] be chosen." *O'Shields v. McNair*, 254 F.Supp. 708, 710 (D.S.C. 1966)(emphasis added). Thus, the Assembly was willing to enlarge the Senate to fifty members, despite a clear state constitutional proscription against such an action,[28] to avoid cutting county lines.

The Senate was next redistricted in 1972. S.C. Code Ann. § 2-1-60 (1976). There, the General Assembly made

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[28] *See infra* note 52.

specific findings of fact and statements of policy included within its plan, the first of which reads:

> 1. It is the public policy of this State that counties, as constitutionally recognized political subdivisions of this State, shall be treated as basic units to construct election districts for the reapportionment of the Senate . . . and it is the public policy of the State that in reapportioning the Senate . . . county boundaries should not be disturbed. . . .

Thus, in the quarter century since *Reynolds* the General Assembly has consistently stated, through its plans and specific statements of policy, that among the various state policies, preserving county lines should enjoy a preeminent role in South Carolina's redistricting process. This preeminence is highly rational.[29]

As a final note, it was suggested at trial that the plans submitted by the respective legislative bodies were state policy and were entitled to deference. We need not decide this issue because none of the districting plans proffered to the court was enacted into law as state policy. *See* S.C. Const. Art. IV, § 21 (all laws require passage by General

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[29] "Political subdivisions should remain undivided whenever possible because the sense of community derived from established governmental units tends to foster effective governmental representation. Unnecessary fragmentation of these units not only 'undermines the ability of constituencies to organize effectively but also . . . increases the likelihood of voter confusion regarding other elections based on political subdivision geographics.' " *Carstens*, 543 F.Supp. at 88 (quoting American Bar Association on Election Law and Voter Participation, *Congressional Redistricting*, at 12 (1981))

Assembly and signature of the Governor); *See also Carstens*, 543 F.Supp. at 79. Unenacted legislative or gubernatorial plans may only be considered evidence of "proffered current policy." *Id.*

B

Equality of Population and Variances

1. Congressional Plan

Redistricting plans for congressional districts are subject to stringent equal population requirements. In *Karcher v. Daggett*, 462 U.S. 725, 730 (1983), the Supreme Court noted, "Article 1, § 2 [U.S. Const.] 'permits only limited population variances which are unavoidable despite a good-faith effort to achieve absolute equality, or for which justification is shown.' " *Karcher*, 462 U.S. at 730 (quoting *Kirkpatrick v. Priesler*, 394 U.S. 526, 531 (1969)). "[T]here are no *de minimis* population variations, which could be avoided, but which nonetheless meet the standard of Art. 1, § 2, without justification." *Karcher*, 462 U.S. at 734.

Karcher sets forth a two-pronged inquiry for assessing any variation in districts from a standard of equality: (1) Does a plan represent a good-faith effort to draw districts of equal population; and (2) Is any "significant" variance between districts necessary to achieve some legitimate state goal? *Id.* at 731; *Anne Arundel County Republican Central Committee v. State Advisory Board of Election Laws*, 781 F.Supp. 394, 396 (D.Md. 1991).

The first prong of the *Karcher* test is essentially a comparative exercise: What are the deviations from

equality existing in the proffered plans? *Cf. Karcher,* 462 U.S. at 739-40 (alternate plans with lower population deviation were presented to legislature); *Hastert v. State Board of Elections,* 777 F.Supp. 634, 644 (N.D.Ill. 1991) (two plans compared for deviation). As to the second prong of the test, important state goals justifying "significant" variations include, but are not necessarily limited to, "making districts compact, respecting municipal boundaries, preserving the cores of prior districts, and avoiding contests between incumbent Representatives." *Karcher,* 462 U.S. at 740.

2. General Assembly Plans

The rigorous standard of population equality demanded of congressional districts under U.S. Const. Art. 1, § 2, is not equally applicable to redistricting of state legislative districts. *Karcher,* 462 U.S. at 732-33. Such districts are governed by the one man, one vote principle inherent in the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. *Reynolds,* 377 U.S. 533 (1964).

After holding both houses of a state legislature must make an honest and good faith effort to apportion on the basis of nearly equal population, *Id.* at 577, the *Reynolds* Court explained its reasoning by adding "we realize that it is a practical impossibility to arrange legislative districts so that each one has an identical number of residents, or citizens or voters. Mathematical exactness or precision is hardly a workable constitutional requirement." *Id.* Thus, in redistricting state assemblies, "both houses of the state legislature must be apportioned so that districts are 'as nearly of equal population as is

practicable.'" *Chapman v. Meier*, 420 U.S. 1, 22 (1975) (quoting *Reynolds*, 377 U.S. at 577). "[S]ubstantial compliance" with the goal of equality, not absolute arithmetic equality, is required. *Chapman*, 420 U.S. at 22. Unlike redistricting of congressional districts, the Supreme Court has specifically acknowledged that *de minimus* variation in state legislative districts is permissible in court-devised redistricting plans for such assemblies. *Id.* at 2627; *Connor v. Finch*, 431 U.S. at 414. An explanation of and the development of this standard is set forth below.

Technology is such today that precise population equality is not only possible but commonplace in state redistricting plans. Thus, the focus has shifted from a question of what can practicably be done to a question of what is desirable within a redistricting process. Despite technological modernity, state legislatures remain free to apportion themselves outside the boundaries of mathematical precision, but only if the deviation is "minor" and "based on legitimate considerations incident to the effectuation of a rational state policy." *Chapman*, 420 U.S. at 23-24. (explaining *Mahan v. Howell*, 410 U.S. 315 (1973) and quoting *Reynolds*, 377 U.S. at 579)). As a general rule, a legislatively enacted apportionment plan with a maximum deviation under 10 percent falls within this category of minor deviations, *Brown v. Thompson*, 462 U.S. 835, 842 (1983), whereas a plan with larger disparities in population creates a *prima facie* case of discrimination and must therefore be justified by the state. *Id.* at 842-43.

The function of this court, however, is much different from that of a state legislature. It is axiomatic by now that redistricting is primarily a matter for legislative consideration and determination. *Wise v. Lipscomb*, 437 U.S. 535,

539 (1978). This is chiefly because a state legislature is better situated to identify and recommend traditional state policies within the constitutionally mandated framework of substantial population equality. *Connor v. Finch*, 431 U.S. at 414-15. In sharp contrast, this court possesses no distinctive mandate to compromise potentially conflicting state redistricting policies in the people's name. *Id.* at 415. Rather, we are admonished to "achieve the goal of population equality with little more than *de minimis* variation." *Chapman*, U.S. at 27. Given that compliance with the principles of one man, one vote is the preeminent concern of court-ordered plans, the very real possibility exists that certain state policies will be compromised in a court-ordered plan which could have been better served had judicial intervention not been necessary.

Although all concede this process is to be guided by the *de minimus* standard, this standard should be clearly elucidated. *Chapman*, the seminal case on court-ordered redistricting plans for state legislatures, holds merely this:

> . . . unless there are persuasive justifications, a court-ordered reapportionment plan of a state legislature must avoid use of multimember districts, and, as well, must ordinarily achieve the goal of population equality with little more than *de minimus* variation. [footnote omitted]. Where important and significant state considerations rationally mandate departure from these standards, it is the reapportioning court's responsibility to articulate precisely why a plan of single-member districts with minimal population variance cannot be adopted.

Id. at 26-27.

There is no definition or demarcation of the *de minimus* standard offered except to say district courts are not required to "attain the mathematical preciseness required for congressional redistricting." *Id.* at 27 n.19. While population equality may well have been the goal of the *Chapman* Court, it was not the requirement. Rather, the opinion clearly states "[w]ith a court-ordered plan, any deviation from approximate population equality must be supported by enunciation of historically significant state policy or unique features." *Id.* at 26. Thus, this quote equates approximate population equality directly with the *de minimus* standard. In sum, the *de minimus* standard is approximate population equality, not exact population equality *coupled with* justification.

Under this theory, there are but three types of court-ordered state redistricting plans: 1) those plans which meet the standard of *de minimis* deviation, 2) those plans which do not meet the *de minimus* standard but whose departure is justified by the court; and 3) those plans which neither meet the standard nor are justified. A non-exhaustive list of state policy factors which might justify greater than *de minimis* variations includes: maintenance of county or other political subdivision boundaries, *Conner v. Finch*, 431 U.S. at 419; compactness and contiguity of legislative districts; and recognition of historical and natural boundaries, *Meier*, 420 U.S. at 23. See also *Karcher*, 462 U.S. at 740 (listing factors justifying possible deviations from equality).

If a plan meets the *de minimus* standard, there need not be any discussion of state policy unless there are other plans which are constitutionally acceptable. Then, of course, a discussion of a state's policies and unique

features is relevant, and in fact necessary, to determine which of the constitutionally acceptable plans best serves those policies or unique features. Importantly, the standard by which the court chooses from among acceptable plans is not the same standard by which a court would have to justify departure from the *de minimus* standard in the first instance. *Cf. Connor v. Finch*, 431 U.S. at 420-421.[30]

If the court must, as some assert,[31] elucidate the reasons behind any departure from exact population equality and articulate clearly the relationship between the deviation and the state policy furthered, then there is no cognizable distinction between the *de minimus* standard and the standard for congressional redistricting. Assuredly, this was not the aim of the *Chapman* Court as

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[30] If, in selecting among constitutionally acceptable plans, the court orders one plan to the exclusion of "statistically less offensive plans," it must provide rationale for its decision. *Chapman*, 420 U.S. at 26. Conversely, if a court attempts to rehabilitate a plan which does not meet the *de minimus* requirement in the first instance, it must "articulate clearly the relationship between the variance and the state policy furthered." *Id.* 420 U.S. at 24.

[31] Despite footnote 19 in *Chapman*, one school of thought reads *Chapman* to mean the *de minimus* standard is exact population equality coupled in every instance of deviation with justification by reference to state policies or unique features. Julie Edwards, Comment, *The Right to Vote and Reapportionment in the Texas Legislature*, 41 Baylor L. Rev. 689 (1989). This theory issues from that portion of *Chapman* which reads: "[t]he burden is on the District Court to elucidate the reasons necessitating any departure from the goal of population equality, and to articulate clearly the relationship between the variance and the state policy furthered." *Id.* at 24.

footnote 19 clearly evidences. As support for this footnote, the Court cited a litany of cases, including *Kirkpatrick v. Preisler*, 394 U.S. 526 (1969), in which the Court refused an invitation to apply the *de minimus* standard to congressional redistricting. In discussing the proposed *de minimus* standard in *Kirkpatrick*, the Court offered an illuminating, if not dispositive, description of the *de minimus* standard:

> We reject Missouri's argument that there is a fixed numerical or percentage population variance small enough to be considered *de minimus* and to satisfy without question the 'as nearly as practicable' standard. The whole thrust of the 'nearly as practicable' approach is inconsistent with the adoption of fixed numerical standards which excuse population variances without regard to the circumstances of each particular case . . . There are other reasons for rejecting the *de minimus* approach. We can see no nonarbitrary way to pick a cutoff point at which population variances suddenly become *de minimus*.

Id. at 530-31.

Thus, it is clear the *Chapman* Court knew full well that the advantages, or disadvantages, of the *de minimus* standard included "a fixed numerical or percentage population variance small enough to be considered *de minimus . . . without question.*" *Kirkpatrick*, 394 U.S. at 530. (emphasis added). Not only did the *Chapman* Court not take pains to distinguish the characteristics proposed in *Kirkpatrick*, which dealt with *congressional* plans, it cited to *Kirkpatrick* immediately upon announcing the new rule for court-ordered plans for state legislatures. *Chapman*, 420 U.S. at 27 n.19. Thus, it is patently clear to this court

the *de minimus* standard, with regard to state legislative bodies, "excuse[s] population variances *without regard to the circumstances of each particular case,*" which is precisely what the Chapman opinion intended. *Kirkpatrick*, 394 U.S. at 530. (emphasis added).

In addition to representing a lucid reading of *Chapman* and *Kirkpatrick*, this conclusion protects the established trichotomy between state legislative plans enacted by state legislatures, state legislative plans ordered by courts, and congressional reapportionment plans. We conclude, without quantifying the *de minimus* standard,[32] that the standard lies somewhere between the 10 percent presumption of *Brown* and the mathematical preciseness required for congressional redistricting under *Wesberry v. Sanders*, 376 U.S. 1, (1964), and in the opinion of this court, it lies closer to *Wesberry* than *Brown*.[33]

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[32] "Neither courts nor legislatures are furnished any specialized calipers that enable them to extract from the general language of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment the mathematical formula that establishes what range of percentage deviations is permissible, and what is not." *Mahan v. Howell*, 410 U.S. 315, 329 (1973).

[33] The *Chapman* Court opined that court-ordered reapportionment of a state legislature need not attain the preciseness required for congressional redistricting, but the Court also "refused to assume that a 5.95% deviation would necessarily satisfy the high standards required of court-ordered plans." *Connor v. Finch*, 431 U.S. at 418 n. 17.

C

Dilution of Minority Voting Opportunities

The redistricting of the General Assembly and the Congressional delegation of the state reflects a change in voting procedures and practices which would require preclearance under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c, if the General Assembly and Governor had discharged their respective duties in such manner that redistricting plans were enacted. *Georgia v. United States*, 411 U.S. 526, 535 (1973). Because, as set forth below, the court does not adopt any plan proffered to the court by the parties *in toto*, but rather has fashioned its own remedial plans as to the General Assembly and congressional seats, such preclearance is not required for the court's plans to take effect. *McDaniel v. Sanchez*, 452 U.S. 130, 138 (1981) ("[T]he Act's preclearance requirement does not apply to plans prepared and adopted by a federal court to remedy a constitutional violation").

In fashioning relief, however, the court must be cognizant of § 5 concerns that voting changes have neither the "purpose . . . [nor] the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote" on the basis of race. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c. *See McDaniel*, 452 U.S. at 148-49. We take it as a given that this court, in fashioning its remedy, is not acting with a racially discriminatory purpose. *See Seamon v. Upham*, 536 F.Supp. 931, 944 (E.D.Tex), *vacated and remanded on other grounds sub. nom., Upham v. Seamon*, 456 U.S. 37 (1982) (per curiam).

In assessing a proposed plan for discriminatory effect under § 5, the Supreme Court has set forth a "retrogression" standard. *Beer v. United States*, 425 U.S. 130, 141

(1976); *City of Lockhart v. United States*, 460 U.S. 125 (1983). As set forth in the application of retrogression analysis is "straightforward." *Id.*, 425 U.S. at 142. In *Beer*, the Supreme Court compared "the position of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise" under the plan of apportionment as it existed immediately before the proposed change and the position of racial minorities after implementation of the change. *Id.* at 142. Thus, where under the old plan no district had a majority of minority population or voters; and under the new plan two districts had majority-minority populations, and one of those districts also contained a majority of minority voters, no retrogression occurred and the plan was valid under § 5. *Id.*; *See also City of Lockhart*, 460 U.S. at 135 (where minorities are in at least the same position with respect to electoral opportunities before and after a change, no retrogression occurs). Thus, retrogression refers to diminution in minority opportunity from what it had been under an earlier plan. *See* discussion, *infra*, regarding "majority/opportunity" districts, page 45. The Department of Justice regulations pertaining to retrogression utilize this same benchmark: "In determining whether a submitted change is retrogressive the Attorney General will normally compare the submitted change to the voting practice or procedure in effect at the time of the submission." 28 C.F.R. § 51.54 (1991).

The court notes two permissible bases and one false basis for assessing retrogression. Retrogression may be measured by simply comparing the gross number of districts with minority population and voting majorities in the old plan and the number of such districts drawn in the proposed plan. This was essentially the approach

taken in *Beer. See also Ketchum v. Byrne*, 740 F.2d 1398, 1402 n. 2 (7th Cir. 1984). There are two possible points at which to measure minority voting opportunities under an old plan: (1) at the time the old plan was originally drawn, or (2) at the time the new plan is proposed to replace the old plan. The point is illustrated by reference to the old General Assembly plans in this case. As originally drawn using 1980 census figures, the State Senate contained ten districts with total black population majorities; the State House of Representative contained 26 such districts.[34]

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[34] The following table sets forth total and voting age (BVAP) population percentages for the majority black districts in the old plans for the General Assembly using 1980 census figures and 1990 census figures:

Senate

	1980 Census		1990 Census		Current Pop.
Dist.	%Blk.	%BVAP	%Blk.	%BVAP	Deviation %
7 *	50.23	45.31	52.35	48.15	-17.80
19*	58.75	54.48	56.47	53.90	+07.28
21	50.83	48.04	54.30	50.86	-17.89
30*	59.30	55.51	58.34	54.61	-17.54
32	58.15	53.90	59.85	55.15	-16.06
36	63.24	59.15	62.51	58.61	-11.81
39*	59.18	55.25	60.39	56.51	-12.47
40	50.69	48.20	54.06	51.90	-12.66
42*	59.13	53.54	63.28	57.02	-24.37
45*	54.60	50.53	55.02	50.88	+00.96

House

23*	68.44	60.53	69.69	65.01	-22.43
31*	64.47	58.62	72.15	65.91	-18.86
41	55.71	57.07	55.92	51.91	-08.84
49*	54.73	52.18	49.92	47.30	+00.75
50	60.04	55.25	60.55	56.30	-13.38
57	48.01	44.98	51.87	47.19	-11.49

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When 1990 census figures are applied to the Senate districts, each retains a majority black population, though the total percentage of blacks decreased in three of the ten districts as a result of "natural retrogression." *See, supra,* note 34. In the State House, application of the 1990 figures shows that eight of the districts declined in percentage of black population, and two districts actually

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59	51.89	47.57	55.83	51.17	-12.09
62*	62.58	59.28	65.00	61.10	-17.71
64	55.64	51.67	54.34	50.28	-06.35
66*	71.93	68.88	72.71	69.69	-17.52
70*	60.26	57.71	63.07	60.35	-18.15
73*	73.64	68.68	82.01	78.44	-25.68
74*	67.85	62.29	76.83	71.79	-20.08
77*	64.02	59.00	61.87	58.77	-14.92
90	58.10	54.53	62.91	58.95	-18.55
93	53.40	51.23	51.56	48.73	-00.52
94*	65.00	61.06	64.50	59.76	-10.80
95	62.71	60.70	67.17	65.04	-17.58
101*	70.79	66.32	72.96	68.64	-11.82
102*	57.11	53.70	56.96	53.63	-05.46
103	51.92	48.13	52.62	48.10	-08.40
109*	55.90	48.55	67.30	65.16	-37.09
110	53.83	46.50	42.50	36.41	-20.79
111*	60.95	55.43	71.74	67.23	-18.53
116*	61.82	57.65	54.25	50.26	-05.07
120	50.12	46.49	52.09	47.44	-10.10
122*	51.25	48.10	54.26	51.82	-04.38

Those districts designated with a "*" are currently occupied by a black senator or representative.

At trial, the parties operated under the assumption that the State House of Representatives, as originally drawn, contained 27 districts with majority-minority populations. District 57 did not, in fact, contain such a majority. S.C. Code § 2-1-10; Summary Tape File (STF 1A, 1B), 1980 Decennial Census.

became majority white districts. *Id.* This "natural retrogression" reflects either black emigration from existing black majority districts in greater proportion than whites (House Dist. 110 Charleston County), or an influx of proportionally greater numbers of whites into a district (House Dist. 49, Rock Hill, York County). The Department of Justice regulations suggest that use of the most current census data as applied to the old plan serves as an appropriate benchmark from which to measure the effect of the new plan:

> In determining whether a submitted change is retrogressive the Attorney General will normally compare the submitted change to the voting practice or procedure in effect at the time of submission. . . . The Attorney General will make the comparison *based on the conditions existing at the time of the submission.*

28 C.F.R. § 51.54 (1990) (emphasis added); See also Ketchum. 740 F.2d at 1202.

A second possible and permissible means of evaluating retrogression could involve a district by district comparison of black population and voting age population in the old and new plans. This comparison, however, has great potential to mislead. Where a new plan does not substantially reincorporate the geographic territory of black majority districts from the old plan, the comparison diminishes in value. Where, as in South Carolina, black majority districts are generally geographically contiguous and have suffered dramatic declines in population through natural retrogression, see note 34, *supra*, it may be necessary to shift black population from one district to

another, or bring additional white population into a district to satisfy one man, one vote constitutional requirements. Such shifting of population can make district by district comparisons meaningless. Consequently, the court looked first to retrogression in the total number of districts in a given plan and only then to decreases in population within a given district, where meaningful comparisons, if any, could be made.

The erroneous basis for measuring retrogression, urged upon the court by certain parties to this suit, is to compare proffered plans one to another without reference to the existing plan. This proposed methodology is flawed in at least two respects. First, it has no basis in case law, the statutes, or § 5 regulations. See *Beer*, 425 U.S. at 142 (comparison of proposed plan to existing plan); *City of Lockhart*, 460 U.S. at 134-36 (same); *Ketchum*, 740 F.2d at 1402 (same); 28 C.F.R. § 51.54(b) (benchmark is the old plan).[35] Second, such methodology serves as a "racial

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[35] *Wilkes County, Ga. v. United States*, 450 F.Supp. 1168 (D.D.C. 1978) was cited as supporting the proposition of inter-plan comparison. In *Wilkes County*, the county's board of commissioners was originally composed of a mayor, elected at-large, and four commissioners elected from single-member districts. In 1972, the county attempted to convert to a completely at-large system with a residency requirement as to the four districts. At the time of the proposed change, the single-member districts were severely malapportioned. While the change was ostensibly made to satisfy one man, one vote concerns, the district court found that the change was purposely made to dilute increasing black voting strength. *Id.* at 1176.

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ratchet," which presumes that the plan offering the greatest number of black majority districts is, for that reason alone and regardless of all other considerations, the benchmark against which all other plans must be measured. Such an approach enshrines the notion that the Voting Rights Act insures proportional representation by race, a proposition that flies squarely in the face of case law and statute. *See Beer*, 425 U.S. at 141; 42 U.S.C. § 1973b.

III

SECTION 2 of the VOTING RIGHTS ACT

As previously noted, this proceeding arises under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act.[36] While the provisions of § 5 are

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In attempting to assess whether or not the new at-large system had the effect of diluting black voting strength, the court made two comparisons. First, the court concluded that if the malapportioned districts had been retained, blacks would have exercised more influence than under the new, at-large plan. *Id.* at 1178. Because the change also represented a change in election systems, not simply a redistricting of the same system, the court also thought it appropriate to compare black opportunity under the new plan with a hypothetical properly apportioned district and concluded that such comparison also indicated retrogression. *Id.* This second holding of *Wilkes County* is pure *obiter dicta* in that the finding of purposeful discrimination and unlawful effect under standard comparisons was sufficient to invalidate the proposed change. The hypothetical plan comparison utilized has no utility in a case, such as the present one, where there is no change in the electoral system.

[36] 42 U.S.C. § 1973c.

directed at specific jurisdictions, the provisions of § 2 are national in scope. Nevertheless, sections 2 and 5 of the Act are not necessarily mutually exclusive and the court has been guided by several aspects of § 2 in developing its remedy. A brief history of the evolution of § 2 is discussed herein and the relationship between sections 2 and 5 is discussed more fully below.

A

1982 Amendments

As amended and in pertinent part, § 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 protects the voting rights of members of protected classes and language minorities and reads as follows:

> (a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in section 4(f)(2), as provided in subsection (b).
>
> (b) A violation of subsection (a) is established if, based on the totality of the circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the state or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice. The extent

> to which members of a protected class have been elected to office in the State or political subdivision is one "circumstance" which may be considered, provided that nothing in this section establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population.

42 U.S.C. § 1973.

As originally passed, the language of § 2 was intended to parallel the language of the Fifteenth Amendment. *City of Mobile v. Bolden*, 446 U.S. 55, 60-61 (1980) (plurality opinion). Based on this parallel, a plurality of the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff was required to prove discriminatory intent to establish a violation of § 2. *Id.* at 62, 71. In response to the Supreme Court's ruling in *City of Mobile v. Bolden*, Congress amended § 2 in 1982 to include a "results," or "effects," test to determine if racial vote dilution has occurred. *See* Senate Report at 27; *Thornburg v. Gingles*, 478 U.S. 30, 35 (1986).

B

Thornburg v. Gingles

In 1986, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to review the amendments to § 2 in *Thornburg v. Gingles*, 478 U.S. 30 (1986). *Gingles* involved a § 2 challenge to the use of multi-member districts in North Carolina. The Court held that "[t]he essence of a § 2 claim is that a certain electoral law, practice, or structure interacts with social and historical conditions to cause an inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by black and white voters to elect their preferred representatives." *Id.* at 47.

In determining if a § 2 violation has occurred, "a court must assess the impact of the contested structure or practice on minority electoral opportunities 'on the basis of objective factors.' " *Id.* at 44 (quoting Senate Report at 27). The Court then reiterated the list of "typical" factors which may be relevant to, and probative of, a § 2 claim as set forth in the Senate Report. Now known as the "Senate factors," these factors are:

> 1. the extent of any history of official discrimination in the state or political subdivision that touches the right of the members of the minority group to register, to vote, or otherwise to participate in the democratic process;
>
> 2. the extent to which voting in the elections of the state or political subdivision is racially polarized;
>
> 3. the extent to which the state or political subdivision has used unusually large election districts, majority vote requirements, anti-single shot provisions, or other voting practices or procedures that may enhance the opportunity for discrimination against the minority group;
>
> 4. if there is a candidate slating process, whether the members of the minority group have been denied access to that process;
>
> 5. the extent to which members of the minority group in the state or political subdivision bear the effects of discrimination in such areas as education, employment and health, which hinder their ability to participate effectively in the political process;
>
> 6. whether political campaigns have been characterized by overt or subtle racial appeals;

> 7. the extent to which members of the minority group have been elected to public office in the jurisdiction.
>
> Additional factors that in some cases have added probative value as part of plaintiffs' evidence to establish a violation are:
>
> whether there is a significant lack of responsiveness on the part of elected officials to the particularized needs of the members of the minority group.
>
> whether the policy underlying the state or political subdivision's use of such voting qualification, prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice or procedure is tenuous.

Id. at 37, 45.

The Court noted, as did the Senate Report, that this list is not exhaustive, nor is it required that any number of factors be proved, and other factors may be relevant. *Id.* at 45. The Court did note, however, that "the most important Senate Report factors bearing on § 2 challenges to multi-member districts are the 'extent to which minority group members have been elected to public office in the jurisdiction' and the 'extent to which voting in the elections of the state or political subdivision is racially polarized.' " *Id.* at 49 n.15.

The Court, however, set forth important limitations on the extent to which these factors establish liability under § 2 by stating:

> [w]hile many or all of the factors listed in the Senate Report may be relevant to a claim of vote dilution through submergence in multimember districts, unless there is a conjunction of the

following circumstances, the use of multimember districts generally will not impede the ability of minority voters to elect representatives of their choice.

The Court then listed three circumstances which "are necessary preconditions for multi-member districts to operate to impair minority voters' ability to elect representatives of their choice." *Id.* at 49-50. These preconditions[37] are:

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[37] Although there is some debate over the extent to which the three prongs of *Gingles* must be viewed as threshold requirements for a § 2 remedy, *Solomon v. Liberty County, Florida*, 899 F.2d 1012, 1022 (11th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (Tjoflat, J. concurring); Karlan, *Maps and Misreadings: The Role of Geographic Compactness in Racial Vote Dilution Litigation*, 24 Harv. C.R.-C.L. Rev. 173 (Winter 1989) (hereinafter *Maps and Misreadings*), the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has clearly held that these three prongs are threshold requirements. *McGhee v. Granville, Co., North Carolina*, 860 F.2d 110, 117 (4th Cir. 1988). The *McGhee* court based its finding, in part, on the "open-ended nature" of a court's inquiry under the totality of the circumstances test, *Id.* at 116, and its concern that left "unbounded," the totality of the circumstances test could be applied to find dilution in any case where the black minority is not represented in proportion to their percentage of the voting age population, which is clearly contrary to the 1982 amendments to § 2. *Id.*

In addition, the *McGhee* court cited favorably to *McNeil v. Springfield Park District*, 851 F.2d 937 (7th Cir. 1988) which stated that "[t]he creation of preconditions – a choice of clear rules over muddy efforts to discern equity – shields the courts from meritless claims and ensures that clearly meritorious

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> 1) the minority group must be able to demonstrate that it is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single member district;
>
> 2) the minority group must be able to show that it is politically cohesive; and
>
> 3) the minority group must be able to demonstrate that the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it – in the absence of special circumstances, such as the minority candidate running unopposed – usually to defeat the minority's preferred candidate.

Id. at 50.

Thus, the *Gingles* decision provided a framework with which to analyze § 2 challenges. The practical application of these factors, however, has been the subject of considerable discussions[38] and it is not entirely clear to what extent *Gingles* applies to the single-member districts involved in this case. Lacking any further guidance, we have applied the decision in Gingles as set forth below.

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claims will survive summary judgment." The court in *McNeil* also noted that the Voting Rights Act, despite being a "crucially important piece of national legislation," remains "subject to the same considerations of administration as other similar statutes." *Id.* at 943.

[38] *See* Quinn, Sallet, and Simon, *Congressional Redistricting in the 1990s: The Impact of the 1982 Amendments to the Voting Rights Act*, 1 Geo. Mason U. Civ. Rights. L.J. 207 (Winter 1990) (hereinafter "Congressional Redistricting"); See Karlan, *Maps and Misreadings:*, 24 Harv. C.R.-C.L. Rev. 173.

Floating through the framework of Gingles and its progeny are several concepts, the definitions of which are important to the court's decision. Briefly, these definitions are 1) How does the court define a "majority?"; 2) What is the definition of "compactness?"; 3) What is the definition of "community of interest?"; and 4) What is the definition of "political cohesion?" Before defining these concepts, however, the court must first address the extent to which it has considered § 2 in its analysis.

C

Application of § 2 to this Proceeding

The application of § 2 to this case has its genesis in the admonition of the Supreme Court in *Connor v. Finch*, 431 U.S. 407, 425 (1977) that "it is imperative for the District Court, in drawing up a new plan, to make every effort not only to comply with the established constitutional standards, but also to allay suspicions and avoid the creation of concerns that might lead to new constitutional challenges." It would be incongruous for the court to adopt a plan which did not comport with the standards and guidelines of § 2. The issue, however, is not whether § 2 considerations are considered – they most certainly are; but rather, whether the court is obligated to completely graft the tests and requirements of § 2, including the searching evidentiary requirements, into a § 5 proceeding.

First, we will establish why a complete adoption of § 2 standards is unwarranted in this proceeding under § 5. Then, we will set forth the standard by which we have reviewed the various plans with respect to § 2

considerations. Finally, we will return to the definition of the four concepts mentioned above.

1. The Substantive Standards for § 2 Should not be Completely Imported into this § 5 Proceeding

Based on three factors, in conjunction with the particularized facts of this case, the court holds that it is not obligated to completely import the standards and requirements of § 2 into a proceeding under § 5. These factors are: 1) the fundamental differences between § 2 and § 5; 2) the particular time factor associated with this case, and 3) the lack of a clear legislative intent or judicial interpretation that the results test of § 2 should be completely imported into § 5.

a. Important differences between § 2 and § 5

Although sections 2 and 5 are similar in their goal of providing minorities with an equal opportunity to elect the representatives of their choice, several important differences exist between the sections. First, each section was designed to address different manifestations of the same problem – disenfranchisement of minorities. As noted earlier, the parameters of § 5 were developed in response to the exclusion of primarily Southern blacks from the voting booth through the use of poll taxes, literacy tests, and other overt forms of racial discrimination and the persistence of the covered districts in developing new methods of vote dilution as the former methods were judicially invalidated. *South Carolina v. Katzenbach*, 383 U.S. 301, 384-85 (1966). As a state with a

history of such discrimination, South Carolina is a covered district under § 5.[39] 42 U.S.C § 1973c.

Consequently, the original focus of § 5 was to provide minorities in those districts with a history of overt racial discrimination with special protections; which included the preclearance requirement for any *change* in voting procedure. *See Id.* An action under § 5 therefore, must be precleared by the Justice Department or the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c. Under § 5, the effect of the new plan is determined by its retrogressive effect on the ability of minorities to elect representatives of their choice. *City of Lockhart v. United States*, 460 U.S. 125 (1983); *Beer v. United States*, 425 U.S. 130 (1976); *See supra* pages 24 to 31.

Section 2, on the other hand, was national in scope and provided a private right of action to remedy the denial or abridgement of the right to vote. *See Solomon v. Liberty County, Florida*, 899 F.2d 1012, 1023-32 (11th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (Tjoflat, J. concurring). As a result, the provisions of § 2 had to address the more subtle forms of

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[39] In *Graham v. State of South Carolina*, No. 84-1430, at 24 (D.S.C. filed July 31, 1984), this court held that "the political processes leading to the nomination and election to public office are equally open to minority races and minority parties." The Lieutenant Governor interprets this remark to mean that the court need only inquire post-1984 for evidence of discrimination. While this may be true in the context of overt forms of discrimination, such as exclusion of blacks from the Democratic Primary as was discussed in *Graham*, in light of the factors enumerated in *Gingles*, we decline to give the language in *Graham* such broad meaning with regard to the *effects* of prior discrimination.

race discrimination. *See McGhee v. Granville County, North Carolina*, 860 F.2d 110, 116 (4th Cir. 1988). Thus, as the law has evolved under § 2, a broader, "results," test has developed. Senate Report at 23-31. It is important to remember, however, that § 2 involves a challenge to the effects or intent of a *specific* plan and the crucial aspect of the proceeding is the determination of liability. *Gingles*, 478 U.S. at 44 (quoting Senate Report at 27).

In turn, the different tests and the different means by which an action under either section proceeds give rise to additional considerations. First, there are the differences in the burden of proof. In a § 5 proceeding, the jurisdiction proposing the change in the voting structure bears the burden of proof whereas in a § 2 proceeding the plaintiff bears the burden of proof. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c *et seq.* Since a § 2 plaintiff is *attacking* an existing practice and a plan being challenged under § 5 must be *advocated*, the difference in the nature of the proceedings makes the necessity for this allocation obvious. Yet, in the context of this case, in which no less than five plans have been submitted for each political body, the burden of proof becomes more complex, especially if the whole of the results test is injected into the proceeding. The court, which is operating more in the nature of a forum, is thus reluctant to tamper with the burden of proof in the absence of sufficient legislative or judicial guidance.[40]

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[40] *See County Council v. United States*, 555 F. Supp. 694, 698 (D.D.C. 1983) ("Whether . . . the "results" standard of Section 2 can properly be imported in Section 5 presents a complex issue which can be decided only after a comprehensive assessment

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The differences between § 2 and § 5 also give rise to several concerns regarding the advisory nature of an opinion of a three-judge panel that the adopted plans completely conform to § 2 criteria. First, there is the obvious difficulty that in the broad spectrum of the "results" test of § 2, any testimony regarding the effect of the proposed plans is sheer speculation. In a § 5 proceeding, this difficulty is minimized by the focus on retrogression – a relatively finite concept. *See supra* pages 24 to 31.

Second, under existing law, if a plan has been precleared by the Justice Department, an individual is still entitled to bring a § 2 challenge against the plan.[41] Similarly, when a district court approves or adopts a legislatively approved plan in a § 2 proceeding that is not of its own making, the plan is still subject to § 5 review. *McDaniel v. Sanchez*, 452 U.S. 130, 150 (1981). Our concern, however, is that by completely grafting the requirements of § 2 into § 5, the court would impair the duality of remedies currently afforded aggrieved parties under principles of *res judicata* or separation of powers. We do not resolve this issue today; however, this issue is indicative of the potentially broad reaching effects of importing § 2 into § 5.

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of the statutory scheme and the legislative history") *cited in* Mark E. Haddad, Note, *Getting Results under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act*, 94 Yale L. Rev. 139, 149 n. 75 (1984) (hereinafter *"Getting Results"*).

[41] As discussed *infra*, the Justice Department has incorporated the results test into its analysis under § 5. Nevertheless, the court is unaware of any case which has challenged the validity of this action.

b. Time considerations

Time is also a crucial factor for the court. The fact finding requirements under § 2 are strenuous and appellate courts have required great specificity with regard to the facts determined by local district courts in a § 2 proceeding. *Westwego Citizens for Better Government v. City of Westwego*, 872 F.2d 1201, 1203 (5th Cir. 1989); *Watkins v. Mabus*, 771 F. Supp. 789, 799 (S.D. Miss. 1991) *aff'd in part, vacated in part* 112 S.Ct 412 (1991) (vacated on other grounds). Yet, courts have also recognized that with elections pending on the horizon, the exigency of the circumstances in voting rights cases mandate special consideration. *Upham v. Seamon*, 456 U.S. 37, 44 (1982); *Mabus*, 771 F. Supp. at 799.

As stated above, no less than five plans were submitted for each political body; and in the case of the Congressional districts, a total of nine plans were offered. The scant case law[42] which advocates a complete incorporation of § 2 into § 5 involves cases where at most two or three plans were under consideration for a single legislative body.[43] Aside from the burden of proof difficulties

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[42] *Edge v. Sumter County School District*, 775 F.2d 1509, 1510 (11th Cir. 1985); *Hastert v. State Bd. of Elections*, 777 F. Supp. 634 (N.D. Ill. 1991).

[43] The court notes that in our study of the cases under section 5 and section 2, we can find no case in which both bodies of the state legislature as well as the congressional districts for an entire state were redistricted in a single action.

The academic literature advocating the incorporation of the § 2 substantive standard in § 5 does not consider the situation presented in this case. *Getting Results* at 149 n. 75.

discussed above, the evidentiary burden presented by a § 2 challenge to each proposed plan in this case would have been staggering and would likely still be ongoing. The filing dates and primaries have already been postponed once; therefore, in an effort to avoid further delay and mindful of the time considerations which fully incorporating 2 into our proceeding would have produced, the court decided against conducting a full § 2 inquiry.

c. Insufficient legislative history

Given the foregoing discussion of the differences between § 2 and § 5, as well as the particular considerations presented by this case, the lack of legislative or judicial guidance persuades the court that this is not the case in which to create a blanket rule that § 2 guidelines should be infused into § 5. As noted above, the case law supporting such an interpretation of the Voting Rights Act is scant and is not analogous to this case. *See supra* notes 42-43. Admittedly, the Justice Department has incorporated the substantive standard of § 2 into their § 5 review procedures 28 C.F.R. § 51.55(b)(2). Nevertheless, not only is the Justice Department conducting a review of a specifically proposed plan, but the Justice Department is entitled to more latitude with respect to speculation over the effect of a proposed plan than a federal court.

Finally, in light of all of the foregoing, we are not persuaded that in amending the provisions of § 2 in 1982 that Congress had the intent of amending the standard to be applied in § 5 actions. The proponents of such an incorporation cite to footnote 31 of the Senate Report at 12 which states that "[i]n light of the amendment to § 2, it

is intended that a § 5 objection also follow if a new voting procedure itself so discriminates as to violate section 2." While this may be true, it does not necessarily speak to the standard the court is to apply to the § 5 objection. More to the point, in the vast consideration of both § 2 and § 5 during the amendments to § 2 in 1982, had Congress intended to change the well-known standard applied to § 5 in *Beer.* it would not relegate such an important decision to a single footnote.[44]

2. The Standard of Analysis

In shaping our application of § 2 to § 5, we are guided by the admonition in *Gingles* that a determination of "whether the political processes are 'equally open' depends upon a searching practical evaluation of the 'past and present reality.' " *Gingles,* 478 U.S. at 45 (citations omitted). In addition, since it would be anomalous for this court to adopt a plan which immediately lends itself to an attack under § 2, our analysis should ensure that the threshold requirements of a § 2 action cannot be established under the adopted plan. In this regard, we are guided by the decision in *Jeffers v. Clinton,* 730 F. Supp. 196, 205 (E.D.Ark. 1989), *aff'd,* 111 S.Ct. 662 (1991):

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[44] Brief for the *Amicus Curiae,* Katherine I. Butler, December 9, 1991 at 6. *But see Getting Results,* supra note 40. Although the author of this note makes a plausible argument for interpreting the legislative history of the Voting Rights Act to incorporate the substantive standard of section 2 into section 5, as mentioned previously, the argument overlooks the unique circumstances presented by this case.

> We agree that *Thornburg* and *Smith* cannot be automatically applied to the single-member context. Dilution may be much more obvious in a case like *Smith*, where a potential majority of black voters was submerged in a two-member district. But the basic principle is the same. If lines are drawn that limit the number of majority-black single-member districts, and reasonably compact and contiguous majority-black districts could have been drawn, and if racial cohesiveness in voting is so great that, as a practical matter, black voters' preferences for black candidates are frustrated by this system of apportionment, the outlines of a section 2 theory are made out.

Therefore, with the goal of providing minorities with an equal opportunity to elect the representatives of their choice in mind, we have analyzed the proposed plans as well as the plans we adopt today based on the following factors: 1) the extent to which the plans proposed and the plans adopted are consistent with the retrogression standard set forth in *Beer* and *City of Lockhart*; 2) the extent to which reasonable compact and contiguous majority black districts were and could be drawn; 3) the extent to which the minority group is politically cohesive; 4) the extent to which racially polarized voting patterns exist; 5) the extent to which the lines which have been drawn limit the number of majority-black single-member districts in light of the expressed state policies of the State of South Carolina. The Senate factors may be applied to the extent that they aid the court in its determination of these factors. This approach allows the court to formulate a plan which is consistent not only with the provisions of § 5, but

insures that the court's plan will not violate the threshold requirements for liability under § 2.

3. Defining the Parameters

Having set forth the extent to which the court has applied § 2 requirements to this case, we return to the four terms which we set forth at the outset as important concepts in our analysis.

a. The definition of majority

Webster's has two alternative definitions for majority. One definition is "the excess of such a greater number over the remainder of the total," while the other definition is "the group or party whose votes preponderates." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1363. The two definitions highlight the different interpretations of majority in the context of the Voting Rights Act. While one definition speaks purely in terms of number, the other definition speaks in terms of votes and, by inference, political power. As a result, courts have attempted to reconcile the pure numerical sense of majority with the concept of an equal opportunity to elect the representative of one's choice. Typically, the reconciliation of these two definitions has occurred in the decision of the court to use either voting age population or total population as the measure of opportunity within a given district. *See McDaniel v. Mehfoud*, 708 F. Supp. 754, 756 (E.D.Va. 1989). The distinction is obviously important because defining majority sets the benchmark by which effective political opportunity is measured.

In this case, the court has looked to the voting age population as the measure of the opportunity to elect the candidate of one's choice. In this regard, we are guided by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in *McGhee*, 860 F.2d 110, in which the court held that a 51.8 percent black voting age population was sufficient to establish a remedy for a § 2 violation. *Mehfoud*, 708 F. Supp. at 756. The *McGhee* court relied heavily throughout its opinion on the Seventh Circuit's opinion in *McNeil v. Springfield Park District*, 851 F.2d 937, 944-45 (7th Cir. 1988) (emphasis in original) in which Judge Cudahy wrote that "[i]n explaining its requirement, the *Gingles* Court consistently refers to 'minority voters,' for only *voters* can demonstrate the potential to elect candidates of their choice." Although the Ninth Circuit has held that total population may be an adequate measure, *Garza v. County of Los Angeles*, 918 F.2d 763, 774-76 (9th Cir. 1990), the implication in *McGhee* that voting age population is the correct measure, as well as the holding in *Mehfoud*, leads us to conclude that political opportunity is best measured in terms of minority voting age population. Thus, a district may be considered a black opportunity district if the percentage of the black voting age population is greater than 50 percent.

Another issue which falls within the concept of majority is the alleged "65 percent rule." The origins of the "65 percent rule" are somewhat unclear;[45]

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[45] The concept was first recognized in *United Jewish Organization v. [sic] of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey*, 430 U.S. 144, 164 (1977); yet, there is no indication that the Court intended to

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nevertheless, the principle for which the rule stands is that to create an effective majority-minority district, the court should ideally create a district with a 65 percent majority-minority population as a remedy for a § 2 violation. The 65 percent is achieved by adjusting the bare 50 percent majority of total population by 5 percent for young population, 5 percent for low voter registration and 5 percent for low voter turn-out among minorities. *Ketchum v. Byrnes*, 740 F.2d 1398, 1415 (7th Cir. 1984).

The "65 percent rule" has been increasingly rejected as a bright line remedy. *See e.g., Neal v. Coleburn*, 689 F. Supp. 1426, 1438 (E.D. Va. 1988).[46] As the court noted in *Coleburn*, "the 65% standard is a flexible and practical guideline to consider in fashioning relief for a § 2 violation." *Id.* First, as opposed to *Coleburn* in which total population figures were used as a baseline, *Id.* at 1437, our use of voting age population as the measure for effective opportunity obviates the need to consider a 65 percent figure as an absolute measure of effective political opportunity. *Ketchum*, 740 F.2d at 1413.

Second, beyond the use of voting age population, we have considered other factors, such as the presence of an incumbent in a district, in formulating our plans. With regard to the presence of an incumbent in a district, the

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give this guideline talismanic significance. Indeed, the Senate Report on the 1982 Amendments to the Voting Rights Act notes that the number 65 originated from a phone call to an unknown staffer at the Justice Department. Senate Report at 121 n. 40.

[46] *See also Congressional Redistricting* at 236-43.

undisputed testimony was that the lack of, or presence of, an incumbent in a district has an effect on voter turnout and this effect is more pronounced for black voters as opposed to white voters. For example, in a district in which there is a black incumbent running, the black voter turnout will be greater than if there is no incumbent running, which will, in turn be greater than if a white incumbent were running. Transcript of Dr. Loewen p. 44-47. This measure then obviously has some impact on the effectiveness of the black voting age population and we have taken this into account in our analysis of the plans.

The final issue with respect to defining majority is the importance of "influence districts." Simply put, influence districts are those districts in which the minority population is sizeable but insufficient to comprise a majority of the voting age population. *See Congressional Redistricting* at 223. In *Gingles,* the Court specifically declined to rule on whether courts were obligated to consider "a claim brought by a minority group, that is not sufficiently large and compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district, alleging that the use of multi-member districts impairs its ability *to influence* elections." 478 U.S. at 46 n.12 (emphasis in the original). This case does not present the opportunity to decide this issue. Therefore, we have not considered the extent to which influence districts have been or could have been created.[47]

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[47] The peculiarly political dilemma faced by courts regarding influence districts was illustrated at trial by the opposing

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b. The definitions of compactness and community of interest

Since the *Gingles* opinion was written, there has been considerable discussion on the definition of compactness

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views of Nelson Rivers, President of the South Carolina Chapter of the NAACP, and Robert Sheheen, Speaker of the House of Representatives.

Mr. Rivers eschewed the concept of an influence district in favor of maximizing the number of majority-minority, or "opportunity" districts which could be created. Mr. Rivers defined "opportunity district" as "having an equal opportunity to elect a candidate of choice of the black community," Rivers' Transcript at 26, which during his visits with the local chapters of the NAACP came down to the same question "am I in a district that has an opportunity to elect a black person or am I not?" *Id.* at 49. Regarding influence districts and how the SRAC plan was developed, Mr. Rivers stated:

> We didn't have much respect for influence districts. We thought that was a misnomer, really, a kind of phantom that does not yield real political influence or build political power in the state . . . . [A] good many people had become disabused of the notion that influence really meant much . . . It's much more important to have power, obviously, than influence, and so we tried to make sure that we did everything we could to enhance the opportunity to have power.

Rivers' Transcript at 26, 28 (February 20, 1992).

Alternatively, the potential danger of this approach was explained by Speaker Sheheen. In essence, Speaker Sheheen's point was that the creation of majority-minority districts will decrease the number of black voters in the surrounding districts. As a result, though black voters may be guaranteed that their interests will be represented in that one district, their

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and its role as a threshold requirement for liability under § 2. Karlan, *Maps and Misreadings*. In the context of this case, our decision has been guided by the holding of the court in *Dillard v. Baldwin County Bd. of Education*, 686 F. Supp. 1459 (M.D. Ala. 1988) in which the court held that:

> By compactness, *Thornburg* does not mean that a district must meet, or attempt to achieve, some aesthetic absolute, such as symmetry or attractiveness. An aesthetic norm, by itself, would be not only unrelated to the legal and social issues

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ability to influence the political acts of the legislators in the remaining districts is lessened. Political segregation occurs because the interests of black constituents are packed into several "guaranteed" seats which, though putatively occupied by minority members, do not form a majority of the legislative whole. As Judge Hill noted in *Solomon*, 899 F.2d at 1038:

> In a democracy, elected office holders tend to advance the interests of their electorate. They have no *political* motivation or pressure to represent other members of the population within their state, district, county or etc. The office holder's official fate is in the hands of those who vote and they can – and historically do – demand responsiveness.

Solomon, 899 F.2d at 1038; *See also Jeffers v. Clinton*, 756 F. Supp. 1195, 1207 (E.D.Ark. 1990) (Eisele, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original); *but see* Karlan, *Maps and Misreadings* at 213.

Thus, without the necessity of building coalitions within the legislative body and among the electorate of a given district, the concern arises that the creation of majority-minority districts as a means of political power serves only to galvanize the separatist barriers that the Voting Rights was designed to attack. Though we certainly do not decide this inherently political issue, we note with apprehension that the Voting Rights Act may be interpreted to promote political apartheid.

> presented under § 2, it would be an unworkable concept, resulting in arbitrary and capricious results, because it offers no guidance as to when it is met . . . The degree of geographical symmetry or attractiveness is therefore a desirable consideration for districting, but only to the extent it aids or facilitates the political process, and only as one among many considerations a court should include, the principal one being § 2's vote dilution prohibition, in determining whether there is sufficient compactness for a majority black district.
>
> The court therefore believes, especially in light of § 2's strong national mandate, that a district is sufficiently geographically compact if it allows for effective representation. For example, a district would not be sufficiently compact if it was so spread out that there was no sense of community, that is, if its members and its representative could not effectively and efficiently stay in touch with each other; or if it was so convoluted that there was no sense of community, that is, if its members and its representative could not easily tell who actually lived within the district. Also of importance, of course, is the compactness of the neighboring districts; obviously, if because of the configuration of a district, its neighboring districts so lacked compactness that they could not be effectively represented, the *Thornburg* standard of compactness would not be met.

Id. at 1465-66.

This functional view of compactness in light of effective representation is a sound approach to the problems of compactness, especially with the ability of modern

technology to create maps which, though they have maximized percentages by pinpointing specific voters, may resemble a series of ink blot tests. Further, this approach allows the court to consider the different communities of interest which may be involved. For example, considerations for a legislative body such as the South Carolina House of Representatives, which has 124 seats, will be different from the considerations for the Congressional districts which are only six in number. The critical aspect of the approach of the court in *Dillard* is that its flexibility is bounded by the degree to which the elected representative can effectively represent the district. The district created must be "manageable" from the standpoint of constituent services. *See id.*

Similarly, our definition of community of interest is also guided by the language in Dillard. At various points of the trial, it was suggested, if not directly stated, that the color of one's skin alone creates a sufficient community of interest. While we do not intend to minimize the important historic and cultural differences which exist between blacks and whites, the color of one's skin, in and of itself, does not create a community of interest.[48]

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[48] *See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Inc.*, 111 S.Ct. 2077, 2088 (1991). In recognizing that preemptory strikes based on race violate the equal protection clause, the Court in *Edmonson* remarked that "[i]f our society is to continue to progress as a multiracial democracy, it must recognize that the automatic invocation of race stereotypes retards the progress and causes continued hurt and injury. By the dispassionate analysis which is its special distinction, the law dispels fears and preconceptions respecting racial attitudes." Although the context is different, we find the analogy applicable to the assumption that the color of one's skin alone creates a community of interest.

Rather, a community's views on crime, employment, education, police brutality, urban sprawl, or urban blight may be just as indicative of a community of interest as whether the members of the community are predominantly black or white or the geometric boundaries of the geographical area. Thus, a community of interest may reflect all of these factors and will vary depending on the legislative body under consideration.

c. Political cohesion and racial bloc voting

As the Court recognized in *Gingles*, 478 U.S. at 52 n.18, political cohesion and racial bloc voting are essentially interchangeable concepts. It stated, "[t]he purpose of inquiring into the existence of racially polarized voting is twofold; to ascertain whether minority group members constitute a politically cohesive unit and to determine whether whites vote sufficiently as a bloc usually to defeat the minority's preferred candidate." *Id.* at 56. The Court held that " 'racial polarization' exists where there is a consistent relationship between [the] race of the voter and the way in which the voter votes." *Id.* at 53 n. 21.

The Court elaborated on this relationship by stating that "[t]he degree of racial bloc voting that is cognizable as an element of a § 2 dilution claim will vary according to a variety of factual circumstances." *Id.* at 58. Included in this list of factors are the presence of incumbents, lack of opposition, the nature of the allegedly dilutive electoral mechanism, the percentage of registered voters in the district who are members of the minority group as well as the size of the district. *Id.* at 57-58. Finally, the

Gingles Court held that the cause of the correlation in the voting patterns is immaterial. *Id.* at 62.

As a measure of racial polarization, the Court accepted the use of extreme case analysis and bivariate ecological regression to determine if blacks and whites differed in their voting patterns. *Id.* at 53. In this case, both Dr. Arrington and Dr. Loewen used the statistical methods set forth in *Gingles*. Dr. Loewen analyzed election results prior to 1984 and Dr. Arrington analyzed elections primarily from 1984 to the present. Despite the testimony of these witnesses that racially polarized voting exists, the extent to which voting is polarized in South Carolina remains an open question and will certainly vary from locality to locality. *See NAACP v. South Carolina Democratic Party et al.*, No. 88-2492 (D.S.C. filed February 22, 1989), *aff'd*, No. 89-1717, (4th Cir. filed March 1, 1990).[49] For example, the testimony regarding the strength of polarization exhibited in some races, such as the 1990 governor's race, was minimized by factors such as incumbency. Nevertheless, since we are not determining liability under § 2 in this case, the parties' stipulation that since 1984 there is evidence of racially polarized voting in South Carolina is sufficient for our analysis of the plans.

In conclusion, by establishing the framework set forth above, we have attempted to avoid the pitfall noted

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[49] Plaintiffs' and the Governor's experts repeatedly asserted, with respect to certain areas of the state, that voter polarization had increased since 1982, when § 2 was amended. We note with concern that if this is the case, § 2 appears to not be working in the manner intended.

by Judge Tjoflat in *Solomon* that "amended section 2 'means all things to all parties [and therefore] means nothing at all.' " *Solomon*, 899 F.2d at 1035 (citations omitted). The limitations set forth above represent a practical application of § 2 by providing meaning to the concept of "equal opportunity to elect the representatives of one's choice" in this § 5 proceeding. Having completed this analysis, we consider the individual plans.

IV

THE PLANS

As stated earlier, the court has adopted its own plan for each legislative body. The plans are discussed in the order that evidence was taken at trial. Therefore, the Senate is discussed first, followed by the House of Representatives plan and the Congressional plan. The relevant maps and geography reports are attached hereto as exhibits and are incorporated herein by reference. The Senate exhibits are Appendix A; the House exhibits are Appendix B; and the Congressional exhibits are Appendix C. The population summaries are the first exhibits associated with each set of plans, followed by geography reports, statewide maps, and local maps by county or municipality.

A

Senate Plan[50]

1. Background

In 1895 the people of South Carolina decided their Senate should be composed of "one member from each County,[51] to be elected for the term of four years by the qualified electors in each County, in the same manner in which members of the House of Representatives are elected." S.C. Const. Art. III, § 6. This section was cogently drafted to accomplish two distinct objectives: 1) to set the numerical composition of the Senate as equivalent to the number of counties[52] and 2) to apportion the members on the basis of one senator from each county. *State v. West*, 249 S.C. 243, 246, 153 S.E.2d 892, 893 (1967). The second of these objectives has been nullified for

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[50] The present Senate plan has a deviation of 63.15 percent, which all parties agree is unacceptable.

[51] In contrast to the explicit provision for 124 members of the House Representatives, no number appears in the Constitution with regard to the Senate, chiefly because the 1895 Constitution contemplated changes in the number of counties. S.C. Const. Art. III, § 3; S.C. Const. Art. III, § 6; S.C. Const. Art. VII, § 1; S.C. Const. Art. VII, § 2.

[52] S.C. Const. Article VIII, § 3, provides "[n]o more than forty-six counties shall exist at any time, but the General Assembly may provide for a lesser number." At the time the provision was drawn, South Carolina consisted of 36 counties. S.C. Const. Art. III, § 3.

conflict with federal law. See *Reynolds*, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).[53]

The numerical composition section of Article III, § 6, survived *Reynolds* but nearly did not survive the Senate itself. The composition was at issue in *O'Shields v. McNair*, 254 F.Supp. 708 (D.S.C. 1966),[54] which involved an attempt by the General Assembly, and more particularly the Senate, to reapportion, using either a Senate/House compromise plan which provided for 50 senators or the Senate's original plan which provided for 59 senators;[55] this despite there being 46 counties in the State in 1966. The three-judge court in *O'Shields* concluded the question of numerical composition was more properly resolved by the state courts, but only after opining in *obiter dicta*:

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[53] The Equal Protection Clause has been interpreted to require that the seats in both houses of a bicameral state legislature must be apportioned on a basis of population. *Reynolds*, 377 U.S at 568.

[54] The *O'Shields* court declared, after a hearing on December 3, 1965, that the present apportionment of the South Carolina Senate, although in strict compliance with the state constitution, could not be squared with federal constitutional requirements in the post *Reynolds* era. Rather than fashion its own plan, the court gave the General Assembly an opportunity to reapportion itself.

[55] The Senate passed a plan which provided itself with 59 seats and the House passed a plan which provided the Senate with 46 seats. A conference committee compromised on a plan which called for 50 seats with the Senate's original 59 seat plan tacked on as the first alternative. The compromise plan was passed February 3, 1966, and suit was filed February 14, 1966.

> [a]fter we held on December 3, 1965 that § 6 of Article III, in its application, was invalid under federal constitutional standards because of the great discrepancies in the populations of the counties, the question arises as to what is left of the provisions of § 6 of Article III. Because the federal constitution requires a reapportionment of South Carolina's Senate, is the General Assembly now free to disregard the heretofore unquestionable, if implicit, provision of the state constitution fixing the size of the Assembly? May the General Assembly now, on its own authority, enlarge the Senate from 46 to 50? To 59? To 75?

Id. at 711.

The South Carolina Supreme Court emphatically answered the questions posed above by holding "Article III, § 6, remains as an effective and valid part of the Constitution of this State for the purpose of determining the size of the Senate." *State v. West*, 249 S.C. at 247, 153 S.E.2d at 894. Thus, the constitutionally infirm section, which apportioned the Senate, was effectively severed from the section which prescribed the numerical composition. Since there are presently forty-six counties in South Carolina, S.C. Code Ann. §§ 4-3-10 through 4-3-530 (1976), there will be forty-six senatorial districts in the court's plan.

2. The Court's Plan

Given a total state population of 3,486,703, the "ideal"[56] senatorial district would have a population of

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[56] *See* Wollock, ed., *Reapportionment Law and Technology* 6 (1980).

75,798. The largest district in the court's plan,[57] District 21, has a population of 76,516 for a positive deviation of .95 percent (718 persons), and the smallest, District 16, has a population of 75,040 for a negative deviation of -1.00 percent (758 persons). We conclude a total deviation range of 1.95 percent (1476 persons), for the South Carolina Senate, is *de minimis* under the prevailing case law. *Chapman*, 420 U.S. 1 (1975); *Connor v. Finch*, 431 U.S. 407 (1977); *Cf. White v. Regester*, 412 U.S. 755 (1973) (9.9 percent total deviation in Texas state House districts); *Gaffney v. Cummings*, 412 U.S. 735 (1973) (7.83 percent total deviation in Connecticut state House districts); *Mahan v. Howell*, 410 U.S. 315 (1973) (16.4 percent total deviation in Virginia state House districts).

In addition, we conclude the plans proposed by the Governor (0.0106 percent) and the Republican Party (0.0145 percent) have *de minimis* deviations as well. We must, therefore, provide rationale, using either the federal factor of retrogression or significant and traditional state policies, to explain our rejection of these plans and preference for our own.[58] *Chapman*, 420 U.S. at 25-26.

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[57] *See* Appendix A-1.

[58] While the majority of our discussion will focus on the plans submitted by the Governor and the Republican Party, we note the same analysis can be applied to the plan proposed by the SRAC. That plan proposed a deviation 2.74 percent, which in the opinion of this Court, is pushing the outer limits of the *de minimis* standard. In addition, the same maladies that afflict the Governor's plan and Republican Party's plan, i.e. splitting county lines, splitting precinct lines, afflict the SRAC plan. As for S. 1003 and the Lt. Governor's plan, we conclude the

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As stated earlier, a non-exhaustive list of state policies, which have historically served to justify *de minimis* deviations and can also serve to distinguish among three constitutionally acceptable plans, includes protection of county or political subdivision lines, compactness, contiguity, recognition of historical boundaries, and protection of constituent representative relations. *Connor v. Finch*, 431 U.S. at 419; *Meier*, 420 U.S. at 23. *See also Karcher*, 462 U.S. at 740; *Swann v. Adams*, 385 U.S. 440 (1967); *Anne Arundel County Republican Central Committee v. State Advisory Board of Elections*, 781 F.Supp. 394 (D.Md. 1991).

The only cognizable state policy the court considered was the preservation of county lines as discussed supra pages 13 to 15. There are, for our purposes, two types of county line cuts: those which are necessary to meet population requirements and those which are not, which we define as "excess" cuts. An example of the former can be found in the court's plan for Pickens County. This County is entitled to 1.2 senate districts.[59] Thus, the County cannot remain whole. Approximately 18,000 people in Pickens County must be placed in a district laying in large part outside of the county. An example of an unnecessary cut can be found in the Republican Party's plan for Spartanburg County. Spartanburg has a population of 226,780 and is therefore ideally suited for three senate

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deviations proposed are outside the *de minimis* standard that the court must satisfy and the parties did not convincingly justify this departure at trial.

[59] Pickens County has a population of 93,894, which divided by the ideal senate district of 75,798 equals 1.2.

districts. All districts could be drawn intracounty thus avoiding altogether any county line cuts. By comparison, the Republican Party splits Spartanburg County into four senate districts, thereby creating a cut in the county line. For purposes of evaluating compliance with this state policy, we calculated the actual number of districts proposed in a certain county, then subtracted the minimum number of districts which could have been drawn had approximate population equality alone been considered. The excess, or remainder represents an unnecessary intrusion against a county line. This methodology was used consistently throughout all of the legislative plans considered by the court.

Turning to the specific plans, the Governor's plan has 52 excess county line cuts while the Republican Party's plan has 56. By stark contrast, our plan contains only 30 such cuts. Clearly we serve the state's policy better than the other two plans. As for compactness and contiguity we find our plan serves these policies as well as, if not better, than the Governor's plan or the Republican Party's plan and we find our plan protects the state's established communities of interest better than the Governor or the Republican Party.

For a particularly egregious example of the Governor's and the Republican Party's disregard for county lines and communities of interest, we look to their District 10. This proposed district stretches from Anderson County to Aiken County, nearly one hundred road miles away. Along the way, it cuts into seven counties to garner black voters, and consolidates three insular and historical

communities of interest; all to create, ostensibly, a majority black district. It seems inconsequential to the proposing parties that the urbanites of Anderson County would be grouped with the rural communities of Abbeville County or that the pulpwood farmers of McCormick County would share representation with the industrial workers of Aiken County. The only cognizable community of interest in this proposed district is the black race. And while there was testimony at trial that blackness alone constitutes a community of interest sufficient to justify a district as contorted as this one, we categorically reject this assertion as overtly racist.[60]

On a related matter, the court's plan splits only 49 precinct lines, while the Governor's plan splits 122 and the Republican Party's plan splits 144. We note that while primarily an issue which effects administrative convenience, splitting precincts also has the effect of confusing both voters and potential voters; thus, in some instances, serving to abridge the right to vote or to have their vote counted. *Cf. Reynolds,* 377 U.S. at 555.

Although protecting constituent-representative relations may be a legitimate concern for a legislative body

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[60] In *Carstens,* 543 F.Supp. at 91, the court defined a community of interest as "distinctive units which share common concerns with respect to *one or more* identifiable features such as geography, demography, ethnicity, culture, socio-economic status, or trade." (emphasis added). While this definition is helpful, we believe a community of interest is broader than race alone or economic status alone; rather it is an amalgamation of sometimes amorphous qualities best understood when considered on a backdrop of time. *See supra* note 48 and accompanying text.

fashioning a plan, *Burns v. Richardson*, 384 U.S. 73, 89 n. 16 (1966), this court must act circumspectly and without taint of arbitrariness. *Connor v. Finch*, 431 U.S. at 415. We were therefore concerned with the apparent partisan considerations in certain plans.[61] In sum, there is nothing in either the Governor's plan or the Republican Party's plan to suggest even a casual observance of South Carolina's traditional and legitimate policies.

In addition to the preeminent goal of "substantial population equality," the court must also take care that its plan has neither the purpose nor effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on the basis of race. *See McDaniel*, 452 U.S. at 14849. To assess this, the Supreme Court employs a "retrogression" test. *See supra* pages 24-31. As stated earlier, this court viewed retrogression with respect to the plans as a whole and only secondarily to the retrogressive effects on a district by district basis.

Between 1980 and 1990 black population in South Carolina increased in real numbers from 948,623 to 1,039,884 but decreased in the percentage it constitutes of the total population from 30.38 percent to 29.82 percent. More pertinent, the 10 majority black districts, provided under the 1984 plan, lost a cumulative population total of

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[61] For example, the Governor's plan pits ten incumbent Democratic senators against one another. We also note that at trial several parties chided the Senate for proposing an "incumbent protection plan." Since 1984, when the Senate last drew a plan for itself, only 14 out of 46 senators remain. It seems safe to conclude that the means by which incumbents have sought to protect themselves have been historically ineffective.

92,744.[62] Losing population is a phenomenon which affects districts other than those which are majority black[63] and we specifically find the demographic changes in South Carolina's majority black districts are wholly unrelated to the representation provided; rather the changes are indicative of a general movement away from urban and rural areas to suburban and resort areas.

That we understand why the natural changes occur does not make the task of avoiding a diminution in black voting strength any easier. Many of the majority black districts in South Carolina are contiguous and this makes enhancement problematic, unless one forgoes all other considerations.

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[62]

Dist.	Population Deviation From Mean (75,798) in real numbers.
7	-13,490
19	+ 5,519
21	-13,561
30	-13,297
32	-12,174
36	- 8,952
39	- 9,451
40	- 9,595
42	-18,471
45	+ 728
	-92,744

[63] For perspective, from 1987 to 1988, over 40 million Americans, or 17.6 percent of the total population, moved households. U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States, p. 19, Table 25 (111th ed. 1991). Over a third of those moved to a different county. *See Freeman v. Pitts*, ___ S.Ct. ___, 60 LW 4286, 4294 (Decided March 31, 1992).

The court's plan, despite the demographic changes, creates one additional majority black district, enhances several existing ones, and when considered as a whole clearly "d[oes] not increase the degree of discrimination against blacks"[64] in this State. Therefore, our plan is not retrogressive. *See Appendix A-1.*

The court's plan contains 10 districts with voting age populations greater than 50 percent as compared to the 1984 plan which had 7 such districts and has 9 districts using the 1990 census figures. Using total population, the court's plan creates 11 majority black districts, including a new District 17 which was heretofore not an equal opportunity district for black candidates.[65] As evidenced by the chart below, the court's plan enhances the other majority black districts where demography and practicability allow. We note again that a district by district enhancement is not constitutionally mandated.

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[64] *City of Lockhart v. United States,* 460 U.S. at 134.

[65] This new district has a total black population of 55.25 percent and a black voting age population of 51.62 percent. Since it was alleged by all parties that there is no incumbent running in the area of District 17, we conclude a 51.62 percent black voting age population clearly represents an opportunity for the black majority to elect the candidate of their choice.

	Court's Plan 1990 data		1984 Plan 1980 data		1984 Plan 1990 data		Changes in[66] 1992 Plan	
Dist.	% Black	% VAP	% Black	% VAP	% Black	% VAP	% Black	% VAP
7	51.90	47.74	50.23	45.31	52.35	48.15	-0.45	-0.41
17	55.25	51.62	—	—	—	—	—	—
19	68.51	64.73	58.75	54.48	56.47	53.90	9.76	10.26
21	54.37	50.01	50.83	48.04	54.30	50.86	0.07	-0.85
30	61.02	56.73	59.30	55.51	58.34	54.61	1.72	1.22
32	62.49	57.81	58.15	53.90	59.85	55.15	2.64	2.66
36	63.67	59.92	63.24	59.15	62.51	58.61	0.43	0.77
39	59.97	55.66	59.18	55.25	60.39	56.51	-0.42	-0.85
40	54.02	51.49	50.69	48.20	54.06	51.90	-0.04	-0.41
42	59.60	54.43	59.13	53.54	63.28	57.02	-3.68	-2.59
45	58.91	54.95	54.60	50.53	55.02	50.88	3.89	4.07

Of particular interest to the court was District 7, in Greenville County. District 7 elected a black, Senator Theo Mitchell, in 1984 with a total black population ("TOP") of 50.23 percent and a BVAP of 45.31 percent. Senator Mitchell has served continuously since 1984. District 7 decreased in population by 13,490 or 17.80 percent of the district from 1980 to 1990. In addition, this district is completely surrounded by majority white districts, making enhancement difficult.[67] Consequently both the

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[66] To calculate the percent increase in black total population (TOP) and voting age population (BVAP), we took whichever was higher between the 1980 figure and the 1990 figure.

[67] Only one plan submitted (Governor's plan) provided a higher TOP or BVAP for this district than our plan and not only was the enhancement minimal it was achieved only by splitting numerous precincts. This Court concludes the perils of splitting precincts, in this instance, outweighed the slight enhancement proposed.

TOP and BVAP percentages are lower in our plan than the 1984 plan using 1990 figures; nevertheless, the minority population of this District still has a fair chance to elect the candidate of their choice. In fact, Senator Mitchell himself supported S. 1003, which provided District 7 with TOP of 50.95 percent and a BVAP of 46.84 percent, clearly less than what the court has provided.

Drawing Districts 39 and 40 proved especially problematic for the court. As the court's map shows, District 40, which lost 9,595 people, is contiguous with District 39, which lost 9,451. Under the 1984 plan using 1990 figures, District 39 had a robust TOP of 60.39 percent and BVAP of 56.51 percent. Considering its loss of population, however, District 39 needed black population added in a proportion relatively equal to that under the 1984 plan using 1990 numbers to avoid a decrease in percentage numbers and to meet the *de minimis* standard. Unfortunately, District 40, which under the 1984 plan using 1990 numbers had a TOP of 54.06 percent and a BVAP of 51.90 percent and is represented by a white, obviously had little black population to provide. So, the court, given the significant limitations caused by natural retrogression coupled with the geographics of the region, equalized the unavoidable decreases in Districts 39 and 40 rather than sacrifice one to avoid any decrease at all in the other.[68] Therefore, the court's plan strikes the proper balance

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[68] All plans but the SRAC plan proposed decreases in BVAP percent in District 39 when compared with 1984 plan using 1990 numbers, while three of the five plans proposed in BVAP percent in District 40 using the same data. Again, the Governor and the Republican Party split numerous precincts to achieve their respective marginal enhancements.

between the various interests arising in this type of proceeding, including equality of population in districts, racial fairness, and maintenance of the South Carolina's political subdivisions and communities of interest.

B

House of Representatives

The South Carolina House of Representatives is composed of 124 single-member districts. S.C. Const., Art. III, § 3. Representatives serve two-year terms. S.C. Const., Art. III, § 2. The last redistricting of the House occurred incident to the 1980 census. Those districts were enacted into law in 1981 and precleared by the United States Justice Department. This districting scheme has never been successfully challenged under § 2 of the Voting Rights Act.

As stipulated by the parties, the current House districts are constitutionally deficient because of disparities in population among the districts. According to the 1990 census, the ideal House district should contain a total population of 28,118.57 persons. The total deviation from this norm under the 1981 House plan is 113.86 percent. District 106 in Horry County, a resort area, has 76.76 percent more population than an ideal district using 1990 census data. District 109, in Charleston County, has 37.09 percent less population than an ideal district. An examination of the 1981 plan districts using 1990 data shows generally that there have been strong population gains in suburban and resort areas of the state and declining populations in inner-city and rural areas of the state.

In effectuating the constitutional state policy of preserving county boundaries to the extent possible given federal constitutional and statutory requirements, the 1981 plan made 17 "excess" cuts in county lines. *See* text, supra, p. 59 for discussion of an "excess" cut. Twenty-nine total districts extended across county lines, with 20 districts falling within two counties, seven falling within three counties, and two falling within four counties.

As noted earlier, *supra*, note 34, the 1981 plan, as originally drawn, contained 26 districts where blacks constituted a majority of the total population in that district and 20 districts with a majority black voting age population. At present, using 1990 census data, the number of such seats has declined to 24 total population majority districts but increased to 21 majority black voting age districts due to natural retrogression.[69]

The plan now implemented by the court as an interim remedy addresses the constitutional infirmities of the old plan while giving due deference to established state policies, particularly the state constitutional policy of preserving the integrity of county boundaries. *Weiser*, 412 U.S. at 795. Given the substantial population deficits in the more rural areas of the state and population surpluses in the suburban and resort areas of the state, close

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[69] One district, 93, lost a majority black voting age population. Two districts, 59 and 122, gained voting age population between 51-52 percent, but were 12.09 percent and 4.38 percent short of population, respectively. One district, 109, went from a 48.55 percent black voting age population to 65.16 percent but was 37.09 percent short of population from the ideal district. *See supra* note 34.

adherence to the old district boundaries, the last explicit expression of state policy with respect to the districting of the House, is not feasible or necessarily possible. *Cf. Upham v. Seamon,* 456 U.S. 37 (1982)(permitting adjustments to boundaries only to the extent necessary to remedy violation); *Reilly,* 533 F.Supp. at 1181 (same).

The court's plan has a total deviation of 1.98 percent. District 14, covering southern Laurens County and northern Abbeville and Greenwood Counties, is .99 percent short of ideal population, or 279 persons. District 123, comprised chiefly of the Hilton Head area of Beaufort County, is .99 percent over ideal population, or 279 persons. This deviation is legally *de minimis;* therefore, the constitutional requirement of one man, one vote implicit in the Fourteenth Amendment is satisfied. *Chapman,* 420 U.S. at 22, 26-27; *see supra,* pages 17 to 24.

The court's plan is not retrogressive. Twenty-three of the districts in the court's plan contain a black voting-age population majority as opposed to the 1981 plan at present (21) or when drawn (20).[70] This represents a two district increase over the 1981 plan as it presently exists or a three district increase over the 1981 plan as originally enacted by the General Assembly and approved by the Justice Department. The court's plan also contains a total of 28 districts with black total population majorities.

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[70] When military populations are subtracted from the following districts the BVAP increases as follows in certain districts: District 70 – 64.01 percent; District 109 – 55.57 percent; and District 122 – 54.38 percent. This would create an additional district with a BVAP above 50 percent for a total of twenty-four districts.

Because "the position of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise" under the court's plan is enhanced over the position with respect to the previous plan, the court's plan satisfies § 5's retrogression standard. *Beer*, 425 U.S. at 142; *see supra*, pages 24 to 31.

To the extent possible, the court's plan also attempts to honor the express state policy of preserving county boundaries in the creation of election districts. The court's plan contains 20 "excess" cuts in county boundaries. *See supra*, pages 13 to 15. Of the 124 districts in the court's plan, 38 lie in two or more counties as follows: 29 (two counties); 7 (three counties); 2 (four counties). These figures reflect only a slight increase over the figures presented in the 1981 plan.

Of the plans submitted to the court for consideration, the plans of SRAC, the Republican Party, House Speaker Sheheen's Revised 2, and the Governor also contained de minimis total population variations among the districts.[71] Each of these plans created a larger number of black majority districts than the plan now adopted by the court.[72] Each plan throws all consideration of the state policy of recognizing county lines to the wind, however.

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[71] SRAC – 1.952 percent; Republican Party 0.18 percent; Governor 0.98 percent; Sheheen 1.998 percent. The House-passed plan had a deviation of almost 10 percent and was not, therefore, considered by the court as an acceptable alternative for implementation by the court.

[72] SRAC – 32 (TOP), 32 (BVAP); Republican Party – 36 (TOP), 33 (BVAP); Governor – 35 (TOP), 33 (BVAP); Sheheen – 29 (TOP), 21 (BVAP).

Each plan, with the exception of Speaker Sheheen's plan, however, also seeks the imprimatur of the court upon the elimination of house incumbents to suit the sponsoring party's political purpose, i.e. the Republican Party and the Governor appear to seek to eliminate Democrats and the SRAC appears to seek to eliminate incumbents because of their race.

As to county lines, each of the four proposed plans make the following "excess" cuts in county lines: Republican Party (40); Governor (38); Sheheen (37); and SRAC (48). The number of districts lying in two or more counties in each of the plans is as follows:

	Republican	Governor	SRAC	Sheheen
Two Counties	28	33	34	36
Three Counties	16	12	9	10
Four Counties	1	1	6	2
Five Counties	1	1	3	1
Total	46	48	52	49

As to incumbency, three plans pit the following numbers of incumbents against one another:

(a) Republican Party – six sets of Democrats (two individuals are allegedly retiring); 1 set of Republicans; and 2 sets of mixed Republican and Democratic incumbents.

(b) Governor – eight sets of Democrats (two individuals are allegedly retiring); 1 set of Republicans; and 2 sets of mixed Republican and Democratic incumbents.

(c) SRAC – 19 sets of white incumbent representatives and one set with one black and one white incumbent, including eight pairs of Democrats, five pairs of Republicans, and 7 mixed political pairs (one incumbent is not running and two are allegedly retiring).

Each of these plans has an acceptable total deviation; all three contain a deviation below that found in the court's plan and Speaker Sheheen's plan is only slightly higher. None of the plans retrogress under § 5 standards. Unlike the parties, however, this court is not free to impose a particular political or racial agenda upon the state.[73] The court must, as a court of equity, remedy the constitutional deficiencies of the current plan with due deference to express state policies. The court's plan, we believe, achieves the proper balance between drawing districts of equal population, recognizing concentrations of black voters, and giving effect to current state policy respecting the redistricting process and avoiding the "political thicket" that arises in pitting large numbers of incumbents against one another.

As discussed in part III above, § 2 of the Voting Rights Act looks to the effects or intent of a specific plan. Where, as here, there have been no elections under the court's plan, assessment of the "results" of such plan is

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[73] *See supra* p. 62. In the ten years since the House was last redistricted, the people have only retained approximately 31 of 124 representatives who sat in House when the 1981 plan was adopted. Over half of the current representatives were elected to the House after 1984. As noted at trial, the defendant Robert Sheheen, Speaker of the House and a 15-year veteran of the House, only narrowly won reelection in 1990.

speculative. We have, however, consistent with the guidelines set forth in Part III, reviewed the court's plan and conclude that it contains no obvious violations of § 2. The districts drawn by the court recognize those concentrations of black population in the state that are sufficiently large and geographically compact to form a majority in a single member district. In so drawing districts, the court was cognizant that there is no duty to maximize the number of black majority districts in the state or insure proportional representation on the basis of race. 42 U.S.C. § 1973.

The court concludes that the balance struck in its plan is the appropriate balance. While other plans create a larger number of black districts, they do so without regard to any interest but race and without the clear necessity which justifies a § 2 remedy. A brief discussion of some aspects of the other plans proposing a greater number of black majority districts illustrates this point.

The House plan proposed by the Republican Party, containing 36 majority black districts using total population, represents an attempt to achieve proportional representation on the basis of race, a result specifically not dictated by any federal or state law.[74] *See* 42 U.S.C. § 1973 ("nothing in this section establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population"). Thus, the Republican plan draws lines without regard to any factor except skin color and possibly political affiliation. As previously noted, the

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[74] Thirty-six of the 124 seats in the House represents 29.03 percent of the House membership. 29.82 percent of the total population of South Carolina is black.

Republican plan shows little regard for traditional state political units such as the county. The plan also divides numerous smaller municipalities and towns into separate districts.

Proposed District 55 in the Republican plan is illustrative. The town of Cheraw, in Chesterfield County, one of that county's largest towns, is divided and part of the town is placed in District 55 which chiefly lies in northern Marlboro County across the Great Pee Dee River. The southern boundary line of the district also divides the town of Bennettsville, the county seat of Marlboro County, placing part of the town in District 55 and another part in proposed District 54. At its eastern end, approximately 50 road miles from Cheraw at the western end, District 55 embraces a piece of the town of Dillon, the county seat of Dillon County, the third county contained within the district. Despite all the slicing and splicing of towns and counties, the district created by the Republican plan only has a total black population of 52.98 percent and a black voting age population of 50.74 percent, numbers barely sufficient to characterize the district as a majority minority district. The Republican district, composed of fractions of three counties and three towns, has no demonstrated cohesiveness. There is no evidence showing that political ties exist between the communities incorporated in the district. Each elects its own councils and school boards.

The Governor's plan, with 35 districts, suffers from the same defect.[75] Though not as egregious in its splintering and splicing tendencies in the Marlboro County area, the Governor's proposed District 54 also divides the towns of Cheraw and Bennettsville and spans parts of two counties, Chesterfield and Marlboro, yet only achieves a district with a 52.22 percent total black population and 49.89 percent black voting age population.

Finally, the plan presented by the SRAC, containing 32 proposed majority minority districts, does not attempt, to the degree of the other plans, to create proportional representation. Nonetheless, the plan suffers some of the same infirmities as the other plans.

Proposed District 105 in the SRAC plan lies wholly within Horry County. With no apparent purpose other than capturing as many black persons in Horry County as possible within a closed area, the district starts near the northwestern corner of the county and runs in a thin, snaking line back and forth across the county, ending at the southern end of the county. The proposed district embraces several distinct rural areas of the county, the town of Loris in the northern part of the county, parts of the resort area, particularly around Myrtle Beach and the Myrtle Beach Air Force Base, and parts of the town of Conway, the county seat. One would be hard pressed to

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[75] The similarity in methodology between the plan of the defendant Governor and the plaintiff Republican Party is hardly surprising. Mark Elam, a member of the Governor's staff, prepared both plans and testified on behalf of both plans though the parties were, ostensibly, on opposite sides of the case.

draw a district which more effectively splits communities of interest in a county and raised skin color to the sole criteria for boundary drawing. Geographical compactness and cohesion is particularly important in a House district which is naturally smaller and less diverse than, for example, a congressional district. The lack of reasonable geographic compactness demonstrated by the bizarre shape of the district and the lack of any distinct community of interest, apart from race, which would demonstrate district cohesiveness, indicate to the court that no § 2 violation arises by failing to include such a district in the court's plan.

In summary, given the nature of this proceeding, the evidence, and the law, the court is satisfied that its plan satisfies the requirements of the Voting Rights Act. The court's plan strikes the proper balance between the various interests arising in this type of proceeding, including equality of population in districts, racial fairness, and maintenance of the state's political subdivisions and communities of interest.

C

Congressional Plan

As mentioned previously, the parties stipulated the current congressional districts are malapportioned if the 1990 census data is applied to the current plan. In keeping with the principle of one man, one vote, a properly apportioned district would have 581,117 individuals. As a result, the deviation of the current plan using 1990 data is

8.33 percent, which is unacceptable. The parties submitted a total of nine plans for the court to consider.[76]

As discussed above, the court developed its plan consistent with the following factors: 1) the extent to which the plans proposed and the plans adopted are

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[76] In addition to the plans set forth below, the SRAC proposed a plan on the next to the last day of the proceedings, the Speaker submitted an additional plan and the Amicus presented a draft of a plan. The SRAC intended to offer a "compromise plan" on behalf of itself, the Senate, and the Lt. Governor; however, Governor Campbell and Congressman Tallon objected to the introduction of this plan on the basis of timeliness and this objection was sustained. The SRAC was permitted to proffer testimony on this plan at the conclusion of the Congressional phase.

Although the Speaker filed a prior plan on behalf of the House, which did not include a majority-minority district, we have focused on the plan subsequently ratified by the House and which was advocated at trial by the Speaker.

As for the plan of the Amicus, although the court has considered the general theories espoused in the plan, detailed geographical data for the plan was not available. Finally, the Republican Party did not present a Congressional plan at trial, but rather adopted the Governor's plan. The salient features of each plan are set forth below:

Plan	% Deviation	Split Counties	Split VTDs
Court	0	13	5
Governor	0	17	14
House	.13	11	0
SRAC	.15	29	0
Tallon	.21	7	0
Senate	.25	25	1
Lt. Gov.	.36	14	1

consistent with the retrogression standard set forth in *Beer* and *City of Lockhart*; 2) the extent to which reasonably compact and contiguous majority black districts were and could be drawn; 3) the extent to which the minority group is politically cohesive; 4) the extent to which racially polarized voting patterns exist; 5) the extent to which the lines which have been drawn limit the number of majority-black single-member districts in light of the expressed state policies of the State of South Carolina.

Based on these factors, two important considerations emerge. First, to what extent does the court's plan comport with the more stringent equal population requirement required for congressional districts? Second, to what extent does the court's plan draw reasonably compact and contiguous black districts?

As stated previously, *Karcher* sets forth a two-pronged inquiry for assessing any variation in districts from a standard of equality: (1) Does a plan represent a good-faith effort to draw districts of equal population, and (2) Is any "significant" variance between districts necessary to achieve some legitimate state goal? *Karcher*, 462 U.S. at 731. The court's plan clearly comports with the stringent equal population requirements set forth in *Karcher*, 462 U.S. at 731. As indicated in the table, *see supra*, note 76, with the exception of the Governor's plan, the court's plan is the only plan with a zero deviation. The other plans proffered to the court have deviations ranging from .15 to .36 percent. Since the court has developed a plan which achieves zero percent deviation, we decide neither the extent to which the deviations of the

other plans may be considered *de minimis* nor the validity of their justifications for their deviations.

The second point we address is the creation of a majority-minority district. Every plan submitted created a black majority district. While the parties disagreed as to the particular shape of such a district, all of the state policymakers – the House, the Senate and the Governor – agreed that such a district should be drawn. *Carstens*, 543 F.Supp. at 79. As a result, the record before the court is devoid of any argument that a majority-minority district should not be created and our decision today is bound by the record developed at trial. Given the lack of an adversarial proceeding in this regard, we do not decide if the court was *required*, under existing legal principles, to create a majority-minority district. Nevertheless, based on the criteria set forth above, the court devised a plan which created a majority-minority district.

First, as stated in *Beer*, "[t]he purpose of § 5 has always been to insure that no voting-procedure changes would be made that would lead to retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise." *Id.* at 141. By establishing a black majority district, the court has enhanced "the position of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise," *Beer*, 425 U.S. at 142, and has satisfied the retrogression standard set forth in *Beer*, *Id.*, and *City of Lockhart*, 460 U.S. at 134.

Having decided that creating a black majority district would satisfy retrogression considerations, we next looked to the extent to which a reasonably compact and contiguous majority black district could be drawn. The

record sets forth the general concentration of black population which runs in a crescent from South Carolina's southwestern border with Georgia through the midlands to the coast in Georgetown County. *See* Brief of *Amicus Curiae* Katharine I. Butler at 9. This crescent does not follow county lines. *Id.* As a result, any black majority district would have to encompass this area. Further, to achieve an effective opportunity for blacks to elect a candidate of their choice, the district had to include those portions of the Charleston and Columbia metropolitan areas with high concentrations of minority voters. By including the Charleston and Columbia metropolitan areas within the black-majority district, the court was able to create a district which has a 57.9 percent black voting age population.

Though we acknowledge that the resulting districts may stretch the concept of compactness, especially in light of the intrusion into the Charleston and Columbia metropolitan areas, we cannot say that the districts do not comport with the flexible approach to compactness advocated by the court in *Dillard, supra.* First, and foremost, the creation of a majority-minority district itself "aids and facilitates the political process" by assuring compliance with the retrogression standard of *Beer. See Dillard,* 686 F. Supp. at 1465. Second, the testimony at trial was sufficient to indicate that the district would be manageable from the standpoint of constituent services.[77] Finally,

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[77] In this regard, we note the testimony of Ms. Smalls, who is the chief of staff for Congressman Tallon and administers his local offices. Ms. Smalls testified that the black majority district created in Congressman Tallon's plan would be manageable.

(Continued on following page)

there is no indication from the record that the impact on the surrounding districts would impair the effective representation of those districts. Thus, in the context of congressional districts, we cannot say that the creation of a majority-minority district would violate the compactness requirement set forth in *Gingles*.

As for the existence of racial bloc voting and political cohesion, by encompassing the crescent of black population within the black-majority district, the court's plan accounts for these considerations to the extent they exist. Finally, the court's plan acknowledges South Carolina's specific state policy of maintaining the integrity of county lines. S.C. Const. Art. VII, § 13; *See supra* pages 13 to 15. The plan developed by the court only splits 13. county lines.[78] Though other plans may split fewer counties, these plans do not have as low a deviation as the court's plan. The court only split county lines when it was necessary to achieve a minimum variation or to increase the percentage of black population within the majority-minority district consistent with the non-retrogression principles of Beer as set forth above.

Based on the foregoing, the plan created by the court satisfies the important principles of one man, one vote and is consistent with the requirements of the Voting

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(Continued from previous page)

The court's plan, which is no less compact, would be similarly manageable.

[78] As a practical matter, five county cuts were necessary to achieve minimal variance. Any remaining cuts were made to enhance black population within the districts. *See supra* page 59.

Rights Act. No other plan has a lower deviation and splits fewer counties than the court created plan.

V

CONCLUSION

Much has changed in South Carolina since 1984 and even more since 1980. One thing that has not changed is the General Assembly's inability to redistrict without judicial intervention or at least prodding. The General Assembly knew the census was coming, correctly predicted malapportionment, and had both sophisticated software and capable operators in place to draw plans. Nevertheless, no compromise was ever reached with the Governor's office and this court was called upon to perform a task that all concede is most properly a legislative one. As set forth more fully above, the duties of a legislature and a federal court are not the same. While we certainly can consider significant state policies, we have less latitude to serve those policies than a state legislature would enjoy.

Since the General Assembly and the Governor did not fulfill their obligations, and the plans proposed at trial suffered an array of infirmities, reluctant as we were, this court unabashedly fashioned its own plans. Our plans meet the *de minimis* standards of *Chapman*, the deviation standard of *Karcher*, and the retrogression standard of *Beer* as applicable to each plan. In addition the plans protect the traditional and legitimate policies of South Carolina. It is our hope that the General Assembly and the Governor will work together and fashion acceptable plans. In the interim, these are the plans for the

South Carolina Senate, House of Representatives and the United States Congressional districts.

IT IS ORDERED, therefore, that the redistricting plans for the South Carolina Senate [Appendix A], South Carolina House of Representatives [Appendix B], and the South Carolina Congressional delegation [Appendix C] shall be the lawful election districts for each of those bodies for the general elections scheduled in 1992,[79] and for all subsequent elections until redistricting plans for those bodies are lawfully enacted by the South Carolina General Assembly, signed by the Governor, and approved by the United States Department of Justice pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1973c.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that the claim of plaintiffs Bufort Blanton, et. al, C.A. No. 3:91-3635-1, regarding the constitutionality of the county delegation system is deconsolidated from this action and referred to a single judge of the district court for resolution. Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 42(b). As to all other claims in the consolidated cases, the interim plans of the court stand as the final judgment of the court as to those claims. We expressly find no just reason for delay; therefore, final judgment shall be entered with respect to all remaining claims. Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 54(b).

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[79] By order entered March 6, 1992, the court directed that the filing dates for the bodies covered by our plans would run from June 1- June 25, 1992; primary elections would be held August 25, 1992; run-off primary elections, if necessary, would be held September 8, 1992; and certification of candidates to the election commissioners would occur on September 18, 1992.

IT IS SO ORDERED, this 1st day of May, 1992, at Columbia, South Carolina.

/s/ Clyde H. Hamilton
CLYDE H. HAMILTON,
UNITED STATES CIRCUIT
JUDGE, FOURTH CIRCUIT
COURT OF APPEALS

/s/ Falcon B. Hawkins
FALCON B. HAWKINS,
CHIEF UNITED STATES
DISTRICT JUDGE, DISTRICT
OF SOUTH CAROLINA

/s/ G. Ross Anderson, Jr.
G. ROSS ANDERSON, JR.,
UNITED STATES DISTRICT
JUDGE, DISTRICT OF SOUTH
CAROLINA

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SOUTH CAROLINA SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

Population Summary Report

Dist.	Total	Black	Pct. Black	Total18+	Black18+	Pct. Black18+	Pct. Dev.
1	76,341	7,193	9.42	60,456	5,259	8.70	0.72
2	75,047	4,684	6.24	56,096	3,345	5.96	-0.99
3	76,324	14,994	19.65	58,120	10,297	17.72	0.69
4	75,838	10,681	14.08	56,295	7,288	12.95	0.05
5	76,379	7,173	9.39	57,633	4,847	8.41	0.77
6	75,758	3,954	5.22	57,530	2,601	4.52	-0.05
7	75,054	38,951	51.90	55,013	26,265	47.74	-0.98
8	75,872	6,400	8.44	58,706	4,484	7.64	0.10
9	75,196	17,554	23.34	55,801	12,170	21.81	-0.79
10	76,463	23,975	31.36	56,761	15,984	28.16	0.88
11	75,276	24,859	33.02	56,054	16,809	29.99	-0.69
12	75,834	11,322	14.93	57,416	7,702	13.41	0.05
13	75,690	10,690	14.12	57,463	7,495	13.04	-0.14
14	75,941	13,495	17.77	56,392	8,851	15.70	0.19
15	75,396	8,847	11.73	56,694	6,134	10.82	-0.53
16	75,040	16,973	22.62	55,291	11,076	20.03	-1.00
17	76,506	42,267	55.25	54,143	27,951	51.62	0.93
18	75,178	22,655	30.14	56,173	15,192	27.05	-0.82
19	76,041	52,097	68.51	55,561	35,967	64.73	0.32
20	76,371	17,970	23.53	60,645	12,897	21.27	0.76
21	76,516	41,602	54.37	58,367	29,187	50.01	0.95
22	76,212	15,559	20.42	56,364	10,139	17.99	0.55
23	75,265	5,434	7.22	54,337	3,693	6.80	-0.70
24	75,276	12,647	16.80	54,999	8,351	15.18	-0.69
25	75,915	27,713	36.51	55,260	18,616	33.69	0.15
26	76,127	12,620	16.58	56,353	8,217	14.58	0.43
27	75,509	23,980	31.76	55,047	16,138	29.32	-0.38
28	75,928	20,254	26.68	55,841	12,778	22.88	0.17
29	75,927	32,229	42.45	54,474	21,170	38.86	0.17
30	75,725	46,207	61.02	52,178	29,599	56.73	-0.10
31	76,171	17,628	23.14	55,458	11,161	20.13	0.49
32	75,855	47,405	62.49	51,246	29,625	57.81	0.08
33	75,304	7,959	10.57	58,747	5,106	8.69	-0.65
34	75,850	27,948	36.85	51,458	17,372	33.76	0.07
35	75,746	24,746	32.67	54,375	16,384	30.13	-0.07
36	75,397	48,006	63.67	52,727	31,594	59.92	-0.53
37	76,141	22,509	29.56	53,724	15,051	28.02	0.45
38	76,487	10,070	13.17	52,119	6,355	12.19	0.91
39	75,933	45,539	59.97	53,160	29,589	55.66	0.18
40	76,379	41,263	54.02	54,953	28,295	51.49	0.77
41	75,940	9,348	12.31	57,440	6,001	10.45	0.19
42	75,081	44,750	59.60	55,299	30,098	54.43	-0.95
43	75,888	26,467	34.88	57,328	17,454	30.45	0.12
44	75,258	9,176	12.19	57,387	6,137	10.69	-0.71
45	75,817	44,667	58.91	52,684	28,948	54.95	0.03
46	75,511	17,424	23.07	56,928	11,368	19.97	-0.38
	3,486,703	1039884		2566496	691,040		-0.01

Mean Deviation is: 367
Mean Percent Deviation is: 0.48

Largest Positive Deviation is: 718 0.95 Percent
Largest Negative Deviation is: -758 -1.00 Percent

Overall Range in Deviation is: 1,476 1.95 Percent

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 1

Area	**Population**
Oconee County	57,494
Pickens County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
CALHOUN	3,672
CLEMSON	2,554
PIKE	755
STONE CHURCH	
Tract 0112.02	
Blocks: 156A, 156B, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162A, 162B, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191	129
Tract 0112.03	
Blocks: 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215A, 215B, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321A, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 403A, 406A, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419A, 419B, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428	2,497
UNIVERSITY	9,240
DISTRICT TOTAL	76,341
PERCENT VARIATION	0.716

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 2

Area	Population
Pickens County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
ALBERT R. LEWIS	2,027
AMBLER	1,493
ARIAL MILL	3,052
BRUSHY CREEK	1,699
CEDAR ROCK	990
CENTRAL 1	2,483
CENTRAL 2	2,058
CROSSWELL	2,611
DACUSVILLE	3,962
EASLEY	3,687
FLAT ROCK	1,964
FOREST ACRES	4,034
GEORGES CREEK	1,276
HOLLY SPRINGS	1,437
LAWRENCE CHAPEL	719
LIBERTY 1	3,428
LIBERTY 2	1,398
MCKISSICK	2,613
MOUNTAIN VIEW	1,218
NORRIS	1,994
PARK STREET	5,011
PICKENS 1	3,617
PICKENS 2	2,588
PICKENS 3	3,675
POWDERSVILLE	3,211
PRATERS CREEK	1,265
PUMPKINTOWN	1,492
RICES CREEK	1,290
SIX MILE	3,368
SMITH GROVE	2,202

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 2

Area	Population
STONE CHURCH	
Tract 0112.02	
Blocks: 201, 202, 203	0
ZION	3,185
DISTRICT TOTAL	75,047
PERCENT VARIATION	-0.991

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 3

Area	Population
Anderson County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
APPLETON EQUINOX	2,142
CENTERVILLE	5,348
CORNER	335
DENVER SANDY SPRINGS	2,054
EDGEWOOD	3,626
FIVE FORKS	1,346
FLATROCK	2,066
FORK 1	816
FORK 2	1,292
GLUCK MILL	469
GREEN POND	3,989
GROVE SCHOOL	301
HAMMOND SCHOOL	
Tract 0003.00	
Blocks: 201C, 202B	6

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 3

Area	Population
HOMELAND PARK	
Tract 0118.00	
Blocks: 107, 118, 119, 138	77
Tract 0119.00	
Blocks: 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 327, 328, 329, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417	1,618
HOPEWELL	2,518
IVA	2,468
JACKSON MILL	1,285
LA FRANCE	630
LAKESIDE	3,433
MOUNT TABOR	1,723
MOUNTAIN CREEK	1,745
ORR MILL	2,354
PENDLETON	4,112
ROCK MILL	2,059
STARR	910
TOWNVILLE	555
VARENNES	2,820
WARD 1 PRECINCT 1	2,559
WARD 1 PRECINCT 2	1,708
WARD 2 PRECINCT 1	1,971
WARD 2 PRECINCT 2	
Tract 0002.00	
Blocks: 501, 502, 508, 509, 510, 512, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 528, 529, 530, 531, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 607, 608, 609, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 712	1,694

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 3

Area **Population**

Tract 0003.00

Blocks: 201B, 204, 205, 301A, 301B, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 402, 403, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412A 1,788

Tract 0112.00

Blocks: 214A, 215A, 217A, 336A, 336B 139

WARD 3 PRECINCT 1 2,283

WARD 4 PRECINCT 1 2,089

WARD 4 PRECINCT 2 1,834

WARD 5 PRECINCT 1 1,150

WARD 5 PRECINCT 2 2,503

WARD 6 PRECINCT 1 2,767

WARD 6 PRECINCT 2 1,306

WEST SAVANNAH 436

DISTRICT TOTAL 76,324

PERCENT VARIATION 0.694

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 4

Area **Population**

Abbeville County

Census Voting Tabulation Districts

BROADMOUTH 505

CENTRAL 269

COLD SPRINGS

Tract 9502.00

Blocks: 339, 340, 341, 342, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353 101

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 4

Area	Population
Tract 9504.00	
Blocks: 115, 116	10
DONALDS	717
DUE WEST	2,032
HALLS STORE	1,239
HAMPTON	37
HILLVILLE	361
KEOWEE	555
LEVEL LAND	432
ROCK SPRINGS	708
Anderson County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
BAKERS CREEK	306
BELTON	6,460
BISHOPS BRANCH	1,413
BOWLING GREEN	727
BROADVIEW	823
BROADWAY	2,485
BRUSHY CREEK	3,706
CEDAR GROVE	1,378
CHIQUOLA MILL	1,216
CONCRETE	4,660
CRAYTONVILLE	1,246
FRIENDSHIP	1,156
HALL	2,125
HAMMOND SCHOOL	
Tract 0003.00	
Blocks: 401, 404, 412B, 413	235
Tract 0004.00	
Blocks: 118B, 119	46

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 4

Area	Population
Tract 0011.00	
Blocks: 301B, 302A, 302B, 302C, 302D, 303A, 303B, 317, 318, 319	286
Tract 0105.00	
Blocks: 387	13
Tract 0112.00	
Blocks: 101, 126, 127, 128, 131, 133, 134, 135, 136, 201, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213B, 214B, 215B, 216, 217B, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 330, 331, 332, 333B, 334, 335	2,140
HIGH POINT	745
HOMELAND PARK	
Tract 0118.00	
Blocks: 103, 104, 105, 106, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 120, 123	535
Tract 0119.00	
Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 301, 302, 303, 304, 326, 331, 332, 401	2,137
HONEA PATH	2,424
MCADAMS	228
MELTON	562
NEALS CREEK	3,179
PELZER	1,537
PIEDMONT	1,201
PIERCETOWN	716
ROCK SPRING	988
SHIRLEYS STORE	905

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 4

Area	**Population**
SIMPSONVILLE	2,285
THREE AND TWENTY	3,981
TONEY CREEK	617
WALKER-MCELMOYLE	963
WARD 2 PRECINCT 2	
Tract 0011.00	
Blocks: 301A	2
Tract 0112.00	
Blocks: 213A, 333A	24
WARD 3 PRECINCT 2	2,366
WEST PELZER	2,625
WHITE PLAINS	2,612
WILLIAMSTON MILL	1,941
WILLIAMSTON	4,947
WRIGHTS SCHOOL	931
DISTRICT TOTAL	75,838
PERCENT VARIATION	0.053

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 5

Area	**Population**
Greenville County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
ALEXANDER	
Tract 0022.01	
Blocks: 413B, 414B, 501A, 501B, 506, 508, 509B, 509C, 712A, 712B, 713, 714	297

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 5

Area	Population
Tract 0022.02	
Blocks: 402D, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 410, 412, 413, 414, 501A, 501B, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 511, 512, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 620, 622, 623, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712A, 712B	2,157
ARMSTRONG	1,542
BEREA	2,984
CHESTNUT HILLS	1,767
CITY VIEW	
Tract 0007.00	
Blocks: 401A	0
Tract 0022.01	
Blocks: 128, 129, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 401, 413A, 414A, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 507, 509A, 726A	1,273
Tract 0022.02	
Blocks: 401A, 402A, 409A	0
Tract 0023.03	
Blocks: 803, 804, 835	0
EBENEZER	1,827
FAIRVIEW	3,518
FROHAWK	2,931
GOWENSVILLE	1,736
GREER 1	1,440
GREER 2	1,340

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 5

Area	Population
GREER 3	1,543
GREER 4	2,344
JENNINGS MILL	996
MARIDELL	2,795
MOUNTAIN VIEW	2,029
ONEAL	3,081
PLEASANT GROVE	
Tract 0025.03	
Blocks: 112, 113B, 116B, 118, 119A, 119B, 120, 121, 124, 125, 126, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206B, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419	2,342
Tract 0025.05	
Blocks: 507C, 802B, 802C, 804, 805B	0
SALUDA	1,885
SANDY FLAT	3,483
SKYLAND	2,753
SLATER MARIETTA	5,725
SULPHUR SPRINGS	
Tract 0037.02	
Blocks: 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 215, 230	2,179
TANGLEWOOD	3,849
TAYLORS	3,684
TIGERVILLE	1,934

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 5

Area	Population
TRAVELERS REST	3,074
TUBBS MOUNTAIN	2,846
WELCOME	
Tract 0021.06	
Blocks: 722, 723	136
WESTCLIFFE	3,173
WESTSIDE	3,716
DISTRICT TOTAL	76,379
PERCENT VARIATION	0.767

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 6

Area	Population
Greenville County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
AVON	2,312
BATESVILLE	4,777
BOTANY WOODS	1,629
BROOKGLENN	3,756
CHEROKEE	2,459
DEL NORTE	4,000
DEVENGER	4,144
DOVE TREE	2,912
EDWARDS FOREST	2,467
FURMAN	5,028
LAKE FOREST	2,214
LEAWOOD	3,177
MEADOWOOD	1,353
MERRIFIELD	1,415

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 6

Area	Population
MONAGHAN	
Tract 0022.01	
Blocks: 113, 114, 115, 116A, 116B, 201, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 301, 302, 303, 304A, 304B, 304C, 305	597
Tract 0023.03	
Blocks: 831	0
MONAVIEW	5,008
NORTHWOOD	2,520
PARIS MOUNTAIN	1,368
PARK PLACE	3,550
PEBBLE CREEK	3,936
PIEDMONT PARK	4,124
PLEASANT GROVE	
Tract 0026.05	
Blocks: 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 513, 514, 515	1,866
POINSETT	2,850
ROCK HILL	3,779
SULPHUR SPRINGS	
Tract 0037.01	
Blocks: 125B, 126, 127, 128	224
Tract 0037.02	
Blocks: 113, 114, 115, 122	103
TIMBERLAKE	1,782
UNION BLEACHERY	1,052
WELLINGTON	1,356
DISTRICT TOTAL	75,758
PERCENT VARIATION	-0.053

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 7

Area **Population**

Greenville County

Census Voting Tabulation Districts

ALEXANDER

Tract 0007.00

Blocks: 218B 13

Tract 0008.00

Blocks: 104C, 105B 9

Tract 0022.02

Blocks: 402C, 409C, 510A, 510B, 514, 516, 517 201

BELLE MEADE 3,226

BRANDON 2,691

CAROLINA 2,410

CITY VIEW

Tract 0009.00

Blocks: 309A, 310A, 311 43

Tract 0023.03

Blocks: 802A, 812A, 821, 822, 836 124

CONESTEE 3,042

DONALDSON 1,002

DUNEAN 2,996

FORK SHOAL

Tract 0032.00

Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 131, 132 972

Tract 0033.02

Blocks: 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431 561

GANTT 3,650

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 7

Area	Population
GREENBRIAR	
Tract 0029.01	
Blocks: 919	0
Tract 0029.02	
Blocks: 403A, 408A, 417A, 417B, 903, 904A, 904B, 905, 907, 908B, 921, 922	363
GREENVILLE 10	923
GREENVILLE 11	1,208
GREENVILLE 12	1,327
GREENVILLE 13	2,833
GREENVILLE 14	3,916
GREENVILLE 19	2,753
GREENVILLE 2	1,188
GREENVILLE 26	
Tract 0012.02	
Blocks: 201, 202, 203, 204, 209, 210, 211, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 402, 403, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 707, 708, 709, 710, 801, 802, 803, 804	2,401
GREENVILLE 4	2,480
GREENVILLE 5	1,816
GREENVILLE 6	1,757
GREENVILLE 7	2,024
GREENVILLE 8	2,704
GREENVILLE 9	1,807
GROVE	3,288
LAUREL CREEK	823
MAULDIN 3	2,106
MONAGHAN	
Tract 0009.00	
Blocks: 104B, 302, 304B	61

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 7

Area	Population
Tract 0023.03	
Blocks: 801, 802B, 812B, 813, 814, 826, 827, 828, 829, 830, 837	252
PARAMOUNT	1,567
REEAY FORK	3,769
ROYAL OAKS	2,510
SOUTHSIDE	2,924
WASHINGTON HEIGHTS	2,459
WELCOME	
Tract 0021.04	
Blocks: 501, 502, 503, 601, 602, 605, 606, 609, 610, 618, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 819	1,047
Tract 0021.06	
Blocks: 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718, 719, 721, 726, 728, 729	3,808
DISTRICT TOTAL	75,054
PERCENT VARIATION	-0.982

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 8

Area	Population
Greenville County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
BRYSON	2,516
FOUNTAIN INN	3,623
GILDER CREEK	6,295
GREENBRIAR	
Tract 0029.02	
Blocks: 402, 403B, 404A, 404B, 408B, 408C, 410, 411A, 411B, 412, 413, 414, 416C, 906B	483
Tract 0029.03	
Blocks: 101A, 101B, 101C, 117, 118, 119, 127B, 128, 130, 131, 301C, 302B, 309B, 317B, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605A, 605C, 605D, 606A, 606C, 607, 608, 609	782
GREENVILLE 1	1,168
GREENVILLE 15	2,049
GREENVILLE 16	1,931
GREENVILLE 17	1,590
GREENVILLE 18	1,480
GREENVILLE 20	1,700
GREENVILLE 21	1,480
GREENVILLE 22	1,893
GREENVILLE 23	2,942
GREENVILLE 24	1,121
GREENVILLE 25	2,797
GREENVILLE 26	
Tract 0012.02	
Blocks: 205, 206, 207, 208	242
GREENVILLE 27	4,571
GREENVILLE 28	1,794
GREENVILLE 3	1,623
HILLCREST	2,836

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 8

Area	**Population**
MAULDIN 1	1,506
MAULDIN 2	3,095
MAULDIN 4	3,652
MISSION	1,781
PLINEY	2,842
ROCKY CREEK	4,360
SIMPSONVILLE 1	2,368
SIMPSONVILLE 2	4,251
SIMPSONVILLE 3	2,327
STANDING SPRINGS	
Tract 0030.07	
Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109A, 109B, 110, 111A, 111B, 112A, 112B, 113, 133, 134	622
WADE HAMPTON	1,598
WOODLAWN	2,554
DISTRICT TOTAL	75,872
PERCENT VARIATION	0.098

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 9

Area	**Population**
Greenville County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
DUNKLIN	2,862

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 9

Area	**Population**
FORK SHOALS	
Tract 0032.00	
Blocks: 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 511	969
HOPEWELL	3,304
PIEDMONT	3,032
STANDING SPRINGS	
Tract 0030.06	
Blocks: 207A, 207B, 314, 315A, 315B, 401A, 401B, 401C, 401D, 401E, 401F, 402, 403, 404, 405A, 405B, 406	2,156
Tract 0030.07	
Blocks: 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 201A, 201B, 201C, 201D, 202, 203, 204, 205, 208	1,246
WARE PLACE	3,535
Laurens County	58,092
DISTRICT TOTAL	75,196
PERCENT VARIATION	-0.794

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 10

Area	Population
Abbeville County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
ABBEVILLE 1	2,866
ABBEVILLE 2	2,762
ABBEVILLE 3	1,487
ABBEVILLE 4	1,403
ABBEVILLE MILL	776
ANTREVILLE	1,362
CALHOUN FALLS 1	1,932
CALHOUN FALLS 2	1,151
COLD SPRINGS	
Tract 9502.00	
Blocks: 354	0
Tract 9504.00	
Blocks: 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 117, 118, 119, 120, 122, 123, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155. 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170	877
LEBANON	658
LOWNDESVILLE 1	484
LOWNDESVILLE 2	336
MOUNTAIN VIEW	457
WATTS	345
Greenwood County	59,567
DISTRICT TOTAL	76,463
PERCENT VARIATION	0.877

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 11

Area	Population
Spartanburg County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
ARROWOOD	517
BOILING SPRINGS	9,045
BOWEN	2,045
BROOKLYN COOLEY SPRINGS FIN	3,633
CAMPTON	9,718
CHESNEE	3,647
CUNNINGHAM	2,461
HAYNE SHOP	3,098
HILLTOP	829
INMAN	5,728
JOHNSON CITY	1,469
NEW PROSPECT	3,096
POWELL SAXON	3,345
UNA	1,389
WARD 1 BOX 1	1,907
WARD 1 BOX 2	998
WARD 1 BOX 3	3,142
WARD 2	3,079
WARD 3 BOX 3 STATION A	2,739
WARD 4 BOX 3	2,878
WARD 5	3,983
WARD 6	2,363
WELLFORD	2,455
WHITNEY STATION B	1,712
DISTRICT TOTAL	75,276
PERCENT VARIATION	-0.689

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 12

Area	Population
Spartanburg County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
ARCADIA	569
ARKWRIGHT	1,343
ARLINGTON	2,687
BALLENGER	2,398
BEN AVON	3,932
BOBO	1,329
CAMPOBELLO	2,725
CANAAN	1,831
CEDAR SPRINGS	2,709
DUNCAN	5,062
EAST GREER	1,511
FAIRFOREST	3,354
GRAMLING	1,533
HOLLY SPRINGS	2,382
JACKSON MILL	762
LANDRUM	4,161
LYMAN	3,680
MOORE SWITZER	882
PELHAM	723
ROEBUCK	5,004
STARTEX	1,110
VICTOR MILL	3,988
WARD 1 BOX 4	1,862
WARD 1 BOX 5	2,921
WARD 3 BOX 2 STATION A	2,514
WARD 3 BOX 2 STATION B	728
WARD 3 BOX 3 STATION B	1,019
WARD 3 BOX 4 STATION A	2,960
WARD 3 BOX 4 STATION B	3,400
WEST VIEW	5,725

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 12

Area	Population
WOODS CHAPEL	1,030
DISTRICT TOTAL	75,834
PERCENT VARIATION	0.047

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 13

Area	Population
Spartanburg County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
BISHOP	2,437
CANNONS CAMPGROUND	1,389
CAVINS HOBBYSVILLE	872
CHEROKEE SPRINGS	3,556
CLIFTON	1,247
CONVERSE	1,863
COWPENS	4,827
CRESCENT	1,488
CROFT	2,424
CROSS ANCHOR	969
DEYOUNG	1,430
DRAYTON	1,131
ENOREE	1,890
FAIRMONT	3,144
GLENDALE	2,028
MAYO	2,826
MOTLOW	1,514
PACOLET MILLS	1,449
PACOLET	2,664
PAULINE GLENN SPRINGS	1,161

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 13

Area	Population
POPLAR SPRINGS	2,679
REIDVILLE	3,320
WALNUT GROVE	3,705
WARD 3 BOX 1	5,951
WARD 4 BOX 2	1,410
WHITE STONE	1,202
WHITNEY STATION A1	4,189
WHITNEY STATION A2	2,312
WOODRUFF 1	3,423
WOODRUFF 2	2,235
WOODRUFF 3	1,182
ZION HILL	3,773
DISTRICT TOTAL	75,690
PERCENT VARIATION	-0.142

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 14

Area	Population
Cherokee County	44,506
Union County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
ADAMSBURG	791
BONHAM	1,163
JONESVILLE 1	1,354
JONESVILLE 2	2,009
KELTON	1,369
LOCKHART 1	640
LOCKHART 2	541

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 14

Area	Population
MONARCH 1	1,926
OAKLAND	240
York County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
BETHANY	2,092
BETHEL NO 1	5,048
BETHEL NO 2	967
BOWLING GREEN	2,923
CLOVER NO 1	2,928
CLOVER NO 2	3,564
COTTON BELT	1,797
HICKORY GROVE	880
HOPEWELL	248
SMYRNA	955
DISTRICT TOTAL	75,941
PERCENT VARIATION	0.189

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 15

Area	Population
York County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
CANNON MILL	3,899
CATAWBA	3,297
DELPHIA	1,980
EBENEZER	2,615
EBINPORT	2,526
FEWELL PARK	1,470
FILBERT	1,599

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 15

Area	Population
HIGHLAND PARK	2,086
INDIA HOOK	1,270
LESLIE NO 1	3,436
LESSLIE [SIC] NO 2	4,051
MT GALLANT	6,819
MT HOLLY	
Tract 0013.02	
Blocks: 201	0
Tract 0612.01	
Blocks: 239, 251	0
Tract 0613.01	
Blocks: 126A, 126B, 127, 201A, 201B, 202, 203, 204, 205, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230	1,002
Tract 0613.02	
Blocks: 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233	767
MUSEUM	4,478
NEWPORT	3,294
NORTHSIDE	1,569
NORTHWESTERN	1,255
OAK RIDGE	2,533
ROCK HILL NO 1	1,040
ROCK HILL NO 4	5,902
ROCK HILL NO 5	2,475
ROCK HILL NO 6	
Tract 0601.01	
Blocks: 419, 420, 423	18

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 15

Area	Population
Tract 0603.00	
Blocks: 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 227, 228, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 312, 313, 314, 315, 317	2,514
ROCK HILL NO 7	3,553
TEGA CAY	
Tract 0610.02	
Blocks: 133, 134, 135, 202A, 203A, 204, 205A, 205B, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259	3,225
TIRZAH	1,604
UNIVERSITY	2,093
YORK NO 2	
Tract 0615.02	
Blocks: 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 316, 317, 318, 319	445
Tract 0616.02	
Blocks: 217, 218, 219, 220, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 301A, 301B, 302, 303, 304A, 304B, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 501,	

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 15

Area	Population
502A, 502B, 503A, 503B, 503C, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521	2,581
DISTRICT TOTAL	75,396
PERCENT VARIATION	-0.530

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 16

Area	Population
Fairfield County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
DUTCHMANS CREEK	679
GLADDEN GROVE	84
LEBANON	1,048
MITFORD	1,380
WINNSBORO 2	
Tract 9602.00	
Blocks: 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 367, 368, 369, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386	470
Tract 9603.00	
Blocks: 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 189, 191, 192, 193	44

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 16

Area	Population
Tract 9604.00	
Blocks: 101, 102, 103A, 103B, 104, 105, 106A, 106B, 107A, 107B, 108A, 108B, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118A, 118B, 119, 120, 121, 122A, 122B, 123A, 123B, 123C, 124, 125, 126, 127A, 127B, 127C, 128, 129A, 129B, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142A, 142B, 143, 144, 145, 146	1,081
WINNSBORO MILLS	1,620
Lancaster County	54,516
York County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
FORT MILL NO 1	3,289
FORT MILL NO 2	823
FORT MILL NO 3	3,210
FORT MILL NO 4	2,505
FORT MILL NO 5	2,351
FORT MILL NO 6	1,515
TEGA CAY	
Tract 0610.02	
Blocks: 201, 202B, 203B	425
DISTRICT TOTAL	75,040
PERCENT VARIATION	-1.000

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 17

Area	Population
Chester County	32,170
Fairfield County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
BLACKSTOCK	97
BLAIRS	689
CENTERVILLE	268
FEASTERVILLE	612
GREENBRIER	2,015
HICKORY RIDGE	1,423
HOREB	604
JENKINSVILLE	653
MONTICELLO	839
NEW HOPE	151
RIDGEWAY	2,653
SIMPSON	909
SOUTH WINNSBORO	1,155
WHITE OAK	605
WINNSBORO 1	2,864
WINNSBORO 2	
Tract 9602.00	
Blocks: 301, 302, 303, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374	223
WOODWARD	129
Union County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
BLACK ROCK	
Tract 0307.00	
Blocks: 358, 359, 360, 362, 363, 364, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383	396
CARLISLE	890
MEADOWS	941

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 17

Area	Population
SANTUCK	1,081
WARD 2	1,946
WARD 3	1,590
WARD 4 BOX 2	1,022
York County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
BLAIRSVILLE	699
BULLOCKS CREEK	399
EDGEWOOD	2,457
MCCONNELS	1,654
MT HOLLY	
Tract 0613.01	
Blocks: 115	254
OGDEN	1,950
ROCK HILL NO 2	3,485
ROCK HILL NO 3	3,600
ROCK HILL NO 6	
Tract 0013.01	
Blocks: 101	0
Tract 0603.00	
Blocks: 212, 213, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 308, 309, 310, 311, 316, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324	1,568
Tract 0612.01	
Blocks: 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 238	173
Tract 0613.01	
Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106A, 106B, 107, 108, 109, 110A, 110B, 111, 112A, 112C, 113, 114B	271
SHAROH	883
YORK NO 1	2,626

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 17

Area **Population**

YORK NO 2

Tract 0616.02

Blocks: 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432 562

DISTRICT TOTAL 76,506

PERCENT VARIATION 0.934

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 18

Area **Population**

Lexington County

Census Voting Tabulation Districts

BATESBURG 3,697

CHAPIN 6,566

LEESVILLE

Tract 0214.00

Blocks: 147A, 169A, 170A, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 213B, 214A, 215A, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 501, 502, 503, 504B, 511B, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516C, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524A, 525, 526A, 527A, 528A, 608, 609A, 610A, 611, 612, 623, 624A, 624B, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 640, 641, 642, 643, 644, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 650, 651A, 651B, 652A, 653A, 654A, 654B, 655, 656A, 656B, 657, 658, 674A, 674B, 702, 703, 704, 725 2,213

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 18

Area **Population**

MIMS

Tract 0214.00

Blocks: 421B, 440B, 441B, 444B, 516D, 524B, 526B, 527B, 528B, 529, 530, 531, 532B, 533B, 533C, 534, 535B, 536B, 652B, 653B, 672, 673, 674C, 675, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711B, 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 721, 722, 723, 724, 737 420

Tract 0215.97

Blocks: 495C 0

RIDGE ROAD

Tract 0214.00

Blocks: 138, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147B, 169B, 170B, 188, 189, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 211, 212, 213C, 214B, 215B, 234B, 301, 302, 303B, 504C, 505B, 508B, 511C, 609B, 610B 312

Tract 0215.97

Blocks: 407B, 427B, 429, 430B, 431B, 431C, 432B, 434, 435B, 436D, 439B, 440B 3

Newberry County 33,172

Saluda County 16,357

Union County

Census Voting Tabulation Districts

BLACK ROCK

Tract 0307.00

Blocks: 319, 320, 321, 322, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 343, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 361, 365, 375, 376, 377, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393 230

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 18

Area	Population
BUFFALO 1	1,625
BUFFALO 2	464
CROSS KEYS	1,224
EXCELSIOR MILL	2,202
MONARCH 2	408
OTTARAY	385
PUTMAN	832
WARD 1 BOX 1	1,197
WARD 1 BOX 2	2,061
WARD 4 BOX 1	1,386
WEST SPRINGS	424
DISTRICT TOTAL	75,178
PERCENT VARIATION	-0.818

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT

DISTRICT 19

Area	Population
Richland County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
ARCADIA	
Tract 0111.02	
Blocks: 101, 103, 104A, 104B, 105A, 105B, 119	427
ARDINCAPLE	832
BLYTHEWOOD	5,002
COLLEGE PLACE	3,822
DENNYSIDE	1,390
DENTSVILLE	4,141
EDGEWOOD	4,011

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 19

Area	Population
FAIDLAWN	2,539
FAIRWOPID	1,654
GREENVIEW	2,955
KEELS	4,481
KEENAN	
Tract 0108.04	
Blocks: 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 518, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 528, 530, 531, 532	1,695
KILLIAN	1,490
LINCOLNSHIRE	3,944
MEADOWLAKE	5,050
MIDWAY	
Tract 0113.04	
Blocks: 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 119	195
MONTICELLO	3,526
RIDGEWOOD	1,933
SPRING VALLEY	
Tract 0114.04	
Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 142, 143	659
WALDEN	
Tract 0103.03	
Blocks: 172A, 172B, 173	4
Tract 0103.04	
Blocks: 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410A, 410B, 411A, 411B, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417A, 417B, 417C, 418, 419A, 419B, 420A, 420B, 421, 422, 423A, 423B, 424, 425, 426A, 426B,	

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 19

Area	Population
427A, 427B, 428A, 428B, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513	2,468
Tract 0104.06	
Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 104, 105A, 105B, 105C, 105D, 105E, 106, 107A, 107B, 107C, 108, 109, 137, 160, 201, 202, 203, 209, 210, 211, 212	6,380
WARD 19	2,721
WARD 20	2,451
WARD 21	3,172
WARD 22	2,368
WARD 29	1,604
WARD 31	1,956
WARD 3	
Tract 0006.00	
Blocks: 110, 111, 112, 113, 116, 117, 118, 201A, 201B, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 401, 402, 403A, 403B, 403C, 404, 405, 406, 407A, 407B, 407C, 408A, 408B, 409A, 409B, 410, 411	1,854
Tract 0105.02	
Blocks: 110A, 110B, 111A, 111B, 120A, 120B	202
WARD 7	
Tract 0009.00	
Blocks: 301B, 301F, 302, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 321, 322, 323, 324, 326	578

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 19

Area **Population**

Tract 0109.00

Blocks: 206, 212A, 212B, 212C, 212D, 214A, 214B, 214D, 216 537

DISTRICT TOTAL 76,041

PERCENT VARIATION 0.321

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 20

Area **Population**

Richland County

Census Voting Tabulation Districts

BALLENTINE 3,358

BRANDON 2,405

FORT JACKSON 1,179

HAMPTON

Tract 0026.00

Blocks: 201A, 201B, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218A, 218B, 219A, 219B, 220A, 220B, 221, 222, 223, 224A, 224B, 225A, 225B, 226, 227A, 227B, 227C, 228A, 228B, 229, 230A, 230B, 231, 232, 233, 301A, 301B, 301C, 302A, 302B, 302C, 303A, 303B, 304A, 304B, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 315, 327, 805, 807, 910 2,107

HARBISON 4,609

KINGSWOOD 3,234

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 20

Area **Population**

MILL CREEK
Tract 0116.05
Blocks: 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611 1,871
Tract 0116.06
Blocks: 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416 250
NEW FRIARSGATE 5,227
OLD FRIARSGATE 2,137
PENNINGTON 1,747
RIVERSIDE 5,657
SPRINGVILLE 3,226
ST ANDREWS 2,215
WALDEN
Tract 0103.04
Blocks: 304, 305B, 308 25
WARD 10 2,211
WARD 11
Tract 0026.00
Blocks: 314A, 314B, 319A, 319B 39
WARD 12 2,172
WARD 13 2,942
WARD 14 2,183
WARD 15 1,188
WARD 17
Tract 0025.00
Blocks: 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 508, 512, 513 516
WARD 18 2,835
WARD 23 1,518

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 20

Area **Population**

WARD 27

Tract 0116.04

Blocks: 312, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 405, 406, 409, 412, 418A, 418B, 418C, 418D, 420, 421, 423A, 423B 1,728

Tract 0116.05

Blocks: 402, 407A, 407B, 407C, 407D 322

WARD 30 2,298

WARD 34 1,792

WARD 3

Tract 0016.00

Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 114 ... 381

WARD 4

Tract 0005.00

Blocks: 202, 230, 231, 233, 239A, 239B, 243, 245A, 245B 4

Tract 0007.00

Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 301, 302, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322 1,802

Tract 0009.00

Blocks: 301C 0

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 20

Area	**Population**
WARD 7	
Tract 0009.00	
Blocks: 101, 102, 111, 112, 113, 114, 204A, 204B, 204C, 204D, 204E, 204F, 204G, 204H, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 301A, 301D, 301E, 303, 304, 319, 325	2,080
WHITEWELL	7,121
WOODLANDS	3,992
DISTRICT TOTAL	76,371
PERCENT VARIATION	0.756

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 21

Area	**Population**
Calhoun County	12,753
Richland County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
BLUFF	3,910
COOPER	3,522
EASTOVER	3,897
FJ 10	0
FJ 17	2,109
FJ 18	0
FJ 19	0
FJ 1	0
FJ 20	0
FJ 21	3,017

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 21

Area	Population
FJ 2	0
FJ 3	444
FJ 4	475
FJ 5	72
FJ 6	7
FJ 7	0
FJ 8	3,073
FJ 9	0
GADSDEN	2,563
GARNERS	1,131
HAMPTON	
Tract 0026.00	
Blocks: 806, 808A, 808B, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 901, 902, 903, 904, 905A, 905B, 906A, 906B, 906C, 907, 908, 909, 914A, 914B, 915	790
HOPKINS	4,266
HORRELL HILL	4,303
HUNTING CREEK	493
MILL CREEK	
Tract 0116.05	
Blocks: 709, 710B, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 721, 722	3
OLYMPIA	2,320
PINEWOOD	
Tract 0119.01	
Blocks: 301, 302, 303, 306, 308	759
WARD 1	7,428

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 21

Area	Population
WARD 11	
Tract 0026.00	
Blocks: 513, 514, 515, 516, 607A, 607B, 607C, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, 911A, 911B, 912, 913	3,152
WARD 2	885
WARD 27	
Tract 0116.05	
Blocks: 411, 415A, 415B, 701A, 701B, 701C, 701D, 701E, 701F, 701G, 701H, 702A, 702B, 703, 704A, 704B, 704C, 704D, 704E, 705, 706, 707, 708, 710A, 723, 724	1,997
Tract 0117.02	
Blocks: 204A, 204B, 206A, 206B, 207A, 207B	1
WARD 32	2,808
WARD 33	1,858
WARD 4	
Tract 0008.00	
Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 104, 105	701
Tract 0010.00	
Blocks: 101, 102	581
WARD 5	2,421
WARD 8	2,061

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 21

Area	**Population**
WARD 9	2,716
DISTRICT TOTAL	76,516
PERCENT VARIATION	0.947

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 22

Area	**Population**
Kershaw County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
DOBYS MILL	
Tract 9709.00	
Blocks: 514, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 551, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 583, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 594	1,163
ELGIN 1	2,803
ELGIN 2	2,701
Richland County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
ARCADIA	
Tract 0111.02	
Blocks: 102A, 102B, 112, 114, 115A, 115B, 116, 117, 118, 120, 201A, 201B, 201C, 201D, 201E, 201F, 201G, 201H, 202, 203A, 203B, 203C, 204A, 204B, 204C, 204D, 205A, 205B	761

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 22

Area	Population
Tract 0113.01	
Blocks: 101A, 101B, 101C, 101D, 101E, 101F, 102, 103, 104, 105A, 105B, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 115, 116, 117, 118, 123, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307	2,563
BRIARWOOD	2,577
EFOREST ACRES	2,113
ESTATES	2,715
FJ 11	942
FJ 12	597
FJ 13	546
FJ 14	5
FJ 15	5
FJ 16	0
KEENAN	
Tract 0111.01	
Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 104A, 104B, 105A, 105B, 105C, 106, 107A, 107B, 107C, 107D, 107E, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 302, 304B, 304C, 304D, 310, 313, 314A, 314B, 314C, 314D, 316A, 316B, 316C, 316D, 316E, 316F, 316G	1,256
LYKESLAND	4,511

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 22

Area	Population
MIDWAY	
Tract 0113.04	
Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 117, 118, 120, 121, 122, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409	4,071
N FOREST ACRES	2,020
NORTH SPRINGS	5,194
OAKWOOD	1,815
PINE LAKES	4,432
PINEWOOD	
Tract 0116.06	
Blocks: 103, 125, 126, 127, 159, 160, 162	191
Tract 0119.01	
Blocks: 304, 305, 307, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318	947
PONTIAC	4,298
S FOREST ACRES	2,283
SATCHELFORD	1,176
SPRING VALLEY	
Tract 0114.03	
Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311	3,405
Tract 0114.04	
Blocks: 121, 122, 123, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313	2,853
WARD 16	1,432

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 22

Area	**Population**
WARD 17	
Tract 0023.00	
Blocks: 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211	756
Tract 0024.00	
Blocks: 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 215, 216, 217, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305	827
WARD 24	1,181
WARD 25	2,160
WARD 6	1,973
WILDEWOOD	4,367
WOODFIELD	5,573
DISTRICT TOTAL	76,212
PERCENT VARIATION	0.546

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 23

Area	**Population**
Lexington County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
CHALLEDON	2,896
COLDSTREAM	3,511
CONGAREE	4,248
CROMER	6,290

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 23

Area	Population
EDMUND	
Tract 0209.00	
Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 203, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 326, 331	2,194
EMMANUEL CHURCH	4,031
GARDENDALE	1,199
IRMO	4,312
JAMIL ROAD	4,603
LAKESIDE	2,421
LEXINGTON 1	5,740
LEXINGTON 2	3,513
MURRAYWOOD	3,049
OLD BARNWELL STORE	3,190
PINEVIEW	
Tract 0206.02	
Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116B, 117B, 120, 121B	1,024

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 23

Area	Population
QUAIL VALLEY	1,941
RED BANK SOUTH	2,777
RED BANK	5,117
SEVEN OAKS	2,096
SPRINGDALE	2,743
ST MICHAEL	2,841
WHITEHALL	3,067
WOODLAND HILLS	2,462
DISTRICT TOTAL	75,265
PERCENT VARIATION	-0.703

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 24

Area	Population
Aiken County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
AIKEN 1	1,428
AIKEN 3	
Tract 0216.01	
Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 211A, 212A	1,452
AIKEN 47	1,821
AIKEN 6	1,744
BEECH ISLAND	2,166
CAROLINA HEIGHTS	2,242
COLLEGE ACRES	1,566
COUCHTON	1,947
EUREKA	1,281
FOX CREEK	2,253

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 24

Area	Population
HAMMOND	2,546
HOLLOW CREEK	5,298
JACKSON	2,843
MILLBROOK	3,567
MONETTA	1,319
MONTMORENCI	1,381
NEW ELLENTON	2,515
NORTH AUGUSTA 25	1,949
NORTH AUGUSTA 26	3,548
NORTH AUGUSTA 27	1,911
NORTH AUGUSTA 28	2,142
NORTH AUGUSTA 29	1,547
NORTH AUGUSTA 54	1,851
NORTH AUGUSTA 55	1,465
REDDS BRANCH	1,384
SAVANNAH RIVER SITE	0
SHAWS FORK	668
SHILOH	1,961
TALATHA	4,351
TOWN CREEK	1,103
WARD	1,562

Lexington County
Census Voting Tabulation Districts

CRAPPS STORE	589
HOLLOW CREEK	2,103
LAKE MURRAY	1,935
LEESVILLE	
Tract 0213.00	
Blocks: 687, 688, 760, 761, 768, 769, 770, 771, 772, 773, 774, 775, 776, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 787, 790, 791, 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797	461

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 24

Area **Population**

Tract 0214.00

Blocks: 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 659, 660, 661, 662, 663, 664, 665, 666, 667, 668, 669, 670, 671, 701, 726, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 732, 733 548

MIMS

Tract 0214.00

Blocks: 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 712, 713, 714, 715, 734, 735, 736, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 747, 748, 749, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 766, 767, 768, 769, 770, 771, 772, 773, 774, 775, 776, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 787, 788, 789, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 821, 822, 823 999

MOUNT HOREB 2,649

RIDGE ROAD

Tract 0213.00

Blocks: 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311,

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 24

Area	Population
312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 420, 421, 438, 439, 440, 441, 443	1,097
Tract 0214.00	
Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 104A, 104B, 105A, 105B, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123A, 123B, 124A, 124B, 124C, 125A, 125B, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 139, 140, 141, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168	748
Tract 0215.97	
Blocks: 370C, 370D, 371B, 372B, 373B, 374, 382B, 401B, 402B, 403B, 404B, 405, 406B	12
Tract 0215.98	
Blocks: 301, 349B, 349C, 368B, 368C, 369B, 369C, 390B, 391C, 391D, 391E, 391F, 391G, 392, 393B, 393C, 396, 397A, 397B	17
SUMMIT	1,307
DISTRICT TOTAL	75,276
PERCENT VARIATION	-0.689

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 25

Area	Population
Aiken County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
AIKEN 2	2,617
AIKEN 3	
Tract 0203.00	
Blocks: 907A, 909A	173
Tract 0214.00	
Blocks: 101, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 520	609
Tract 0216.01	
Blocks: 104	0
AIKEN 4	2,336
AIKEN 5	2,656
BATH	1,749
BELVEDERE 44	2,260
BELVEDERE 45	4,684
BELVEDERE 9	2,277
BREEZY HILL	2,035
CHINA SPRINGS	2,258
CLEARWATER	1,511
GLOVERVILLE	1,577
GRANITEVILLE	2,759
JORDANTOWN	1,130
LANGLEY	2,843
LEVELS	3,042
LYNWOOD	1,608
SIX POINTS 35	1,431
SIX POINTS 46	2,370
VAUCLUSE	904
WARRENSVILLE	2,202
WILLOW SPRINGS	3,641

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 25

Area	**Population**
Edgefield County	18,375
McCormick County	8,868
DISTRICT TOTAL	75,915
PERCENT VARIATION	0.154

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 26

Area	**Population**
Aiken County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
NEW HOLLAND	844
OAK GROVE	864
PERRY	1,287
SALLEY	990
TABERNACLE	795
WAGENER	2,209
WHITE POND	783
WINDSOR	1,685
Lexington County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
BOILING SPRINGS	2,526
CAYCE 1	1,877
CAYCE 2A	2,878
CAYCE 2	3,956
CAYCE 3	1,351
CHALK HILL	6,544
EDENWOOD	2,368

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 26

Area	Population
EDMUND	
Tract 0209.00	
Blocks: 201, 202, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 325, 327, 328, 329, 330, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 357, 363	1,575
FAIRVIEW	555
GASTON	4,292
GILBERT	1,671
HOOKS STORE	3,684
LEAPHART ROAD	2,426
MACK EDISTO	492
PELION	2,772
PINERIDGE	2,188
PINEVIEW	
Tract 0205.07	
Blocks: 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527	2,502

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 26

Area	Population
POND BRANCH	2,443
QUAIL HOLLOW	2,325
ROUND HILL	1,411
SALUDA RIVER	3,144
SANOY RUN	770
SHARPES HILL	1,073
SWANSEA	3,272
WEST COLUMBIA #1	1,269
WEST COLUMBIA #2	1,824
WEST COLUMBIA #3	692
WEST COLUMBIA #4	2,831
WESTOVER	1,959
DISTRICT TOTAL	76,127
PERCENT VARIATION	0.434

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 27

Area	Population
Chesterfield County	38,577
Kershaw County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
AIRPORT	2,308
ANTIOCH	820
BETHUNE	1,877
BUFFALO	1,277
CAMDEN 1	1,356
CAMDEN 2	574
CAMDEN 3	1,008
CAMDEN 4	1,600

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 27

Area	Population
CAMDEN 5A	886
CAMDEN 5	562
CAMDEN 6	601
CASSATT	1,316
CHARLOTTE THOMPSON	1,955
DOBYS MILL	
Tract 9709.00	
Blocks: 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 513, 515, 516, 517, 539, 540, 541, 547, 548, 549, 550, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 595, 596, 597	132
EAST CAMDEN-HERMITAGE	929
GATES FORD	441
LIBERTY HILL	385
LUGOFF 1	1,416
LUGOFF 2	2,427
LUGOFF 3	1,292
MALVERN HILL	1,908
RABONS CROSSROADS	1,671
RIVERDALE	1,629
SALT POND	1,210
SHAYLORS HILL	925
SPRINGDALE	2,269
WESTVILLE	2,123
WHITE GARDENS	2,035
DISTRICT TOTAL	75,509
PERCENT VARIATION	-0.381

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 28

Area	**Population**
Dillon County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
BERMUDA	437
CAROLINA	521
EAST DILLON	2,939
FLOYDALE	913
FORK	788
GADDY'S MILL	523
HAMER	1,201
KEMPER	643
LAKE VIEW	2,122
MANNING	671
MT. CALVARY	
Tract 9702.00	
Blocks: 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 423, 424, 431, 432, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440	1,565
OAKLAND	965
PLEASANT HILL	380
Horry County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
ADRIAN	1,698
ALLSBROOK	840
ATLANTIC BEACH	446
AYNOR	1,685
BAYBORO	1,274
BROOKSVILLE	1,613
CEDAR GROVE	773

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 28

Area	Population
CHERRY GROVE	2,637
COOL SPRINGS	622
CRESCENT BEACH	1,778
DAISY	1,026
DOG BLUFF	925
DOGWOOD	340
DUNES 2	988
DUNES 3	1,234
EAST LORIS	2,386
EBENEZER	480
FLOYDS	820
FOUR MILE	1,516
GALIVANTS FERRY	258
GREEN SEA	1,659
GURLEY	274
HICKORY GROVE	1,215
HICKORY HILL	240
HOMEWOOD	970
HORRY	879
JERNIGANS CROSS ROADS	873
JORDANVILLE	525
JOYNER SWAMP	422
JUNIPER BAY	1,433
LEON	983
LITTLE RIVER	2,762
LIVE OAK	376
METHODIST RHEOBETH	577
MILL SWAMP	280
MOUNT OLIVE	582
MOUNT VERNON	600
NIXONS CROSSROADS	1,760
NORTON	243

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 28

Area	Population
OCEAN DRIVE 1	1,680
OCEAN DRIVE 2	1,935
PLEASANT VIEW	385
POPLAR HILL	1,022
RACEPATH 1	1,566
RACEPATH 2	2,441
RED BLUFF	743
SHELL	890
SPRING BRANCH	517
SWEET HOME	927
TAYLORSVILLE	487
WAMPEE	1,721
WEST LORIS	1,737
WHITE OAK	483
WINDY HILL	1,529
Marlboro County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
CLIO	
Tract 9604.00	
Blocks: 401, 402, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465	135
Tract 9605.00	
Blocks: 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 275, 277	130
EAST MCCOLL	1,649
MCCOLL	2,291
DISTRICT TOTAL	75,928
PERCENT VARIATION	0.172

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 29

Area	Population
Darlington County	61,851
Marlboro County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
ADAMSVILLE	718
BRIGHTSVILLE	837
BROWNSVILLE	526
QUICKS CROSS ROADS	2,106
RED HILL	1,630
SOUTH BENNETTSVILLE	1,528
WALLACE	1,821
WEST BENNETTSVILLE	4,910
DISTRICT TOTAL	75,927
PERCENT VARIATION	0.170

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 30

Area	Population
Dillon County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
LATTA	3,627
LITTLE ROCK	752
MINTURN	472
MT. CALVARY	
Tract 9702.00	
Blocks: 222, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 433, 434	1,143
NEW HOLLY	666

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 30

Area	Population
OAK GROVE	1,057
SOUTH DILLON	3,748
WEST DILLON	3,981
Florence County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
CLAUSSEN	1,337
FLORENCE WARD 10	1,578
FLORENCE WARD 1	2,415
FLORENCE WARD 2	2,606
FLORENCE WARD 3	3,001
FLORENCE WARD 9	3,315
GILBERT	2,534
KINGSBURG	651
MARS BLUFF 1	3,883
MILL BRANCH	819
PAMPLICO 2	1,255
SPAULDING	1,538
STONE	787
Marion County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
MARION 1	2,122
MARION 2	2,187
MARION NORTH	1,351
MARION SOUTH	4,690
MARION WEST	1,839
NICHOLS	1,341
NORTHEAST MULLINS	3,967
NORTHWEST MULLINS	3,254
SELLERS	590
TEMPERANCE	1,346
ZION	793

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 30

Area **Population**

Marlboro County

Census Voting Tabulation Districts

BLENHEIM..... 471

CLIO

Tract 9604.00

Blocks: 245, 246, 247, 248, 249..... 14

Tract 9605.00

Blocks: 112, 113, 114, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132A, 132B, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248A, 248B, 249, 250A, 250B, 251A, 251B, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256A, 256B, 257A, 257B, 258, 259A, 259B, 260A, 260B, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 276, 278, 279, 280, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306A, 306B, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318A, 318B, 319A, 319B, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326A, 326B, 327, 328, 329A, 329B, 330A, 330B, 331A, 331B, 332A, 332B, 333A, 333B, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 396, 397..... 2,546

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 25

Area **Population**

GREENVILLE 23

Tract 0019.00

Blocks: 903 7

Tract 0029.01

Blocks: 905, 906, 910A, 912A, 912B, 917A, 917B, 918A, 950A, 950B, 963A 1,210

GROVE

Tract 0035.00

Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 115, 116, 117, 118, 901, 902, 903, 904, 905, 906, 907, 908, 909, 910, 911, 912, 913, 914, 915, 916, 917, 919, 920, 921 1,036

Tract 0036.02

Blocks: 905, 906, 907, 908 842

LAUREL CREEK..... 823

MAULDIN 1

Tract 0029.02

Blocks: 901A..... 206

PARAMOUNT

Tract 0014.00

Blocks: 401A, 402A, 409, 410A, 411, 412 ... 540

Tract 0015.02

Blocks: 612A, 612B, 701A, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 711A, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716A, 717A, 717B, 718, 719, 720A, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808.....1,027

PIEDMONT

Tract 0033.01

Blocks: 101 0

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 25

Area **Population**

REEAY FORK

Tract 0033.02

Blocks: 116, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 245, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333 3,006

ROYAL OAKS 2,510

SOUTHSIDE

Tract 0021.03

Blocks: 103, 104, 105, 107, 108A, 108B, 126, 127, 128, 129, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229 1,850

DISTRICT TOTAL 28,286

PERCENT VARIATION 0.597

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 26

Area **Population**

Greenville County

Census Voting Tabulation Districts

ALEXANDER

Tract 0007.00

Blocks: 218B 13

Tract 0008.00

Blocks: 104C, 105B 9

Tract 0022.01

Blocks: 413B, 414B, 501A, 501B, 506, 508, 509B, 509C, 712A, 712B, 713, 714 297

Tract 0022.02

Blocks: 501A, 501B, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510A, 510B, 511, 512, 514, 516, 517, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 620, 622, 623, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712A, 712B 1,910

BRANDON

Tract 0021.04

Blocks: 401, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 607, 608, 619, 620, 621, 622, 820 412

Tract 0021.05

Blocks: 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408,409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 423, 502, 503A, 503B, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 515, 516, 517, 525, 526 ... 1,092

CITY VIEW 1,440

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 26

Area	Population
GREENVILLE 7	
Tract 0008.00	
Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 104A, 105A, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112A, 112B, 112C, 113A, 113B, 114A, 114B, 115, 116A, 116B, 117, 118	506
Tract 0021.05	
Blocks: 501A, 501B	2
MONAGHAN	910
MONAVIEW	
Tract 0037.04	
Blocks: 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 318	956
TANGLEWOOD	3,849
WESTCLIFFE	3,173
WESTSIDE	3,716
Pickens County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
CROSSWELL	2,611
DACUSVILLE	
Tract 0105.01	
Blocks: 152	0
Tract 0106.00	
Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 108, 109, 110, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 137, 138, 139, 145, 154, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329	2,382
GEORGES CREEK	1,276

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 26

Area	**Population**
MCKISSICK	
Tract 0106.00	
Blocks: 135, 136, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 146, 165, 166, 207, 208, 209, 214	534
POWDERSVILLE	3,211
DISTRICT TOTAL	28,299
PERCENT VARIATION	0.644

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 27

Area	**Population**
Greenville County	
Census Votinq Tabulation Districts	
BRYSON	2,516
FOUNTAIN INN	3,623
GILDER CREEK	
Tract 0028.06	
Blocks: 151, 152, 317, 318, 319	911
Tract 0028.07	
Blocks: 303, 304, 305, 306	448
Tract 0030.03	
Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 120, 121, 122, 125, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134	2,681
HILLCREST	
Tract 0030.03	
Blocks: 119, 123, 126, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141	340

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 27

Area	Population
Tract 0030.04	
Blocks: 101A, 101B, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118A, 118B, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123A, 123B, 123C, 124, 128, 134B, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139B, 140C, 179B, 179C, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184	2,246
Tract 0030.05	
Blocks: 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208A, 208B, 209, 210, 211, 213B, 214B, 215A, 215B, 216A, 216B, 218B, 254B	113
HOPEWELL	3,304
SIMPSONVILLE 1	2,368
SIMPSONVILLE 2	4,251
SIMPSONVILLE 3	2,327
STANDING SPRINGS	
Tract 0030.06	
Blocks: 207A, 207B, 314, 315A, 315B, 401A, 401B, 401C, 401D, 401E, 401F, 402, 403, 404, 405A, 405B, 406	2,156
Tract 0030.07	
Blocks: 108, 109A, 109B, 110, 111A, 111B, 112A, 112B, 113, 114, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 201A, 201B, 201C, 201D, 202, 203, 204, 205	639
DISTRICT TOTAL	27,923
PERCENT VARIATION	-0.694

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 28

Area **Population**

Greenville County

Census Voting Tabulation Districts

CONESTEE

Tract 0029.01

Blocks: 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 449, 450, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 931 1,028

Tract 0033.02

Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 109, 118, 119, 120 ... 421

DUNKLIN 2,862

FORK SHOALS

Tract 0032.00

Blocks: 101, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 511 1,051

Tract 0033.02

Blocks: 401, 402, 430, 431 207

GANTT

Tract 0020.03

Blocks: 905, 906 461

Tract 0034.00

Blocks: 911, 912, 913, 914 89

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 28

Area **Population**

GILDER CREEK

Tract 0028.07

Blocks: 103, 104A, 104B, 105A, 105B, 105C, 105D, 106A, 106B, 106C, 106D, 106E, 106F, 106G, 106J, 106K, 107A, 107B, 107C, 107D, 108A, 108B, 108C, 108D, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 301, 302A, 302B 1,979

GREENBRIAR 1,628

GROVE

Tract 0033.01

Blocks: 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 226, 227, 228 901

Tract 0033.02

Blocks: 301, 302, 303, 304 169

Tract 0035.00

Blocks: 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 119, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 922 340

HILLCREST

Tract 0030.04

Blocks: 107, 108A, 108B, 108C, 108D, 108E, 109 119

Tract 0030.05

Blocks: 201, 202, 212 18

MAULDIN 1

Tract 0029.02

Blocks: 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 901B, 902 1,300

MAULDIN 3 2,106

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 28

Area **Population**

MAULDIN 4

Tract 0028.07

Blocks: 106H 8

Tract 0029.03

Blocks: 102, 103A, 103B, 103C, 103D, 103E, 113, 114, 115, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127A, 129, 132, 133, 134, 135, 138, 139, 140, 142, 143, 144, 145, 147, 148, 149, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 209, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 301A, 301B, 302A, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309A, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317A, 605B, 606B 3,387

PIEDMONT

Tract 0033.01

Blocks: 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 208, 209, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 901, 902, 903 3,032

PLINEY

Tract 0028.06

Blocks: 139, 140 353

REEAY FORK

Tract 0033.02

Blocks: 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 117 763

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 28

Area	**Population**
ROCKY CREEK	
Tract 0028.06	
Blocks: 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138	143
Tract 0028.07	
Blocks: 101, 102	784
STANDING SPRINGS	
Tract 0030.07	
Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 208	1,229
WARE PLACE	3,535
DISTRICT TOTAL	27,913
PERCENT VARIATION	-0.729

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 29

Area	**Population**
Cherokee County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
ALLENS	
Tract 9705.00	
Blocks: 758, 759, 760, 762, 776, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 787, 788, 789, 790, 791, 792, 793, 794, 795	1,051
Tract 9706.00	
Blocks: 507	2
DRAYTONVILLE	2,444

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 29

Area **Population**

GAFFNEY WARD 4
Tract 9703.00
Blocks: 115A, 117, 118, 119, 120A, 123A, 124, 126, 133A, 134, 135, 136, 137, 139, 140, 141 769
GAFFNEY WARD 6 2,079
LITTLEJOHNS
Tract 9707.00
Blocks: 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 227, 228, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257 202
MACEDONIA
Tract 9703.00
Blocks: 115B 0
METCALF 535
MUSGROVE MILL
Tract 9702.00
Blocks: 423, 424, 501B, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 606B, 633B 689
Tract 9703.00
Blocks: 115C, 115D, 120B, 121, 122, 123B, 133B 172
Tract 9706.00
Blocks: 223B, 301C, 302B, 303B, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309B, 314, 318, 322B, 323, 324, 329B, 336B, 337B, 338, 339, 340, 341, 401B, 402B, 402C, 403B, 404B, 405B, 406, 407, 408, 409B, 411C, 414B, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422,

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 29

Area **Population**

423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430,
431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438,
439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446,
447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452. 453, 454,
455, 456, 457, 458D, 459B, 460, 461, 462,
463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470,
471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478 . . . 1,531

SARRATTS 205

TIMBER RIDGE

Tract 9706.00

Blocks: 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 541, 542,
543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550,
551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558,
559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 573, 574,
616 921

WILKINSVILLE 389

Chester County

Census Voting Tabulation Districts

BALDWIN MILL

Tract 0205.00

Blocks: 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318,
323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330,
331, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411,
412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418 816

BATON ROUGE 1,014

CHESTER WARD 1

Tract 0203.00

Blocks: 201B, 504, 505, 506B, 507, 508,
509, 528, 529B 296

Tract 0204.00

Blocks: 138, 139, 140, 146, 147, 148, 149,
150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157 197

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 29

Area	Population
Tract 0205.00	
Blocks: 305, 306	28
CHESTER WARD 4	
Tract 0206.00	
Blocks: 545, 546, 547, 559, 560, 561	273
EDGEMOOR	
Tract 0207.00	
Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 106	35
Tract 0208.00	
Blocks: 114, 115	0
EUREKA MILL	
Tract 0203.00	
Blocks: 501, 502, 503, 510, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527	338
Tract 0204.00	
Blocks: 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235	306
Tract 0206.00	
Blocks: 537, 538, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571	682
HALSELLVILLE	335
LOWRYS	1,126
RODMAN	
Tract 0204.00	
Blocks: 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 215, 216, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 236, 237, 238, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250	494
Tract 0206.00	
Blocks: 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531,	

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 29

Area	Population
532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 572, 573, 574	513
Tract 0207.00	
Blocks: 104, 105, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143	112
WILKSBURG	976
York County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
BETHANY	2,092
BLAIRSVILLE	699
BULLOCKS CREEK	399
COTTON BELT	1,797
HICKORY GROVE	880
HOPEWELL	248
MCCONNELLS	
Tract 0614.01	
Blocks: 123, 128A, 128B, 129A, 129B, 131, 133, 134, 137, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148A, 148B, 202, 203, 204, 208, 209A, 209B, 214A, 215, 216A, 216B, 217, 218, 219, 220A, 220B, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226A, 226B, 227, 228, 229A, 229B, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 248, 251A, 251B, 263, 264	1,370
SHAROH	883
SMYRNA	955
DISTRICT TOTAL	27,853
PERCENT VARIATION	-0.942

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 30

Area **Population**

Cherokee County

Census Voting Tabulation Districts

ALMA MILL 2,703
ANTIOCH 693
ASHWORTH 873
BLACKSBURG WARD 1 941
BLACKSBURG WARD 2 452
BLACKSBURG WARD 3 797
BLACKSBURG WARD 4 1,193
BUFFALO 822
CENTRAL 1,151
CHEROKEE FALLS 890
GAFFNEY WARD 1 1,744
GAFFNEY WARD 2 2,230
GAFFNEY WARD 3 1,905
GAFFNEY WARD 4
Tract 9702.00
Blocks: 413A, 417A, 602A, 602B, 602C, 603, 604,605, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 717, 718, 719, 720, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 732, 733, 734, 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763 ... 1,055
Tract 9703.00
Blocks: 110A, 110B, 111A, 112A, 113A, 113B, 116A,125A, 125B, 138 106
Tract 9706.00
Blocks: 101, 102, 113, 114 31
GAFFNEY WARD 5 747
GRASSY POND 1,445

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 30

Area	Population
HOLLY GROVE	622
KINGS CREEK	610
LIMESTONE	1,975
MACEDONIA	
Tract 9701.00	
Blocks: 301	0
Tract 9702.00	
Blocks: 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408,409, 410, 411, 412, 413C, 413D, 414, 415B, 416B, 417B, 417C, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422	313
Tract 9703.00	
Blocks: 101, 102, 103C, 104B, 106B, 107B, 110C,111B, 112B	192
MORGAN	1,207
MUSGROVE MILL	
Tract 9703.00	
Blocks: 112C, 113C, 114, 116B	1
NINETY NINE	462
PLEASANT GROVE	1,256
PLEASANT MEADOWS	1,141
WOODS	402
DISTRICT TOTAL	27,959
PERCENT VARIATION	-0.565

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 31

Area **Population**

Spartanburg County

Census Voting Tabulation Districts

ARKWRIGHT

Tract 0207.00

Blocks: 201A, 202, 301, 302A, 302B, 303A, 303B, 304, 305, 306A, 306B, 307A, 307B, 307C, 401C 193

Tract 0209.00

Blocks: 219A, 225A 0

Tract 0210.020

Blocks: 203 3

POWELL SAXON

Tract 0204.00

Blocks: 222A, 224A, 225A, 229A, 230A..... 52

Tract 0205.00

Blocks: 301A, 302A 5

Tract 0206.01

Blocks: 118, 120A, 120B, 121A, 122A..... 8

Tract 0217.00

Blocks: 305, 314, 319, 320, 322, 323, 324, 326, 402, 403, 410, 411, 412, 413, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514A, 514B, 514C, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524..... 3,138

ROEBUCK

Tract 0220.01

Blocks: 113A, 113B, 114A, 119, 120, 121.... 320

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 31

Area	Population
UNA	
Tract 0217.00	
Blocks: 401A	43
WARD 1 BOX 1	1,907
WARD 1 BOX 2	998
WARD 1 BOX 3	3,142
WARD 1 BOX 5	
Tract 0212.00	
Blocks: 103, 105, 106, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 118, 119, 120, 121, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127	289
WARD 2	3,079
WARD 3 BOX 2 STATION A	
Tract 0211.00	
Blocks: 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 301, 302, 303A, 322, 324, 325, 328, 330, 331, 332, 509, 607A	1,343
WARD 3 BOX 2 STATION B	728
WARD 3 BOX 3 STATION A	2,739
WARD 3 BOX 4 STATION A	
Tract 0207.00	
Blocks: 333C	43
Tract 0220.01	
Blocks: 114B	0
WARD 4 BOX 2	
Tract 0203.02	
Blocks: 119, 123, 125, 126, 131, 132, 133, 134, 137, 206, 207	19
Tract 0212.00	
Blocks: 101, 102, 104, 107, 122	27
WARD 4 BOX 3	2,878
WARD 5	3,983
WARD 6	2,363

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 31

Area **Population**

WHITNEY STATION B

Tract 0203.01

Blocks: 201A, 202A, 202B, 203A, 321A 76

Tract 0216.00

Blocks: 302, 310, 312, 337, 339, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410 490

DISTRICT TOTAL 27,866

PERCENT VARIATION .....-0.896

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 32

Area **Population**

Spartanburg County

Census Voting Tabulation Districts

BEN AVON

Tract 0213.02

Blocks: 301B, 301C, 302, 303, 304, 305A, 305B, 305C, 305D, 401B 274

CANNONS CAMPGROUND 1,389

CHEROKEE SPRINGS

Tract 0224.03

Blocks: 119, 120, 121, 137, 146, 147, 148, 204,206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229.....1,372

CONVERSE 1,863

DRAYTON 1,131

MAYO.....2,826

WARD 1 BOX 4 1,862

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 32

Area **Population**

WARD 1 BOX 5

Tract 0212.00

Blocks: 115, 116, 117, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 229, 230, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 324, 325, 326 2,409

Tract 0213.02

Blocks: 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207 ... 223

WARD 3 BOX 1

Tract 0213.01

Blocks: 101, 111, 113, 114, 116, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 132, 133, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 305A, 305D, 306A 1,777

Tract 0213.02

Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126 798

Tract 0213.03

Blocks: 103C, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207A, 207B, 208A, 208B, 208C, 301, 302A, 302B, 302C, 302D, 303, 304, 305 .. 2,465

WARD 3 BOX 2 STATION A

Tract 0211.00

Blocks: 117, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 501A, 502A, 503, 504, 507, 508 1,171

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 32

Area **Population**

WARD 4 BOX 2
Tract 0203.02
Blocks: 101, 102A, 102B, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 120, 121, 122, 124, 127, 128, 129, 130, 139, 201A, 202, 203A, 204A, 205, 216, 217A, 218, 221A, 223A 862
Tract 0213.01
Blocks: 118, 119, 120 322
Tract 0215.00
Blocks: 222, 223, 224, 225, 226A, 226B, 226C, 226D, 226E, 227 180
WHITNEY STATION A1 4,189
WHITNEY STATION A2 2,312
ZION HILL
Tract 0213.01
Blocks: 306C, 307, 308 445

DISTRICT TOTAL 27,870

PERCENT VARIATION ..... -0.882

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 33

Area **Population**

Cherokee County

Census Voting Tabulation Districts

ALLENS

Tract 9706.00

Blocks: 508, 509, 510, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538 512

BROWNS MILL 395

BUTLER 448

EZELLS 941

GOUCHER 646

LITTLEJOHNS

Tract 9707.00

Blocks: 166, 167, 168, 169, 226, 229 48

MACEDONIA

Tract 9701.00

Blocks: 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 349, 401, 402, 403, 404A, 405, 408, 411, 420, 421, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 437, 438, 439, 440 769

RAVENA 325

THICKETTY 484

TIMBER RIDGE

Tract 9706.00

Blocks: 539, 540, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572 156

WHITE PLAINS 834

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 33

Area **Population**

Spartanburg County

Census Voting Tabulation Districts

BEN AVON

Tract 0221.00

Blocks: 101, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 125, 126, 127, 128, 135, 136, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 284, 285, 286, 290, 294, 301, 304, 309, 311, 316, 317 3,015

Tract 0239.00

Blocks: 106 2

CLIFTON 1,247

COWPENS 4,827

CROFT 2,424

GLENDALE 2,028

PACOLET MILLS 1,449

PACOLET 2,664

WARD 3 BOX 1

Tract 0213.03

Blocks: 103A, 118D, 118E, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407A, 407B, 408 911

WHITE STONE

Tract 0221.00

Blocks: 228, 318, 327, 328 71

Tract 0239.00

Blocks: 107, 109, 110, 113, 114, 117, 118 ... 327

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 33

Area	Population
ZION HILL	
Tract 0213.01	
Blocks: 301, 302, 303, 304, 305B, 305C, 305E	280
Tract 0213.03	
Blocks: 101A, 101B, 102, 103B, 103D, 104A, 104B, 104C, 105A, 105B, 105C, 106, 107, 117A, 117B, 118A, 118B, 118C, 118F, 118G, 118H, 118J, 119A, 119B, 119C, 120A, 120B, 120C, 120D, 120E, 120F, 120G, 121A, 121B, 501A, 501B, 501C, 501D, 501E, 501F, 502A, 502B, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509A, 509B, 509C, 510A, 510B, 511, 512A, 512B, 512C, 513, 514	1,816
Tract 0221.00	
Blocks: 102, 103, 104A, 104B, 115	69
Tract 0222.01	
Blocks: 211, 311, 312, 314, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 332, 334, 335, 336, 414, 415, 417, 418A, 418B, 424	1,163
DISTRICT TOTAL	27,851
PERCENT VARIATION	-0.950

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 34

Area **Population**

Spartanburg County

Census Voting Tabulation Districts

ARCADIA 569

ARKWRIGHT

Tract 0207.00

Blocks: 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333B, 334, 336, 337, 401A 1,147

BEN AVON

Tract 0213.02

Blocks: 401C, 410, 413, 414, 415, 416, 418, 419 237

Tract 0221.00

Blocks: 302, 303, 305, 306, 310, 312, 313, 314, 315 404

BOBO 1,329

CEDAR SPRINGS 2,709

FAIRFOREST 3,354

ROEBUCK

Tract 0207.00

Blocks: 333A, 333D, 335B 0

Tract 0220.01

Blocks: 101B, 102B, 104, 105B, 106B, 107A, 107C, 108, 110, 111B, 112, 117, 128, 201B, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 521, 522A, 522B, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 532, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618 ... 4,553

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 34

Area **Population**

Tract 0220.03

Blocks: 604, 605, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615 31

WARD 3 BOX 3 STATION B 1,019

WARD 3 BOX 4 STATION A

Tract 0206.01

Blocks: 121B 22

Tract 0206.02

Blocks: 201 397

Tract 0206.03

Blocks: 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 238, 303, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315 ... 1,336

Tract 0207.00

Blocks: 335A, 407, 408, 413, 415 762

Tract 0220.01

Blocks: 101A, 107B, 109, 111A 400

WARD 3 BOX 4 STATION B 3,400

WEST VIEW 5,725

WHITE STONE

Tract 0221.00

Blocks: 307, 308C, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 325, 326 382

DISTRICT TOTAL 27,876

PERCENT VARIATION ..... -0.861

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 35

Area	**Population**
Spartanburg County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
BISHOP	2,437
CANAAN	1,831
CAVINS HOBBYSVILLE	872
CRESCENT	1,488
ENOREE	1,890
FAIRMONT	
Tract 0231.02	
Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 617	1,144
Tract 0234.00	
Blocks: 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 210, 212, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339	1,930
MOTLOW	1,514
PAULINE GLENN SPRINGS	
Tract 0238.00	
Blocks: 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273	705
POPLAR SPRINGS	2,679

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 35

Area **Population**

REIDVILLE

Tract 0234.00

Blocks: 327, 418, 419, 420, 421, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540 2,278

WALNUT GROVE

Tract 0235.00

Blocks: 232, 233, 234, 235 48

Tract 0238.00

Blocks: 301, 302, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 586 ... 1,872

WHITE STONE

Tract 0238.00

Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208 120

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 35

Area **Population**

Tract 0239.00

Blocks: 404, 405, 407, 408, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444 302

WOODRUFF 1 3,423

WOODRUFF 2 2,235

WOODRUFF 3 1,182

DISTRICT TOTAL 27,950

PERCENT VARIATION ..... -0.597

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 36

Area **Population**

Spartanburg County

Census Voting Tabulation Districts

ARLINGTON 2,687

BALLENGER 2,398

CUNNINGHAM 2,461

DEYOUNG 1,430

DUNCAN

Tract 0230.00

Blocks: 355, 356 15

Tract 0231.01

Blocks: 101A, 101B, 102, 103A, 103B, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 111, 112, 113, 114, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123,

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 36

Area **Population**

124, 125A, 125B, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130A, 130B, 130C, 130D, 130E, 131, 132, 133, 201A, 201B, 201C, 201D, 201E, 202, 203, 204A, 204B, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213A, 213B, 214A, 214B, 215, 216, 217, 218A, 218B, 219, 220, 221A, 221B, 222A, 222B, 223, 224, 225, 301A, 301B, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 347, 348, 350, 360, 401A, 401B, 401C, 401D, 401E, 402, 403, 404, 405, 412, 413 3,634

Tract 0232.00

Blocks: 204, 205, 210, 211, 212, 217, 228, 229, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 416 ... 1,043

FAIRMONT

Tract 0231.01

Blocks: 501, 502, 503 60

Tract 0234.00

Blocks: 324 10

HOLLY SPRINGS 2,382

INMAN

Tract 0228.00

Blocks: 519 13

Tract 0229.00

Blocks: 501, 502, 503, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511A, 511B, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546 937

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 36

Area	Population
JACKSON MILL	762
LYMAN	3,680
PELHAM	723
REIDVILLE	
Tract 0231.01	
Blocks: 308	0
Tract 0232.00	
Blocks: 513, 514, 516, 523, 528, 529, 539, 540, 541, 542	218
Tract 0234.00	
Blocks: 325, 326, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 422, 423, 424, 425	824
STARTEX	1,110
VICTOR MILL	
Tract 0232.00	
Blocks: 425, 426, 427	69
WELLFORD	2,455
WOODS CHAPEL	1,030
DISTRICT TOTAL	27,941
PERCENT VARIATION	-0.629

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 37

Area	Population
Spartanburg County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
BOILING SPRINGS	
Tract 0214.00	
Blocks: 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809	792

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 37

Area	Population
Tract 0218.01	
Blocks: 101, 113, 303, 317A, 317B, 318	122
Tract 0218.02	
Blocks: 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410	955
Tract 0224.02	
Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314	3,528
Tract 0224.03	
Blocks: 322, 323, 324	215
CAMPTON	9,718
HAYNE SHOP	3,098
HILLTOP	829
INMAN	
Tract 0228.00	
Blocks: 116, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 171, 172	230
Tract 0229.00	
Blocks: 101, 102A, 102B, 103A, 103B, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111A, 111B, 112, 113, 114, 115A, 115B, 116A, 116B, 117A, 117B, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124A, 124B, 125A, 125B, 125C, 126, 127, 128, 201, 202, 203, 204A, 204B, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211A, 211B, 212, 213, 214A, 214B, 214C, 214D, 215, 216, 217A, 217B, 218A, 218B, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234A, 234B, 235, 280,	

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 37

Area **Population**

281, 282, 283, 284, 286, 287, 289, 290, 291, 292A, 292B, 293, 294, 295, 296A, 296B, 297, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318A, 318B, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324A, 324B, 325, 326, 327, 328A, 328B, 329A, 329B, 329C, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 387, 390, 391, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 426, 504, 901, 902, 903, 904, 905, 906, 907, 908, 909, 910, 911, 912, 913, 914 4,548

JOHNSON CITY 1,469

POWELL SAXON

Tract 0217.00

Blocks: 302, 303, 304, 315, 318 142

UNA

Tract 0217.00

Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 202, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 301 1,346

WHITNEY STATION B

Tract 0216.00

Blocks: 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 301, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 311A, 311B, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317A, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324A, 324B, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 338 1,146

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 37

Area **Population**

DISTRICT TOTAL 28,138

PERCENT VARIATION 0.071

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 38

Area **Population**

Spartanburg County

Census Voting Tabulation Districts

ARROWOOD 517

BOILING SPRINGS

Tract 0224.02

Blocks: 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 442, 443, 517, 518, 519, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550 2,854

Tract 0224.03

Blocks: 301, 302, 303, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 321 579

BOWEN 2,045

BROOKLYN COOLEY SPRINGS FIN 3,633

CAMPOBELLO 2,725

CHEROKEE SPRINGS

Tract 0224.03

Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126,

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 38

Area	Population
127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 149, 201, 202, 203, 205, 212, 213, 304, 305, 306, 320	2,184
CHESNEE	3,647
GRAMLING	1,533
LANDRUM	4,161
MOORE SWITZER	882
NEW PROSPECT	3,096
DISTRICT TOTAL	27,856
PERCENT VARIATION	-0.932

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 39

Area	Population
Lexington County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
BATESBURG	3,697
LEESVILLE	3,222
MIMS	1,419
POND BRANCH	2,443
RIDGE ROAD	2,189
Saluda County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
CLYDE	505
DELMAR	555
DENNY	398
FRUIT HILL	1,110
HIGGINS	230

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 39

Area	**Population**
HOLLYWOOD	1,062
HOLLY	829
HOLSTONS	995
MONETTA	253
MOUNT WILLING	294
PLEASANT CROSS	362
PLEASANT GROVE	552
RICHLAND	682
RIDGE SPRING	1,329
SALUDA 1	2,489
SALUDA 2	1,787
SARDIS	722
WARD	607
ZOAR	309
DISTRICT TOTAL	28,040
PERCENT VARIATION	-0.277

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 40

Area **Population**

Newberry County

Census Voting Tabulation Districts

BETH EDEN

Tract 9505.00

Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112A, 112C, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 201A, 201B,

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 40

Area	Population
201C, 202B, 203B, 204C, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210B, 211, 212B, 302, 307B, 308B	580
BUSH RIVER	600
CHAPPELLS	711
FAIRVIEW ONEAL	2,116
HARTFORD	1,192
HELENA	1,332
JOHNSTONE	801
KINARDS JACAPA	765
LITTLE MOUNTAIN	1,252
MIDWAY	283
MOUNT BETHEL GARMANY	
Tract 9502.00	
Blocks: 113, 114, 115, 116, 118, 135, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214B, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220B, 221D, 223C, 224B, 226C, 227B, 228, 229, 301, 302, 303B, 304, 305, 306B, 321, 322, 325, 326	1,340
NEWBERRY WARD 1	749
NEWBERRY WARD 2	1,984
NEWBERRY WARD 3 NO.1	455
NEWBERRY WARD 3 NO.2	1,138
NEWBERRY WARD 4	1,333
NEWBERRY WARD 5	1,320
NEWBERRY WARD 6	1,765
OAKLAND	1,738
PEAK	177
POMARIA	899
PROSPERITY	2,320
SAINT PHILLIP JOLLY STREET	1,104

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 40

Area	**Population**
SILVERSTREET	1,176
STONEY HILL	726
WHEELAND	375
DISTRICT TOTAL	28,231
PERCENT VARIATION	0.402

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 41

Area	**Population**
Chester County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
BALDWIN MILL	
Tract 0202.00	
Blocks: 108	0
Tract 0203.00	
Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 104A, 104C, 105, 106B, 109A	247
Tract 0205.00	
Blocks: 319, 320, 321, 322, 401. 402, 403, 404, 419, 420	325
Tract 0206.00	
Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 104, 105	56
BLACKSTOCK	920
CHESTER WARD 1	
Tract 0203.00	
Blocks: 201A, 506A, 529A, 530	523
CHESTER WARD 2	
Tract 0202.00	
Blocks: 222B	0

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 41

Area	Population
Tract 0203.00	
Blocks: 104B, 106A, 107A, 107B, 107C, 107D, 108, 110	467
Tract 0205.00	
Blocks: 421, 422	5
Tract 0206.00	
Blocks: 106A, 106B, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 119, 120	135
CHESTER WARD 3	
Tract 0202.00	
Blocks: 306, 307, 316, 317, 318A, 318B, 319A, 319B, 324B, 404, 405, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429A, 429B, 430A, 430B, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435	948
Tract 0206.00	
Blocks: 107, 113A, 113B, 113C, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118A, 118B, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 129, 141, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 201, 202A, 202B, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 308B, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475	1,032
HAZELWOOD	692
ROSSVILLE	698
Fairfield County	22,295
DISTRICT TOTAL	28,343
PERCENT VARIATION	0.800

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 42

Area	Population
Union County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
ADAMSBURG	791
BONHAM	1,163
BUFFALO 1	1,625
BUFFALO 2	464
CARLISLE	890
EXCELSIOR MILL	2,202
JONESVILLE 1	1,354
JONESVILLE 2	2,009
KELTON	1,369
LOCKHART 1	640
LOCKHART 2	541
MEADOWS	941
MONARCH 1	1,926
MONARCH 2	408
OAKLAND	240
OTTARAY	385
PUTMAN	
Tract 0307.00	
Blocks: 108, 111, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205	713
SANTUCK	1,081
WARD 1 BOX 1	1,197
WARD 1 BOX 2	2,061
WARD 2	1,946
WARD 3	1,590
WARD 4 BOX 1	1,386
WARD 4 BOX 2	1,022
WEST SPRINGS	424

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 42

Area	**Population**
DISTRICT TOTAL	28,368
PERCENT VARIATION	0.889

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 43

Area	**Population**
Chester County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
BALDWIN MILL	
Tract 0202.00	
Blocks: 105B, 107, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125B, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139B, 208B, 212B, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220	981
Tract 0203.00	
Blocks: 109B	0
BECKHAMVILLE	1,696
CHESTER WARD 1	
Tract 0202.00	
Blocks: 201, 202, 203	36
Tract 0203.00	
Blocks: 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208A, 208B, 209A, 209B, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 513, 514, 515, 516A, 516B, 517A, 517B, 518	1,662

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 43

Area **Population**

CHESTER WARD 2

Tract 0202.00

Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 104, 105A, 106, 125A, 126, 127, 128, 129, 139A, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208A, 209, 210, 211, 212A, 221A, 221B, 222A 1,188

CHESTER WARD 3

Tract 0201.00

Blocks: 301, 302, 303, 304A, 304B, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313A, 313B, 314A, 314B, 315A, 315B, 316, 317A, 317B, 318A, 318B, 319A, 319B, 320A, 320B, 321A, 321B, 322, 323A, 323B, 324A, 324B, 325, 326A, 326B, 327 ... 790

Tract 0202.00

Blocks: 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324A, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332 753

Tract 0206.00

Blocks: 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 429, 430, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 459, 460, 461, 462, 476, 477 725

CHESTER WARD 4

Tract 0201.00

Blocks: 111A, 121A, 121B, 122A, 123A, 123B, 124, 201A, 201B, 202A, 202B, 203A, 203B, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209A, 209B, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218 1,008

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 43

Area	Population
Tract 0202.00	
Blocks: 401, 402, 403, 406, 407, 408	138
Tract 0203.00	
Blocks: 402A, 403A, 404A, 405A, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 522A	553
EDGEMOOR	
Tract 0207.00	
Blocks: 107	0
Tract 0208.00	
Blocks: 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 143, 144, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 155, 156, 160, 165, 166, 167, 168	1,255
EUREKA MILL	
Tract 0201.00	
Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111B, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 122B	655
Tract 0203.00	
Blocks: 401, 402B, 403B, 404B, 405B, 511, 512, 519, 520, 521, 522B	389
Tract 0206.00	
Blocks: 562, 563	0
FORT LAWN	1,853
GREAT FALLS 1 AND 2	935
GREAT FALLS 3	1,071
LANDO	511
LANSFORD	743
RICHBURG	1,263

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 43

Area **Population**

RODMAN

Tract 0206.00

Blocks: 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 428, 431 208

Tract 0207.00

Blocks: 134, 135, 137, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148 158

York County

Census Voting Tabulation Districts

CATAWBA 3,297

LESLIE NO 1

Tract 0013.02

Blocks: 101, 102, 103 26

Tract 0612.01

Blocks: 101, 102B, 103, 104, 105, 106, 112, 113, 144, 145, 146, 203, 204, 205, 220, 221, 222, 223, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256 2,131

Tract 0612.02

Blocks: 102, 103 12

Tract 0612.03

Blocks: 303, 305, 306, 307, 308, 314, 315 ... 215

Tract 0613.02

Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 108 61

LESSLIE [sic] NO 2 4,051

DISTRICT TOTAL 28,374

PERCENT VARIATION 0.910

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 44

Area **Population**

Kershaw County

Census Voting Tabulation Districts

BETHUNE

Tract 9701.00

Blocks: 114, 115, 118, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197 815

BUFFALO 1,277

Lancaster County

Census Voting Tabulation Districts

ANTIOCH 1,089

CHARLESBORO 373

CHESTERFIELD AVENUE 1,678

DIXIE

Tract 0110.00

Blocks: 315, 316 256

DOUGLAS

Tract 0103.00

Blocks: 401, 402, 403 2

Tract 0104.00

Blocks: 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 144, 145, 146, 147, 161, 175, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215,

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 44

Area	Population
216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241	1,939
Tract 0105.00	
Blocks: 324, 325, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339	410
ELGIN	1,988
FLAT CREEK	258
FLINT RIDGE	363
FORK HILL	383
GOOCHS CROSS ROADS	
Tract 0105.00	
Blocks: 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463	1,370
Tract 0106.00	
Blocks: 102, 105, 107, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 119, 120, 121	471
HEATH SPRINGS	1,343
HYDE PARK	
Tract 0110.00	
Blocks: 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 501, 502, 503, 507, 508, 513, 514, 515, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 606, 607, 609, 610, 611, 612	2,449
KERSHAW 1	823
KERSHAW 2	935

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 44

Area	**Population**
KERSHAW HEALTH CENTER	1,548
KERSHAW MILL	1,317
LYNWOOD DRIVE	2,554
MIDWAY	572
OAK RIDGE	902
PLEASANT HILL	765
PRIMUS	254
RICH HILL	454
THREE C5	285
TRADESVILLE	702
UNION	499
WELSHS	162
DISTRICT TOTAL	28,236
PERCENT VARIATION	0.420

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 45

Area	**Population**
Lancaster County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
BELAIRE	1,353
CAMP CREEK	974
CARMEL	584
DIXIE	
Tract 0110.00	
Blocks: 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 327, 328, 329	477

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 45

Area	Population
DOUGLAS	
Tract 0103.00	
Blocks: 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495	373
Tract 0104.00	
Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 176, 177, 178, 179	96
DWIGHT	631
ERWIN FARM	2,341
GOOCHS CROSS ROADS	
Tract 0105.00	
Blocks: 501, 502, 503, 504A, 504B, 504C, 504D, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509A, 509B, 509C, 509D, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524A, 524B, 525A, 525B, 525C	621
HYDE PARK	
Tract 0110.00	
Blocks: 504, 506, 509, 510, 511, 512, 516	176
JACKSONHAM	2,240
LANCASTER EAST	3,792
LANCASTER WEST	1,751
PLEASANT VALLEY	3,272
RIVERSIDE	1,678
SPRINGS MILL 1	1,194
SPRINGS MILL	1,344

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 45

Area	**Population**
TABERNACLE	1,161
UNITY	1,070
VAN WYCK	871
WYLIE PARK	2,373
DISTRICT TOTAL	28,372
PERCENT VARIATION	0.903

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 46

Area	**Population**
York County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
EBENEZER	2,615
EBINPORT	2,526
FEWELL PARK	1,470
HIGHLAND PARK	2,086
LESLIE NO 1	
Tract 0602.00	
Blocks: 124, 125	0
Tract 0612.01	
Blocks: 102A, 114A, 114B, 115, 116A, 116B, 117A, 117B, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213A, 213B, 224, 225	991

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 46

Area **Population**

MT GALLANT

Tract 0608.01

Blocks: 101A, 101B, 101C, 101D, 101E, 101F, 102A, 102B, 102C, 103A, 103B, 103C, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111A, 111B, 112, 113A, 113B, 114, 115A, 115B, 115C, 116, 117, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134A, 134B, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140A, 140B, 141 2,860

Tract 0609.01

Blocks: 101, 102, 103A, 103B, 104, 105, 106A, 106B, 107A, 107B, 107C, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116A, 116B, 116C, 116D, 117, 118, 119A, 119B, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124A, 124B, 124C, 125A, 125B, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 201A, 201B, 202, 203, 204A, 204B, 205A, 205B, 206A, 206B, 207, 208A, 208B, 209, 210, 211, 212A, 212B, 213, 214A, 214B, 215A, 215B, 215C, 216, 217A, 217B, 218A, 218B, 218C, 219A, 219B, 219C, 220, 221, 222, 223A, 223B, 224 1,713

NORTHSIDE 1,569

NORTHWESTERN

Tract 0605.01

Blocks: 136 0

Tract 0614.02

Blocks: 102A, 102B, 104A, 104B, 104C, 104D, 105, 106, 107, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126A, 126B 633

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 46

Area	Population
ROCK HILL NO 1	1,040
ROCK HILL NO 4	
Tract 0601.02	
Blocks: 305	127
Tract 0607.00	
Blocks: 208, 209, 210, 221, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321	403
ROCK HILL NO 5	
Tract 0601.01	
Blocks: 301, 302, 303, 304, 401, 402, 404	104
Tract 0601.02	
Blocks: 104A, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 202, 203, 209, 210, 211, 212, 219, 220, 221, 301, 302, 303, 304, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317	2,302
Tract 0605.01	
Blocks: 211	0
Tract 0606.00	
Blocks: 101, 104, 105	0
Tract 0607.00	
Blocks: 305	2
ROCK HILL NO 6	
Tract 0601.01	
Blocks: 419, 420, 423	18
Tract 0603.00	
Blocks: 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 227, 228, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 315, 317	2,138

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 46

Area	**Population**
ROCK HILL NO 7	3,553
UNIVERSITY	2,093
DISTRICT TOTAL	28,243
PERCENT VARIATION	0.445

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 47

Area	**Population**
York County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
BETHEL NO 1	
Tract 0617.03	
Blocks: 160, 161, 162, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 186, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265	1,810
Tract 0617.04	
Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171	1,200

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 47

Area	Population
BOWLING GREEN	2,923
CANNON MILL	3,899
CLOVER NO 1	2,928
CLOVER NO 2	3,564
FILBERT	1,599
NEWPORT	3,294
NORTHWESTERN	
Tract 0614.02	
Blocks: 108A, 108B, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307	622
TIRZAH	1,604
YORK NO 1	
Tract 0616.01	
Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117A, 117B, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122A, 122B, 122C, 123A, 123B, 125, 126, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155	902
YORK NO 2	3,588
DISTRICT TOTAL	27,933
PERCENT VARIATION	-0.658

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 48

Area **Population**

York County

Census Voting Tabulation Districts

BETHEL NO 1

Tract 0617.04

Blocks: 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372 2,038

BETHEL NO 2 967

FORT MILL NO 1 3,289

FORT MILL NO 2 823

FORT MILL NO 3 3,210

FORT MILL NO 4 2,505

FORT MILL NO 5 2,351

FORT MILL NO 6 1,515

INDIA HOOK 1,270

MT GALLANT

Tract 0609.02

Blocks: 219A, 303A, 303C, 303D, 304, 305, 306, 307A, 307F, 307G, 308A, 308B, 309B, 309C, 309D, 313, 314, 315A, 316A, 316B 2,246

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 48

Area	**Population**
MUSEUM	4,478
TEGA CAY	3,650
DISTRICT TOTAL	28,342
PERCENT VARIATION	0.797

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 49

Area	**Population**
York County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
DELPHIA	1,980
EDGEWOOD	2,457
MCCONNELLS	
Tract 0614.01	
Blocks: 201, 205, 206, 207, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214B, 247, 249, 250, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262	284
MT HOLLY	2,023
OAK RIDGE	2,533
OGDEN	1,950
ROCK HILL NO 2	3,485
ROCK HILL NO 3	3,600
ROCK HILL NO 4	
Tract 0605.01	
Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122A, 122B, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130A, 130B, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 201, 202,	

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 49

Area	Population
203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 216, 217	1,834
Tract 0606.00	
Blocks: 102, 103	2,045
Tract 0609.05	
Blocks: 125A, 201A, 201B, 201C, 201D, 201E, 202A, 202B, 203, 204A, 204B, 205	1,406
Tract 0614.02	
Blocks: 101A, 101B, 101C, 101D, 103	87
ROCK HILL NO 5	
Tract 0601.01	
Blocks: 403	22
Tract 0605.01	
Blocks: 212, 213	45
ROCK HILL NO 6	
Tract 0013.01	
Blocks: 101	0
Tract 0603.00	
Blocks: 212, 213, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 316, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324	1,944
Tract 0612.01	
Blocks: 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 238	173
Tract 0613.01	
Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106A, 106B, 107, 108, 109, 110A, 110B, 111, 112A, 112C, 113, 114B	271
YORK NO 1	
Tract 0615.01	
Blocks: 244, 245, 267, 268, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286	148

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 49

Area	**Population**
Tract 0615.02	
Blocks: 325, 326, 327	57
Tract 0616.01	
Blocks: 108, 124, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131A, 131B, 131C, 132, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205A, 205B, 206, 207, 208, 209A, 209B, 209C, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222A, 222B, 223, 224, 225A, 225B, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231A, 231B, 231C, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244A, 244B	1,519
DISTRICT TOTAL	27,863
PERCENT VARIATION	-0.907

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 50

Area	**Population**
Lee County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
ASHWOOD	856
BISHOPVILLE 1	1,031
BISHOPVILLE 2	1,317
BISHOPVILLE 3	1,339
BISHOPVILLE 4	1,946
CEDAR CREEK	502
CYPRESS	667
ELLIOTT	808
HICKORY HILL	357
IONIA	904

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 50

Area	Population
LYNCHBURG	1,302
MANVILLE	775
MOUNT CLIO	504
RATTLESNAKE SPRINGS	534
SAINT CHARLES	1,426
SOUTH LYNCHBURG	722
SPRING HILL	794
STOKES BRIDGE	720
WOODROW	423

Sumter County

Census Voting Tabulation Districts

DALZELL DUBOSE	3,954
HILLCREST	2,493
HORSEPEN BRANCH	1,985
OSWEGO	
Tract 0004.00	
Blocks: 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569	695
REMBERT	
Tract 0001.00	
Blocks: 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247,	

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 50

Area	**Population**
248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297	1,965
DISTRICT TOTAL	28,019
PERCENT VARIATION	-0.352

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 51

Area	**Population**
Sumter County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
BATES	1,495
BIRNIE	1,829
BROGDON	
Tract 0006.00	
Blocks: 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 339, 340, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 416, 417, 418, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438	1,724

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 51

Area **Population**

CONCORD

Tract 0006.00

Blocks: 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 129, 130, 131, 134, 135, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 419, 420, 439, 440 1,130

Tract 0011.00

Blocks: 608 8

LEMIRA 2,275

MAGNOLIA 1,107

MAYESVILLE 1,218

MCCRAYS MILL NORTH

Tract 0017.02

Blocks: 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 301A, 301B, 301C, 302, 303A, 303B, 304, 305, 306, 308A, 308B, 309 649

MCCRAYS MILL SOUTH

Tract 0017.02

Blocks: 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 307, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318 1,408

MILLWOOD

Tract 0017.01

Blocks: 201A, 201B, 202A, 202C, 202D, 208A, 209, 210A, 210B, 211, 213, 214, 215A, 215B, 216A, 216B, 217A, 217B, 218A, 218B, 219A, 219B, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231A, 231B, 232, 233A, 233B, 233C 1,370

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 51

Area	Population
MULBERRY	1,604
OLD POCALLA	1,655
OSWEGO	
Tract 0004.00	
Blocks: 509, 510, 531, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542	325
PLEASANT GROVE TRINITY	658
SALEM	659
SALTERSTOWN	1,665
SAVAGE GLOVER	1,188
SHILOH	495
SOUTH LIBERTY	
Tract 0013.00	
Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 214, 215, 216, 516, 517, 519, 520	812
SOUTH RED BAY	1,662
STONE HILL	1,223
SUNSET	
Tract 0017.02	
Blocks: 401, 402A, 402B, 402C, 403, 404A, 404B, 404C, 405A, 405C, 406A, 406B, 406C, 406D, 407, 408A, 408B, 409, 420, 421, 422, 425, 426, 442, 443	1,135
TAYLORS	937
WILDER	1,085
DISTRICT TOTAL	28,316
PERCENT VARIATION	0.704

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 52

Area **Population**

Kershaw County

Census Voting Tabulation Districts

AIRPORT....2,308
ANTIOCH....820
CAMDEN 1....1,356
CAMDEN 2....574
CAMDEN 3....1,008
CAMDEN 4....1,600
CAMDEN 5A....886
CAMDEN 5....562
CAMDEN 6....601
CASSATT
Tract 9701.00
Blocks: 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 173, 174, 175....134
Tract 9702.00
Blocks: 280, 281....79
Tract 9705.00
Blocks: 151....0
Tract 9706.00
Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 194, 195, 196, 197....802
CHARLOTTE THOMPSON....1,955
DOBYS MILL....1,295
EAST CAMDEN-HERMITAGE....929

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 52

Area	Population
GATES FORD	441
LIBERTY HILL	385
MALVERN HILL	1,908
RABONS CROSSROADS	1,671
RIVERDALE	1,629
SHAYLORS HILL	925
SPRINGDALE	2,269
WESTVILLE	2,123
WHITE GARDENS	2,015
DISTRICT TOTAL	28,295
PERCENT VARIATION	0.629

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 53

Area	Population
Chesterfield County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
BAY SPRINGS	215
BLACK CREEK	187
BROCKS MILL	2,086
CASH	1,147
CAT POND	509
CENTER GROVE	539
CENTER POINT	260
CHERAW 1	2,153
CHERAW 2	5,282
CHERAW 3	1,969
COURT HOUSE	2,919

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 53

Area	Population
CROSS ROADS	217
GRANTS MILL	1,545
MCBEE	
Tract 9508.98	
Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110A, 110B, 111A, 111B, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139A, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 153, 154, 155, 160, 163A, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168A, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243A, 243B, 244, 245, 246, 257, 258, 263A, 263B, 263C, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275A, 275B, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286A, 286B, 287, 288, 289A, 289B, 290, 291, 292, 293A, 293B, 296, 297	1,237
MIDDENDORF	604
MOUNT CROGHAN	299
OUSLEYDALE	712
PATRICK	1,034
PEE DEE	273
RUBY	1,115
SHILOH	853
SNOW HILL	354
VAUGHN	336
WEXFORD	359
WHITE OAK	469
WINZO	1,373

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 53

Area	**Population**
DISTRICT TOTAL	28,046
PERCENT VARIATION	-0.256

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 54

Area	**Population**
Marlboro County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
ADAMSVILLE	718
BLENHEIM	471
BRIGHTSVILLE	837
BROWNSVILLE	526
CLIO	2,825
EAST BENNETTSVILLE	7,431
EAST MCCOLL	1,649
MCCOLL	2,291
QUICKS CROSS ROADS	2,106
RED HILL	
Tract 9602.00	
Blocks: 802, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 823, 824, 825, 827, 828, 829, 830, 831, 832	311
Tract 9606.00	
Blocks: 101, 102, 106, 108, 109, 110, 112	261
SOUTH BENNETTSVILLE	1,528
TATUM	618
WALLACE	1,821
WEST BENNETTSVILLE	4,910

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 54

Area	**Population**
DISTRICT TOTAL	28,303
PERCENT VARIATION	0.658

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 55

Area	**Population**
Dillon County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
BERMUDA	437
CAROLINA	521
EAST DILLON	2,939
FLOYDALE	913
FORK	788
GADDY'S MILL	523
HAMER	1,201
KEMPER	643
LAKE VIEW	2,122
LATTA	
Tract 9706.00	
Blocks: 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306A, 306B, 307, 308, 309A, 309B, 309C, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326A, 326B, 326C, 326D, 327, 328, 329A, 329B, 330, 331, 332, 333A, 333B, 334, 335, 336A, 336B, 337A, 337B, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359A, 359B, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373A, 373B, 374A, 374B, 401,	

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 55

Area	Population
402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413A, 413B, 414A, 414B, 415A, 415B, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428A, 429A, 430A, 431A, 432A, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441A, 442A, 445, 447, 451, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 526, 527, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 552, 553, 554, 652, 653, 654, 677, 678, 679	2,464
LITTLE ROCK	752
MANNING	671
MINTURN	472
MT. CALVARY	2,708
NEW HOLLY	666
OAK GROVE	1,057
OAKLAND	965
PLEASANT HILL	380
SOUTH DILLON	3,748
WEST DILLON	3,981
DISTRICT TOTAL	27,951
PERCENT VARIATION	-0.594

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 56

Area	Population
Darlington County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
ANTIOCH	2,242
BURNT BRANCH BETHEL	2,836
CLYDE BLACK CREEK	
Tract 0102.00	
Blocks: 166	0
DARLINGTON 1	
Tract 0111.00	
Blocks: 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 213, 215, 216	170
DARLINGTON 3	4,279
DARLINGTON 6	2,433
DOVESVILLE	1,353
HARTSVILLE 4	
Tract 0106.00	
Blocks: 349, 350, 351, 353, 354, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 382, 383, 384, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397	251
Tract 0108.00	
Blocks: 201, 202, 203, 207, 208, 209, 210	119
HARTSVILLE 7	
Tract 0106.00	
Blocks: 210, 211, 212, 250, 251, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 352	926

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 56

Area	Population
Tract 0109.00	
Blocks: 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 139, 140, 158, 159, 160	194
HARTSVILLE 8A	2,968
HARTSVILLE 8B	2,515
MONT CLARE MECHANICSVILLE	
Tract 0101.00	
Blocks: 341, 343, 347, 349, 350, 352, 353, 354,357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397	268
Tract 0113.00	
Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 220, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 255, 256, 277, 280, 281, 282, 285, 286, 291, 295, 296, 297	1,331
OATS PHILADELPHIA	1,325
POND HOLLOW NEW MARKET	1,392
SOCIETY HILL	1,195
SWIFT CREEK	1,447

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 56

Area	**Population**
Marlboro County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
RED HILL	
Tract 9602.00	
Blocks: 162, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 826, 833, 834, 835, 836, 837, 838, 839, 840, 841, 842	185
Tract 9606.00	
Blocks: 103, 104, 105, 107, 111, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179	873
DISTRICT TOTAL	28,302
PERCENT VARIATION	0.654

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 57

Area	**Population**
Marion County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
BRITTONS NECK	2,294
CENTENARY	1,788
FRIENDSHIP	409

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 57

Area	**Population**
MARION 1	2,122
MARION NORTH	1,351
MARION SOUTH	4,690
NICHOLS	1,341
NORTHEAST MULLINS	3,967
NORTHWEST MULLINS	3,254
RAINS	1,242
SOUTHEAST MULLINS	2,158
SOUTHWEST MULLINS	2,528
TEMPERANCE	
Tract 9502.00	
Blocks: 543	0
ZION	793
DISTRICT TOTAL	27,937
PERCENT VARIATION	-0.644

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 58

Area	**Population**
Horry County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
AYNOR	1,685
BAYBORO	1,274
BROWNWAY	1,111
CEDAR GROVE	773
COOL SPRINGS	622
DOG BLUFF	925
FLOYDS	820
FOUR MILE	1,516

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 58

Area	Population
GALIVANTS FERRY	258
GREEN SEA	1,659
HOMEWOOD	970
HORRY	879
JAMESTOWN	2,647
JORDANVILLE	525
JOYNER SWAMP	122
JUNIPER BAY	1,433
METHODIST RHEOBETH	577
MILL SWAMP	280
MOUNT OLIVE	582
NORTH CONWAY 1	1,341
NORTON	243
PLEASANT VIEW	385
POPLAR HILL	1,022
RACEPATH 1	1,566
RACEPATH 2	2,441
SPRING BRANCH	517
TAYLORSVILLE	487
WEST CONWAY	1,330
DISTRICT TOTAL	28,290
PERCENT VARIATION	0.612

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 59

Area **Population**

Dillon County
Census Voting Tabulation Districts
LATTA
Tract 9706.00
Blocks: 428B, 429B, 430B, 431B, 432B, 441B, 442B, 443, 444A, 444B, 446, 448, 449, 450, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 528, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561 1,163

Florence County
Census Voting Tabulation Districts
BACK SWAMP 1,234
BROOKGREEN
Tract 0003.00
Blocks: 202, 203, 210, 211B, 212B, 213 151
CLAUSSEN
Tract 0016.01
Blocks: 201A 0
Tract 0016.02
Blocks: 207 0
Tract 0017.00
Blocks: 132A, 133, 134, 135, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 179, 180 932

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 59

Area	Population
FLORENCE WARD 10	
Tract 0003.00	
Blocks: 204, 211A, 211C, 211D, 212A, 214, 215A, 215B, 215C, 215D, 413A	392
Tract 0008.00	
Blocks: 101B, 603, 604, 605, 606, 619	151
FLORENCE WARD 1	2,415
FLORENCE WARD 9	
Tract 0008.00	
Blocks: 101A, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 201, 202, 203, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 621, 622	3,143
Tract 0009.00	
Blocks: 119, 136, 137, 140, 141, 142	0
GILBERT	
Tract 0005.00	
Blocks: 101, 102, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 135, 136, 137, 207, 208	515
Tract 0007.00	
Blocks: 525	23
KINGSBURG	651
MARS BLUFF 1	3,883
MARS BLUFF 2	1,953
MILL BRANCH	819
PAMPLICO 2	1,255
QUINBY	1,249

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 59

Area	**Population**
SPAULDING	1,538
STONE	787
Marion County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
MARION 2	2,187
MARION WEST	1,839
SELLERS	590
TEMPERANCE	
Tract 9502.00	
Blocks: 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 542, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568	1,346
DISTRICT TOTAL	28,216
PERCENT VARIATION	0.349

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 60

Area	**Population**
Florence County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
BROOKGREEN	
Tract 0001.00	
Blocks: 102, 107	106

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 60

Area	Population
CARTERSVILLE	1,619
EBENEZER	
Tract 0001.00	
Blocks: 201, 202A, 202B, 202C, 202D, 203, 204, 205, 301A, 301B, 302, 303A, 303B, 304A, 304B, 304C, 304D, 305, 306A, 306B, 307A, 307B, 308, 309A, 309B, 310, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405A, 405B, 406, 407, 408, 409, 501, 502A, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508	2,684
Tract 0015.01	
Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206A, 206B, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 301, 406, 407, 409	1,331
ELIM	617
GLENWOOD	1,777
GREENWOOD	4,202
OAK GROVE	859
OLANTA	2,296
SALEM	903
SARDIS	477
SAVANNAH GROVE	2,787
TANS BAY	2,108
TIMMONSVILLE	4,642
WEST FLORENCE	
Tract 0001.00	
Blocks: 103, 104, 105, 106, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135	1,551

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 60

Area	**Population**
DISTRICT TOTAL	27,959
PERCENT VARIATION	-0.565

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 61

Area	**Population**
Florence County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
CLAUSSEN	
Tract 0016.02	
Blocks: 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245	405
COWARDS 1	1,110
COWARDS 2	1,264
EFFINGHAM	1,322
EVERGREEN	1,404
FRIENDFIELD	728
HANNAH	999
HIGHHILL	777
JOHNSONVILLE	3,543
LAKE CITY 1	2,397
LAKE CITY 2	1,561
LAKE CITY 3	2,413
LAKE CITY 4	3,443
LEO	1,021
MCALLISTER MILL	1,150

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 61

Area	**Population**
PAMPLICO 1	1,464
PROSPECT	820
SCRANTON	1,619
VOX	740
DISTRICT TOTAL	28,180
PERCENT VARIATION	0.220

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 62

Area	**Population**
Darlington County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
DARLINGTON 1	
Tract 0111.00	
Blocks: 212, 214, 217, 218, 301, 310, 311, 325	321
DARLINGTON 2	2,645
DARLINGTON 4	2,349
DARLINGTON 5	2,871
HIGH HILL INDIAN BRANCH	3,268
LAKE SWAMP	1,588
LAMAR 1	1,308
LAMAR 2 NEWMAN SWAMP	2,078
MONT CLARE MECHANICSVILLE	
Tract 0113.00	
Blocks: 218, 219, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 251, 252, 253, 254, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269,	

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 62

Area	Population
270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 278, 301	376
PALMETTO	2,856
Florence County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
BROOKGREEN	
Tract 0001.00	
Blocks: 101	0
Tract 0003.00	
Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121B, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209	907
Tract 0008.00	
Blocks: 601B, 602	0
Tract 0009.00	
Blocks: 101B, 113B	0
FLORENCE WARD 10	
Tract 0003.00	
Blocks: 121A, 122	6
Tract 0008.00	
Blocks: 601A, 620	0
Tract 0009.00	
Blocks: 101A, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113A, 114, 115, 116, 117, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130	1,029
FLORENCE WARD 2	2,606
FLORENCE WARD 3	3,001
FLORENCE WARD 9	
Tract 0009.00	
Blocks: 118, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 138, 139	2

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 62

Area	**Population**
Tract 0010.00	
Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110	170
GILBERT	
Tract 0007.00	
Blocks: 223B, 301B, 301C, 302B, 303B, 304B, 304C, 317B, 318A, 318B, 319B, 319C, 321, 322, 323A, 323B, 323C, 506B, 507B, 508, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517B, 518, 519C, 520B, 521B, 521C, 522, 523, 524	1,014
Tract 0010.00	
Blocks: 126B, 132B	0
DISTRICT TOTAL	28,395
PERCENT VARIATION	0.985

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 63

Area	**Population**
Florence County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
COLES CROSS ROADS	3,191
DELMAE	4,218
EBENEZER	
Tract 0001.00	
Blocks: 502B	0
Tract 0002.01	
Blocks: 315, 316, 317B, 318, 319	12
Tract 0002.02	
Blocks: 101B, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113	776

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 63

Area	Population
Tract 0011.00	
Blocks: 706C	0
Tract 0015.01	
Blocks: 404, 405	2
FLORENCE WARD 11	1,621
FLORENCE WARD 12	2,038
FLORENCE WARD 14	3,037
FLORENCE WARD 15	2,172
FORENCE WARD 4	1,394
FLORENCE WARD 5	2,071
FLORENCE WARD 6	1,032
FLORENCE WARD 7	1,763
FLORENCE WARD 8	2,064
GILBERT	
Tract 0005.00	
Blocks: 201B, 201C, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206A, 206B, 209	864
Tract 0007.00	
Blocks: 403C, 405A, 405B, 406B, 407B, 412B	118
WEST FLORENCE	
Tract 0002.01	
Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 104, 105A, 105B, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 112, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 301B, 302C, 303D, 303E, 303F, 303G, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 311B, 313B, 314	2,006
DISTRICT TOTAL	28,379
PERCENT VARIATION	0.928

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 64

Area	**Population**
Clarendon County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
ALCOLU	1,361
BARRINEAU	770
BARROWS MILL	261
BLOOMVILLE	498
DAVIS STATION	1,621
HARMONY	958
HICKS	1,205
HOME BRANCH	473
JORDAN	1,408
MANNING 1	1,084
MANNING 2	1,481
MANNING 3	1,388
MANNING 4	2,716
MANNING 5	1,340
NEW ZION	676
OAKDALE	292
PANOLA	550
SARDINIA GABLE	554
SUMMERTON 1	1,939
SUMMERTON 2	920
SUMMERTON 3	2,000
TURBEVILLE	1,242
WILSON FORESTON	1,622
Williamsburg County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
BLACK RIVER	488

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 64

Area	**Population**
KINGSTREE 1	
Tract 9706.00	
Blocks: 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 615, 616	344
MOUNT VERNON	581
WORKMAN	96
DISTRICT TOTAL	27,868
PERCENT VARIATION	-0.889

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 65

Area	**Population**
Chesterfield County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
ANGELUS CATARRAH	353
DUDLEY	683
JEFFERSON	2,420
MANGUM	672
MCBEE	
Tract 9508.98	
Blocks: 139B, 152, 156, 157, 158, 159, 161, 162, 163B, 168B, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186B, 187B, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196B, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 247,	

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 65

Area **Population**

248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255,
256, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263D, 294, 295 . . 1,094

PAGELAND 5,309

Darlington County

Census Voting Tabulation Districts

CLYDE BLACK CREEK

Tract 0102.00

Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107,
108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115,
116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123,
124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131,
132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139,
140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147,
148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155,
156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163,
164, 165, 167, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176,
177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184,
185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192,
193, 194, 195, 196, 197 977

Tract 0104.00

Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107,
108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115,
136, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174,
175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182,
183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190,
191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196 534

Tract 0117.98

Blocks: 186A, 187A, 196A, 197. 0

HARTSVILLE 1. 1,216

HARTSVILLE 2&3 1,143

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 65

Area **Population**

HARTSVILLE 4

Tract 0106.00

Blocks: 151, 153, 155, 156, 157, 162A, 162B, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186A, 186B, 187A, 187B, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195A, 195B, 196, 197, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 385, 386, 387A, 387B, 388A, 388B, 389, 390, 391, 392 897

Tract 0107.00

Blocks: 112, 113, 201A, 201B, 301A, 301B, 401 172

HARTSVILLE 5 3,568

HARTSVILLE 6 3,556

HARTSVILLE 7

Tract 0106.00

Blocks: 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 160, 161, 208, 209, 213, 214, 215, 216A, 216B, 220A, 220B, 221A, 221B, 222, 223, 224, 225A, 225B, 226A, 226B, 228, 229A, 229B, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 252A, 252B, 253A, 253B 894

KELLYTOWN 1,990

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 65

Area **Population**

Kershaw County

Census Voting Tabulation Districts

BETHUNE

Tract 9701.00

Blocks: 201A, 201B, 201C, 201D, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206A, 206B, 207A, 207B, 207C, 208A, 208B, 209, 210A, 210B, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215A, 215B, 216A, 216B, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229A, 229B, 230A, 230B, 231A, 231B, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237A, 237B, 238A, 238B, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257A, 257B, 258A, 258B, 259A, 259B, 260, 261A, 261B, 262, 263A, 263B, 264A, 264B, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296A, 296B, 297A, 297B 1,062

CASSATT

Tract 9701.00

Blocks: 170, 171, 172, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189 208

Tract 9706.00

Blocks: 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 178..... 93

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 65

Area	**Population**
Lee County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
ASHLAND	233
LUCKNOW	648
SHROCKS MILL	108
ST MATTHEWS	241
TURKEY CREEK	80
DISTRICT TOTAL	28,351
PERCENT VARIATION	0.829

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 66

Area	**Population**
Colleton County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
EDISTO	524
SMOAKS	1,332
WILLIAMS	516
Dorchester County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
REEVESVILLE	
Tract 0101.00	
Blocks: 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173	187

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 66

Area	Population
Orangeburg County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
BETHEL	809
EAST HOLLY HILL	2,770
NORTH BOWMAN	2,353
NORTH BRANCHVILLE	1,400
NORTH EUTAWVILLE	1,985
ORANGEBURG WARD 2	
Tract 0113.00	
Blocks: 116, 117, 118, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144	341
ORANGEBURG WARD 3	1,098
ORANGEBURG WARD 4	
Tract 0106.00	
Blocks: 301A, 302, 303, 304A, 305A	49
Tract 0107.00	
Blocks: 312, 313, 314A, 316, 317, 318	85
PROVIDENCE	1,983
ROWESVILLE	725
SOUTH BOWMAN	1,243
SOUTH BRANCHVILLE	785
SOUTH EUTAWVILLE	2,273
SUBURBAN 2	
Tract 0107.00	
Blocks: 310, 311, 314B, 315, 319A, 319B, 320	57
SUBURBAN 3	2,122
SUBURBAN 4	978
VANCE	1,817
WEST HOLLY HILL	2,707

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 66

Area **Population**

WHITTAKER
Tract 0107.00
Blocks: 232, 233, 234, 260 37

DISTRICT TOTAL 28,176

PERCENT VARIATION 0.206

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 67

Area **Population**

Clarendon County
Census Voting Tabulation Districts
CALVARY 961
PAXVILLE 1,130

Sumter County
Census Voting Tabulation Districts
BROGDON
Tract 0006.00
Blocks: 312, 313, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 341, 342, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363 284
CAUSEWAY BRANCH 2,126
CONCORD
Tract 0006.00
Blocks: 117, 118, 127, 128, 132, 133, 136, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233 613

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 67

Area **Population**

DELAINE

Tract 0017.01

Blocks: 102A, 102B, 102C, 102D, 103, 104A, 104B, 104C, 104D, 104E, 123, 142, 143, 145, 146, 147 150

Tract 0018.02

Blocks: 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 131, 132, 136, 137, 138, 139, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 150A, 151, 152A, 152B, 152C, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 166A, 169, 173, 176, 211, 212, 213, 301A 1,669

MANCHESTER FOREST

Tract 0017.02

Blocks: 104, 106, 110, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129 149

Tract 0018.01

Blocks: 203, 204, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 266, 267, 268, 270, 295 412

Tract 0019.01

Blocks: 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 349, 350, 351, 352, 401, 402 227

MCCRAYS MILL NORTH

Tract 0017.02

Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123 1,335

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 67

Area	Population
MCCRAYS MILL SOUTH	
Tract 0017.02	
Blocks: 124, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143	828
MILLWOOD	
Tract 0017.01	
Blocks: 101A, 101B, 101C, 105A, 105B, 106A, 106B, 106C, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111A, 111B, 112A, 112B, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120A, 120B, 120C, 120D, 121, 131, 133, 149, 150, 203, 204A, 204B, 205, 206, 212	1,361
PINEWOOD	1,645
POCOTALIGO	3,966
PRIVATEER	3,743
SHAW 10	6,695
SHAW 11	0
SHAW 13	0
SHAW 14	0
SHAW 16	0
SUNSET	
Tract 0017.02	
Blocks: 405B, 405D, 410, 411, 412A, 412B, 413A, 413B, 414A, 414B, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 423, 424, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441	733
DISTRICT TOTAL	28,027
PERCENT VARIATION	-0.324

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 68

Area	**Population**
Sumter County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
BURNS DOWNS	975
CHERRYVALE	1,935
CROSSWELL	2,634
FOLSOM PARK	2,990
GREEN SWAMP	2,525
HAMPTON PARK	1,232
LORING	2,074
MORRIS COLLEGE	2,505
PALMETTO PARK	2,203
SECOND MILL	1,266
SHAW 12	0
SHAW 15	0
SHAW 1	1,260
SHAW 2	339
SHAW 3	407
SHAW 4	430
SHAW 5	394
SHAW 6	281
SHAW 7	1,908
SHAW 8	625
SHAW 9	229
SOUTH LIBERTY	
Tract 0013.00	
Blocks: 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 301, 302, 303, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 506, 507, 508, 509, 514, 515	470
SWAN LAKE	1,432
DISTRICT TOTAL	28,114
PERCENT VARIATION	-0.014

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 69

Area **Population**

Lexington County

Census Voting Tabulation Districts

CROMER

Tract 0210.07

Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321 4,514

Tract 0210.08

Blocks: 203, 204, 205 18

GARDENDALE 1,199

JAMIL ROAD 4,603

LEAPHART ROAD 2,426

LEXINGTON 1

Tract 0205.06

Blocks: 103, 104, 105, 106, 107 88

Tract 0210.06

Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128A, 128B, 129, 130, 131, 201A, 201B, 201C, 201D, 202A, 202B, 202C, 203A, 203B, 203C, 203D, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 301A, 301B, 301C, 301D, 302, 303A, 303B, 303C, 304A, 304B, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310A, 310B, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315,

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 69

Area	**Population**
316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325	4,638
PINEVIEW	3,526
QUAIL HOLLOW	2,325
SEVEN OAKS	2,096
WOODLAND HILLS	2,462
DISTRICT TOTAL	27,895
PERCENT VARIATION	-0.793

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 70

Area	**Population**
Richland County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
BLUFF	
Tract 0117.02	
Blocks: 122, 123, 310, 311, 312, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320	220
EASTOVER	3,897
FJ 17	2,109
FJ 18	0
FJ 19	0
FJ 20	0
FJ 4	475
FJ 5	72
FJ 6	7
FJ 7	0
FJ 8	3,073
FJ 9	0

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 70

Area	Population
GADSDEN	2,563
GARNERS	1,131
HOPKINS	4,266
HUNTING CREEK	493
OLYMPIA	
Tract 0117.01	
Blocks: 115, 119, 120, 123, 902, 903, 904, 905, 906, 907, 909, 910, 916, 917, 918, 919, 920, 921, 922	110
Tract 0117.02	
Blocks: 220, 221	0
PONTIAC	
Tract 0114.05	
Blocks: 419, 420, 432, 433, 434, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449	237
Tract 0120.00	
Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117	35
Sumter County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
DELAINE	
Tract 0017.01	
Blocks: 148	0
Tract 0018.02	
Blocks: 148, 149, 150B, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 170, 174, 175, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 301B, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339,	

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 70

Area **Population**

340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397 2,159

Tract 1802.00

Blocks: 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322 0

HORATIO 752

MANCHESTER FOREST

Tract 0017.02

Blocks: 105, 107, 108, 109 215

Tract 0018.01

Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211 1,082

Tract 0019.01

Blocks: 105, 106, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140 111

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 70

Area	Population
OAKLAND PLANTATION	3,574
REMBERT	
Tract 0001.00	
Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112A, 112B, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197	1,286
DISTRICT TOTAL	27,867
PERCENT VARIATION	-0.893

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 71

Area	Population
Richland County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
BALLENTINE	3,358
HARBISON	4,609
KINGSWOOD	
Tract 0104.06	
Blocks: 222, 223, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415	2,437

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 71

Area	Population
NEW FRIARSGATE	5,227
OLD FRIARSGATE	2,137
SPRINGVILLE	3,226
WALDEN	
Tract 0103.03	
Blocks: 172A, 172B, 173	4
Tract 0103.04	
Blocks: 304, 305B, 308, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410A, 410B, 411A, 411B, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417A, 417B, 418, 419A, 419B, 420A, 420B, 421, 422, 423A, 423B, 424, 425, 426A, 427A, 428A, 428B	1,083
WHITEWELL	
Tract 0104.05	
Blocks: 107, 109, 110, 113, 114, 115, 212, 231, 232, 301, 302, 303, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 501, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607	5,813
DISTRICT TOTAL	27,894
PERCENT VARIATION	-0.797

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 72

Area	Population
Richland County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
ARDINCAPLE	832
RIDGEWOOD	1,933

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 30

Area	**Population**
Tract 9606.00	
Blocks: 229	0
EAST BENNETTSVILLE	7,431
TATUM	618
DISTRICT TOTAL	75,725
PERCENT VARIATION	-0.096

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 31

Area	**Population**
Florence County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
BACK SWAMP	1,234
BROOKGREEN	1,164
COLES CROSS ROADS	3,191
COWARDS 1	1,110
COWARDS 2	1,264
DELMAE	4,218
EBENEZER	4,805
EFFINGHAM	1,322
ELIM	617
EVERGREEN	1,404
FLORENCE WARD 11	1,621
FLORENCE WARD 12	2,038
FLORENCE WARD 14	3,037
FLORENCE WARD 15	2,172
FLORENCE WARD 4	1,394
FLORENCE WARD 5	2,071
FLORENCE WARD 6	1,032

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 31

Area	Population
FLORENCE WARD 7	1,763
FLORENCE WARD 8	2,064
FRIENDFIELD	728
GLENWOOD	1,777
GREENWOOD	4,202
HANNAH	999
HIGHHILL	777
JOHNSONVILLE	3,543
MARS BLUFF 2	1,953
MCALLISTER MILL	1,150
OAK GROVE	859
OLANTA	2,296
PAMPLICO 1	1,464
PROSPECT	820
QUINBY	1,249
SALEM	903
SARDIS	477
SAVANNAH GROVE	2,787
SCRANTON	1,619
TANS BAY	2,108
TIMMONSVILLE	4,642
VOX	740
WEST FLORENCE	3,557
DISTRICT TOTAL	76,171
PERCENT VARIATION	0.492

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 32

Area	Population
Berkeley County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
ALVIN	1,205
CROSS	2,738
EADYTOWN	983
RUSSELLVILLE	1,941
SAINT STEPHEN	4,223
Florence County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
LAKE CITY 1	2,397
LAKE CITY 2	1,561
LAKE CITY 3	2,413
LAKE CITY 4	3,443
LEO	1,021
Georgetown County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
ANDREWS OUTSIDE	1,791
ANDREWS	3,038
CEDAR CREEK	746
FOLLY GROVE	1,121
Marion County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
BRITTONS NECK	2,294
CENTENARY	1,788
FRIENDSHIP	409
RAINS	1,242
SOUTHEAST MULLINS	2,158
SOUTHWEST MULLINS	2,528

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 32

Area	Population
Williamsburg County	36,815
DISTRICT TOTAL	75,855
PERCENT VARIATION	0.075

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 33

Area	Population
Horry County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
COASTAL LANE 1	1,392
COASTAL LANE 2	3,096
DUNES 1	2,923
EAST CONWAY	1,587
GARDEN CITY 1	2,323
GARDEN CITY 2	1,291
GARDEN CITY 3	3,592
JET PORT	6,971
MAPLE	938
MARLOWE	3,279
MYRTLEWOOD 1	1,743
MYRTLEWOOD 2	2,186
MYRTLEWOOD 3	364
NORTH CONWAY 1	1,341
NORTH CONWAY 2	1,425
OCEAN FOREST 1	1,636
OCEAN FOREST 3	1,957
RED HILL 2	2,848
SALEM	1,361
SEA OATS 1	5,020

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 33

Area	**Population**
SEA OATS 2	2,092
SOCASTEE 1	7,805
SOCASTEE 2	2,655
SOCASTEE 3	3,885
SURFSIDE BEACH 1	2,191
SURFSIDE BEACH 2	1,563
SURFSIDE BEACH 3	1,416
SURFSIDE BEACH 4	4,337
TILLY SWAMP	757
WEST CONWAY	1,330
DISTRICT TOTAL	75,304
PERCENT VARIATION	-0.652

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 34

Area	**Population**
Berkeley County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
CAINHOY	
Tract 0204.02	
Blocks: 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 151, 152, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 163, 165, 166, 167, 168, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212,	

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 34

Area	Population
213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 280, 281, 282, 283, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291	2,293
GOOSE CREEK 2	
Tract 0207.03	
Blocks: 907, 908, 909A, 909B, 909C, 909D, 909E, 909F, 909G, 909H, 910, 911, 912, 913, 914, 915A, 915B, 915C, 916, 917, 918, 919, 920, 921, 922, 923, 924, 925, 926, 927, 928, 929, 930, 931, 932, 933, 934, 935, 936, 937, 938, 939, 940, 941, 942, 943, 944	10,981
Tract 0208.01	
Blocks: 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 603	3,772
Tract 0208.02	
Blocks: 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 301A, 307B, 308, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327	2,405
Charleston County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
AWENDAW	1,276
CHRIST CHURCH 4	793

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 34

Area	Population
CHRIST CHURCH 5	1,682
MCCLELLANVILLE 1	852
MCCLELLANVILLE 2	339
ST JAMES - SANTEE	1,157

Georgetown County
Census Voting Tabulation Districts

BETHEL	1,247
BLACK RIVER	1,315
BROWNS FERRY	2,281
CARVERS BAY	166
CHOPPEE	1,557
GEORGETOWN 1	1,428
GEORGETOWN 2	726
GEORGETOWN 3	2,756
GEORGETOWN 4	769
GEORGETOWN 5	2,538
GEORGETOWN 6	663
GEORGETOWN 7	560
GRIERS	709
KENSINGTON	1,803
MURRELLS INLET	4,436
MYERSVILLE	463
PAWLEYS ISLAND 1	1,387
PAWLEYS ISLAND 2	1,679
PAWLEYS ISLAND 3	1,300
PAWLEYS ISLAND 4	971
PENNY ROYAL	959
PLANTERSVILLE	916
PLEASANT HILL	1,344
POTATO BED FERRY	694
SAMPIT	1,413

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 34

Area	Population
SANTEE	1,425
SPRING GULLEY	3,210
WINYAH BAY	891
Horry County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
BROWNWAY	1,111
INLAND	355
JAMESTOWN	2,647
PAWLEYS SWAMP	519
PORT HARRELSON	1,046
RED HILL 1	4,043
TODDVILLE	973
DISTRICT TOTAL	75,850
PERCENT VARIATION	0.069

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 35

Area	Population
Sumter County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
BURNS DOWNS	975
CAUSEWAY BRANCH	2,126
CHERRYVALE	1,935
CROSSWELL	2,634
DALZELL DUBOSE	3,954
DELAINE	3,978
FOLSOM PARK	2,990
GREEN SWAMP	2,525
HAMPTON PARK	1,232

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 35

Area	Population
HILLCREST	2,493
HORATIO	752
HORSEPEN BRANCH	1,985
LEMIRA	
Tract 0007.00	
Blocks: 403	0
Tract 0011.00	
Blocks: 201, 202A, 202B, 203A, 203B, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213A, 214A, 215A, 216, 217, 301, 302B, 505, 506, 602A	860
MANCHESTER FOREST	2,196
MCCRAYS MILL NORTH	1,984
MCCRAYS MILL SOUTH	2,236
MILLWOOD	2,731
MULBERRY	1,604
OAKLAND PLANTATION	3,574
OSWEGO	1,020
PALMETTO PARK	2,203
POCOTALIGO	3,966
PRIVATEER	3,743
REMBERT	3,251
SALTERSTOWN	1,665
SECOND MILL	1,266
SHAW 10	6,695
SHAW 11	0
SHAW 12	0
SHAW 13	0
SHAW 14	0
SHAW 15	0
SHAW 16	0
SHAW 1	1,260
SHAW 2	339

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 35

Area	Population
SHAW 3	407
SHAW 4	430
SHAW 5	394
SHAW 6	281
SHAW 7	1,908
SHAW 8	625
SHAW 9	229
SUNSET	1,868
SWAN LAKE	1,432
DISTRICT TOTAL	75,746
PERCENT VARIATION	-0.069

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 36

Area	Population
Clarendon County	28,450
Florence County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
CARTERSVILLE	1,619
Lee County	18,437
Sumter County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
BATES	1,495
BIRNIE	1,829
BROGDON	2,008
CONCORD	1,751

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 36

Area	Population
LEMIRA	
Tract 0006.00	
Blocks: 101, 102	16
Tract 0011.00	
Blocks: 401B, 402B, 410, 411, 412, 514, 515A, 515B, 515C, 515D, 515E, 516A, 516B, 517, 518, 519A, 519B, 520A, 520B, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 601, 602B, 603A, 603B, 604, 605, 606, 607	1,399
Tract 0016.00	
Blocks: 501, 502	0
LORING	2,074
MAGNOLIA	1,107
MAYESVILLE	1,218
MORRIS COLLEGE	2,505
OLD POCALLA	655
PINEWOOD	1,645
PLEASANT GROVE TRINITY	658
SALEM	659
SAVAGE GLOVER	1,188
SHILOH	495
SOUTH LIBERTY	1,282
SOUTH RED BAY	1,662
STONE HILL	1,223
TAYLORS	937
WILDER	1,085
DISTRICT TOTAL	75,397
PERCENT VARIATION	-0.529

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 37

Area	Population
Berkeley County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
BERKELEY	2,461
BETHERA	357
BONNEAU	2,692
CARNES CROSS ROADS	5,180
CORDESVILLE	1,407
GOOSE CREEK 1	8,764
GOOSE CREEK 2	
Tract 0208.02	
Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114A, 114B, 116A, 116B, 117, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 301B, 302, 303A, 303B, 304A, 304B, 304C, 305, 306, 307A, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316	3,405
HANAHAN	
Tract 0208.02	
Blocks: 118	0
HILTON CROSS ROAD	2,330
HUGER	1,269
JAMESTOWN	760
LEBANON	678
MACEDONIA	2,229
MCBETH	1,169
MONCKS CORNER	9,896
PIMLICO	1,268
PINOPOLIS	1,966
SHULERVILLE HH	433
WASSAMASSAW	2,804

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 37

Area	Population
Colleton County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
CANADY'S	602
COTTAGEVILLE	2,614
HORSE PEN	608
MAPLE CANE	677
PEOPLES	497
ROUND O	657
SIDNEY	390
WALTERBORO 4	4,006
WOLFE CREEK	505
Dorchester County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
FLOWERTOWN	
Tract 0105.00	
Blocks: 261, 262, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 321, 322, 323, 324, 335, 336	1,468
FOUR HOLE	1,428
GREENWAVE	
Tract 0105.00	
Blocks: 317, 325, 326, 327, 328, 330	398
GROVER NO.1	890
GROVER NO.3	221
HARLEYVILLE	980
KNIGHTSVILLE	
Tract 0105.00	
Blocks: 110, 113, 115, 127, 128, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229,	

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 37

Area	Population
230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 263, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 318, 319, 320	3,899
RIDGEVILLE	3,332
ROSSES	889
ST. GEORGE NO.1	2,248
ST. GEORGE NO.2	714
DISTRICT TOTAL	76,141
PERCENT VARIATION	0.453

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 38

Area	Population
Berkeley County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
GOOSE CREEK 3	7,511
WIDE AWAKE	21,702
Charleston County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
LADSON	3,133
LINCOLNVILLE	1,050
Dorchester County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
CAROLINA	2,242
CLEMSON	2,495

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 38

Area	Population
COASTAL	6,608
DORCHESTER	2,633
FLOWERTOWN	
Tract 0106.00	
Blocks: 719A, 719B, 720, 721A, 721B, 721C, 722, 723, 724A, 724B	1,034
GERMAN TOWN	1,685
GREENWAVE	
Tract 0105.00	
Blocks: 401A, 401B, 401C, 401D, 401E, 401F, 402, 403, 404, 405A, 405B, 406A, 406B, 406C, 406D, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413	2,253
IRONGATE	4,530
KNIGHTSVILLE	
Tract 0105.00	
Blocks: 107, 108, 109, 111, 112, 114, 117, 118, 119, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 129, 130	284
NEWINGTON	2,760
NORTH SUMMERVILLE	2,772
SPANN	1,231
STALLSVILLE	1,580
TRANQUIL	2,686
TROLLEY	4,115
TUPPERWAY	4,183
DISTRICT TOTAL	76,487
PERCENT VARIATION	0.909

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 39

Area **Population**

Allendale County 11,722

Bamberg County 16,902

Barnwell County
Census Voting Tabulation Districts
BARNWELL 2
Tract 9701.00
Blocks: 169, 170, 171, 172, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185 118
Tract 9702.00
Blocks: 455 18
Tract 9703.00
Blocks: 402, 424 23
Tract 9704.98
Blocks: 401, 402, 403B, 404, 405 92
BARNWELL 3
Tract 9704.98
Blocks: 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 217, 218, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305 279
BLACKVILLE 1
Tract 9702.00
Blocks: 224, 225, 226, 229, 230, 231, 414, 415B, 416, 417, 418B, 419B, 420B, 420C, 421B, 434C, 439B, 440B, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450B, 452, 453, 454, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466C, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471 254
Tract 9703.00
Blocks: 401, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423 107
BLACKVILLE 2
Tract 9702.00
Blocks: 340, 341B, 342, 343 24

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 39

Area	Population
ELKO	
Tract 9701.00	
Blocks: 164, 165, 168	20
Tract 9702.00	
Blocks: 221, 222, 223, 227, 228, 232, 233	7
FRIENDSHIP	663
HILDA	1,260
Dorchester County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
INDIAN FIELD	1,972
REEVESVILLE	1,338
ROSINVILLE	1,819
Hampton County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
BRUNSON	1,090
CROCKETVILLE MILEY	699
ESTILL	3,909
GARNETT	235
GIFFORD	483
HAMPTON COURTHOUSE 1	1,803
HAMPTON COURTHOUSE 2	1,980
RIVERS MILL	169
SCOTIA	481
VARNVILLE	2,614
Orangeburg County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
EAST HOLLY HILL	2,770
EDISTO	1,276
ELCOREE	2,534
NORTH BOWMAN	2,353
NORTH BRANCHVILLE	1,400

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 39

Area	Population
NORTH EUTAWVILLE	1,985
PROVIDENCE	1,983
SANTEE	2,726
SOUTH BOWMAN	1,243
SOUTH BRANCHVILLE	785
SOUTH EUTAWVILLE	2,273
VANCE	1,817
WEST HOLLY HILL	2,707
DISTRICT TOTAL	75,933
PERCENT VARIATION	0.178

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 40

Area	Population
Barnwell County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
BARNWELL 1	1,200
BARNWELL 2	
Tract 9701.00	
Blocks: 180	1
Tract 9703.00	
Blocks: 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 336, 337, 403, 404, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416A, 416B, 416C, 416D, 417, 418, 425, 426, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432A, 432B, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 448, 450A, 450B	990

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 40

Area **Population**

Tract 9704.98

Blocks: 403A, 406A, 406B, 407, 408A, 408B, 409A, 409B, 410, 411A, 411B, 412A, 412B, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445 1,025

BARNWELL 3

Tract 9704.98

Blocks: 306A, 306B, 307A, 307B, 308, 309A, 309B, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333A, 333B, 334A, 334B, 335, 336A, 336B, 337A, 337B, 338A, 338B, 339A, 339B, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353A, 353B, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359..... 1,196

Tract 9705.00

Blocks: 103, 104, 107, 113, 114, 115, 116, 132, 163, 164 240

BARNWELL 4 2,217

BLACKVILLE 1

Tract 9702.00

Blocks: 202, 203, 204, 205, 209, 210, 211A, 211B, 212A, 212B, 212C, 213A, 213B, 214, 218, 219, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 243, 244, 245, 256, 257, 258, 259, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 402, 403, 404, 405, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413A, 413B, 415A, 418A, 419A, 420A, 421A,

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 40

Area **Population**

422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427A, 427B, 427C, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434A, 434B, 435, 436A, 436B, 437, 438, 439A, 440A, 450A, 451, 466A, 466B.....1,272

Tract 9703.00

Blocks: 427 0

BLACKVILLE 2

Tract 9702.00

Blocks: 201, 206, 207, 208, 241, 242, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 276, 277, 278, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307A, 307B, 308A, 308B, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320A, 320B, 321, 322A, 322B, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329A, 329B, 330, 331, 332A, 332B, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 341A, 401, 406.....1,074

ELKO

Tract 9701.00

Blocks: 111, 112, 116, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125A, 125B, 126A, 126B, 126C, 127, 128, 129A, 129B, 130A, 130B, 131, 132A, 132B, 133A, 133B, 134A, 134B, 135A, 135B, 136A, 136B, 137A, 137B, 138, 139A, 139B, 140A, 140B, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152A, 152B, 153, 154, 155A, 155B, 156A, 156B, 157A, 157B, 158A, 158B, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 166, 167..... 708

Tract 9702.00

Blocks: 133, 134, 182, 215, 216, 217, 220 23

HEALING SPRINGS.....1,536

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 40

Area	Population
KLINE	885
SNEELING	1,069
WILLISTON 1	1,665
WILLISTON 2	804
WILLISTON 3	1,523
Orangeburg County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
BETHEL	809
BROOKDALE	1,152
COPE	815
COROOVA	4,171
EAST NORTH	1,581
EAST SPRINGFIELD	917
FOUR HOLES	864
JAMISON	1,965
LIMESTONE	2,775
NEESES-LIVINGSTON	1,784
NIX	3,098
NORWAY	1,977
ORANGEBURG WARD 10	1,103
ORANGEBURG WARD 1	1,246
ORANGEBURG WARD 2	1,426
ORANGEBURG WARD 3	1,098
ORANGEBURG WARD 4	3,969
ORANGEBURG WARD 5	938
ORANGEBURG WARD 6	1,357
ORANGEBURG WARD 7	887
ORANGEBURG WARD 8	788
ORANGEBURG WARD 9	797
PINEHILL-BOLEN	2,394
ROWESVILLE	725
SUBURBAN 1	1,670

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 40

Area	Population
SUBURBAN 2	1,699
SUBURBAN 3	2,122
SUBURBAN 4	978
SUBURBAN 5	1,951
SUBURBAN 6	1,789
SUBURBAN 7	1,890
SUBURBAN 8	1,039
SUBURBAN 9	2,383
WEST NORTH	1,838
WEST SPRINGFIELD	858
WHITTAKER	2,098
DISTRICT TOTAL	76,379
PERCENT VARIATION	0.767

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 41

Area	Population
Charleston County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
JAMES ISLAND 10	1,718
JAMES ISLAND 13	965
JAMES ISLAND 14	1,223
JAMES ISLAND 15	2,259
JAMES ISLAND 16	594
JAMES ISLAND 18	496
JAMES ISLAND 19	749
JAMES ISLAND 20	1,507
JAMES ISLAND 21	1,372
JAMES ISLAND 22	1,809

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 41

Area	Population
JAMES ISLAND 9	2,110
NORTH CHARLESTON 13	3,617
NORTH CHARLESTON 14	4,852
SAINT ANDREWS 10	1,082
SAINT ANDREWS 15	871
SAINT ANDREWS 16	1,567
SAINT ANDREWS 17	2,193
SAINT ANDREWS 18	990
SAINT ANDREWS 19	1,966
SAINT ANDREWS 23	2,181
SAINT ANDREWS 26	1,004
SAINT ANDREWS 27	2,781
SAINT ANDREWS 28	2,294
SAINT ANDREWS 29	3,146
SAINT ANDREWS 31	5,830
SAINT ANDREWS 32	3,670
SAINT ANDREWS 4	1,718
SAINT ANDREWS 5	1,418
SAINT ANDREWS 6	288
SAINT ANDREWS 7	1,627
SAINT ANDREWS 8	1,067
SAINT ANDREWS 9	1,065
Dorchester County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
ASHBOROUGH	4,007
BEECH HILL	1,160
GREGG	10,744
DISTRICT TOTAL	75,940
PERCENT VARIATION	0.187

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 42

Area	Population
Charleston County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
AIR FORCE BASE NO. 10	182
AIR FORCE BASE NO. 11	90
AIR FORCE BASE NO. 12	314
AIR FORCE BASE NO. 13	398
AIR FORCE BASE NO. 14	309
AIR FORCE BASE NO. 15	172
AIR FORCE BASE NO. 16	0
AIR FORCE BASE NO. 17	346
AIR FORCE BASE NO. 18	0
AIR FORCE BASE NO. 19	0
AIR FORCE BASE NO. 1	0
AIR FORCE BASE NO. 20	0
AIR FORCE BASE NO. 2	617
AIR FORCE BASE NO. 3	704
AIR FORCE BASE NO. 4	524
AIR FORCE BASE NO. 5	19
AIR FORCE BASE NO. 6	305
AIR FORCE BASE NO. 7	116
AIR FORCE BASE NO. 8	120
AIR FORCE BASE NO. 9	62
CHARLESTON 10	1,743
CHARLESTON 16	984
CHARLESTON 17	1,676
CHARLESTON 18	1,469
CHARLESTON 19	2,864
CHARLESTON 20	1,570
CHARLESTON 21	1,338
CHARLESTON 25	1,552
CHARLESTON 26	952
CHARLESTON 27	994

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 42

Area	Population
CHARLESTON 28	992
CHARLESTON 29	1,047
CHARLESTON 30	2,795
CHARLESTON 8	1,438
CHARLESTON 9	1,123
NORTH CHARLESTON 4	1,481
NORTH CHARLESTON 10	1,265
NORTH CHARLESTON 11	2,091
NORTH CHARLESTON 12	4,176
NORTH CHARLESTON 18	
Tract 0036.00	
Blocks: 314, 315, 316, 317	443
NORTH CHARLESTON 1	3,431
NORTH CHARLESTON 28	1,155
NORTH CHARLESTON 2	1,080
NORTH CHARLESTON 3	2,945
NORTH CHARLESTON 5	1,952
NORTH CHARLESTON 6	1,767
NORTH CHARLESTON 7	2,072
NORTH CHARLESTON 8	1,533
NORTH CHARLESTON 9	3,541
SAINT ANDREWS 11	1,726
SAINT ANDREWS 12	2,272
SAINT ANDREWS 13	1,983
SAINT ANDREWS 14	2,108
SAINT ANDREWS 1	1,141
SAINT ANDREWS 20	2,929
SAINT ANDREWS 21	1,849
SAINT ANDREWS 22	1,417
SAINT ANDREWS 2	1,745
SAINT ANDREWS 30	1,032

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 42

Area	Population
SAINT ANDREWS 3	1,132
DISTRICT TOTAL	75,081
PERCENT VARIATION	-0.946

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 43

Area	Population
Charleston County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
CHARLESTON 11	564
CHARLESTON 12	734
CHARLESTON 13	1,116
CHARLESTON 14	881
CHARLESTON 15	722
CHARLESTON 1	1,128
CHARLESTON 22	730
CHARLESTON 23	1,296
CHARLESTON 24	879
CHARLESTON 2	1,203
CHARLESTON 3	2,610
CHARLESTON 4	478
CHARLESTON 5	3,076
CHARLESTON 6	1,471
CHARLESTON 7	789
DEER PARK 1	3,600
DEER PARK 3	2,300
JAMES ISLAND 11	1,898
JAMES ISLAND 12	1,586
JAMES ISLAND 17	950

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 43

Area	Population
JAMES ISLAND 1	1,323
JAMES ISLAND 3	1,428
JAMES ISLAND 6	1,243
JAMES ISLAND 7	859
JAMES ISLAND 8	1,289
JOHNS ISLAND 1	3,057
JOHNS ISLAND 2	1,557
JOHNS ISLAND 3	3,004
JOHNS ISLAND 4	1,157
NAVAL SHIPYARD NO. 10	24
NAVAL SHIPYARD NO. 11	0
NAVAL SHIPYARD NO. 12	0
NAVAL SHIPYARD NO. 13	0
NAVAL SHIPYARD NO. 14	0
NAVAL SHIPYARD NO. 15	0
NAVAL SHIPYARD NO. 16	2
NAVAL SHIPYARD NO. 17	110
NAVAL SHIPYARD NO. 18	56
NAVAL SHIPYARD NO. 19	256
NAVAL SHIPYARD NO. 1	0
NAVAL SHIPYARD NO. 20	33
NAVAL SHIPYARD NO. 2	0
NAVAL SHIPYARD NO. 3	5,694
NAVAL SHIPYARD NO. 4	0
NAVAL SHIPYARD NO. 5	0
NAVAL SHIPYARD NO. 6	4
NAVAL SHIPYARD NO. 7	0
NAVAL SHIPYARD NO. 8	0
NAVAL SHIPYARD NO. 9	92
NORTH CHARLESTON 15	1,949
NORTH CHARLESTON 16	1,300
NORTH CHARLESTON 17	1,886

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 43

Area	Population
NORTH CHARLESTON 18	
Tract 0036.00	
Blocks: 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417	1,258
NORTH CHARLESTON 19	1,479
NORTH CHARLESTON 23	
Tract 0035.00	
Blocks: 417, 418, 419, 420, 501, 502, 503	291
NORTH CHARLESTON 24	1,282
NORTH CHARLESTON 25	1,168
NORTH CHARLESTON 26	1,750
NORTH CHARLESTON 27	623
NORTH CHARLESTON 29	1,155
NORTH CHARLESTON 30	2,190
NORTH CHARLESTON 31	2,195
NORTH CHARLESTON 32	3,632
NORTH CHARLESTON 33	4,531
DISTRICT TOTAL	75,888
PERCENT VARIATION	0.119

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 44

Area	Population
Berkeley County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
CAINHOY	
Tract 0204.02	
Blocks: 279, 284, 285	0

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 44

Area **Population**

GOOSE CREEK 2

Tract 0208.01

Blocks: 601, 602, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632A, 632B, 633A, 633B, 634 6,493

Tract 0208.02

Blocks: 115, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 208 315

HANAHAN

Tract 0209.00

Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 201, 202, 203, 204, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 218, 219, 220, 301, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 320, 321, 322, 325, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717 8,240

Tract 0210.00

Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 208, 209, 210A, 210B, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 801, 802A, 802B, 803, 901, 902, 903, 904, 905, 906, 907, 908, 909, 910, 911, 912, 913, 914, 915, 916, 917, 918 . . . 4,856

Charleston County

Census Voting Tabulation Districts

CHRIST CHURCH 1 1,888

CHRIST CHURCH 2 2,180

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 44

Area	Population
CHRIST CHURCH 3	1,027
CHRIST CHURCH 6	468
CHRIST CHURCH 7	1,637
CHRIST CHURCH 8	7,248
CHRIST CHURCH 9	2,998
DEER PARK 2	5,771
FOLLY BEACH	1,255
ISLE OF PALMS 1	929
ISLE OF PALMS 2	2,751
JAMES ISLAND 2	0
JAMES ISLAND 4	809
JAMES ISLAND 5	2,527
JOHNS ISLAND 5	1,631
MOUNT PLEASANT 10	1,110
MOUNT PLEASANT 11	1,175
MOUNT PLEASANT 1	824
MOUNT PLEASANT 2	1,790
MOUNT PLEASANT 3	1,308
MOUNT PLEASANT 4	1,054
MOUNT PLEASANT 5	1,637
MOUNT PLEASANT 6	1,905
MOUNT PLEASANT 7	1,254
MOUNT PLEASANT 8	1,334
MOUNT PLEASANT 9	3,345
NORTH CHARLESTON 20	1,564
NORTH CHARLESTON 21	727
NORTH CHARLESTON 22	681
NORTH CHARLESTON 23	
Tract 0035.00	
Blocks: 309, 314, 315, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 415, 416, 504, 505, 511, 517	904

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 44

Area	**Population**
SULLIVANS ISLAND	1,623
DISTRICT TOTAL	75,258
PERCENT VARIATION	-0.712

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 45

Area	**Population**
Beaufort County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
DALE LOBECO	1,244
LADYS ISLAND 3A	
Tract 0009.00	
Blocks: 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 553, 554, 555, 556, 558, 559, 564, 566, 567, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578, 579, 580, 596, 597	1,141
SAINT HELENA 1A	1,568
SAINT HELENA 1B	1,689
SAINT HELENA 2A	524
SAINT HELENA 2B	1,687
SAINT HELENA 2C	1,111
SHELDON 1	1,052
SHELDON 2	898

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 45

Area	Population
Charleston County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
ADAMS RUN 2	1,149
EDISTO	1,318
HOLLYWOOD	2,198
MEGGETT 1	2,340
MEGGETT 2	969
no name for (0190154)	1,764
RAVENEL 1	1,738
RAVENEL 2	1,210
SAINT ANDREWS 24	2,118
SAINT ANDREWS 25	1,031
WADMALAW 1	1,266
WADMALAW 2	1,304
Colleton County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
ASHTON	170
BELLS	373
BEREA	138
EDISTO BEACH	351
EDISTO	524
GREEN POND	1,380
HENDERSONVILLE	1,921
HUDSON'S MILL	544
JACKSONBORO	631
LODGE	679
MASHAWVILLE	1,015
PENIEL	609
PETITS	194
RICE PATCH	971
RITTER	1,489

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 45

Area	Population
RUFFIN	506
SMOAKS	1,332
SNIDERS	873
STOKES	710
WALTERBORO 1	2,694
WALTERBORO 2	3,303
WALTERBORO 3	2,898
WILLIAMS	516
Dorchester County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
DELEMARS	505
GIVHANS	1,688
SAUL DAM	269
Hampton County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
BLACK CREEK	256
BONNETT	758
CUMMINGS	1,137
EARLY BRANCH	523
FURMAN	528
HOPEWELL	209
HORSE GALL	99
YEMASEE	1,218
Jasper County	15,487
DISTRICT TOTAL	75,817
PERCENT VARIATION	0.025

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 46

Area	Population
Beaufort County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
AS 10	0
AS 11	0
AS 12	0
AS 1	0
AS 2	0
AS 3	760
AS 4	0
AS 5	0
AS 6	0
AS 7	0
AS 8	0
AS 9	0
BEAUFORT 1A	545
BEAUFORT 1B	1,108
BEAUFORT 2	1,381
BEAUFORT 3	1,798
BLUFFTON 1	2,348
BLUFFTON 2	3,784
BURTON 1A	1,846
BURTON 1B	3,316
BURTON 2A	1,815
BURTON 2B	2,047
BURTON 2C	1,500
BURTON 3	1,774
CHECHESSEE	660
DAUFUSKIE	122
HILTON HEAD 10	223
HILTON HEAD 11	2,165
HILTON HEAD 12	1,184
HILTON HEAD 13	1,696

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 46

Area	Population
HILTON HEAD 14	1,317
HILTON HEAD 15A	938
HILTON HEAD 15B	571
HILTON HEAD 1	1,990
HILTON HEAD 2	2,074
HILTON HEAD 3	730
HILTON HEAD 4A	927
HILTON HEAD 4B	1,921
HILTON HEAD 5A	1,032
HILTON HEAD 5B	888
HILTON HEAD 6A	676
HILTON HEAD 6B	1,207
HILTON HEAD 7	1,633
HILTON HEAD 8	1,785
HILTON HEAD 9	1,025
LADYS ISLAND 1A	1,451
LADYS ISLAND 1B	968
LADYS ISLAND 2A	1,032
LADYS ISLAND 3A	
Tract 0009.00	
Blocks: 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325	454
LB 10	55
LB 1	301
LB 2	319
LB 3	273
LB 4	5
LB 5	14
LB 6	1,096
LB 7	489
LB 8	922

SC SENATE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 46

Area	Population
LB 9	604
MOSSY OAKS 1A	1,641
MOSSY OAKS 1B	960
MOSSY OAKS 2	1,888
PI 10	0
PI 1	0
PI 2	1,278
PI 3	1,030
PI 4	535
PI 5	255
PI 6	1,256
PI 7	387
PI 8	701
PI 9	1,730
PORT ROYAL 1	1,357
PORT ROYAL 2	1,609
SEABROOK 1	1,681
SEABROOK 2	915
SEABROOK 3	1,519
DISTRICT TOTAL	75,511
PERCENT VARIATION	-0.379

D-1

SOUTH CAROLINA HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

Population Summary Report

Dist.	Total	Black	Pct. Black	Total18+	Black18+	Pct. Black18+	Pct. Dev.
1	27,914	1,119	4.01	21,205	821	3.87	-0.73
2	27,908	3,932	14.09	21,039	2,680	12.74	-0.75
3	27,863	2,763	9.92	23,883	2,200	9.21	-0.91
4	28,114	1,360	4.84	20,978	975	4.65	-0.02
5	27,903	2,414	8.65	20,979	1,718	8.19	-0.77
6	28,166	6,409	22.75	21,456	4,359	20.32	0.17
7	28,053	5,149	18.35	21,099	3,644	17.27	-0.23
8	28,014	2,937	10.48	21,061	1,998	9.49	-0.37
9	27,844	6,912	24.82	21,047	4,503	21.39	-0.98
10	28,120	2,022	7.19	20,753	1,419	6.84	0.00
11	28,072	7,857	27.99	20,754	5,367	25.86	-0.17
12	27,967	9,661	34.54	20,892	6,805	32.57	-0.54
13	28,331	9,587	33.84	21,337	6,356	29.79	0.75
14	27,840	7,145	25.66	20,621	4,846	23.50	-0.99
15	27,926	7,953	28.48	21,567	5,737	26.60	-0.69
16	28,331	8,618	30.42	20,775	5,931	28.55	0.75
17	27,871	1,598	5.73	20,800	1,186	5.70	-0.88
18	27,937	5,486	19.64	20,931	3,621	17.30	-0.65
19	28,193	2,037	7.23	22,078	1,297	5.87	0.26
20	27,849	2,086	7.49	20,964	1,428	6.81	-0.96
21	27,883	1,213	4.35	20,403	876	4.29	-0.84
22	27,910	2,414	8.65	23,199	1,680	7.24	-0.74
23	28,036	17,592	62.75	20,774	12,036	57.94	-0.30
24	27,881	2,687	9.64	21,582	1,816	8.41	-0.85
25	28,286	16,338	57.76	20,360	10,944	53.75	0.59
26	28,299	2,947	10.41	21,063	1,967	9.34	0.64
27	27,923	3,173	11.36	20,008	2,161	10.80	-0.70
28	27,913	2,740	9.82	20,694	1,857	8.97	-0.73
29	27,853	5,116	18.37	20,338	3,526	17.34	-0.95
30	27,959	7,481	26.76	20,613	4,789	23.23	-0.57
31	27,866	18,872	67.72	20,342	12,599	61.94	-0.90
32	27,870	2,950	10.58	21,674	1,946	8.98	-0.89
33	27,851	3,224	11.58	20,992	2,216	10.56	-0.95
34	27,876	4,936	17.71	21,056	3,290	15.63	-0.86
35	27,950	3,834	13.72	20,720	2,639	12.74	-0.60
36	27,941	3,263	11.68	21,144	2,277	10.77	-0.63
37	28,138	4,268	15.17	21,537	3,082	14.31	0.07
38	27,856	2,745	9.85	20,669	1,858	8.99	-0.94
39	28,040	8,391	29.93	20,563	5,449	26.50	-0.28
40	28,231	10,247	36.30	21,014	6,906	32.86	0.40
41	28,343	15,822	55.82	20,203	10,401	51.48	0.80
42	28,368	8,451	29.79	21,313	5,725	26.86	0.89
43	28,374	8,252	29.08	20,447	5,358	26.20	0.91
44	28,236	6,846	24.25	20,716	4,484	21.65	0.42
45	28,372	7,618	26.85	20,666	4,884	23.63	0.90
46	28,243	2,696	9.55	21,738	1,757	8.08	0.44
47	27,933	4,056	14.52	20,138	2,745	13.63	-0.66
48	28,342	1,562	5.51	21,759	1,086	4.99	0.79
49	27,863	15,958	57.27	19,977	10,794	54.03	-0.91
50	28,019	16,863	60.18	19,268	10,769	55.89	-0.36

SOUTH CAROLINA HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

Population Summary Report

Dist.	Total	Black	Pct. Black	Total18+	Black18+	Pct. Black18+	Pct. Dev.
51	28,316	18,450	65.16	19,916	12,367	62.10	0.70
52	28,295	9,109	32.19	20,867	6,313	30.25	0.63
53	28,046	9,690	34.55	20,462	6,483	31.68	-0.26
54	28,303	13,941	49.26	20,074	9,193	45.80	0.65
55	27,951	11,769	42.11	19,196	7,133	37.16	-0.60
56	28,302	9,379	33.14	20,454	6,069	29.67	0.65
57	27,937	16,101	57.63	19,108	10,127	53.00	-0.65
58	28,290	8,031	28.39	20,173	5,092	25.24	0.61
59	28,216	15,996	56.69	19,916	10,513	52.79	0.34
60	27,959	9,406	33.64	19,400	5,875	30.28	-0.57
61	28,180	10,838	38.46	19,725	6,692	33.93	0.22
62	28,395	17,997	63.38	20,089	11,997	59.72	0.98
63	28,379	3,797	13.38	21,611	2,383	11.03	0.92
64	27,868	15,468	55.50	19,593	10,075	51.42	-0.89
65	28,351	9,533	33.62	20,398	6,134	30.07	0.83
66	28,176	18,267	64.83	19,626	11,805	60.15	0.20
67	28,027	7,757	27.68	20,976	5,412	25.80	-0.33
68	28,114	8,948	31.83	19,590	5,739	29.30	-0.02
69	27,895	2,420	8.68	20,845	1,683	8.07	-0.80
70	27,867	16,926	60.74	20,518	11,847	57.74	-0.90
71	27,894	5,549	19.89	20,746	3,893	18.77	-0.80
72	27,915	10,299	36.89	24,187	7,858	32.49	-0.73
73	27,862	19,683	70.64	20,824	14,063	67.53	-0.91
74	27,919	20,212	72.40	20,591	13,756	66.81	-0.71
75	27,878	8,875	31.84	23,037	6,479	28.12	-0.86
76	27,842	2,946	10.58	22,985	2,374	10.33	-0.99
77	27,889	18,356	65.82	20,331	12,628	62.11	-0.82
78	27,881	7,435	26.67	20,365	4,714	23.15	-0.85
79	27,898	4,235	15.18	19,372	2,740	14.14	-0.79
80	27,903	11,857	42.49	19,004	7,312	38.48	-0.77
81	28,074	8,008	28.52	21,061	5,407	25.67	-0.16
82	28,043	11,282	40.23	19,973	7,458	37.34	-0.27
83	28,129	5,508	19.58	20,524	3,551	17.30	0.04
84	28,170	5,941	21.09	20,360	3,829	18.81	0.18
85	28,183	1,738	6.17	20,060	1,157	5.77	0.23
86	28,076	7,662	27.29	19,931	5,094	25.56	-0.15
87	28,327	1,914	6.76	20,560	1,341	6.52	0.74
88	27,894	2,592	9.29	19,751	1,590	8.05	-0.80
89	28,358	4,841	17.07	22,404	3,208	14.32	0.85
90	28,377	14,987	52.81	20,116	9,971	49.57	0.92
91	28,307	13,582	47.98	19,942	8,784	44.05	0.67
92	28,365	2,385	8.41	18,684	1,424	7.62	0.87
93	28,164	14,939	53.04	20,129	9,913	49.25	0.16
94	28,244	4,111	14.56	19,596	2,615	13.34	0.44
95	28,313	18,100	63.93	21,283	13,304	62.51	0.69
96	28,269	7,197	25.46	20,073	4,724	23.53	0.53
97	28,225	12,547	44.45	20,262	8,722	43.05	0.38
98	28,212	3,054	10.83	19,763	1,958	9.91	0.33
99	28,221	3,517	12.46	19,931	2,285	11.46	0.36
100	28,264	6,639	23.49	18,493	4,124	22.30	0.52

SOUTH CAROLINA HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

Population Summary Report

Dist.	Total	Black	Pct. Black	Total18+	Black18+	Pct. Black18+	Pct. Dev.
101	28,211	18,320	64.94	18,902	11,425	60.44	0.33
102	28,392	16,143	56.86	19,392	10,374	53.50	0.97
103	28,315	15,499	54.74	18,991	9,497	50.01	0.70
104	28,332	7,660	27.04	21,645	4,782	22.09	0.76
105	28,254	4,702	16.64	20,858	3,000	14.38	0.48
106	28,344	1,255	4.43	22,701	839	3.70	0.80
107	27,940	2,171	7.77	22,359	1,459	6.53	-0.64
108	27,975	10,191	36.43	20,394	6,361	31.19	-0.51
109	28,312	14,779	52.20	21,331	10,066	47.19	0.69
110	28,376	14,361	50.61	22,629	9,999	44.19	0.91
111	28,396	18,805	66.22	21,336	12,918	60.55	0.99
112	28,265	1,331	4.71	21,590	874	4.05	0.52
113	28,227	5,976	21.17	20,038	3,675	18.34	0.38
114	28,309	3,969	14.02	21,778	2,690	12.35	0.68
115	28,160	6,262	22.24	21,217	4,186	19.73	0.15
116	28,371	16,651	58.69	19,929	11,034	55.37	0.90
117	28,387	4,764	16.78	20,137	2,826	14.03	0.95
118	28,323	12,065	42.60	20,129	7,302	36.28	0.73
119	28,384	7,129	25.12	22,489	4,810	21.39	0.94
120	28,374	15,658	55.18	19,407	9,793	50.46	0.91
121	28,279	10,793	38.17	19,588	6,806	34.75	0.57
122	28,376	14,905	52.53	18,619	9,283	49.86	0.91
123	28,398	3,015	10.62	22,995	1,952	8.49	0.99
124	28,169	10,066	35.73	21,978	7,073	32.18	0.18

3,486,703	1039884		2566496	691,040	-0.19

Mean Deviation is: 176
Mean Percent Deviation is: 0.63

Largest Positive Deviation is:	279	0.99 Percent
Largest Negative Deviation is:	-279	-0.99 Percent
Overall Range in Deviation is:	558	1.98 Percent

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 1

Area	**Population**
Oconee County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
HOLLY SPRINGS	683
KEOWEE KEY	1,418
LONG CREEK	447
MADISON	869
MOUNTAIN REST	1,078
OAKWAY	
Tract 0309.00	
Blocks: 205, 206, 209, 210, 211, 212, 216, 217, 218, 219, 251, 257, 258	424
RICHLAND	893
SALEM	2,394
SOUTH UNION	903
TAMASEE	1,436
WALHALLA	9,699
WESTMINSTER	7,670
DISTRICT TOTAL	27,914
PERCENT VARIATION	-0.726

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 2

Area	**Population**
Oconee County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
FRIENDSHIP	2,319
KEOWEE	2,527
NEWRY CORINTH	530

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 2

Area	**Population**
OAKWAY	
Tract 0309.00	
Blocks: 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 137, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 213, 214, 215, 259, 260, 261	626
PROVIDENCE	
Tract 0309.00	
Blocks: 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 570	637
RAVENEL	2,098
RETURN	643
SENECA	13,965
SHILOH	1,296
TOKEENA	629
UTICA	1,008
WEST UNION	1,630
DISTRICT TOTAL	27,908
PERCENT VARIATION	-0.747

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 3

Area	**Population**
Pickens County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
CALHOUN	3,672
CENTRAL 1	2,483

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 3

Area **Population**

CENTRAL 2

Tract 0110.03

Blocks: 251, 252 3

Tract 0111.01

Blocks: 101, 102, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116A, 116B, 116C, 153, 154, 155, 156, 160A, 160B, 161A, 161B, 162 166

Tract 0111.02

Blocks: 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112A, 112B, 113A, 113B, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 201A, 201B, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212A, 212B, 213A, 213B, 214, 215A, 215B, 215C, 215D, 216A, 216B, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223A, 223B, 224A, 224B, 224C, 225A, 225B, 226 1,560

Tract 0111.03

Blocks: 145, 148, 149, 150, 158, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177 81

CLEMSON 2,554

LAWRENCE CHAPEL 719

PIKE 755

PRATERS CREEK

Tract 0103.00

Blocks: 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 152, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 253, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266 636

SIX MILE 3,368

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 3

Area	**Population**
STONE CHURCH	2,626
UNIVERSITY	9,240
DISTRICT TOTAL	27,863
PERCENT VARIATION	-0.907

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 4

Area	**Population**
Pickens County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
ALBERT R. LEWIS	2,027
AMBLER	1,493
CENTRAL 2	
Tract 0111.02	
Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 104	86
Tract 0111.03	
Blocks: 143B, 151B, 153B, 154, 155, 156C, 159B, 159C	162
DACUSVILLE	
Tract 0105.01	
Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 136, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 153, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 209, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 228, 242, 243	1,580
HOLLY SPRINGS	1,437
LIBERTY 1	3,428

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 4

Area	Population
LIBERTY 2	1,398
MOUNTAIN VIEW	1,218
NORRIS	1,994
PICKENS 1	3,617
PICKENS 2	2,588
PICKENS 3	3,675
PRATERS CREEK	
Tract 0102.00	
Blocks: 186, 194	28
Tract 0103.00	
Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 153	601
PUMPKINTOWN	1,492
RICES CREEK	1,290
DISTRICT TOTAL	28,111
PERCENT VARIATION	-0.014

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 5

Area	Population
Pickens County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
ARIAL MILL	3,052
BRUSHY CREEK	1,699
CEDAR ROCK	990
EASLEY	3,687

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 5

Area	**Population**
FLAT ROCK	1,964
FOREST ACRES	4,034
MCKISSICK	
Tract 0106.00	
Blocks: 107, 132, 167, 168, 210, 211, 212	237
Tract 0108.01	
Blocks: 101A, 101B, 102, 103A, 103B, 103C, 104A, 104B, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112A, 112E, 112C, 112D, 113A, 113B, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 128, 131, 132A, 132B, 135, 136A, 136B, 137A, 137B, 138, 142, 143, 144, 151	1,493
Tract 0108.02	
Blocks: 101A, 101B, 102A, 102B, 103, 104A, 104B, 105A, 105B, 106A, 106B, 106C, 106D, 107, 120, 123, 124, 125A, 125B, 152, 153, 154	349
PARK STREET	5,011
SMITH GROVE	2,202
ZION	3,185
DISTRICT TOTAL	27,903
PERCENT VARIATION	-0.765

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 6

Area	**Population**
Anderson County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
APPLETON EQUINOX	2,142

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 6

Area	**Population**
DENVER SANDY SPRINGS	
Tract 0106.00	
Blocks: 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 427, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439	365
Tract 0108.00	
Blocks: 218, 219, 220, 221, 223, 224	141
EDGEWOOD	3,626
FIVE FORKS	1,346
HOPEWELL	2,518
LA FRANCE	630
MELTON	562
MOUNT TABOR	1,723
PENDLETON	4,112
PIERCETOWN	716
WARD 1 PRECINCT 1	2,559
WARD 5 PRECINCT 1	1,150
WARD 5 PRECINCT 2	2,503
WARD 6 PRECINCT 1	2,767
WARD 6 PRECINCT 2	1,306
DISTRICT TOTAL	28,166
PERCENT VARIATION	0.171

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 7

Area	**Population**
Anderson County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
BAKERS CREEK	306

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 7

Area	Population
BELTON	6,460
BROADVIEW	823
BROADWAY	
Tract 0004.00	
Blocks: 101, 124, 125, 126	20
Tract 0005.00	
Blocks: 201, 202, 203, 206B, 207	330
Tract 0112.00	
Blocks: 223, 224, 225	188
Tract 0113.00	
Blocks: 105, 106, 107, 108A, 108B, 123A, 123B, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230	1,581
Tract 0114.00	
Blocks: 501A, 501B, 502, 503	80
CHIQUOLA MILL	1,216
CRAYTONVILLE	1,246
FRIENDSHIP	1,156
HALL	2,125
HIGH POINT	745
HONEA PATH	2,424
IVA	2,468
JACKSON MILL	1,285
MCADAMS	228

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 7

Area	**Population**
NEALS CREEK	
Tract 0113.00	
Blocks: 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 316, 317, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 407, 408, 409, 410, 412, 413	1,931
ROCK SPRING	988
SHIRLEYS STORE	905
TONEY CREEK	617
WRIGHTS SCHOOL	931
DISTRICT TOTAL	28,053
PERCENT VARIATION	-0.231

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 8

Area	**Population**
Anderson County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
CENTERVILLE	5,348

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 8

Area **Population**

DENVER SANDY SPRINGS

Tract 0106.00

Blocks: 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 428, 429, 430, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450 953

Tract 0108.00

Blocks: 222, 227, 228, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321 595

FORK 1 816

FORK 2 1,292

GREEN POND 3,989

HOMELAND PARK

Tract 0118.00

Blocks: 103, 104 99

Tract 0119.00

Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 331, 332, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417 3,755

LAKESIDE 3,433

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 8

Area	**Population**
MOUNTAIN CREEK	
Tract 0120.00	
Blocks: 420, 421, 422, 423	104
ORR MILL	
Tract 0006.00	
Blocks: 401B, 402, 403, 404B, 405B, 406B, 407, 408A, 408B, 409, 414, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420B, 421, 422, 423	524
ROCK MILL	2,059
TOWNVILLE	555
VARENNES	2,820
Oconee County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
EARLES GROVE	889
FAIR PLAY	723
PROVIDENCE	
Tract 0309.00	
Blocks: 541, 542, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569	60
DISTRICT TOTAL	28,014
PERCENT VARIATION	-0.370

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 9

Area	**Population**
Anderson County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
BOWLING GREEN	727

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 9

Area **Population**

BROADWAY

Tract 0004.00

Blocks: 102, 108, 109, 110, IIIB, 117C, 121C, 121D, 122B, 123B 116

Tract 0005.00

Blocks: 204B, 205B, 208C, 208D 13

Tract 0112.00

Blocks: 202, 203 157

CEDAR GROVE 1,378

HAMMOND SCHOOL 2,726

NEALS CREEK

Tract 0004.00

Blocks: 129B, 202B 0

Tract 0005.00

Blocks: 109, 110, 114, 120B, 122B, 127, 134B, 135, 136B, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316 1,192

Tract 0006.00

Blocks: 201B, 202B, 203, 204B, 206C, 210B, 214, 226B, 227B, 230, 231, 338 56

ORR MILL

Tract 0006.00

Blocks: 410, 411B, 412B, 413, 415, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429 211

Tract 0007.00

Blocks: 247A, 288A, 288C, 290, 293A, 293C, 294, 295, 296, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418D, 419D, 419E, 419F, 602B, 603B, 603C, 604A, 605, 606, 607, 608A, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614A, 614B, 614C, 615, 616B, 617, 618, 619, 620B, 621, 622,

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 9

Area	Population
623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 640, 641, 642, 643, 644, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 650, 651, 652, 653	1,619
WARD 1 PRECINCT 2	1,708
WARD 2 PRECINCT 1	1,971
WARD 2 PRECINCT 2	3,647
WARD 3 PRECINCT 1	2,283
WARD 3 PRECINCT 2	2,366
WARD 4 PRECINCT 1	2,089
WARD 4 PRECINCT 2	1,834
WILLIAMSTON MILL	
Tract 0104.01	
Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 104, 105A, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126A, 129A, 130A, 131A, 132, 133, 134, 135A, 136, 137A, 138A, 143, 144, 145, 601A, 601B, 602A, 602B, 603, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 628, 629, 630, 631, 633, 634, 635, 636, 637, 638A, 638B, 639, 640, 641A, 641B, 642, 643A, 643B, 644, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 650, 651, 652	1,509
Tract 0104.02	
Blocks: 305, 306, 307A, 307B, 308, 309A, 310A, 313, 314, 315, 336, 337, 338	300
WILLIAMSTON	
Tract 0104.01	
Blocks: 105B, 106, 126B, 126C, 127, 128, 129B, 140, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222D, 223	473

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 9

Area **Population**

Tract 0104.02

Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 159, 160 1,469

DISTRICT TOTAL 27,844

PERCENT VARIATION ..... -0.974

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 10

Area **Population**

Anderson County

Census Voting Tabulation Districts

BISHOPS BRANCH 1,413
BRUSHY CREEK 3,706
CONCRETE 4,660
PELZER 1,537
PIEDMONT 1,201
SIMPSONVILLE 2,285
THREE AND TWENTY 3,981
WALKER-MCELMOYLE 963
WEST PELZER 2,625
WHITE PLAINS 2,612

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 10

Area **Population**

WILLIAMSTON MILL

Tract 0104.01

Blocks: 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 627, 632, 653, 654 132

WILLIAMSTON

Tract 0103.00

Blocks: 122, 129, 130, 131 153

Tract 0104.01

Blocks: 201A, 201B, 202A, 202B, 203A, 203B, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212A, 212B, 213A, 213B, 214, 215A, 215B, 222A, 222B, 222C, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239A, 239B, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248A, 248B, 249, 250, 251, 309A, 311, 322, 323, 324A, 325, 401A, 401B, 402, 403, 404A, 404B, 405, 406, 407A, 407B, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 513, 514A, 514B, 514C, 515A, 515B, 516A, 516B, 516C, 517A, 517B, 518A, 518B, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529A, 529B, 530, 531A, 531B, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553A, 553B, 554, 555A, 555B, 556A, 556B, 557A, 557B, 558, 559, 560 2,822

Tract 0104.02

Blocks: 301, 302, 303, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 326 30

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 10

Area	Population
DISTRICT TOTAL	28,120
PERCENT VARIATION	0.007

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 11

Area	Population
Abbeville County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
ABBEVILLE 1	2,866
ABBEVILLE 2	2,762
ABBEVILLE 3	1,487
ABBEVILLE 4	1,403
ABBEVILLE MILL	776
ANTREVILLE	1,362
CALHOUN FALLS 1	1,932
CALHOUN FALLS 2	1,151
CENTRAL	269
COLD SPRINGS	988
DUE WEST	2,032
HAMPTON	37
HILLVILLE	361
KEOWEE	555
LEBANON	658
LEVEL LAND	432
LOWNDESVILLE 1	484
LOWNDESVILLE 2	336
MOUNTAIN VIEW	457
ROCK SPRINGS	708
WATTS	345

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 11

Area **Population**

Anderson County

Census Voting Tabulation Districts

CORNER 335
FLATROCK 2,066
GLUCK MILL 469
GROVE SCHOOL 301
HOMELAND PARK
Tract 0118.00
Blocks: 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 123, 138 513
MOUNTAIN CREEK
Tract 0119.00
Blocks: 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613 40
Tract 0120.00
Blocks: 426, 427, 428, 430 26
Tract 0122.00
Blocks: 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 302, 303, 304, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 329, 332, 335, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354 1,575
STARR 910
WEST SAVANNAH 436

DISTRICT TOTAL 28,072

PERCENT VARIATION ..... -0.164

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 12

Area **Population**

Greenwood County

Census Voting Tabulation Districts

BRADLEY 238
CALLISON 328
CAMBRIDGE 325
EPWORTH 389
GLENDALE 3,637
GREENWOOD MILL
Tract 9704.00
Blocks: 403A, 405A, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 434, 435, 436, 501A, 505A, 506 268
GREENWOOD NO 5
Tract 9704.00
Blocks: 309A, 309B, 331, 332, 427, 428, 429, 430, 432, 433, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456A, 457, 458, 459, 460A, 460B, 460C, 462, 465A, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 512A, 513, 533A, 533B, 535A, 536A, 538 418
HARRIS
Tract 9703.00
Blocks: 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 239, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 249, 250, 251 651
Tract 9704.00
Blocks: 402, 403B 3
KIRKSEY'S 393
LACO 2,691

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 12

Area	**Population**
NEW MARKET	
Tract 9706.00	
Blocks: 401, 410B, 411B, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 501, 502B, 516B, 517B, 520B, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541	1,383
Tract 9708.00	
Blocks: 230	0
NINETY SIX	3,279
NINETY SIX MILL	1,661
OAK GROVE	223
PHOENIX	625
TROY	262
VERDERY	968
McCormick County	8,868
Saluda County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
CENTENNIAL	716
MAYSON	571
DISTRICT TOTAL	27,967
PERCENT VARIATION	-0.537

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 13

Area **Population**

Greenwood County

Census Voting Tabulation Districts

BLAKEDALE 3,091

FAIRGROUND

Tract 9702.00

Blocks: 205, 207, 237B, 239, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309B, 310, 311, 312, 403B, 403C, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 502B, 504B, 615B 2,490

Tract 9705.00

Blocks: 101, 102B, 103, 104, 105B, 106, 107, 108, 109B, 109C, 110B, 124, 128B, 129B 311

Tract 9706.00

Blocks: 204, 205, 206, 207, 208 64

GREENWOOD MILL

Tract 9704.00

Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 401A, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 431 945

GREENWOOD NO 1 3,882

GREENWOOD NO 2 3,461

GREENWOOD NO 3 3,312

GREENWOOD NO 4

Tract 9702.00

Blocks: 237A, 309A, 403A, 413, 414, 415, 416A, 416B, 417, 418, 419, 420, 502A, 503, 504A, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 601, 602,

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 13

Area	Population
603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615A, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622	3,429
Tract 9705.00	
Blocks: 102A, 105A, 109A, 110A, 111, 112, 113, 115, 122, 125, 126, 127, 128A, 129A, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134	924
GREENWOOD NO 5	
Tract 9704.00	
Blocks: 124, 131, 132, 133, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330	1,422
GREENWOOD NO 6	2,976
HARRIS	
Tract 9703.00	
Blocks: 201, 202, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 230, 236, 237, 238, 240, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 505B, 516B, 518B, 519, 520B, 522, 536B	2,024
Tract 9704.00	
Blocks: 401B, 404	0
DISTRICT TOTAL	28,331
PERCENT VARIATION	0.758

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 14

Area **Population**

Abbeville County

Census Voting Tabulation Districts

BROADMOUTH 505
DONALDS 717
HALLS STORE 1,239

Greenwood County

Census Voting Tabulation Districts

COKESBURY 1,442
CORONACA 1,315
EMERALD 2,892
FAIRGROUND
Tract 9702.00
Blocks: 130, 131, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 206, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218B, 218C, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224B, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 238, 401, 402, 416C, 501B 816
Tract 9706.00
Blocks: 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 201, 202, 203 891
Tract 9707.00
Blocks: 113 1
GREENWOOD NO 4
Tract 9702.00
Blocks: 218A, 224A, 501A 6
HODGES 1,761
NEW MARKET
Tract 9707.00
Blocks: 126, 127 276
RILEY 394

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 14

Area	Population
SHOALS JUNCTION	351
STONEY POINT	600
WARE SHOALS	2,679
Laurens County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
BAILEYS	
Tract 9803.00	
Blocks: 301, 302, 303, 304, 319, 320, 321, 322, 411, 419, 420, 421, 422, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433	502
Tract 9807.00	
Blocks: 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 530, 531	144
BREWERTON	737
CROSS HILL	1,656
DANIELS STORE	145
EKOM	296
HICKORY TAVERN	1,509
MADDENS	1,563
MOUNT OLIVE	411
MOUNT PLEASANT	283
MOUNTVILLE	889
POPLAR SPRINGS	689
PRINCETON	528
TIP TOP	1,194
WATERLOO	1,409
DISTRICT TOTAL	27,840
PERCENT VARIATION	-0.989

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 15

Area	Population
Laurens County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
CLINTON 1 BOX 1	2,534
CLINTON 1 BOX 2	6,527
CLINTON MILL	3,470
HOPEWELL	496
JOANNA	1,979
LYDIA MILL	1,969
RENNO	323
SHADY GROVE	508
Newberry County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
BETH EDEN	
Tract 9502.00	
Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134	266
MAYBINTON	152
MOUNT BETHEL GARMANY	
Tract 9502.00	
Blocks: 110, 111, 112, 117, 119, 120	60
MOUNT PLEASANT	1,380
WHITMIRE CITY	1,702
WHITMIRE OUTSIDE	1,381
Spartanburg County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
CROSS ANCHOR	969

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 15

Area **Population**

PAULINE GLENN SPRINGS

Tract 0238.00

Blocks: 236, 237, 238, 239, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285 456

WALNUT GROVE

Tract 0238.00

Blocks: 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578, 579, 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 587 1,785

Union County

Census Voting Tabulation Districts

BLACK ROCK 626

CROSS KEYS 1,224

PUTMAN

Tract 0307.00

Blocks: 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 224, 225 119

DISTRICT TOTAL 27,926

PERCENT VARIATION ..... -0.683

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 16

Area **Population**

Laurens County

Census Voting Tabulation Districts

BAILEYS

Tract 9803.00

Blocks: 101B, 102, 120B, 120C, 125C, 126B, 128, 129C, 130B, 133B, 134B, 135, 136B, 137B, 138B, 139B, 140, 201B, 207B, 212B, 213, 216, 217, 218, 219, 305, 306, 401, 402, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 423 1,101

Tract 9804.00

Blocks: 724B 0

Tract 9807.00

Blocks: 502, 503 0

BARKSDALE NARNI 1,003

COOKS STORE 684

DIALS 405

GRAY COURT 1,531

GRAYS 492

JONES STORE 1,607

LANFORD 553

LONG BRANCH 1,633

ORA 436

OWINGS 972

PLEASANT MOUND 442

SHILOH 286

STEWART STORE 764

TRINITY RIDGE 1,473

WARD 1 537

WARD 2 1,044

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 16

Area	Population
WARD 3	1,344
WARD 4	2,496
WARD 5	2,454
WARD 6	2,034
WATTSVILLE	2,734
WOODVILLE	1,483
YOUNGS	841
DISTRICT TOTAL	28,331
PERCENT VARIATION	0.758

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 17

Area	Population
Greenville County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
EBENEZER	1,827
GOWENSVILLE	1,736
JENNINGS MILL	996
MARIDELL	2,795
MOUNTAIN VIEW	2,029
SANDY FLAT	
Tract 0026.01	
Blocks: 201, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 223, 229, 230, 260	1,211

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 17

Area **Population**

Tract 0039.02

Blocks: 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 122, 123, 124, 125, 133, 134, 135, 136, 138, 139, 140, 141, 143, 147, 150, 151, 152, 157, 158, 201, 203, 204, 205, 206, 255, 256 945

SKYLAND 2,753

SLATER MARIETTA 5,725

TIGERVILLE 1,934

TRAVELERS REST 3,074

TUBBS MOUNTAIN 2,846

DISTRICT TOTAL 27,871

PERCENT VARIATION .... -0.878

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 18

Area **Population**

Greenville County

Census Voting Tabulation Districts

DEL NORTE

Tract 0026.04

Blocks: 520, 521, 522 194

FAIRVIEW 3,518

FROHAWK 2,931

GREER 1 1,440

GREER 2 1,340

GREER 3 1,543

GREER 4 2,344

ONEAL 3,081

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 18

Area **Population**

PLEASANT GROVE

Tract 0025.03

Blocks: 112, 113B, 116B, 118, 119A, 119B, 120, 121, 124, 125, 126, 201, 202, 203, 205, 206B, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331 . . . 1,689

Tract 0025.05

Blocks: 507C, 802B, 802C, 804, 805B 0

SANDY FLAT

Tract 0026.01

Blocks: 210, 211, 219, 220, 221, 222, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 231, 232, 233, 235, 238, 242, 244, 249, 250, 251, 252. 1,327

TAYLORS

Tract 0026.04

Blocks: 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514 2,730

Spartanburg County

Census Voting Tabulation Districts

DUNCAN

Tract 0232.00

Blocks: 203, 206, 208, 209, 213, 226, 227 . . . 370

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 18

Area	Population
EAST GREER	1,511
VICTOR MILL	
Tract 0232.00	
Blocks: 401, 402A, 402B, 410, 413A, 413B, 417, 418, 419, 420A, 420B, 424, 436	308
Tract 0233.00	
Blocks: 315, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322A, 323, 324, 401A, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418A, 418B, 419, 501A, 501B, 501C, 502A, 502B, 503A, 503B, 503C, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510A, 510B, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515A, 515B, 516, 517A, 517B, 517C, 518A, 518B, 518C, 518D, 518E, 518F, 519, 520, 521A, 521B, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 595, 596, 597, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806A, 806B, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815	3,611
DISTRICT TOTAL	27,937
PERCENT VARIATION	-0.644

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 19

Area **Population**

Greenville County

Census Voting Tabulation Districts

ARMSTRONG 1,542
BEREA 2,984
FURMAN 5,028
LEAWOOD
Tract 0038.02
Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 301, 305 2,131
MONAVIEW
Tract 0022.01
Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 202, 203, 204, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827, 828, 829, 830, 831, 832 2,599
Tract 0023.02
Blocks: 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 732, 733, 803, 804, 807, 901, 902, 903 1,269
Tract 0037.02
Blocks: 306 87
Tract 0037.04
Blocks: 301, 319, 320 97
PARIS MOUNTAIN 1,368

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 19

Area **Population**

PARK PLACE
Tract 0023.02
Blocks: 401, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 601, 602, 603, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 634, 701, 728, 729, 730, 801, 802 1,808
Tract 0023.03
Blocks: 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411 339
POINSETT 2,850
SALUDA 1,885
SULPHUR SPRINGS 2,506
UNION BLEACHERY 1,052
WASHINGTON HEIGHTS
Tract 0023.04
Blocks: 202, 210, 211, 212, 213, 220, 221, 222, 310 648

DISTRICT TOTAL 28,193

PERCENT VARIATION 0.267

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 20

Area **Population**

Greenville County
Census Voting Tabulation Districts
AVON 2,312
BROOKGLENN 3,756

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 20

Area	Population
DEL NORTE	
Tract 0026.04	
Blocks: 515, 516, 517, 518, 519	648
EDWARDS FOREST	2,467
GREENVILLE 1	1,168
LEAWOOD	
Tract 0023.04	
Blocks: 303, 305	69
Tract 0038.02	
Blocks: 302, 303, 304, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319	977
NORTHWOOD	2,520
PEBBLE CREEK	3,936
PIEDMONT PARK	4,124
TAYLORS	
Tract 0026.04	
Blocks: 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415	954
WADE HAMPTON	1,598
WASHINGTON HEIGHTS	
Tract 0023.04	
Blocks: 201, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 301, 302, 304, 306, 307, 308, 309	766
WOODLAWN	2,554
DISTRICT TOTAL	27,849
PERCENT VARIATION	-0.957

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 21

Area **Population**

Greenville County

Census Voting Tabulation Districts

BATESVILLE 4,777

DEL NORTE

Tract 0018.02

Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 111, 114, 115, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 127 1,332

Tract 0026.02

Blocks: 604, 605, 608, 609 1,148

Tract 0028.03

Blocks: 905, 906, 907, 908, 909, 910, 911 ... 678

DEVENGER 4,144

DOVE TREE 2,912

GILDER CREEK

Tract 0028.06

Blocks: 150 276

MEADOWOOD 1,353

MERRIFIELD 1,415

MISSION

Tract 0018.02

Blocks: 901A, 901B, 901C, 902 253

Tract 0028.05

Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119 1,243

PLEASANT GROVE

Tract 0025.03

Blocks: 204, 220, 221, 222, 301, 302, 303, 321, 322, 323, 324, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419 653

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 21

Area **Population**

Tract 0026.05

Blocks: 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 513, 514, 515 1,866

PLINEY

Tract 0028.06

Blocks: 101, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326 2,163

Tract 0030.03

Blocks: 203, 204, 205, 206, 207 326

ROCKY CREEK

Tract 0026.05

Blocks: 930, 931 14

Tract 0028.06

Blocks: 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130 2,175

Tract 0028.07

Blocks: 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209C, 210, 211, 212, 213, 901, 902A, 902B, 902C, 903, 904, 905, 906, 917 1,155

DISTRICT TOTAL 27,883

PERCENT VARIATION ..... -0.836

92-155

SUPREME COURT, U.S.
FILED
JUL 21 1992
OFFICE OF THE CLERK

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1992

STATEWIDE REAPPORTIONMENT ADVISORY COMMITTEE, et al.,

Appellants,

v.

NICK THEODORE, et al.,

Appellees.

On Appeal From The United States District Court For The District Of South Carolina

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT APPENDIX VOLUME II, PAGES 224-485

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SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 22

Area	**Population**
Greenville County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
BOTANY WOODS	1,629
CHEROKEE	2,459
GREENVILLE 13	
Tract 0012.02	
Blocks: 805	75
GREENVILLE 2	1,188
GREENVILLE 25	2,797
GREENVILLE 26	2,643
GREENVILLE 27	4,571
GREENVILLE 28	1,794
GREENVILLE 3	1,623
LAKE FOREST	2,214
ROCK HILL	3,779
TIMBERLAKE	1,782
WELLINGTON	1,356
DISTRICT TOTAL	27,910
PERCENT VARIATION	-0.740

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 23

Area	**Population**
Greenville County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
ALEXANDER	
Tract 0022.02	
Blocks: 402C, 402D, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409C, 410, 412, 413, 414	448

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 23

Area	Population
BRANDON	
Tract 0021.05	
Blocks: 101A, 101B, 102A, 102B, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 110, 111, 112A, 112B, 112C, 113, 114, 115A, 115B, 116, 118, 120	537
DUNEAN	
Tract 0005.00	
Blocks: 208A	0
Tract 0021.08	
Blocks: 105, 106, 107, 108, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 116A, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 125, 126, 127, 129, 130A, 131A, 132A, 132B, 133, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209A, 209B, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 221, 222, 223A, 223B, 224	1,580
GREENVILLE 10	923
GREENVILLE 11	
Tract 0003.00	
Blocks: 205, 206, 207, 214, 216	79
Tract 0004.00	
Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 116, 118, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 210	687
GREENVILLE 12	1,327
GREENVILLE 13	
Tract 0012.02	
Blocks: 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 401, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 617, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 812, 813, 814, 815, 819	2,066

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 23

Area **Population**

Tract 0013.01

Blocks: 319, 320, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 412, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621 692

GREENVILLE 14 3,916

GREENVILLE 24 1,121

GREENVILLE 4 2,480

GREENVILLE 5 1,816

GREENVILLE 6 1,757

GREENVILLE 7

Tract 0007.00

Blocks: 217, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307 521

Tract 0008.00

Blocks: 104B, 106, 107, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220 995

GREENVILLE 8 2,704

GREENVILLE 9 1,807

MISSION

Tract 0018.02

Blocks: 905, 908A, 908B, 909A, 909B, 910, 911, 912 132

PARK PLACE

Tract 0023.03

Blocks: 201B, 202B, 203B, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 325, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332 1,403

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 23

Area **Population**

WASHINGTON HEIGHTS

Tract 0023.04

Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 104, 119, 120, 121, 122, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141 . . . 1,045

DISTRICT TOTAL 28,036

PERCENT VARIATION . . . . . -0.292

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 24

Area **Population**

Greenville County

Census Voting Tabulation Districts

BRANDON

Tract 0021.05

Blocks: 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323 650

CHESTNUT HILLS 1,767

DUNEAN

Tract 0021.03

Blocks: 102A, 102B, 102C 108

Tract 0021.07

Blocks: 201, 202, 218, 219, 220, 224, 226, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 315, 316, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411 1,137

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 24

Area	Population
Tract 0021.08	
Blocks: 313, 314, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321	171
GREENVILLE 11	
Tract 0004.00	
Blocks: 208, 209, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 301, 302, 303	442
GREENVILLE 15	2,049
GREENVILLE 16	1,931
GREENVILLE 17	1,590
GREENVILLE 18	1,480
GREENVILLE 19	
Tract 0015.02	
Blocks: 501, 502, 507, 508	99
GREENVILLE 20	1,700
GREENVILLE 21	1,480
GREENVILLE 22	1,893
GREENVILLE 23	
Tract 0019.00	
Blocks: 118, 119, 120, 207, 208, 209, 210, 223, 224, 225, 902, 905A, 905B, 906, 907, 908, 909, 911, 914, 917, 918, 919, 922, 923, 924, 925, 926, 927	1,725
MAULDIN 2	3,095
MAULDIN 4	
Tract 0029.03	
Blocks: 106, 116, 136	257
MISSION	
Tract 0019.00	
Blocks: 901A, 901B, 901C, 901D, 901E, 901F, 901G, 910A, 910B, 910C, 910D, 910E, 912A, 912B, 913A, 913B, 913C, 915, 916A, 916B, 916C	153

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 24

Area	**Population**
PARAMOUNT	
Tract 0014.00	
Blocks: 401B, 402B	0
ROCKY CREEK	
Tract 0028.07	
Blocks: 209A, 217C, 221B, 221C, 907, 908, 909, 910A, 910B, 911, 912B, 913, 914, 915, 916, 918, 919C, 919D	89
SOUTHSIDE	
Tract 0021.03	
Blocks: 109A, 109B, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125	1,056
Tract 0021.07	
Blocks: 810, 825, 826, 833, 834, 836, 837, 838, 839	18
WELCOME	4,991
DISTRICT TOTAL	27,881
PERCENT VARIATION	0.843

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 25

Area	**Population**
Greenville County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
BELLE MEADE	3,226
CAROLINA	2,410
CONESTEE	
Tract 0020.01	
Blocks: 402	2

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 25

Area **Population**

Tract 0020.02

Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 302, 303 1,591

DONALDSON 1,002

FORK SHOALS

Tract 0032.00

Blocks: 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 116, 117, 125, 126 890

Tract 0033.02

Blocks: 403, 404, 405, 426, 427, 428, 429 ... 354

GANTT

Tract 0020.03

Blocks: 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718, 719, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827, 828, 829, 830, 831, 832, 833, 834 3,100

GREENVILLE 19

Tract 0015.01

Blocks: 413, 414, 501, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508 531

Tract 0015.02

Blocks: 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612C, 701B, 710, 711B, 716B, 717C, 717D, 720B, 720C 2,123

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 72

Area **Population**

RIVERSIDE 5,657
ST ANDREWS 2,215
WARD 1
Tract 0015.00
Blocks: 215, 216, 220 140
Tract 0018.00
Blocks: 105, 205 1,416
Tract 0019.00
Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106 2,465
Tract 0020.01
Blocks: 105, 106, 107, 108 227
Tract 0027.00
Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107 ... 602
WARD 10
Tract 0027.00
Blocks: 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 302, 303, 304, 306, 307, 308, 309, 311, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 509, 510 ... 2,182
WARD 22 2,368
WARD 29
Tract 0002.00
Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 305, 306, 307, 308 682
Tract 0106.00
Blocks: 318, 401A, 401B 145

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 72

Area	**Population**
WARD 30	
Tract 0016.00	
Blocks: 107, 112, 113, 115, 116, 117, 118, 201, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 213, 214, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 317, 318, 319, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415	2,193
Tract 0017.00	
Blocks: 101, 102	0
WARD 3	2,437
WARD 5	2,421
DISTRICT TOTAL	27,915
PERCENT VARIATION	-0.722

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 73

Area	**Population**
Richland County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
COLLEGE PLACE	3,822
DENNYSIDE	1,390
EDGEWOOD	
Tract 0109.00	
Blocks: 104, 105, 107A, 107B, 201A, 201B, 202, 203, 204A, 204B, 204C, 204D, 207, 208A, 208B, 215A, 215B, 215C, 301A, 301B, 301C, 303, 306, 307, 308A, 308B	998
FAIRWOPID	1,654

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 73

Area **Population**

GREENVIEW

Tract 0107.03

Blocks: 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 301, 302, 303, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321 2,853

KEENAN

Tract 0108.04

Blocks: 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 508, 518, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 528, 530, 532 1,124

KINGSWOOD

Tract 0104.06

Blocks: 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221 797

MONTICELLO

Tract 0105.01

Blocks: 902B, 904A, 904B, 905 1,223

WALDEN

Tract 0103.04

Blocks: 417C, 426B, 427B, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513 1,410

Tract 0104.06

Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 104, 105A, 105B, 105C, 105D, 105E, 106, 107A, 107B, 107C, 108, 109, 137, 160, 201, 202, 203, 209, 210, 211, 212 6,380

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 73

Area **Population**

WARD 21 3,172
WARD 29
Tract 0106.00
Blocks: 204A, 204B, 204C, 204D, 204E, 205, 209A, 209B, 209C, 302A, 305, 307, 308, 309, 310A, 310B, 310C, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317 777
WARD 31
Tract 0001.00
Blocks: 113, 117, 118, 119, 301, 302, 303, 304, 317 785
Tract 0002.00
Blocks: 213, 214, 215, 216 169
WHITEWELL
Tract 0104.05
Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 108, 111, 112 1,308

DISTRICT TOTAL 27,862

PERCENT VARIATION ..... -0.910

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 74

Area **Population**

Richland County
Census Voting Tabulation Districts
EDGEWOOD
Tract 0009.00
Blocks: 201A, 201B, 201C, 202, 203, 205, 206, 207, 208, 218, 219A, 219B 220

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 74

Area	Population
Tract 0109.00	
Blocks: 205A, 205B, 209A, 209B, 209C, 210A, 210B, 210C, 210D, 211A, 211B, 213, 214C, 214E	943
Tract 0110.00	
Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, IIIA, IIIB, 112, 113, 114, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207A, 207B, 208, 209, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309A, 309B	1,850
KEENAN	
Tract 0108.04	
Blocks: 507, 509, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 531	571
Tract 0111.01	
Blocks: 302, 304B, 304C, 304D, 310, 313, 314A, 314B, 314C, 314D, 316A, 316B, 316C, 316D, 316E, 316F, 316G	272
WARD 18	2,835
WARD 19	2,721
WARD 20	2,451
WARD 31	
Tract 0002.00	
Blocks: 201, 202, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 217, 218, 219, 220, 301, 302, 303, 304, 309, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319	1,002
WARD 32	2,808
WARD 34	
Tract 0011.00	
Blocks: 201, 202, 215, 218, 219, 220, 221, 301, 302, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308A, 308B, 309A, 309B, 310, 311, 312, 313A, 313B, 314A, 314B, 315A, 315B, 316A, 316B,	

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 74

Area	Population
317, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 513, 523, 524	1,766
WARD 4	3,088
WARD 6	
Tract 0111.01	
Blocks: 301, 303, 304A, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 311, 312, 315, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323	1,141
Tract 0112.02	
Blocks: 232, 233	49
WARD 7	3,195
WARD 8	2,061
WARD 9	
Tract 0013.00	
Blocks: 102, 103, 201, 206, 207, 501, 502, 503, 504	946
DISTRICT TOTAL	27,919
PERCENT VARIATION	-0.708

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 75

Area	Population
Richland County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
HAMPTON	2,897
OLYMPIA	
Tract 0026.00	
Blocks: 608	0
Tract 0027.00	
Blocks: 508	3

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 75

Area **Population**

Tract 0028.00

Blocks: 237, 238, 239A, 239B, 240A, 240B, 240C, 240D, 247 52

Tract 0117.01

Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 116, 117, 118, 121, 122, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 901, 908, 911, 912, 913, 914, 915 2,155

S FOREST ACRES

Tract 0012.00

Blocks: 101, 108, 109A, 109B, 110, 111, 116, 117, 118, 119A, 119B, 120A, 120B, 123A, 123B, 152, 154A, 154B, 156A, 156B 675

WARD 1

Tract 0020.01

Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 104, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214 ... 2,356

Tract 0020.02

Blocks: 104, 110, 111, 112, 114, 116 222

WARD 10

Tract 0027.00

Blocks: 507A, 507B 29

WARD 11 3,191

WARD 12 2,172

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 75

Area	Population
WARD 13	2,942
WARD 14	2,183
WARD 15	1,188
WARD 2	885
WARD 23	1,518
WARD 30	
Tract 0015.00	
Blocks: 120, 121, 203, 204, 205, 206, 211, 212	52
Tract 0016.00	
Blocks: 108, 109, 110, 111, 202, 203, 212, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 301, 302, 303, 315, 316	53
WARD 33	1,858
WARD 9	
Tract 0013.00	
Blocks: 202, 203, 204, 205, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516	1,706
Tract 0020.02	
Blocks: 101, 102, 103	64
WOODLANDS	
Tract 0026.00	
Blocks: 101A, 101B, 101C, 101D, 101E, 101F, 101G, 102A, 102B, 103, 104, 105, 106A, 106B, 106C, 801, 802, 803, 804	1,677
DISTRICT TOTAL	27,878
PERCENT VARIATION	-0.854

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 76

Area **Population**

Richland County

Census Voting Tabulation Districts

ARCADIA

Tract 0111.02

Blocks: 104A, 104B, 105A, 119 286

BRANDON

Tract 0116.03

Blocks: 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121A, 121B, 122, 123A, 123B, 123C, 123D, 123E, 123F, 123G, 123H, 123J 728

E FOREST ACRES 2,113

FJ 10 0

FJ 11 942

FJ 12 597

FJ 13 546

FJ 15 5

FJ 1 0

FJ 2 0

FJ 3 444

FORT JACKSON 1,179

KEENAN

Tract 0111.01

Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 104A, 104B, 105A, 105B, 105C, 106, 107A, 107B, 107C, 107D, 107E, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117 984

N FOREST ACRES 2,020

OAKWOOD 1,815

PENNINGTON 1,747

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 76

Area	Population
S FOREST ACRES	
Tract 0011.00	
Blocks: 318A, 318B, 319, 320	359
Tract 0024.00	
Blocks: 105A, 105B	34
Tract 0112.01	
Blocks: 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111A, 111B, 112, 128A, 128B, 129A, 129B, 201A, 201B, 202, 203, 204, 205, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305A, 305B, 309, 310	1,215
SATCHELFORD	
Tract 0111.02	
Blocks: 401A, 401B, 402, 403, 404A, 404B, 404C, 405A, 405B, 406, 407A, 407B, 408A, 408B, 408C, 408D, 409, 410A, 410B, 411, 412, 413, 414A, 414B, 415A, 415B, 416, 417A, 417B, 417C, 417D, 417E, 420A, 420B, 421A, 421B, 421C, 422A, 422B, 422C, 422D	760
Tract 0112.02	
Blocks: 105A, 105B, 105C, 106A, 106B, 106C, 107	138
Tract 0113.01	
Blocks: 806A, 806B, 807, 813A, 813B	133
WARD 16	1,432
WARD 17	2,099
WARD 24	1,181
WARD 25	2,160

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 76

Area **Population**

WARD 27

Tract 0116.04

Blocks: 312, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 405, 406, 409, 412, 418A, 418B, 418C, 418D, 420, 421, 423A, 423B 1,728

Tract 0116.05

Blocks: 701A, 701B, 701C, 701D, 701E, 701F, 701G, 701H, 702A, 702B 73

WARD 34

Tract 0011.00

Blocks: 303 26

WARD 6

Tract 0111.01

Blocks: 201, 202, 203, 205, 206, 207, 209, 210, 211, 212, 214A, 214B 488

Tract 0112.02

Blocks: 214A, 214B, 218A, 218B, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 231 295

WOODLANDS

Tract 0116.04

Blocks: 301A, 301B, 301C, 301D, 301E, 301F, 301G, 301H, 301J, 301K, 301L, 301M, 301N, 301P, 301R, 301T, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308A, 308B, 309, 310, 311A, 311B, 311C, 313A, 313B, 313C, 322 2,315

DISTRICT TOTAL 27,842

PERCENT VARIATION ..... -0.982

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 77

Area **Population**

Richland County

Census Voting Tabulation Districts

ARCADIA

Tract 0111.02

Blocks: 101, 103, 105B..... 141

BLYTHEWOOD

Tract 0101.00

Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 159, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168A, 168B, 169A, 169B, 170, 171A, 171B, 172A, 172B, 172C, 173, 174A, 174B, 175A, 175B, 175C, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 196, 197, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213A, 213B, 214, 215A, 215B, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 224, 225, 226, 271, 272, 273, 295, 296, 297, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308A, 308B, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315A, 315B, 316, 317A, 317B, 317C, 318A, 318B, 319, 320, 321A, 321B, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326A, 326B, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 336, 337, 353A, 353B, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366..... 2,418

Tract 0102.00

Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169,

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 77

Area	Population
170, 171, 172, 173, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 222, 301	1,393
DENTSVILLE	4,141
FAIDLAWN	2,539
GREENVIEW	
Tract 0107.03	
Blocks: 101	99
Tract 0108.04	
Blocks: 435	3
KEELS	
Tract 0108.02	
Blocks: 103, 105, 106, 107, 110, 111, 201, 202, 203	1,360
Tract 0113.03	
Blocks: 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 108, 145, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221	1,770
KILLIAN	
Tract 0101.00	
Blocks: 267, 268, 269, 270, 276, 277, 278, 284, 285, 333, 334, 335, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 401, 402, 411	1,236
LINCOLNSHIRE	3,944
MEADOWLAKE	5,050

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 77

Area **Population**

MONTICELLO

Tract 0102.00

Blocks: 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 236, 237, 239, 240, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396 2,203

Tract 0105.01

Blocks: 901, 902A, 902C, 903 100

SPRING VALLEY

Tract 0114.04

Blocks: 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117,

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 77

Area **Population**

118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 142, 143, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309 1,492

DISTRICT TOTAL 27,889

PERCENT VARIATION ..... -0.814

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 78

Area **Population**

Richland County

Census Voting Tabulation Districts

ARCADIA

Tract 0111.02

Blocks: 102A, 102B, 112, 114, 115A, 115B, 116, 117, 118, 120, 201A, 201B, 201C, 201D, 201E, 201F, 201G, 201H, 202, 203A, 203B, 203C, 204A, 204B, 204C, 204D, 205A, 205B 761

Tract 0113.01

Blocks: 101A, 101B, 101C, 101D, 101E, 101F, 102, 103, 104, 105A, 105B, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 115, 116, 117, 118, 123, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307 2,563

BRIARWOOD

Tract 0113.03

Blocks: 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422 1,001

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 78

Area	Population
Tract 0114.03	
Blocks: 418, 422, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512	846
COOPER	3,522
KEELS	
Tract 0113.03	
Blocks: 101, 106, 109, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310	533
Tract 0114.04	
Blocks: 401, 402B, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417	818
MIDWAY	4,266
PONTIAC	
Tract 0114.05	
Blocks: 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 336, 337, 338, 339, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 435, 436, 450	3,746
SATCHELFORD	
Tract 0113.01	
Blocks: 805A, 805B, 805C, 805D, 808, 810, 811	145
SPRING VALLEY	
Tract 0114.03	
Blocks: 101, 102, 103	319
Tract 0114.04	
Blocks: 101, 106, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 301, 302, 303, 310, 311, 312, 313	2,020

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 78

Area	Population
WILDEWOOD	
Tract 0114.03	
Blocks: 403, 404, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610	1,074
Tract 0114.05	
Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 105, 106, 107, 108A, 108B, 109A, 109B, 109C, 110, 111, 112, 113	694
WOODFIELD	5,573
DISTRICT TOTAL	27,881
PERCENT VARIATION	-0.843

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 79

Area	Population
Kershaw County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
ELGIN 1	2,803
ELGIN 2	2,701
LUGOFF 1	1,416
LUGOFF 2	2,427
LUGOFF 3	1,292
SALT POND	1,210
Richland County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
BLYTHEWOOD	
Tract 0101.00	
Blocks: 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 160, 161, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187,	

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 79

Area **Population**

188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 221, 222, 223, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 253, 254, 256, 258, 259, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294 1,191

BRIARWOOD

Tract 0114.03

Blocks: 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 419, 420, 421 730

ESTATES 2,715

KILLIAN

Tract 0101.00

Blocks: 252, 255, 257, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 274, 275, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 286, 287, 288, 289 254

NORTH SPRINGS 5,194

PONTIAC

Tract 0114.05

Blocks: 328, 335 280

SPRING VALLEY

Tract 0114.03

Blocks: 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311 3,086

WILDEWOOD

Tract 0114.03

Blocks: 401A, 401B, 402, 423 650

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 79

Area **Population**

Tract 0114.05

Blocks: 104, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215 1,949

DISTRICT TOTAL 27,898

PERCENT VARIATION ..... -0.782

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 80

Area **Population**

Richland County

Census Voting Tabulation Districts

BLUFF

Tract 0117.02

Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 201, 202, 203, 204C, 204D, 205, 208A, 208B, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235A, 235B, 236, 237, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 313, 314, 315 3,690

BRANDON

Tract 0116.05

Blocks: 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 312, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 401A, 401B, 401C, 403, 404, 405, 406A, 406B, 408A, 408B, 409A, 409B, 409C, 410, 412, 413, 414A, 414B, 414C, 416 1,677

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 80

Area	**Population**
FJ 14	5
FJ 16	0
FJ 21	3,017
HORRELL HILL	4,303
LYKESLAND	4,511
MILL CREEK	2,124
PINE LAKES	4,432
PINEWOOD	1,897
WARD 27	
Tract 0116.05	
Blocks: 402, 407A, 407B, 407C, 407D, 411, 415A, 415B, 703, 704A, 704B, 704C, 704D, 704E, 705, 706, 707, 708, 710A, 723, 724	2,246
Tract 0117.02	
Blocks: 204A, 204B, 206A, 206B, 207A, 207B	1
DISTRICT TOTAL	27,903
PERCENT VARIATION	-0.765

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 81

Area	**Population**
Aiken County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
AIKEN 1	1,428
AIKEN 2	2,617
AIKEN 3	2,234
AIKEN 47	1,821
AIKEN 4	2,336

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 81

Area	Population
AIKEN 5	2,656
AIKEN 6	1,744
HOLLOW CREEK	
Tract 0212.01	
Blocks: 401A, 401B, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406A, 406C, 407	374
LEVELS	3,042
MILLBROOK	3,567
MONTMORENCI	
Tract 0216.02	
Blocks: 303A, 303B, 304, 305, 306, 307A, 307B, 308A, 308B, 309A, 309B, 310A, 310B, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 321, 322	764
REDDS BRANCH	1,384
SIX POINTS 35	1,431
SIX POINTS 46	2,370
WARRENSVILLE	
Tract 0211.00	
Blocks: 116, 118, 133, 134, 136, 140, 141, 142	306
DISTRICT TOTAL	28,074
PERCENT VARIATION	-0.156

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 82

Area	**Population**
Aiken County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
BREEZY HILL	2,035
CHINA SPRINGS	2,258
EUREKA	1,281
GRANITEVILLE	
Tract 0203.00	
Blocks: 212, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 226B, 236, 239	259
Tract 0204.00	
Blocks: 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 222, 223, 418, 507, 508	302
SHAWS FORK	668
SHILOH	1,961
VAUCLUSE	904
Edgefield County	18,375
DISTRICT TOTAL	28,043
PERCENT VARIATION	-0.267

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 83

Area	**Population**
Aiken County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
BELVEDERE 44	2,260
BELVEDERE 45	4,684
BELVEDERE 9	2,277
CAROLINA HEIGHTS	2,242
FOX CREEK	2,253

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 83

Area	Population
NORTH AUGUSTA 25	1,949
NORTH AUGUSTA 26	3,548
NORTH AUGUSTA 27	1,911
NORTH AUGUSTA 28	2,142
NORTH AUGUSTA 29	1,547
NORTH AUGUSTA 54	1,851
NORTH AUGUSTA 55	1,465
DISTRICT TOTAL	28,129
PERCENT VARIATION	0.039

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 84

Area	Population
Aiken County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
BATH	1,749
BEECH ISLAND	2,166
CLEARWATER	1,511
GLOVERVILLE	1,577
GRANITEVILLE	
Tract 0203.00	
Blocks: 226A, 237A, 237B, 238	490
Tract 0204.00	
Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 212, 213, 221, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307,	

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 84

Area **Population**

308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 327, 901A, 901B, 902, 903, 904, 905, 906, 907A, 907B, 908A, 908B, 909A, 909B. 910, 911 1,708

HAMMOND 2,546

JACKSON 2,843

JORDANTOWN 1,130

LANGLEY 2,843

LYNWOOD 1,608

TALATHA

Tract 0220.00

Blocks: 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 225, 226, 227, 230, 233, 235, 236, 238, 240, 249, 562, 563, 565, 566, 567, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578, 579, 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 594, 595, 596, 597 ... 1,359

Tract 0221.00

Blocks: 186, 187 0

TOWN CREEK 1,103

WARRENSVILLE

Tract 0211.00

Blocks: 101A, 101B, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115A, 115B, 117, 119A, 119B, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 135, 137, 138, 139, 143, 144, 145, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 624, 901, 902, 903, 905, 906, 909, 911, 912, 913, 914, 915, 916, 917, 918, 919, 920,

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 84

Area	**Population**
921, 922, 923, 924, 925, 926, 933, 934, 935	1,896
WILLOW SPRINGS	3,641
DISTRICT TOTAL	28,170
PERCENT VARIATION	0.185

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 85

Area	**Population**
Lexington County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
CHALLEDON	2,896
CHAPIN	6,566
COLDSTREAM	3,511
IRMO	4,312
MURRAYWOOD	3,049
QUAIL VALLEY	1,941
ST MICHAEL	2,841
WHITEHALL	3,067
DISTRICT TOTAL	28,183
PERCENT VARIATION	0.231

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 86

Area **Population**

Aiken County

Census Voting Tabulation Districts

COLLEGE ACRES 1,566

COUCHTON 1,947

HOLLOW CREEK

Tract 0212.01

Blocks: 406B, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 601A, 601B, 601C, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 701, 702, 703A, 703B, 704A, 704B, 705A, 705B, 706A, 706B, 706C, 706D, 707A, 707B, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713..... 2,740

Tract 0212.03

Blocks: 201A, 201B, 201C, 201D, 201E, 201F, 201G, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 301A, 301B, 301C, 301D, 301E, 301F, 301G, 302A, 302B, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 401A, 401B, 401C, 401D, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 501A, 501B, 501C, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526..... 2,184

MONETTA 1,319

MONTMORENCI

Tract 0216.01

Blocks: 372, 373..... 21

Tract 0216.02

Blocks: 301, 302, 320, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330..... 115

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 86

Area **Population**

Tract 0219.00

Blocks: 127, 128, 129, 130, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 221 150

Tract 0220.00

Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106A, 106B, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 629, 630, 631 331

NEW ELLENTON 2,515

NEW HOLLAND 844

OAK GROVE 864

PERRY 1,287

SALLEY 990

SAVANNAH RIVER SITE 0

TABERNACLE 795

TALATHA

Tract 0220.00

Blocks: 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157B, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168B, 168C, 168D, 169, 171B, 172B, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 205B, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 228, 229, 231, 232, 234, 237, 239, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257B, 258, 323B, 360B, 360C, 361B, 362, 363B, 364B, 368, 369, 425B, 426B, 501, 502, 503B, 504,

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 86

Area **Population**

506B, 509B, 510B, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518B, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 564, 568, 587, 588, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610B, 611B, 612B, 619B, 620B, 621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 632, 633, 634, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 640, 641, 642, 643, 644, 645, 646B, 649B 2,992

Tract 0222.00

Blocks: 108 0

WAGENER 2,209

WARD 1,562

WHITE POND 783

WINDSOR 1,685

Orangeburg County

Census Voting Tabulation Districts

EAST SPRINGFIELD

Tract 0118.00

Blocks: 329A, 329B, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350A, 350B, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357A, 357B, 358, 359A, 359B, 360A, 360B, 361A, 361B, 362, 363A, 363B, 364A, 364B, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369A, 369B, 370, 371 319

WEST SPRINGFIELD 858

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 86

Area	**Population**
DISTRICT TOTAL	28,076
PERCENT VARIATION	-0.149

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 87

Area	**Population**
Lexington County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
BOILING SPRINGS	2,526
CRAPPS STORE	589
CROMER	
Tract 0210.08	
Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 113, 206, 207, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217	1,758
EDMUND	
Tract 0209.00	
Blocks: 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 228, 229, 232, 233, 234, 235, 269, 270, 271, 272	313
GILBERT	1,671
HOLLOW CREEK	2,103
LAKE MURRAY	1,935
LAKESIDE	2,421
LEXINGTON 1	
Tract 0210.08	
Blocks: 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118	1,014
LEXINGTON 2	3,513
MOUNT HOREB	2,649
RED BANK	5,117
ROUND HILL	1,411

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 87

Area	**Population**
SUMMIT	1,307
DISTRICT TOTAL	28,327
PERCENT VARIATION	0.743

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 88

Area	**Population**
Lexington County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
CHALK HILL	6,544
CONGAREE	4,248
EDMUND	
Tract 0209.00	
Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 240, 241, 242, 243, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 346, 347, 348	2,698

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 88

Area	Population
EMMANUEL CHURCH	4,031
OLD BARNWELL STORE	3,190
PINERIDGE	2,188
RED BANK SOUTH	2,777
SPRINGDALE	
Tract 0206.02	
Blocks: 116A, 117A, 121A, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 302, 303, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 316, 317, 318, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 904, 905, 906	2,218
DISTRICT TOTAL	27,894
PERCENT VARIATION	-0.797

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 89

Area	Population
Lexington County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
CAYCE 1	1,877
CAYCE 2A	2,878
CAYCE 2	3,956
CAYCE 3	1,351
EDENWOOD	2,368
HOOKS STORE	3,684
SALUDA RIVER	3,144

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 89

Area	Population
SPRINGDALE	
Tract 0206.02	
Blocks: 301, 304, 319, 320	525
WEST COLUMBIA #1	1,269
WEST COLUMBIA #2	1,824
WEST COLUMBIA #3	692
WEST COLUMBIA #4	2,831
WESTOVER	1,959
DISTRICT TOTAL	28,358
PERCENT VARIATION	0.854

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 90

Area	Population
Allendale County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
ALLENDALE 2	
Tract 9702.00	
Blocks: 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 246A, 249, 250, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321A, 322A, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327A, 401, 402, 403, 409, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421A, 422A	1,703
FAIRFAX 1	
Tract 9702.00	
Blocks: 205	4

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 90

Area **Population**

Tract 9704.00

Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111A, 111B, 112B, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119B, 120B, 121B, 135, 136, 137, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220A, 220B, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228A, 228B, 229, 230, 231A, 231B, 232, 233A, 233B, 234A, 234B, 235A, 235B, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256 650

FAIRFAX 2

Tract 9702.00

Blocks: 203, 204, 206, 207, 208, 209, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246B, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 321B, 322B, 327B, 421B, 422B, 427, 428, 429, 430 59

Tract 9704.00

Blocks: 301, 302, 303, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 335A, 335B, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342A, 342B, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 401, 402B, 434, 435, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511 818

Tract 9705.98

Blocks: 127B, 127C, 127E, 128, 129, 130A, 130B, 131A, 131B 194

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 90

Area	Population
SYCAMORE	
Tract 9703.00	
Blocks: 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 234B, 235, 236, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 270, 271	280
Bamberg County	16,902
Colleton County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
ASHTON	170
BELLS	373
BEREA	138
HORSE PEN	
Tract 9704.00	
Blocks: 417, 418, 420, 421, 422, 423, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 446, 447	136
HUDSON'S MILL	544
LODGE	679
RUFFIN	506
STOKES	710
WALTERBORO 4	4,006
WOLFE CREEK	505
DISTRICT TOTAL	28,377
PERCENT VARIATION	0.921

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 91

Area **Population**

Allendale County

Census Voting Tabulation Districts

ALLENDALE 1 2,214

ALLENDALE 2

Tract 9702.00

Blocks: 210A, 211, 212, 213, 214A, 215, 216, 217, 247, 248A, 404, 405, 406, 408, 410, 423A, 424, 425 593

FAIRFAX 1

Tract 9704.00

Blocks: 112A, 119A, 120A, 121A, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161 348

FAIRFAX 2

Tract 9702.00

Blocks: 210B, 214B, 248B 1

Tract 9704.00

Blocks: 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333A, 333B, 334, 402A, 403A, 403B, 403C, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463A, 463B, 464A, 464B, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538A, 538B, 539A, 539B,

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 91

Area **Population**

540, 541, 542, 543A, 543B, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 640, 641, 642, 643, 644, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 650, 651, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656, 657, 658, 659, 660, 661, 662, 663, 664, 665, 666, 667, 668, 669, 670, 671, 672, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677, 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 688, 689, 690, 691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 732, 733, 734, 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 747, 748, 749, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 766, 767, 768, 769 2,201

MARTIN 881

SYCAMORE

Tract 9703.00

Blocks: 212A, 212B, 213, 214, 215, 216A, 216B, 216C, 217A, 217B, 218, 219, 220,

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 91

Area	**Population**
221A, 221B, 222A, 222B, 223A, 223B, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229A, 229B, 229C, 230A, 230B, 231, 232A, 232B, 233A, 233B, 234A, 237A, 237B, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245A, 245B, 246A, 246B, 247, 267, 268, 269, 324, 325, 327, 328, 329	378
ULMER	466
WOODS	932
Barnwell County	20,293
DISTRICT TOTAL	28,307
PERCENT VARIATION	0.672

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 92

Area	**Population**
Berkeley County	
Census Votinq Tabulation Districts	
GOOSE CREEK 3	
Tract 0207.05	
Blocks: 312A, 312B, 312D, 312E, 312F, 313A, 313B, 316, 317, 318, 319A, 319B, 319C, 320A, 320B, 321A, 321B, 322A, 322B, 323A, 323B, 323C, 323D, 324	1,759
Tract 0207.06	
Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 117, 118, 121, 124, 125, 128, 129, 301, 302A, 302B, 303A, 303B, 303C, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310	4,904

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 92

Area	Population
WIDE AWAKE	21,702
DISTRICT TOTAL	28,365
PERCENT VARIATION	0.878

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 93

Area	Population
Calhoun County	12,753
Orangeburg County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
ELCOREE	2,534
FOUR HOLES	864
JAMISON	
Tract 0108.00	
Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197	1,617
Tract 0111.00	
Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119	301

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 93

Area **Population**

LIMESTONE.....2,775
ORANGEBURG WARD 7
Tract 0109.00
Blocks: 261A, 294A, 294B.....0
SANTEE.....2,726
SUBURBAN 2
Tract 0107.00
Blocks: 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328.....681
SUBURBAN 7
Tract 0109.00
Blocks: 201, 202, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261B, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294C, 295, 296, 297.....1,852
WHITTAKER
Tract 0107.00
Blocks: 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 220, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425.....2,061

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 93

Area **Population**

DISTRICT TOTAL 28,164

PERCENT VARIATION 0.164

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 94

Area **Population**

Charleston County
Census Voting Tabulation Districts
LADSON
Tract 0031.98
Blocks: 705A, 705B, 705C, 707A, 906, 907, 911, 912, 913, 914, 915, 916, 917, 918, 919, 920, 921, 922, 923, 924, 925, 926, 927, 929 1,890
Tract 0051.97
Blocks: 901B 0
Tract 0051.98
Blocks: 901C 0
LINCOLNVILLE 1,050

Dorchester County
Census Voting Tabulation Districts
COASTAL
Tract 0108.98
Blocks: 301, 302, 310A, 310B, 310C, 310D, 311A, 311B, 311C, 311D, 311E, 401A, 401B, 401C, 401D, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 901A, 901D, 901E, 902A, 902B, 903A, 903B, 903C, 904A, 904B, 905A, 905B, 906, 907, 908, 909A,

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 94

Area	Population
909B, 909C, 909D, 910, 911A, 911B, 911C, 912, 913, 914, 915, 916, 917, 918, 919, 920, 921, 922, 923, 924, 925	6,367
Tract 0109.98	
Blocks: 401E, 403B, 405, 406C, 407B, 408, 409, 410, 701E, 705D, 706, 707B, 708	53
Tract 0110.98	
Blocks: 916A, 916C	0
DORCHESTER	2,633
FLOWERTOWN	
Tract 0106.00	
Blocks: 719A, 719B, 720, 721A, 721B, 721C, 722, 723, 724A, 724B	1,034
GERMAN TOWN	1,685
IRONGATE	
Tract 0108.03	
Blocks: 512A, 512B, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 519	1,006
NEWINGTON	2,760
NORTH SUMMERVILLE	2,772
SPANN	1,231
STALLSVILLE	1,580
TUPPERWAY	4,183
DISTRICT TOTAL	28,244
PERCENT VARIATION	0.448

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 95

Area	Population
Orangeburg County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
BROOKDALE	1,152
COROOVA	
Tract 0116.00	
Blocks: 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 119, 128, 131, 133, 135, 136, 203B, 204, 205	930
JAMISON	
Tract 0111.00	
Blocks: 120, 121	47
NIX	3,098
ORANGEBURG WARD 10	1,103
ORANGEBURG WARD 1	1,246
ORANGEBURG WARD 2	
Tract 0113.00	
Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 145, 146, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 312	902
Tract 0114.00	
Blocks: 405, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528	183
ORANGEBURG WARD 4	
Tract 0112.00	
Blocks: 113B, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124B, 127B, 128, 129, 130B, 131B, 132B, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 150A, 151A, 201B, 202, 203B, 204, 205, 206, 207	3,295

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 95

Area	Population
Tract 0113.00	
Blocks: 201A, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247	540
ORANGEBURG WARD 5	938
ORANGEBURG WARD 6	1,357
ORANGEBURG WARD 7	
Tract 0109.00	
Blocks: 301A, 302, 303, 304, 305A, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314A, 314B, 315A, 315B, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 402	794
Tract 0114.00	
Blocks: 110	93
ORANGEBURG WARD 8	788
ORANGEBURG WARD 9	797
PINEHILL-BOLEN	
Tract 0115.00	
Blocks: 402	0
Tract 0116.00	
Blocks: 101, 102, 103	480
Tract 0119.00	
Blocks: 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 327, 328, 329, 330, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350	739
SUBURBAN 1	1,670
SUBURBAN 2	
Tract 0112.00	
Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150B, 151B, 152, 153, 154	930

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 95

Area	Population
Tract 0113.00	
Blocks: 201B	31
SUBURBAN 5	1,951
SUBURBAN 6	1,789
SUBURBAN 7	
Tract 0109.00	
Blocks: 301B, 301C, 305B, 314C, 315C	38
SUBURBAN 8	1,039
SUBURBAN 9	2,383
DISTRICT TOTAL	28,313
PERCENT VARIATION	0.694

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 96

Area	Population
Lexington County	
Census Votinq Tabulation Districts	
EDMUND	
Tract 0209.00	
Blocks: 227, 230, 231, 236, 237, 238, 239, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 342, 343, 344, 345, 357, 363	758
FAIRVIEW	555
GASTON	4,292
MACK EDISTO	492

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 96

Area **Population**

PELION 2,772
SANOY RUN 770
SHARPES HILL 1,073
SWANSEA 3,272

Orangeburg County
Census Voting Tabulation Districts
COPE 815
COROOVA
Tract 0116.00
Blocks: 118, 120, 127, 129, 130, 132, 134, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 201, 202A, 202B, 203A, 206, 207, 208, 209A, 209B, 210A, 210B, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312A, 312B, 313, 314A, 314B, 315, 316A, 316B, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336A, 336B, 337, 339, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346 ... 3,017
Tract 0117.00
Blocks: 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 420, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428 224
EAST NORTH 1,581
EAST SPRINGFIELD
Tract 0118.00
Blocks: 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 372, 553, 554, 558, 559, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 594, 595, 596, 597 530

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 96

Area	Population
Tract 0119.00	
Blocks: 117, 118, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144	68
EDISTO	1,276
NEESES-LIVINGSTON	1,784
NORWAY	1,977
PINEHILL-BOLEN	
Tract 0116.00	
Blocks: 104, 105, 106, 107, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126	161
Tract 0118.00	
Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 118, 119, 120	396
Tract 0119.00	
Blocks: 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 309, 310, 312, 313, 314, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356	618
WEST NORTH	1,838
DISTRICT TOTAL	28,269
PERCENT VARIATION	0.537

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 97

Area **Population**

Dorchester County

Census Voting Tabulation Districts

CAROLINA 2,242
CLEMSON 2,495
DELEMARS 505
FLOWERTOWN
Tract 0105.00
Blocks: 261, 262, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 321, 322, 323, 324, 335, 336 1,468
FOUR HOLE 1,428
GIVHANS 1,688
GROVER NO.1 890
GROVER NO.3 221
HARLEYVILLE 980
INDIAN FIELD 1,972
KNIGHTSVILLE 4,183
REEVESVILLE
Tract 0101.00
Blocks: 102, 103A, 103B, 104A, 104B, 105A, 105B, 106, 107A, 107B, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114A, 114B, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 129, 130, 131A, 131B, 132, 133, 134, 135A, 135B, 136A, 136B, 137A, 137B, 138A, 138B, 139, 140, 141, 142A, 142B, 143A, 143B, 144, 145, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231 ... 1,151
RIDGEVILLE 3,332
ROSINVILLE 1,819
ROSSES 889

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 97

Area	Population
ST. GEORGE NO.1	2,248
ST. GEORGE NO.2	714
DISTRICT TOTAL	28,225
PERCENT VARIATION	0.381

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 98

Area	Population
Dorchester County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
ASHBOROUGH	4,007
BEECH HILL	
Tract 0105.00	
Blocks: 329, 331, 332, 333, 334	254
Tract 0108.01	
Blocks: 103, 104	43
COASTAL	
Tract 0108.98	
Blocks: 413, 414	188
GREENWAVE	2,651
GREGG	10,744
IRONGATE	
Tract 0108.03	
Blocks: 518A, 518B, 518C, 518D, 705, 707A, 707B, 707C, 707D, 707E, 707F, 707G, 707H, 707J, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713A, 713B, 713C, 713D, 713E, 714A, 714B, 715A, 715B, 715C, 716A, 716B, 717A, 717B, 718A, 718B, 718C, 718D	3,524

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 98

Area	**Population**
TRANQUIL	2,686
TROLLEY	4,115
DISTRICT TOTAL	28,212
PERCENT VARIATION	0.334

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 99

Area	**Population**
Berkeley County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
CAINHOY	
Tract 0204.02	
Blocks: 278, 279, 280, 282, 283, 284, 285	0
GOOSE CREEK 2	
Tract 0207.03	
Blocks: 912, 913, 914, 915B, 916, 917, 918, 919, 920, 934, 935, 936, 937, 939, 940, 941, 942, 943, 944	3,654
Tract 0208.01	
Blocks: 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632A, 632B, 633A, 633B, 634	10,265

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 99

Area	Population
Tract 0208.02	
Blocks: 301A, 308, 309, 311, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323	1,206
HANAHAN	
Tract 0209.00	
Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 201, 202, 203, 204, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 218, 219, 220, 301, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 320, 321, 322, 325, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717	8,240
Tract 0210.00	
Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 208, 209, 210A, 210B, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 801, 802A, 802B, 803, 901, 902, 903, 904, 905, 906, 907, 908, 909, 910, 911, 912, 913, 914, 915, 916, 917, 918	4,856
DISTRICT TOTAL	28,221
PERCENT VARIATION	0.366

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 100

Area **Population**

Berkeley County

Census Voting Tabulation Districts

BERKELEY 2,461

CARNES CROSS ROADS

Tract 0207.01

Blocks: 124, 125A, 125B, 125C, 128, 129, 130, 181, 182, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 218, 219, 220, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 244, 245A, 245B, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 276A, 276B, 276C, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 284, 285A, 285B, 285C, 285D, 285E, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307 4,166

GOOSE CREEK 1

Tract 0207.03

Blocks: 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 901, 902A, 902B, 902C, 902D, 902E, 902F, 902G, 902H, 902J, 902K, 902L, 902M, 902N, 902P, 902R, 902T, 902U, 903A, 903B, 903C, 903D, 903E, 904, 905, 906 11

GOOSE CREEK 2

Tract 0207.03

Blocks: 907, 908, 909A, 909B, 909C, 909D, 909E, 909F, 909G, 909H, 910, 911, 915A, 915C, 921, 922, 923, 924, 925, 926, 927, 928, 929, 930, 931, 932, 933, 938 7,327

MCBETH 1,169

MONCKS CORNER 9,896

PIMLICO 1,268

PINOPOLIS 1,966

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 100

Area	Population
DISTRICT TOTAL	28,264
PERCENT VARIATION	0.519

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 101

Area	Population
Georgetown County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
CEDAR CREEK	746
Williamsburg County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
BLOOMINGVALE	922
CADES	1,166
CEDAR SWAMP	546
CENTRAL	664
EARLS	601
GREELEYVILLE	2,192
HARMONY	424
HEBRON	908
INDIANTOWN	
Tract 9702.00	
Blocks: 203, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 267, 268, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279	839

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 101

Area **Population**

Tract 9703.00

Blocks: 435 11

Tract 9704.00

Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 113 60

KINGSTREE 1

Tract 9706.00

Blocks: 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209A, 209B, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217A, 217B, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223A, 223B, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329A, 329B, 330, 331, 332, 333A, 333B, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343A, 343B, 344A, 344B, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349A, 349B, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 401A, 401B, 402, 415, 421, 422, 423, 424A, 424B, 425A, 425B, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 601, 602, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614 3,950

KINGSTREE 2 1,855

KINGSTREE 3 5,586

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 101

Area	Population
LANE	1,452
LENUDS	103
MILLWOOD	621
OAK RIDGE	171
PERGAMOS	439
PINEY FOREST	595
SALTERS	1,885
SANDY BAY	670
SINGLETARY	408
SUTTONS	248
TRIO	1,149
DISTRICT TOTAL	28,211
PERCENT VARIATION	0.331

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 102

Area	Population
Berkeley County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
ALVIN	1,205
BETHERA	357
BONNEAU	2,692
CAINHOY	
Tract 0204.02	
Blocks: 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 151, 152, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 163, 165, 166, 167, 168, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193,	

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 102

Area	Population
194, 195, 196, 197, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 281, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291	2,293
CORDESVILLE	1,407
CROSS	2,738
EADYTOWN	983
HILTON CROSS ROAD	2,380
HUGER	1,269
JAMESTOWN	760
LEBANON	678
MACEDONIA	2,229
RUSSELLVILLE	1,941
SAINT STEPHEN	4,223
SHULERVILLE HH	433
WASSAMASSAW	2,804
DISTRICT TOTAL	28,392
PERCENT VARIATION	0.974

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 103

Area	Population
Georgetown County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
ANDREWS OUTSIDE	1,791
ANDREWS	3,038
BETHEL	1,247
BROWNS FERRY	2,281
CARVERS BAY	166
CHOPPEE	1,557
FOLLY GROVE	1,121
GRIERS	709
PLEASANT HILL	1,344
POTATO BED FERRY	694
SAMPIT	1,413
SPRING GULLEY	
Tract 9806.00	
Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 203, 204, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 737, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 787	2,220
Horry County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
INLAND	355
PAWLEYS SWAMP	519
PORT HARRELSON	1,046
TODDVILLE	973
Williamsburg County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
EBENEEZER	1,004
HEMINGWAY	2,452
HENRY POPLAR HILL	880

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 103

Area	Population
INDIANTOWN	
Tract 9702.00	
Blocks: 201, 202, 204, 205	174
Tract 9703.00	
Blocks: 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406A, 406B, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417A, 417B, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428A, 428B, 429A, 429B, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441,. 442, 443, 444, 445, 446	1,057
Tract 9704.00	
Blocks: 108, 109, 110, 111, 112	91
MIDWAY	571
MORRISVILLE	485
MUDDY CREEK	174
NESMITH	953
DISTRICT TOTAL	28,315
PERCENT VARIATION	0.701

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 104

Area	Population
Horry County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
ATLANTIC BEACH	446
BROOKSVILLE	1,613
CHERRY GROVE	2,637
CRESCENT BEACH	1,778
DAISY	1,026

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 104

Area **Population**

DOGWOOD 340
EAST LORIS 2,386
EBENEZER 480
JERNIGANS CROSS ROADS 873
LEON 983
LITTLE RIVER 2,762
MOUNT VERNON 600
NIXONS CROSSROADS 1,760
OCEAN DRIVE 1 1,680
OCEAN DRIVE 2 1,935
RED BLUFF 743
SHELL
Tract 0203.00
Blocks: 447, 448, 453, 454, 455, 456 165
Tract 0301.00
Blocks: 306, 307, 308, 339, 340, 341 81
Tract 0701.00
Blocks: 219, 220, 221, 224, 226, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232 225
SWEET HOME 927
WAMPEE 1,721
WEST LORIS 1,737
WINDY HILL
Tract 0405.00
Blocks: 107B, 117B, 123B, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208A, 208B, 208C, 209, 210, 211, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510,

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 104

Area	Population
511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 601, 809, 811, 812,. 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827, 828, 829, 830, 831	1,434
DISTRICT TOTAL	28,332
PERCENT VARIATION	0.761

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 105

Area	Population
Horry County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
ADRIAN	1,698
ALLSBROOK	840
COASTAL LANE 2	3,096
EAST CONWAY	1,587
GURLEY	274
HICKORY GROVE	1,215
HICKORY HILL	240
JET PORT	
Tract 0510.00	
Blocks: 901A, 901D	5,493
Tract 0511.00	
Blocks: 113, 114, 115, 116	33
LIVE OAK	376
MAPLE	938

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 105

Area	Population
NORTH CONWAY 2	1,425
RED HILL 1	
Tract 0604.00	
Blocks: 104A, 105, 137	761
SALEM	1,361
SEA OATS 1	
Tract 0509.00	
Blocks: 201A, 201B, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210	1,281
SEA OATS 2	2,092
SHELL	
Tract 0701.00	
Blocks: 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 225, 234, 236	419
SOCASTEE 3	3,885
TILLY SWAMP	757
WHITE OAK	483
DISTRICT TOTAL	28,254
PERCENT VARIATION	0.484

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 106

Area	Population
Horry County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
GARDEN CITY 1	2,323
GARDEN CITY 2	1,291
GARDEN CITY 3	3,592
MARLOWE	3,279

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 106

Area	Population
RED HILL 1	
Tract 0604.00	
Blocks: 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 232, 235, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316A, 316B, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352	3,282
RED HILL 2	2,848
SOCASTEE 1	
Tract 0515.00	
Blocks: 409, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519	1,069
Tract 0516.00	
Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 104, 108, 109, 110, 112	117
SOCASTEE 2	2,655
SURFSIDE BEACH 1	2,191
SURFSIDE BEACH 2	1,563
SURFSIDE BEACH 3	1,416

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 106

Area **Population**

SURFSIDE BEACH 4

Tract 0511.00

Blocks: 250, 251, 252, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273A, 273B, 273C, 273D, 273E, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286 381

Tract 0512.00

Blocks: 101 0

Tract 0514.00

Blocks: 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207A, 207B, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212A, 212B, 213A, 213B, 220, 224, 225 2,337

DISTRICT TOTAL 28,344

PERCENT VARIATION 0.804

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 107

Area **Population**

Horry County

Census Voting Tabulation Districts

COASTAL LANE 1 1,392

DUNES 1 2,923

DUNES 2 988

DUNES 3 1,234

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 107

Area **Population**

JET PORT

Tract 0508.00

Blocks: 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220A, 220B, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306A, 306B 288

Tract 0509.00

Blocks: 507A, 507B, 507C, 508 0

Tract 0510.00

Blocks: 901B, 901C, 901E, 902 0

Tract 0511.00

Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112 35

Tract 0515.00

Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 201, 202, 203, 228A, 228B, 229A, 229B, 301A 1,122

MYRTLEWOOD 1 1,743

MYRTLEWOOD 2 2,186

MYRTLEWOOD 3 364

OCEAN FOREST 1 1,636

OCEAN FOREST 3 1,957

SEA OATS 1

Tract 0507.00

Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 201, 202, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308,

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 107

Area **Population**

309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316A, 316B, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327 1,092

Tract 0508.00

Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 301 665

Tract 0509.00

Blocks: 401, 402, 403, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 509, 510, 511, 512, 601A, 601B, 601C, 602A, 602B, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613A, 613B, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621 ... 1,982

SOCASTEE 1

Tract 0515.00

Blocks: 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 301B, 302, 303, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 508 6,619

SURFSIDE BEACH 4

Tract 0511.00

Blocks: 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 287 751

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 107

Area	**Population**
Tract 0514.00	
Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128	868
WINDY HILL	
Tract 0405.00	
Blocks: 602A, 602B, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 611	95
DISTRICT TOTAL	27,940
PERCENT VARIATION	-0.633

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 108

Area	**Population**
Georgetown County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
BLACK RIVER	1,315
GEORGETOWN 1	1,428
GEORGETOWN 2	726
GEORGETOWN 3	2,756
GEORGETOWN 4	769
GEORGETOWN 5	2,538
GEORGETOWN 6	663
GEORGETOWN 7	560
KENSINGTON	1,803
MURRELLS INLET	4,436
MYERSVILLE	463
PAWLEYS ISLAND 1	1,387

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 108

Area	Population
PAWLEYS ISLAND 2	1,679
PAWLEYS ISLAND 3	1,300
PAWLEYS ISLAND 4	971
PENNY ROYAL	959
PLANTERSVILLE	916
SANTEE	1,425
SPRING GULLEY	
Tract 9802.00	
Blocks: 601, 602, 666, 667, 668, 669, 670, 671, 672, 673, 674, 675, 676	339
Tract 9803.00	
Blocks: 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286	0
Tract 9806.00	
Blocks: 123, 124, 125, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 732, 733, 734, 735, 736, 738, 747B, 747C, 748, 749, 750, 751, 752B, 753B, 754B, 755B, 755C, 756B, 757B, 759B, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 766, 767B, 768B, 769B, 771B, 775, 776, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786	651
Tract 9807.00	
Blocks: 122B, 123, 136B, 137B	0
WINYAH BAY	891
DISTRICT TOTAL	27,975
PERCENT VARIATION	-0.509

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 109

Area	Population
Charleston County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
AWENDAW	1,276
CHARLESTON 21	
Tract 0012.00	
Blocks: 205, 206, 207, 208, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 310, 312	599
CHARLESTON 22	730
CHARLESTON 23	1,296
CHARLESTON 24	879
CHARLESTON 25	1,552
CHARLESTON 30	
Tract 0014.00	
Blocks: 101B, 102	0
Tract 0045.00	
Blocks: 101A, 101B, 406, 407, 411, 412, 413, 414, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 906	243
CHRIST CHURCH 1	1,888
CHRIST CHURCH 2	2,180
CHRIST CHURCH 3	1,027
CHRIST CHURCH 4	793
CHRIST CHURCH 5	1,682
CHRIST CHURCH 6	468
CHRIST CHURCH 7	1,637
CHRIST CHURCH 8	
Tract 0046.05	
Blocks: 205A, 205B, 413C	50
Tract 0046.06	
Blocks: 233, 234, 235, 236	202
MCCLELLANVILLE 1	852
MCCLELLANVILLE 2	339

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 109

Area	Population
MOUNT PLEASANT 11	1,175
MOUNT PLEASANT 2	
Tract 0047.00	
Blocks: 503, 510, 511, 517, 518, 602, 603, 609, 612, 613, 617, 708, 709, 714, 719	507
MOUNT PLEASANT 5	
Tract 0046.04	
Blocks: 112A, 112B, 112C, 112D, 112E, 112F, 112G, 112H, 112J, 113, 114, 116, 117, 202C	366
MOUNT PLEASANT 7	
Tract 0046.05	
Blocks: 209A, 209B, 209C, 209D	9
Tract 0046.06	
Blocks: 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220	258
Tract 0046.07	
Blocks: 301, 302, 303A, 303B, 304, 305, 306A, 306B, 306C, 306D, 306E, 306F, 307	40
Tract 0047.00	
Blocks: 101, 104, 105	656
MOUNT PLEASANT 8	
Tract 0046.06	
Blocks: 240, 241, 242, 245	757
NAVAL SHIPYARD NO. 3	5,694
ST JAMES - SANTEE	1,157
DISTRICT TOTAL	28,312
PERCENT VARIATION	0.690

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 110

Area **Population**

Charleston County

Census Voting Tabulation Districts

CHARLESTON 10 1,743
CHARLESTON 11 564
CHARLESTON 12 734
CHARLESTON 13 1,116
CHARLESTON 14 881
CHARLESTON 15 722
CHARLESTON 16 984
CHARLESTON 17 1,676
CHARLESTON 18 1,469
CHARLESTON 19
Tract 0017.00
Blocks: 211 48
Tract 0018.00
Blocks: 105, 114, 116, 122, 123 284
CHARLESTON 1 1,128
CHARLESTON 20
Tract 0017.00
Blocks: 203, 204, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210 ... 318
CHARLESTON 2 1,203
CHARLESTON 3 2,610
CHARLESTON 4 478
CHARLESTON 5 3,076
CHARLESTON 6 1,471
CHARLESTON 7 789
CHARLESTON 8 1,438
CHARLESTON 9 1,123

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 110

Area	Population
SAINT ANDREWS 11	
Tract 0027.02	
Blocks: 201A, 201B, 202, 203, 214, 217, 218, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309	1,117
SAINT ANDREWS 12	2,272
SAINT ANDREWS 3	1,132
DISTRICT TOTAL	28,376
PERCENT VARIATION	0.918

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 111

Area	Population
Charleston County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
CHARLESTON 19	
Tract 0017.00	
Blocks: 212, 301, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 319, 320	736
Tract 0018.00	
Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 104, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 115	1,796
CHARLESTON 20	
Tract 0017.00	
Blocks: 101, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 201, 202, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 302, 311, 312, 318	1,252

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 111

Area **Population**

CHARLESTON 21

Tract 0012.00

Blocks: 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 202, 203, 204, 209, 210 739

CHARLESTON 26 952

CHARLESTON 27 994

CHARLESTON 28 992

CHARLESTON 29 1,047

CHARLESTON 30

Tract 0044.00

Blocks: 401A, 401B, 402A, 402B, 402C, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 614, 617, 618, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 901A, 901B, 901C, 902, 903, 904, 905, 906 1,486

Tract 0045.00

Blocks: 101C, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 213, 214, 215, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 410, 501 1,066

NAVAL SHIPYARD NO. 10 24

NAVAL SHIPYARD NO. 11 0

NAVAL SHIPYARD NO. 12 0

NAVAL SHIPYARD NO. 13 0

NAVAL SHIPYARD NO. 14 0

NAVAL SHIPYARD NO. 15 0

NAVAL SHIPYARD NO. 16 2

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 111

Area	Population
NAVAL SHIPYARD NO. 17	110
NAVAL SHIPYARD NO. 18	56
NAVAL SHIPYARD NO. 19	256
NAVAL SHIPYARD NO. 20	33
NAVAL SHIPYARD NO. 4	0
NAVAL SHIPYARD NO. 5	0
NAVAL SHIPYARD NO. 6	4
NAVAL SHIPYARD NO. 7	0
NAVAL SHIPYARD NO. 8	0
NAVAL SHIPYARD NO. 9	92
NORTH CHARLESTON 4	1,481
NORTH CHARLESTON 13	
Tract 0031.10	
Blocks: 926B, 926C, 927, 928, 929, 930, 931	693
NORTH CHARLESTON 1	3,431
NORTH CHARLESTON 2	1,080
NORTH CHARLESTON 3	2,945
NORTH CHARLESTON 5	1,952
NORTH CHARLESTON 6	1,767
NORTH CHARLESTON 7	2,072
NORTH CHARLESTON 8	
Tract 0041.00	
Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 116, 121, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 211, 212, 215, 216, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 312, 313	1,338
DISTRICT TOTAL	28,396
PERCENT VARIATION	0.989

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 112

Area **Population**

Charleston County

Census Voting Tabulation Districts

CHRIST CHURCH 8

Tract 0046.05

Blocks: 207, 208A, 208B, 208C, 401, 402, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413A, 413B, 413D, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426 5,658

Tract 0046.06

Blocks: 201, 202, 203A, 203B, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 246, 247 ... 1,338

CHRIST CHURCH 9 2,998

ISLE OF PALMS 1 929

ISLE OF PALMS 2 2,751

MOUNT PLEASANT 10 1,110

MOUNT PLEASANT 1 824

MOUNT PLEASANT 2

Tract 0046.07

Blocks: 908, 909 0

Tract 0047.00

Blocks: 303, 304, 305, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 401, 404, 405, 406, 407, 410, 411, 413, 414, 415, 416, 504, 505, 506, 509, 519, 520, 601, 610, 611, 616, 619, 620, 703, 705, 707, 716, 717, 718, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727 1,283

MOUNT PLEASANT 3 1,308

MOUNT PLEASANT 4 1,054

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 112

Area	Population
MOUNT PLEASANT 5	
Tract 0046.04	
Blocks: 201, 202A, 202B, 202D, 202E, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208	1,271
MOUNT PLEASANT 6	1,905
MOUNT PLEASANT 7	
Tract 0046.06	
Blocks: 212, 213, 214	291
MOUNT PLEASANT 8	
Tract 0046.03	
Blocks: 301A, 301B, 301C	502
Tract 0046.06	
Blocks: 221A, 221B, 221C, 221D, 221E, 222, 223, 243, 244	75
MOUNT PLEASANT 9	3,345
SULLIVANS ISLAND	1,623
DISTRICT TOTAL	28,265
PERCENT VARIATION	0.523

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 113

Area	Population
Charleston County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
AIR FORCE BASE NO. 10	182
AIR FORCE BASE NO. 11	90
AIR FORCE BASE NO. 12	314
AIR FORCE BASE NO. 13	398
AIR FORCE BASE NO. 14	309

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 113

Area	Population
AIR FORCE BASE NO. 15	172
AIR FORCE BASE NO. 16	0
AIR FORCE BASE NO. 17	346
AIR FORCE BASE NO. 18	0
AIR FORCE BASE NO. 19	0
AIR FORCE BASE NO. 1	0
AIR FORCE BASE NO. 20	0
AIR FORCE BASE NO. 2	617
AIR FORCE BASE NO. 3	704
AIR FORCE BASE NO. 4	524
AIR FORCE BASE NO. 5	19
AIR FORCE BASE NO. 6	305
AIR FORCE BASE NO. 7	116
AIR FORCE BASE NO. 8	120
AIR FORCE BASE NO. 9	62
DEER PARK 1	
Tract 0031.97	
Blocks: 913A, 913B, 913C, 914, 915A, 916B, 917A, 917B, 918	61
NORTH CHARLESTON 13	
Tract 0031.10	
Blocks: 201A, 201B, 201C, 202A, 202B, 203, 301, 302, 303A, 303B, 303C, 304A, 304B, 305A, 305B, 306, 307A, 307B, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 921A, 921B, 922, 923, 924, 925, 926D, 926E, 926F	1,627
Tract 0031.85	
Blocks: 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210A, 210B, 211, 212A, 212B, 212C, 213, 922D, 932B	1,297
NORTH CHARLESTON 14	4,852
NORTH CHARLESTON 15	1,949

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 113

Area	Population
NORTH CHARLESTON 16	
Tract 0033.00	
Blocks: 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 201, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 222, 223	670
NORTH CHARLESTON 17	
Tract 0033.00	
Blocks: 401, 408	0
NORTH CHARLESTON 22	681
NORTH CHARLESTON 23	1,195
NORTH CHARLESTON 24	1,282
NORTH CHARLESTON 25	
Tract 0034.00	
Blocks: 401, 402, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 410, 411	1,168
NORTH CHARLESTON 32	3,632
NORTH CHARLESTON 33	4,531
SAINT ANDREWS 26	1,004
DISTRICT TOTAL	28,227
PERCENT VARIATION	0.388

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 114

Area **Population**

Charleston County

Census Voting Tabulation Districts

RAVENEL 2

Tract 0025.00

Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118A, 118B, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124A, 124B, 125A, 125B, 126, 127A, 127B, 128A, 128B, 128C, 129, 130, 131, 132B, 138A, 138B, 139A, 139B, 139C, 201, 202A, 202B, 202C, 202D, 203 824

SAINT ANDREWS 14 2,108

SAINT ANDREWS 15 871

SAINT ANDREWS 16 1,567

SAINT ANDREWS 17 2,193

SAINT ANDREWS 18 990

SAINT ANDREWS 19 1,966

SAINT ANDREWS 27 2,781

SAINT ANDREWS 28 2,294

SAINT ANDREWS 29 3,146

SAINT ANDREWS 31

Tract 0026.08

Blocks: 201, 202, 206, 208, 209, 210, 311, 312, 313A, 313B, 313C, 313D, 313E, 313F, 313G, 313H, 313J, 313K, 313L, 313M, 314A, 314B, 315A, 315B, 316A, 316B, 317, 318, 320, 321, 322A, 322B, 322C, 322D, 322E, 322F, 322G, 322H, 325, 326A, 326B, 327, 328 4,764

Tract 0027.01

Blocks: 602B 3

SAINT ANDREWS 32 3,670

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 114

Area **Population**

Dorchester County

Census Voting Tabulation Districts

BEECH HILL

Tract 0108.01

Blocks: 101, 102, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167,. 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 225B, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 281, 282B. 863

SAUL DAM 269

DISTRICT TOTAL 28,309

PERCENT VARIATION 0.679

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 115

Area **Population**

Charleston County

Census Voting Tabulation Districts

FOLLY BEACH	1,255
JAMES ISLAND 10	1,718
JAMES ISLAND 11	1,898
JAMES ISLAND 12	1,586
JAMES ISLAND 13	965
JAMES ISLAND 14	1,223
JAMES ISLAND 15	2,259
JAMES ISLAND 16	594
JAMES ISLAND 17	950
JAMES ISLAND 18	496
JAMES ISLAND 19	749
JAMES ISLAND 1	1,323
JAMES ISLAND 20	1,507
JAMES ISLAND 21	1,372
JAMES ISLAND 2	0
JAMES ISLAND 3	1,428
JAMES ISLAND 4	809
JAMES ISLAND 5	2,527
JAMES ISLAND 6	1,243
JAMES ISLAND 7	859
JAMES ISLAND 8	1,289
JAMES ISLAND 9	2,110
DISTRICT TOTAL	28,160
PERCENT VARIATION	0.149

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 116

Area **Population**

Charleston County

Census Voting Tabulation Districts

ADAMS RUN 2 1,149

EDISTO 1,318

HOLLYWOOD 2,198

JOHNS ISLAND 1

Tract 0021.01

Blocks: 203A, 203B, 203C, 203D, 204, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311A, 311B, 311C, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436A, 436B, 437A, 437B, 437C, 437D, 438A, 438B, 439, 440, 441, 442 2,946

JOHNS ISLAND 2

Tract 0021.01

Blocks: 202A, 202C, 202D, 202E, 202F, 202G, 202H, 202J, 202K, 202L, 202M, 202N, 202R, 202T, 202U, 202V, 205A, 205B, 205C, 205D, 205E, 205F, 205G, 205H, 206A, 206B, 207A, 207B, 207C, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213A, 213B, 213C, 214A, 214B, 215A, 215B, 215C, 215D, 216A, 216B, 216C, 217, 218A, 218B, 218C, 218D, 218E, 218F, 218G, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223A, 223B, 223C, 223D, 224A, 224B, 224C, 225, 226A, 226B, 227, 228, 229, 230, 323A, 323B, 323C, 323D, 323E, 323F, 323G, 323H, 323J 1,255

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 116

Area **Population**

JOHNS ISLAND 3

Tract 0021.01

Blocks: 101A, 101B, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106A, 106B, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120A, 120B, 120C, 120D, 120E, 120F, 120G, 120H, 121, 122, 123A, 123B, 124A, 124B, 125, 126A, 126B, 126C, 126D, 127, 128A, 128B, 128C, 128D, 129, 130 . . 1,598

Tract 0021.02

Blocks: 202, 203, 204, 205, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214 1,237

JOHNS ISLAND 4

Tract 0021.02

Blocks: 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 331, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362A, 362B, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 376 1,009

MEGGETT 1 2,340

MEGGETT 2 969

no name for (0190153) 1,764

RAVENEL 1 1,738

RAVENEL 2

Tract 0025.00

Blocks: 119, 132A, 133A, 133B, 134, 135A, 135B, 136, 137 386

SAINT ANDREWS 24 2,118

SAINT ANDREWS 25 1,031

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 116

Area **Population**

WADMALAW 1 1,266
WADMALAW 2 1,304

Colleton County
Census Voting Tabulation Districts
COTTAGEVILLE
Tract 9707.00
Blocks: 230, 236, 237A, 237B, 238, 239, 240A, 240B, 240C, 241, 242A, 242B, 243, 244A, 244B, 245A, 245B, 246, 247A, 247B, 248A, 248B, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 301, 302, 303, 304A, 304B, 305A, 305B, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 349, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373A, 373B, 374A, 374B 2,116
JACKSONBORO
Tract 9707.00
Blocks: 332, 333, 334, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368..... 19
Tract 9708.00
Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 159, 160, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190 610

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 116

Area **Population**

MAPLE CANE

Tract 9707.00

Blocks: 134 0

DISTRICT TOTAL 28,371

PERCENT VARIATION 0.900

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 117

Area **Population**

Berkeley County

Census Voting Tabulation Districts

CARNES CROSS ROADS

Tract 0207.01

Blocks: 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275 420

Tract 0207.05

Blocks: 301, 501, 502, 503, 507 467

Tract 0207.07

Blocks: 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 153, 154, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172 127

GOOSE CREEK 1

Tract 0207.07

Blocks: 158A, 158B, 159, 160A, 160B, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 201A, 201B, 201C, 201D, 202A, 202B, 203A, 203B, 203C, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305 3,272

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 117

Area	Population
Tract 0208.03	
Blocks: 301A, 301B, 301C, 301D, 301E, 301F, 301G, 301H, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310A, 310B, 311, 312, 313, 314A, 314B, 314C, 315A, 315B, 316A, 316B, 316C, 317A, 317B, 501A, 501B, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521	5,481
GOOSE CREEK 2	
Tract 0208.02	
Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114A, 114B, 115, 116A, 116B, 117, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 301B, 302, 303A, 303B, 304A, 304B, 304C, 305, 306, 307A, 307B, 310, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 324, 325, 326, 327	4,919
GOOSE CREEK 3	
Tract 0207.06	
Blocks: 104, 105, 106, 107, 116, 119, 120, 122, 123, 126, 127, 303D, 305	848
HANAHAN	
Tract 0208.02	
Blocks: 118	0

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 117

Area **Population**

Charleston County

Census Voting Tabulation Districts

DEER PARK 1

Tract 0031.03

Blocks: 101, 102, 103A, 103B, 104A, 104B, 104C, 104D, 104E, 104F, 104G, 104H, 105, 106A, 106B, 106C, 106D, 107, 108, 109, 901, 902, 904, 905A, 905B, 906, 907, 908, 909, 911, 912, 913, 917, 924A, 924B, 924C, 924D, 925, 926, 927, 928 3,159

Tract 0031.97

Blocks: 901, 902, 903A, 903B, 904, 905, 906, 907, 908, 909, 910, 911A, 911B, 912A, 912B, 912C, 919, 920A, 920B 380

DEER PARK 2 5,771

DEER PARK 3 2,300

LADSON

Tract 0031.98

Blocks: 928, 930, 931, 932, 933, 934, 935, 936, 937, 938, 939, 940, 941, 942, 943, 944, 945, 946, 947, 948, 949, 950, 951, 952, 953, 954, 955, 956 1,243

DISTRICT TOTAL 28,387

PERCENT VARIATION 0.957

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 118

Area **Population**

Charleston County

Census Voting Tabulation Districts

NAVAL SHIPYARD NO. 1 0
NAVAL SHIPYARD NO. 2 0
NORTH CHARLESTON 10 1,265
NORTH CHARLESTON 11 2,091
NORTH CHARLESTON 12 4,176
NORTH CHARLESTON 16
Tract 0031.85
Blocks: 101A, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113A 385
Tract 0032.81
Blocks: 113B 0
Tract 0032.82
Blocks: 101B 0
Tract 0033.00
Blocks: 101, 102, 202, 218, 219, 220, 221 ... 245
NORTH CHARLESTON 17
Tract 0033.00
Blocks: 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 409, 410, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 810 1,886
NORTH CHARLESTON 18 1,701
NORTH CHARLESTON 19 1,479
NORTH CHARLESTON 20 1,564
NORTH CHARLESTON 21 727
NORTH CHARLESTON 25
Tract 0034.00
Blocks: 409 0
NORTH CHARLESTON 26 1,750
NORTH CHARLESTON 27 623

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 118

Area	Population
NORTH CHARLESTON 28	1,155
NORTH CHARLESTON 29	1,155
NORTH CHARLESTON 30	2,190
NORTH CHARLESTON 31	2,195
NORTH CHARLESTON 8	
Tract 0041.00	
Blocks: 311, 314, 315	195
NORTH CHARLESTON 9	3,541
DISTRICT TOTAL	28,323
PERCENT VARIATION	0.729

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 119

Area	Population
Charleston County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
JAMES ISLAND 22	1,809
JOHNS ISLAND 1	
Tract 0021.01	
Blocks: 302, 303, 304	111
JOHNS ISLAND 2	
Tract 0021.01	
Blocks: 201A, 201B, 201C, 201D, 201E, 201F, 201G, 201H, 201J, 202B, 202P, 231A, 231B, 232A, 232B, 232C, 301A, 301B, 301C, 301D	302
JOHNS ISLAND 3	
Tract 0021.02	
Blocks: 101, 102A, 102B, 102C, 102D, 103, 104	169

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 119

Area	Population
JOHNS ISLAND 4	
Tract 0021.02	
Blocks: 105, 201, 206, 301, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 332, 333, 334, 373, 374, 375	148
JOHNS ISLAND 5	1,631
SAINT ANDREWS 10	1,082
SAINT ANDREWS 11	
Tract 0027.02	
Blocks: 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 215, 216, 219	609
SAINT ANDREWS 13	1,983
SAINT ANDREWS 1	1,141
SAINT ANDREWS 20	2,929
SAINT ANDREWS 21	1,849
SAINT ANDREWS 22	1,417
SAINT ANDREWS 23	2,181
SAINT ANDREWS 2	1,745
SAINT ANDREWS 30	1,032
SAINT ANDREWS 31	
Tract 0026.08	
Blocks: 203, 204, 205, 207, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218	1,063
SAINT ANDREWS 4	1,718
SAINT ANDREWS 5	1,418
SAINT ANDREWS 6	288
SAINT ANDREWS 7	1,627
SAINT ANDREWS 8	1,067
SAINT ANDREWS 9	1,065
DISTRICT TOTAL	28,384
PERCENT VARIATION	0.946

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 120

Area **Population**

Colleton County

Census Voting Tabulation Districts

HENDERSONVILLE 1,921
PENIEL 609
PETITS 194
RICE PATCH 971
RITTER
Tract 9703.00
Blocks: 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 545 269
Tract 9706.00
Blocks: 508, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578 444
Tract 9708.00
Blocks: 202 15
SNIDERS 873
WALTERBORO 1 2,694
WALTERBORO 3
Tract 9705.00
Blocks: 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411A, 411B, 412A, 412B, 413, 414, 415, 416A, 416B, 417A, 417B, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425A, 425B, 426, 427A, 427B, 428A, 428B, 429A, 429B, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434 802
Tract 9706.00
Blocks: 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 344, 348, 349, 350, 351 1,391

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 120

Area	Population
Hampton County	18,191
DISTRICT TOTAL	28,374
PERCENT VARIATION	.0.910

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 121

Area	Population
Beaufort County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
AS 10	0
AS 11	0
AS 12	0
AS 2	0
AS 4	0
AS 5	0
AS 6	0
AS 7	0
AS 8	0
AS 9	0
BEAUFORT 3	
Tract 0005.00	
Blocks: 401, 409	3
Tract 0006.00	
Blocks: 202B, 204, 205, 212A, 212B, 217A	198
Tract 0007.00	
Blocks: 101	231
BURTON 1A	1,846
BURTON 1B	3,316
BURTON 2A	1,815

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 121

Area	Population
BURTON 2B	2,047
BURTON 2C	1,500
BURTON 3	1,774
DALE LOBECO	
Tract 0001.00	
Blocks: 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 367, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380	9
LADYS ISLAND 1A	1,451
LADYS ISLAND 2A	1,032
SEABROOK 1	
Tract 0002.00	
Blocks: 125, 146, 147, 148, 149, 201, 202, 203, 204, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 264, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285	1,674
Tract 0004.00	
Blocks: 109	0
SEABROOK 2	
Tract 0002.00	
Blocks: 116, 117, 119, 120	73

Colleton County

Census Voting Tabulation Districts

CANADY'S	602

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 121

Area	Population
COTTAGEVILLE	
Tract 9707.00	
Blocks: 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235	498
EDISTO BEACH	351
GREEN POND	1,380
HORSE PEN	
Tract 9704.00	
Blocks: 252, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 419, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436	472
JACKSONBORO	
Tract 9708.00	
Blocks: 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 174, 175, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197	2
MAPLE CANE	
Tract 9707.00	
Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 108, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 136	677
MASHAWVILLE	1,015
PEOPLES	497

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 121

Area **Population**

RITTER

Tract 9706.00

Blocks: 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 511, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571 724

Tract 9708.00

Blocks: 201, 203, 210, 211 37

ROUND 0 657

SIDNEY 390

WALTERBORO 2 3,303

WALTERBORO 3

Tract 9706.00

Blocks: 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243 705

DISTRICT TOTAL 28,279

PERCENT VARIATION 0.573

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 122

Area **Population**

Beaufort County

Census Voting Tabulation Districts

AS 1 0

AS 3 760

BLUFFTON 1

Tract 0021.00

Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 201, 202, 203, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 477, 478 2,020

Tract 0022.00

Blocks: 139, 140, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309 62

CHECHESSEE

Tract 0022.00

Blocks: 123, 124, 125, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 141, 142, 170 416

DALE LOBECO

Tract 0001.00

Blocks: 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 192, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358,

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 122

Area	Population
359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 368, 369, 370, 371, 381	1,235
LB 10	55
LB 1	301
LB 2	319
LB 3	273
LB 4	5
LB 5	14
LB 6	1,096
LB 7	489
LB 8	922
LB 9	604
SEABROOK 1	
Tract 0002.00	
Blocks: 205, 241, 242, 286	7
SEABROOK 2	
Tract 0002.00	
Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 118, 121, 122, 123, 124, 152	842
SEABROOK 3	1,519
SHELDON 1	1,052
SHELDON 2	898
Jasper County	15,487
DISTRICT TOTAL	28,376
PERCENT VARIATION	0.918

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 123

Area **Population**

Beaufort County

Census Voting Tabulation Districts

BLUFFTON 1

Tract 0022.00

Blocks: 301, 302, 303, 304, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 339, 340, 341 266

BLUFFTON 2 3,784

CHECHESSEE

Tract 0022.00

Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 126, 127, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411 244

DAUFUSKIE 122

HILTON HEAD 10 223

HILTON HEAD 11 2,165

HILTON HEAD 12 1,184

HILTON HEAD 13 1,696

HILTON HEAD 14 1,317

HILTON HEAD 15A 938

HILTON HEAD 15B 571

HILTON HEAD 1 1,990

HILTON HEAD 2 2,074

HILTON HEAD 3 730

HILTON HEAD 4A 927

HILTON HEAD 4B 1,921

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 123

Area	Population
HILTON HEAD 5A	1,032
HILTON HEAD 5B	888
HILTON HEAD 6A	676
HILTON HEAD 6B	1,207
HILTON HEAD 7	1,633
HILTON HEAD 8	1,785
HILTON HEAD 9	1,025
DISTRICT TOTAL	28,398
PERCENT VARIATION	0.996

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 124

Area	Population
Beaufort County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
BEAUFORT 1A	545
BEAUFORT 1B	1,108
BEAUFORT 2	1,381
BEAUFORT 3	
Tract 0007.00	
Blocks: 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 410, 411, 412	1,366
LADYS ISLAND 1B	968
LADYS ISLAND 3A	1,595

SC HOUSE DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 124

Area	Population
MOSSY OAKS 1A	1,641
MOSSY OAKS 1B	960
MOSSY OAKS 2	1,888
PI 10	0
PI 1	0
PI 2	1,278
PI 3	1,030
PI 4	535
PI 5	255
PI 6	1,256
PI 7	387
PI 8	701
PI 9	1,730
PORT ROYAL 1	1,357
PORT ROYAL 2	1,609
SAINT HELENA 1A	1,568
SAINT HELENA 1B	1,689
SAINT HELENA 2A	524
SAINT HELENA 2B	1,687
SAINT HELENA 2C	1,111
DISTRICT TOTAL	28,169
PERCENT VARIATION	0.181

C-1

SOUTH CAROLINA CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

Population Summary Report

Dist.	Total	Black	Pct. Black	Total18+	Black18+	Pct. Black18+	Pct. Dev.
1	581,125	117,022	20.14	427,603	75,536	17.66	0.00
2	581,111	147,626	25.40	431,032	98,040	22.75	-0.00
3	581,104	120,579	20.75	435,406	81,796	18.79	-0.00
4	581,113	114,332	19.67	437,837	77,739	17.76	-0.00
5	581,117	181,430	31.22	422,294	119,204	28.23	0.00
6	581,133	358,895	61.76	412,324	238,725	57.90	0.00
	3,486,703	1039884		2566496	691,040		0.00

Mean Deviation is: 7
Mean Percent Deviation is: 0.00

Largest Positive Deviation is: 16 0.00 Percent
Largest Negative Deviation is: -13 -0.00 Percent

Overall Range in Deviation is: 29 0.00 Percent

SC CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 1

Area	Population
Berkeley County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
BERKELEY	2,461
BONNEAU	2,692
CARNES CROSS ROADS	5,180
CORDESVILLE	1,407
GOOSE CREEK 1	8,764
GOOSE CREEK 2	27,371
GOOSE CREEK 3	7,511
HANAHAN	13,096
LEBANON	678
MACEDONIA	2,229
MCBETH	1,169
MONCKS CORNER	9,896
PIMLICO	1,268
PINOPOLIS	1,966
WASSAMASSAW	2,804
WIDE AWAKE	21,702
Charleston County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
AIR FORCE BASE NO. 10	182
AIR FORCE BASE NO. 11	90
AIR FORCE BASE NO. 12	314
AIR FORCE BASE NO. 13	398
AIR FORCE BASE NO. 14	309
AIR FORCE BASE NO. 15	172
AIR FORCE BASE NO. 16	0
AIR FORCE BASE NO. 17	346
AIR FORCE BASE NO. 18	0
AIR FORCE BASE NO. 19	0
AIR FORCE BASE NO. 1	0

SC CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 1

Area	Population
AIR FORCE BASE NO. 20	0
AIR FORCE BASE NO. 2	617
AIR FORCE BASE NO. 3	704
AIR FORCE BASE NO. 4	524
AIR FORCE BASE NO. 5	19
AIR FORCE BASE NO. 6	305
AIR FORCE BASE NO. 7	116
AIR FORCE BASE NO. 8	120
AIR FORCE BASE NO. 9	62
AWENDAW	1,276
CHARLESTON 10	1,743
CHARLESTON 11	564
CHARLESTON 1	1,128
CHARLESTON 2	1,203
CHARLESTON 3	2,610
CHARLESTON 4	478
CHARLESTON 5	3,076
CHARLESTON 6	1,471
CHARLESTON 7	789
CHARLESTON 8	1,438
CHRIST CHURCH 1	1,888
CHRIST CHURCH 2	2,180
CHRIST CHURCH 3	1,027
CHRIST CHURCH 4	793
CHRIST CHURCH 5	1,682
CHRIST CHURCH 6	468
CHRIST CHURCH 7	1,637
CHRIST CHURCH 8	7,248
CHRIST CHURCH 9	2,998
DEER PARK 1	3,600
DEER PARK 2	5,771
DEER PARK 3	2,300

SC CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)
DISTRICT 1

Area	Population
FOLLY BEACH	1,255
ISLE OF PALMS 1	929
ISLE OF PALMS 2	2,751
JAMES ISLAND 10	1,718
JAMES ISLAND 11	1,898
JAMES ISLAND 12	1,586
JAMES ISLAND 13	965
JAMES ISLAND 14	1,223
JAMES ISLAND 15	2,259
JAMES ISLAND 16	594
JAMES ISLAND 17	950
JAMES ISLAND 18	496
JAMES ISLAND 19	749
JAMES ISLAND 20	1,507
JAMES ISLAND 21	1,372
JAMES ISLAND 22	1,809
JAMES ISLAND 2	0
JAMES ISLAND 4	809
JAMES ISLAND 5	2,527
JAMES ISLAND 6	1,243
JAMES ISLAND 7	859
JAMES ISLAND 8	1,289
JAMES ISLAND 9	2,110
JOHNS ISLAND 1	3,057
JOHNS ISLAND 2	1,557
JOHNS ISLAND 3	
Tract 0021.02	
Blocks: 101, 102A, 102B, 102D	51
JOHNS ISLAND 5	1,631
LADSON	3,133
LINCOLNVILLE	1,050
MCCLELLANVILLE 1	852

SC CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 1

Area	Population
MCCLELLANVILLE 2	339
MOUNT PLEASANT 10	1,110
MOUNT PLEASANT 11	1,175
MOUNT PLEASANT 1	824
MOUNT PLEASANT 2	1,790
MOUNT PLEASANT 3	1,308
MOUNT PLEASANT 4	1,054
MOUNT PLEASANT 5	1,637
MOUNT PLEASANT 6	1,905
MOUNT PLEASANT 7	1,254
MOUNT PLEASANT 8	1,334
MOUNT PLEASANT 9	3,345
NAVAL SHIPYARD NO. 10	24
NAVAL SHIPYARD NO. 11	0
NAVAL SHIPYARD NO. 12	0
NAVAL SHIPYARD NO. 13	0
NAVAL SHIPYARD NO. 14	0
NAVAL SHIPYARD NO. 15	0
NAVAL SHIPYARD NO. 16	2
NAVAL SHIPYARD NO. 17	110
NAVAL SHIPYARD NO. 18	56
NAVAL SHIPYARD NO. 19	256
NAVAL SHIPYARD NO. 1	0
NAVAL SHIPYARD NO. 20	33
NAVAL SHIPYARD NO. 2	0
NAVAL SHIPYARD NO. 3	5,694
NAVAL SHIPYARD NO. 4	0
NAVAL SHIPYARD NO. 5	0
NAVAL SHIPYARD NO. 6	4
NAVAL SHIPYARD NO. 7	0
NAVAL SHIPYARD NO. 8	0

SC CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)
DISTRICT 1

Area	Population
NAVAL SHIPYARD NO. 9	92
NORTH CHARLESTON 12	4,176
NORTH CHARLESTON 13	3,617
NORTH CHARLESTON 14	4,852
NORTH CHARLESTON 15	1,949
NORTH CHARLESTON 18	1,701
NORTH CHARLESTON 19	1,479
NORTH CHARLESTON 20	1,564
NORTH CHARLESTON 21	727
NORTH CHARLESTON 22	681
NORTH CHARLESTON 23	1,195
NORTH CHARLESTON 24	1,282
NORTH CHARLESTON 25	1,168
NORTH CHARLESTON 26	1,750
NORTH CHARLESTON 27	623
NORTH CHARLESTON 28	1,155
NORTH CHARLESTON 29	1,155
NORTH CHARLESTON 30	2,190
NORTH CHARLESTON 31	2,195
NORTH CHARLESTON 32	3,632
NORTH CHARLESTON 33	4,531
NORTH CHARLESTON 6	1,767
SAINT ANDREWS 10	1,082
SAINT ANDREWS 14	2,108
SAINT ANDREWS 15	871
SAINT ANDREWS 16	1,567
SAINT ANDREWS 17	2,193
SAINT ANDREWS 18	990
SAINT ANDREWS 19	1,966
SAINT ANDREWS 1	1,141
SAINT ANDREWS 20	2,929
SAINT ANDREWS 22	1,417

SC CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 1

Area	Population
SAINT ANDREWS 23	2,181
SAINT ANDREWS 26	1,004
SAINT ANDREWS 27	2,781
SAINT ANDREWS 28	2,294
SAINT ANDREWS 29	3,146
SAINT ANDKEWS 2	1,745
SAINT ANDREWS 30	1,032
SAINT ANDREWS 31	5,830
SAINT ANDREWS 32	3,670
SAINT ANDREWS 4	1,718
SAINT ANDREWS 5	1,418
SAINT ANDREWS 6	288
SAINT ANDREWS 7	1,627
SAINT ANDREWS 8	1,067
SAINT ANDREWS 9	1,065
ST JAMES - SANTEE	1,157
SULLIVANS ISLAND	1,623
Dorchester County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
ASHBOROUGH	4,007
BEECH HILL	1,160
CAROLINA	2,242
CLEMSON	2,495
COASTAL	6,608
DORCHESTER	2,633
FLOWERTOWN	2,502
GERMAN TOWN	1,685
GIVHANS	1,688
GREENWAVE	2,651
GREGG	10,744
IRONGATE	4,530

SC CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 1

Area	**Population**
KNIGHTSVILLE	4,183
NEWINGTON	2,760
NORTH SUMMERVILLE	2,772
RIDGEVILLE	3,332
SAUL DAM	269
SPANN	1,231
STALLSVILLE	1,580
TRANQUIL	2,686
TROLLEY	4,115
TUPPERWAY	4,183
Georgetown County	46,302
Horry County	144,053
DISTRICT TOTAL	581,125
PERCENT VARIATION	0.001

SC CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 2

Area	**Population**
Aiken County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
COLLEGE ACRES	1,566
COUCHTON	1,947
MONTMORENCI	1,381
NEW HOLLAND	844
OAK GROVE	
Tract 0201.00	
Blocks: 306, 307, 308, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343	232

SC CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 2

Area	Population
PERRY	1,287
REDDS BRANCH	1,384
SALLEY	990
SHAWS FORK	668
SHILOH	1,961
TABERNACLE	795
WAGENER	2,209
WHITE POND	783
WINDSOR	1,685
Allendale County	11,722
Barnwell County	20,293
Beaufort County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
AS 10	0
AS 11	0
AS 12	0
AS 1	0
AS 2	0
AS 3	760
AS 4	0
AS 5	0
AS 6	0
AS 7	0
AS 8	0
AS 9	0
BEAUFORT 1A	545
BEAUFORT 1B	1,108
BEAUFORT 2	1,381
BEAUFORT 3	1,798
BLUFFTON 1	2,348
BLUFFTON 2	3,784

SC CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)
DISTRICT 2

Area	Population
BURTON 1A	1,846
BURTON 1B	3,316
BURTON 2A	1,815
BURTON 2B	2,047
BURTON 2C	1,500
BURTON 3	1,774
CHECHESSEE	660
DAUFUSKIE	122
HILTON HEAD 10	223
HILTON HEAD 11	2,165
HILTON HEAD 12	1,184
HILTON HEAD 13	1,696
HILTON HEAD 14	1,317
HILTON HEAD 15A	938
HILTON HEAD 15B	571
HILTON HEAD 1	1,990
HILTON HEAD 2	2,074
HILTON HEAD 3	730
HILTON HEAD 4A	927
HILTON HEAD 4B	1,921
HILTON HEAD 5A	1,032
HILTON HEAD 5B	888
HILTON HEAD 6A	676
HILTON HEAD 6B	1,207
HILTON HEAD 7	1,633
HILTON HEAD 8	1,785
HILTON HEAD 9	1,025
LADYS ISLAND 1A	1,451
LADYS ISLAND 1B	968
LADYS ISLAND 2A	1,032
LADYS ISLAND 3A	1,595
LB 10	55

SC CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 2

Area	Population
LB 1	301
LB 2	319
LB 3	273
LB 4	5
LB 5	14
LB 6	1,096
LB 7	489
LB 8	922
LB 9	604
MOSSY OAKS 1A	1,641
MOSSY OAKS 1B	960
MOSSY OAKS 2	1,888
PI 10	0
PI 1	0
PI 2	1,278
PI 3	1,030
PI 4	535
PI 5	255
PI 6	1,256
PI 7	387
PI 8	701
PI 9	1,730
PORT ROYAL 1	1,357
PORT ROYAL 2	1,609
SAINT HELENA 1A	1,568
SAINT HELENA 1B	1,689
SAINT HELENA 2A	524
SAINT HELENA 2B	1,687
SAINT HELENA 2C	1,111
SEABROOK 1	1,681
SEABROOK 2	915
SEABROOK 3	1,519

SC CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)
DISTRICT 2

Area	Population
Calhoun County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
BETHEL	1,104
CENTER HILL	1,050
DIXIE	2,779
FALL BRANCH	498
MURPH MILL	548
SANDY RUN	1,509
ST. MATTHEWS	1,971
Colleton County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
ASHTON	170
BELLS	373
HORSE PEN	608
HUDSON'S MILL	544
LODGE	679
PENIEL	609
PETITS	194
RICE PATCH	971
RUFFIN	506
SNIDERS	873
STOKES	710
WALTERBORO 1	2,694
WALTERBORO 4	4,006
WILLIAMS	516
WOLFE CREEK	505
Hampton County	18,191
Jasper County	15,487
Lexington County	167,611

SC CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 2

Area **Population**

Orangeburg County

Census Voting Tabulation Districts

COPE 815
COROOVA 4,171
EAST NORTH 1,581
EAST SPRINGFIELD 917
LIMESTONE
Tract 0109.00
Blocks: 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 133, 134, 135, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 269, 270 ... 1,857
Tract 0120.00
Blocks: 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397 681
NEESES-LIVINGSTON 1,784
NORWAY 1,977
ORANGEBURG WARD 10 1,103
ORANGEBURG WARD 1 1,246
ORANGEBURG WARD 6 1,357
ORANGEBURG WARD 7 887
ORANGEBURG WARD 8 788
ORANGEBURG WARD 9 797
PINEHILL-BOLEN 2,394
SUBURBAN 4 978

SC CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 2

Area	Population
SUBURBAN 5	1,951
SUBURBAN 6	1,789
SUBURBAN 7	1,890
SUBURBAN 8	1,039
SUBURBAN 9	2,383
WEST NORTH	1,838
WEST SPRINGFIELD	858
Richland County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
ARCADIA	3,751
BALLENTINE	3,358
BLYTHEWOOD	5,002
BRANDON	2,405
BRIARWOOD	2,577
COOPER	3,522
E FOREST ACRES	2,113
ESTATES	2,715
FJ 10	0
FJ 11	942
FJ 12	597
FJ 13	546
FJ 14	5
FJ 15	5
FJ 16	0
FJ 17	2,109
FJ 18	0
FJ 19	0
FJ 1	0
FJ 20	0
FJ 21	3,017
FJ 2	0
FJ 3	444

SC CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 2

Area	Population
FJ 4	475
FJ 5	72
FJ 6	7
FJ 7	0
FJ 8	3,073
FJ 9	0
FORT JACKSON	1,179
HAMPTON	2,897
HARBISON	4,609
HORRELL HILL	4,303
HUNTING CREEK	493
KEELS	4,481
KILLIAN	1,490
KINGSWOOD	3,234
LYKESLAND	4,511
MIDWAY	4,266
MILL CREEK	2,124
MONTICELLO	3,526
N FOREST ACRES	2,020
NEW FRIARSGATE	5,227
NORTH SPRINGS	5,194
OAKWOOD	1,815
OLD FRIARSGATE	2,137
PENNINGTON	1,747
PINE LAKES	4,432
PINEWOOD	1,897
PONTIAC	4,298
RIVERSIDE	5,657
S FOREST ACRES	2,283
SATCHELFORD	1,176
SPRING VALLEY	6,917

SC CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)
DISTRICT 2

Area	Population
SPRINGVILLE	3,226
ST ANDREWS	2,215
WALDEN	8,877
WARD 1	7,428
WARD 10	2,211
WARD 12	2,172
WARD 13	2,942
WARD 14	2,183
WARD 15	1,188
WARD 16	1,432
WARD 17	2,099
WARD 23	1,518
WARD 24	1,181
WARD 25	2,160
WARD 27	4,048
WARD 34	1,792
WARD 6	1,973
WHITEWELL	7,121
WILDEWOOD	4,367
WOODFIELD	5,573
WOODLANDS	3,992
DISTRICT TOTAL	581,111
PERCENT VARIATION	-0.001

SC CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 3

Area	Population
Abbeville County	23,862
Aiken County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
AIKEN 1	1,428
AIKEN 2	2,617
AIKEN 3	2,234
AIKEN 47	1,821
AIKEN 4	2,336
AIKEN 5	2,656
AIKEN 6	1,744
BATH	1,749
BEECH ISLAND	2,166
BELVEDERE 44	2,260
BELVEDERE 45	4,684
BELVEDERE 9	2,277
BREEZY HILL	2,035
CAROLINA HEIGHTS	2,242
CHINA SPRINGS	2,258
CLEARWATER	1,511
EUREKA	1,281
FOX CREEK	2,253
GLOVERVILLE	1,577
GRANITEVILLE	2,759
HAMMOND	2,546
HOLLOW CREEK	5,298
JACKSON	2,843
JORDANTOWN	1,130
LANGLEY	2,843
LEVELS	3,042
LYNWOOD	1,608
MILLBROOK	3,567
MONETTA	1,319

SC CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 3

Area	Population
NEW ELLENTON	2,515
NORTH AUGUSTA 25	1,949
NORTH AUGUSTA 26	3,548
NORTH AUGUSTA 27	1,911
NORTH AUGUSTA 28	2,142
NORTH AUGUSTA 29	1,547
NORTH AUGUSTA 54	1,851
NORTH AUGUSTA 55	1,465
OAK GROVE	
Tract 0201.00	
Blocks: 188, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 309, 310, 311, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 344, 345, 346B, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 395, 397	632
SAVANNAH RIVER SITE	0
SIX POINTS 35	1,431
SIX POINTS 46	2,370
TALATHA	4,351
TOWN CREEK	1,103
VAUCLUSE	904
WARD	1,562
WARRENSVILLE	2,202
WILLOW SPRINGS	3,641
Anderson County	145,196
Edgefield County	18,375
Greenwood County	59,567

SC CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 3

Area **Population**

Laurens County

Census Voting Tabulation Districts

BAILEYS 1,747
BARKSDALE NARNI 1,003
BREWERTON 737
CLINTON 1 BOX 1 2,534
CLINTON 1 BOX 2 6,527
CLINTON MILL 3,470
CROSS HILL 1,656
DANIELS STORE 145
DIALS 405
EKOM 296
GRAY COURT 1,531
HICKORY TAVERN 1,509
HOPEWELL 496
JOANNA 1,979
JONES STORE
Tract 9801.00
Blocks: 213A, 213C, 222, 223, 224A, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323A, 323B, 324A, 324B, 324C, 325, 326, 327, 328A, 328B, 328C, 329A, 329B, 330A, 330B, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337A, 337B, 338, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344A, 344B, 345, 346A, 346B, 347A, 347B, 348A, 348B, 349A, 351, 353, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 374, 385, 396, 397 1,574
LONG BRANCH 1,633
LYDIA MILL 1,969
MADDENS 1,563

SC CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 3

Area	Population
MOUNT OLIVE	411
MOUNT PLEASANT	283
MOUNTVILLE	889
ORA	
Tract 9805.00	
Blocks: 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170A, 170B, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180	436
OWINGS	972
POPLAR SPRINGS	689
PRINCETON	528
RENNO	323
SHADY GROVE	508
SHILOH	268
TIP TOP	1,194
TRINITY RIDGE	1,473
WARD 1	537
WARD 2	1,044
WARD 3	1,344
WARD 4	2,496
WARD 5	2,454
WARD 6	2,034
WATERLOO	1,409
WATTSVILLE	2,734
WOODVILLE	1,483
McCormick County	8,868
Oconee County	57,494
Pickens County	93,894
Saluda County	16,357

SC CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 3

Area	**Population**
DISTRICT TOTAL	581,104
PERCENT VARIATION	-0.002

SC CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 4

Area	**Population**
Greenville County	320,167
Laurens County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
COOKS STORE	684
GRAYS	492
JONES STORE	
Tract 9801.00	
Blocks: 224B	33
LANFORD	553
ORA	
Tract 9805.00	
Blocks: 135	0
PLEASANT MOUND	442
STEWART STORE	764
YOUNGS	841
Spartanburg County	226,800
Union County	30,337
DISTRICT TOTAL	581,113
PERCENT VARIATION	-0.001

SC CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)
DISTRICT 5

Area	Population
Cherokee County	44,506
Chester County	32,170
Chesterfield County	38,577
Darlington County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
ANTIOCH	2,242
BURNT BRANCH BETHEL	2,836
CLYDE BLACK CREEK	1,511
DARLINGTON 1	491
DARLINGTON 2	2,645
DARLINGTON 3	4,279
DARLINGTON 6	2,433
DOVESVILLE	1,353
HARTSVILLE 1	1,216
HARTSVILLE 2&3	1,143
HARTSVILLE 4	1,439
HARTSVILLE 5	3,568
HARTSVILLE 6	3,556
HARTSVILLE 7	2,014
HARTSVILLE 8A	2,968
HARTSVILLE 8B	2,515
HIGH HILL INDIAN BRANCH	
Tract 0109.00	
Blocks: 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 412, 413, 414, 417,	

SC CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)
DISTRICT 5

Area	Population
418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 533, 534, 535, 536	1,777
Tract 0115.00	
Blocks: 201, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 224, 225, 226, 227, 303, 304	691
KELLYTOWN	1,990
LAKE SWAMP	1,588
MONT CLARE MECHANICSVILLE	1,975
OATS PHILADELPHIA	1,325
POND HOLLOW NEW MARKET	1,392
SOCIETY HILL	1,195
SWIFT CREEK	1,447
Dillon County	29,114
Fairfield County	22,295
Kershaw County	43,599
Lancaster County	54,516
Lee County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
ASHLAND	233
ASHWOOD	856
BISHOPVILLE 3	1,339
BISHOPVILLE 4	1,946
CEDAR CREEK	502
HICKORY HILL	357

SC CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 5

Area	Population
IONIA	904
LUCKNOW	648
MANVILLE	775
RATTLESNAKE SPRINGS	534
SHROCKS MILL	108
SPRING HILL	794
ST MATTHEWS	241
STOKES BRIDGE	720
TURKEY CREEK	280
WOODROW	423
Marlboro County	29,361
Newberry County	33,172
Sumter County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
BURNS DOWNS	975
CAUSEWAY BRANCH	2,126
CHERRYVALE	1,935
DALZELL DUBOSE	3,954
FOLSOM PARK	2,990
GREEN SWAMP	2,525
HAMPTON PARK	1,232
HILLCREST	2,493
HORSEPEN BRANCH	1,985
MCCRAYS MILL NORTH	1,984
MCCRAYS MILL SOUTH	2,236
MILLWOOD	2,731
MULBERRY	1,604
OAKLAND PLANTATION	3,574
OSWEGO	1,020
PALMETTO PARK	2,203

SC CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 5

Area	Population
POCOTALIGO	3,966
PRIVATEER	3,743
SALTERSTOWN	1,665
SECOND MILL	1,266
SHAW 10	6,695
SHAW 11	0
SHAW 12	0
SHAW 13	0
SHAW 14	0
SHAW 15	0
SHAW 16	0
SHAW 1	1,260
SHAW 2	339
SHAW 3	407
SHAW 4	430
SHAW 5	394
SHAW 6	281
SHAW 7	1,908
SHAW 8	625
SHAW 9	229
SUNSET	1,868
SWAN LAKE	1,432
York County	131,497
DISTRICT TOTAL	581,131
PERCENT VARIATION	0.002

SC CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 6

Area	Population
Bamberg County	16,902
Beaufort County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
DALE LOBECO	1,244
SHELDON 1	1,052
SHELDON 2	898
Berkeley County	
ALVIN	1,205
BETHERA	357
CAINHOY	2,293
CROSS	2,738
EADYTOWN	983
HILTON CROSS ROAD	2,380
HUGER	1,269
JAMESTOWN	760
RUSSELLVILLE	1,941
SAINT STEPHEN	4,223
SHULERVILLE HH	433
Calhoun County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
CAMERON	996
CRESTON	358
FORT MOTTE	379
LONE STAR	1,073
MIDWAY	488
Charleston County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
ADAMS RUN 2	1,149
CHARLESTON 12	734
CHARLESTON 13	1,116
CHARLESTON 14	881

SC CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)
DISTRICT 6

Area	Population
CHARLESTON 15	722
CHARLESTON 16	984
CHARLESTON 17	1,676
CHARLESTON 18	1,469
CHARLESTON 19	2,864
CHARLESTON 20	1,570
CHARLESTON 21	1,338
CHARLESTON 22	730
CHARLESTON 23	1,296
CHARLESTON 24	879
CHARLESTON 25	1,552
CHARLESTON 26	952
CHARLESTON 27	994
CHARLESTON 28	992
CHARLESTON 29	1,047
CHARLESTON 30	2,795
CHARLESTON 9	1,123
EDISTO	1,318
HOLLYWOOD	2,198
JAMES ISLAND 1	1,323
JAMES ISLAND 3	1,428
JOHNS ISLAND 3	
Tract 0021.01	
Blocks: 101A, 101B, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106A, 106B, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120A, 120B, 120C, 120D, 120E, 120F, 120G, 120H, 121, 122, 123A, 123B, 124A, 124B, 125, 126A, 126B, 126C, 126D, 127, 128A, 128B, 128C, 128D, 129, 130	1,598
Tract 0021.02	
Blocks: 102C, 103, 104, 202, 203, 204, 205, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214	1,355

SC CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)
DISTRICT 6

Area	Population
JOHNS ISLAND 4	1,157
MEGGETT 1	2,340
MEGGETT 2	969
no name for (0190154)	1,764
NORTH CHARLESTON 4	1,481
NORTH CHARLESTON 10	1,265
NORTH CHARLESTON 11	2,091
NORTH CHARLESTON 16	1,300
NORTH CHARLESTON 17	1,886
NORTH CHARLESTON 1	3,431
NORTH CHARLESTON 2	1,080
NORTH CHARLESTON 3	2,945
NORTH CHARLESTON 5	1,952
NORTH CHARLESTON 7	2,072
NORTH CHARLESTON 8	1,533
NORTH CHARLESTON 9	3,541
RAVENEL 1	1,738
RAVENEL 2	1,210
SAINT ANDREWS 11	1,726
SAINT ANDREWS 12	2,272
SAINT ANDREWS 13	1,983
SAINT ANDREWS 21	1,849
SAINT ANDREWS 24	2,118
SAINT ANDREWS 25	1,031
SAINT ANDREWS 3	1,132
WADMALAW 1	1,266
WADMALAW 2	1,304
Clarendon County	28,450

SC CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 6

Area	Population
Colleton County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
BEREA	138
CANADY'S	602
COTTAGEVILLE	2,614
EDISTO BEACH	351
EDISTO	524
GREEN POND	1,380
HENDERSONVILLE	1,921
JACKSONBORO	631
MAPLE CANE	677
MASHAWVILLE	1,015
PEOPLES	497
RITTER	1,489
ROUND O	657
SIDNEY	390
SMOAKS	1,332
WALTERBORO 2	3,303
WALTERBORO 3	2,898
Darlington County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
DARLINGTON 4	2,349
DARLINGTON 5	2,871
HIGH HILL INDIAN BRANCH	
Tract 0109.00	
Blocks: 410, 411, 415, 416, 450, 451, 452, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 532	800
LAMAR 1	1,308
LAMAR 2 NEWMAN SWAMP	2,078
PALMETTO	2,856

SC CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 6

Area	Population
Dorchester County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
DELEMARS	505
FOUR HOLE	1,428
GROVER NO.1	890
GROVER NO.3	221
HARLEYVILLE	980
INDIAN FIELD	1,972
REEVESVILLE	1,338
ROSINVILLE	1,819
ROSSES	889
ST. GEORGE NO.1	2,248
ST. GEORGE NO.2	714
Florence County	114,344
Lee County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
BISHOPVILLE 1	1,031
BISHOPVILLE 2	1,317
CYPRESS	667
ELLIOTT	808
LYNCHBURG	1,302
MOUNT CLIO	504
SAINT CHARLES	1,426
SOUTH LYNCHBURG	722
Marion County	33,899
Orangeburg County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
BETHEL	809
BROOKDALE	1,152
EAST HOLLY HILL	2,770

SC CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 6

Area	Population
EDISTO	1,276
ELCOREE	2,534
FOUR HOLES	864
JAMISON	1,965
LIMESTONE	
Tract 0109.00	
Blocks: 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 136, 137, 138	237
NIX	3,098
NORTH BOWMAN	2,353
NORTH BRANCHVILLE	1,400
NORTH EUTAWVILLE	1,985
ORANGEBURG WARD 2	1,426
ORANGEBURG WARD 3	1,098
ORANGEBURG WARD 4	3,969
ORANGEBURG WARD 5	938
PROVIDENCE	1,983
ROWESVILLE	725
SANTEE	2,726
SOUTH BOWMAN	1,243
SOUTH BRANCHVILLE	785
SOUTH EUTAWVILLE	2,273
SUBURBAN 1	1,670
SUBURBAN 2	1,699
SUBURBAN 3	2,122
VANCE	1,817
WEST HOLLY HILL	2,707
WHITTAKER	2,098

SC CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 6

Area	Population
Richland County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
ARDINCAPLE	832
BLUFF	3,910
COLLEGE PLACE	3,822
DENNYSIDE	1,390
DENTSVILLE	4,141
EASTOVER	3,897
EDGEWOOD	4,011
FAIDLAWN	2,539
FAIRWOPID	1,654
GADSDEN	2,563
GARNERS	1,131
GREENVIEW	2,955
HOPKINS	4,266
KEENAN	2,951
LINCOLNSHIRE	3,944
MEADOWLAKE	5,050
OLYMPIA	2,320
RIDGEWOOD	1,933
WARD 11	3,191
WARD 18	2,835
WARD 19	2,721
WARD 2	885
WARD 20	2,451
WARD 21	3,172
WARD 22	2,368
WARD 29	1,604
WARD 30	2,298
WARD 31	1,956
WARD 32	2,808
WARD 33	1,858

SC CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)
DISTRICT 6

Area	Population
WARD 3	2,437
WARD 4	3,088
WARD 5	2,421
WARD 7	3,195
WARD 8	2,061
WARD 9	2,716
Sumter County	
Census Voting Tabulation Districts	
BATES	1,495
BIRNIE	1,829
BROGDON	2,008
CONCORD	1,751
CROSSWELL	2,634
DELAINE	3,978
HORATIO	752
LEMIRA	2,275
LORING	2,074
MAGNOLIA	1,107
MANCHESTER FOREST	2,196
MAYESVILLE	1,218
MORRIS COLLEGE	2,505
OLD POCALLA	655
PINEWOOD	1,645
PLEASANT GROVE TRINITY	658
REMBERT	3,251
SALEM	659
SAVAGE GLOVER	1,188
SHILOH	495
SOUTH LIBERTY	1,282
SOUTH RED BAY	1,662
STONE HILL	1,223

SC CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS (FEDERAL COURT)

DISTRICT 6

Area	Population
TAYLORS	937
WILDER	1,085
Williamsburg County	36,815
DISTRICT TOTAL	581,119
PERCENT VARIATION	0.000



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

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

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA

MICHAEL G. BURTON, as Executive Director and on behalf of the Republican Party, *et al.*,

Plaintiffs,

KIMBERLY T. BURCH, ROBIN TALLON,

Plaintiff-Intervenor,

vs.

ROBERT J. SHEHEEN, in his representative capacity as Speaker of the South Carolina House of Representatives, NICK THEODORE, in his representative capacity as presiding officer of the South Carolina Senate, CARROLL A. CAMPBELL,JR., in his representative capacity as the Governor of South Carolina, JAMES ELLISOR,

Defendants,

NEIL A. VANDER LINDEN, FORREST E. OTT, PHILIP T. JONES, ANN Y. HART, PEGGY A. DUFEK, GWENDOLYN L. GROOMS, THE SOUTH CAROLINA SENATE, THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF SOUTH CAROLINA,

Defendant-Intervenors.

KATHERINE I. BUTLER,

Amicus Curiae.

JUDGMENT IN A CIVIL CASE

C.A. No. 3:91-2983-1

(Filed MAY 20 1992)

STATEWIDE REAPPORTIONMENT ADVISORY COMMITTEE, WILLIAM GIBSON, FREDERICK CALHOUN JAMES, HERBERT WILLIAMS, WILLIE B. OWENS, SOUTH CAROLINA STATE CONFERENCE OF THE NAACP BRANCHES Plaintiffs, vs. CARROLL A. CAMPBELL, JR., *et al.*, Defendants. KATHERINE I. BUTLER, Amicus Curiae.	C.A. No. 3:91-3310-1
BUFORT BLANTON, NEIL A. VANDER LINDEN, FORREST E. OTT, ANN Y. HART, PEGGY A. DUFEK and VINCENT JOHNSON, Plaintiffs, vs. CARROLL A. CAMPBELL, JR., in his official capacity as Governor of South Carolina, NICK THEODORE, in official capacity as Lt. Governor and presiding officer of the South Carolina Senate, ROBERT J. SHEHEEN, in his official capacity as Speaker of the South Carolina House of Representatives, JAMES B. ELLISOR, in his official capacity as Executive Director of the South Carolina State Election	C.A. No. 2:91-3635-1

Commission, DORCHESTER COUNTY LEGISLATIVE DELEGATION,STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA, SHERRY MARTSCHINK, in her representative capacity as a State Senator, STEPHEN E. GONZALES, in his representative capacity as a member of the State House of Representatives, ANNETTE YOUNG, in her representative capacity as a member of the State House of Representatives, SANDRA S. WOFFORD, in her representative capacity as a member of State House of Representatives, GEORGE H. BAILEY, in his representative capacity as a member of the State House of Representatives, JOHN W. MATTHEWS, JR., in his representative capacity as a State Senator, MICHAEL T. ROSE, in his representative capacity as a State Senator, THE SOUTH CAROLINA SENATE,

Defendants.

Decision by Court. This action came to trial before the Court. The issues have been tried and we expressly find no just reason for delay; therefore, final judgment shall be entered with respect to all remaining claims. Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 54(b).

IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED for the plaintiffs, Michael G. Burton, as Executive Director and on behalf of the Republican Party, Robin Tallon, Statewide

Reapportionment Advisory Committee, William Gibson, Frederick Calhoun James, Herbert Williams, Willie B. Owens, South Carolina State Conference of the NAACP Branches, Bufort Blanton, Neil A. Vander Linden, Forrest E. Ott, Ann Y. Hart, Peggy A. Dufek, and Vincent Johnson against defendants, Robert J. Sheheen, in his representative capacity as Speaker of the South Carolina House of Representatives, Nick Theodore, in his representative capacity as presiding officer of the South Carolina Senate, Carroll A. Campbell, Jr., in his representative capacity as the Governor of South Carolina, James B. Ellisor, in his official capacity as Executive Director of the South Carolina State Election Commission, The South Carolina Senate, The Democratic Party of South Carolina Dorchester County Legislative Delegation, State of South Carolina, Sherry Marschink, in her representative capacity as a State Senator, Stephen E. Gonzales, in his representative capacity as a member of the State House of Representatives, Annette Young, in her representative capacity as a member of the State House of Representatives, Sandra S. Wofford, in her representative capacity as a member of State House of Representatives, George H. Bailey, in his representative capacity as a member of the State House of Representatives, John W. Matthews, Jr., in his representative capacity as a State Senator, Michael T. Rose, in his representative capacity as a State Senator, and The South Carolina Senate that the redistricting plans for the South Carolina Senate [Memorandum Order Appendix A], South Carolina House of Representatives [Memorandum Order Appendix B], and the South Carolina Congressional delegation [Memorandum Order Appendix C] shall be the lawful election districts for each of those

bodies for the general elections scheduled in 1992, and for all subsequent elections until redistricting plans for those bodies are lawfully enacted by the South Carolina General Assembly, signed by the Governor, and approved by the United States Department of Justice pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1973c.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDGED, that the claim of plaintiffs Bufort Blanton, Neil A. Vander Linden, Forrest E. Ott, Ann Y. Hart, Peggy A. Dufek and Vincent Johnson, C.A. No. 3:91-3635-1, regarding the constitutionality of the county delegation system is deconsolidated from this action and referred to a single judge of the district court for resolution.

May 20, 1992

ANN A. BIRCH, CLERK
/s/ Mary B. Lafaye
Mary B. Lafaye
Deputy Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
COLUMBIA DIVISION

MICHAEL G. BURTON, as Executive Director and on behalf of the Republican Party, *et al.*, Plaintiffs, KIMBERLY T. BURCH, Plaintiff-Intervenor, vs. ROBERT J. SHEHEEN, in his representative capacity as Speaker of the South Carolina House of Representatives, *et al.*, Defendants, ROBIN TALLON, NEIL A. VANDERLINDEN, FORREST E. OTT, PHILIP T. JONES, ANN Y. HART, PEGGY A DUFEK, GRWNDOLYN L. GOOMS, THE SOUTH CAROLINA SENATE, THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF SOUTH CAROLINA, Defendant-Intervenors. KATHARINE I. BUTLER, Amicus Curiae.	C.A. No. 3:91-2983-1
STATEWIDE REAPPORTIONMENT ADVISORY COMMITTEE, DR. WILLIAM GIBSON, BISHOP FREDERICK CALHOUN JAMES, REV. HERBERT WILLIAMS, WILLIE B. OWENS and SOUTH	C.A. NO. 3:91-3310-1

CAROLINA STATE CONFERENCE OF THE NAACP BRANCHES,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

CARROLL A. CAMPBELL, JR., in his official capacity as Governor of South Carolina; NICK THEODORE, in his official capacity as Lieutenant Governor and presiding officer of the South Carolina Senate; ROBERT J. SHEHEEN, in his official capacity as Speaker of the South Carolina House of Representatives; and, JAMES B. ELLISOR, in his official capacity of Executive Director of the South Carolina State Election Commission,

Defendants.

KATHARINE I. BUTLER,

Amicus Curiae

BUFORT BLANTON, NEIL A. VANDERLINDEN, FORREST E. OTT, ANN Y. HART, PEGGY A. DUFEK and VINCENT JOHNSON,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

CARROLL A. CAMPBELL, JR., *et al.*,

Defendants.

C.A. NO. 3:91-3635-1

NOTICE OF APPEAL TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

(Filed May 22, 1992)

Notice is hereby given that the Statewide Reapportionment Advisory Committee, Dr. William Gibson, Bishop Frederick Calhoun James, Rev. Herbert Williams, Willie B. Owens, and the South Carolina State Conference of NAACP Branches, the plaintiffs above-named in Civil Action No. 3:91-3310-1, hereby appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States from the Order and final judgment of the three-judge district court, adopting and creating plans for the redistricting of South Carolina's Senate, House of Representatives, and Congressional districts following the 1990 decennial census, entered in the above consolidated actions on May 1, 1992, and on May 20, 1992.

This appeal is taken pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 1253.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Laughlin McDonald
LAUGHLIN MCDONALD
American Civil Liberties Union Foundation, Inc.
44 Forsyth Street, N.W.
Suite 202
Atlanta, Georgia 30303
(404) 523-2721

/s/ Willie Abrams
WILLIE ABRAMS
DENNIS COURTLAND HAYES
NAACP Special Contribution Fund

4805 Mount Hope Drive
Baltimore, Maryland 21215-3297
(410) 358-8900
/s/ John Roy Harper II
JOHN ROY HARPER II
I.D. NO. 1729
P.O. Box 843
Columbia, South Carolina 29202
(803) 771-4723

ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS

Columbia, South Carolina
May 22, 1992

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
COLUMBIA DIVISION

MICHAEL G, BURTON, as Executive Director and on behalf of the Republican Party, *et al.*,	) C.A. No. 8:91-2983-1
Plaintiffs,	)
KIMBERLY T. BURCH,	)
Plaintiff-Intervenor,	)
vs.	)
ROBERT J. SHEHEEN, in his representative capacity as Speaker of the South Carolina House of Representatives, *et al.*,	)
Defendants,	)

ROBIN TALLON, NEIL A. VANDERLINDEN, FORREST E. OTT, PHILIP T. JONES, ANN Y. HART, PEGGY A DUFEK, GRWNDOLYN L. GOOMS, THE SOUTH CAROLINA SENATE, THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF SOUTH CAROLINA,

Defendant-Intervenors.

KATHARINE I. BUTLER,

Amicus Curiae.

STATEWIDE REAPPORTIONMENT ADVISORY COMMITTEE, DR. WILLIAM GIBSON, BISHOP FREDERICK CALHOUN JAMES, REV. HERBERT WILLIAMS, WILLIE B. OWENS and SOUTH CAROLINA STATE CONFERENCE OF THE NAACP BRANCHES,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

CARROLL A. CAMPBELL, JR., in his official capacity as Governor of South Carolina; NICK THEODORE, in his official capacity as Lieutenant Governor and presiding officer of the South Carolina Senate; ROBERT J. SHEHEEN, in his official capacity as Speaker of the South Carolina House of Representatives; and, JAMES B. ELLISOR, in his official

C.A. NO. 3:91-3310-1

capacity of Executive Director of the South Carolina State Election Commission,

Defendants.

KATHARINE I. BUTLER,

Amicus Curiae

BUFORT BLANTON, NEIL A. VANDERLINDEN, FORREST E. OTT, ANN Y. HART, PEGGY A. DUFEK and VINCENT JOHNSON,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

CARROLL A. CAMPBELL, JR., *et al.*,

Defendants.

C.A. NO. 3:91-3635-1

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned attorney, do hereby certify that I have caused the foregoing Notice of Appeal to be served on counsel for all parties required to be served by mailing a copy thereof, postage prepaid, to the attorney shown below at the address shown below, on the 22nd day of May, 1992.

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Amendment I.

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.

Amendment XIII.

Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.

Amendment XIV.

Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

Amendment XV.

Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.

§ 1973. Denial or abridgement of right to vote on account of race or color through voting qualifications or prerequisites; establishment of violation

(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in section 1973b(f)(2) of this title, as provided in subsection (b) of this section.

(b) A violation of subsection (a) of this section is established if, based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) of this section in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice. The extent to which members of a protected class have been elected to office in the State or political subdivision is one circumstance which may be considered: *Provided,* That nothing in this section establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population.

(As amended Pub. L. 97-205, § 3, June 29, 1982, 96 Stat. 134)

§ 1973c. Alteration of voting qualifications and procedures; action by State or political subdivision for declaratory judgment of no denial or abridgment of voting rights; three-judge district court; appeal to Supreme Court

Whenever a State or political subdivision with respect to which the prohibitions set forth in section 1973b(a) of this title based upon determinations made under the first sentence of section 1973b(b) of this title are in effect shall enact or seek to administer any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting different from that in force or effect on November 1, 1964, or whenever a State or political subdivision with respect to which the prohibitions set forth in section 1973b(a) of this title based upon determinations made under the second sentence of section 1973b(b) of this title are in effect shall enact or seek to administer any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting different from that in force or effect on November 1, 1968, or whenever a State or political subdivision with respect to which the prohibitions set forth in section 1973b(a) of this title based upon determinations made under the third sentence of section 1973b(b) of this title are in effect shall enact or seek to administer any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting different from that in force or effect on November 1, 1972, such State or subdivision may institute an action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia for a declaratory judgment that such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure does

not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in section 1973b(f)(2) of this title, and unless and until the court enters such judgment no person shall be denied the right to vote for failure to comply with such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure: *Provided*, That such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure may be enforced without such proceeding if the qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure has been submitted by the chief legal officer or other appropriate official of such State or subdivision to the Attorney General and the Attorney General has not interposed an objection within sixty days after such submission, or upon good cause shown, to facilitate an expedited approval within sixty days after such submission, the Attorney General has affirmatively indicated that such objection will not be made. Neither an affirmative indication by the Attorney General that no objection will be made, nor the Attorney General's failure to object, nor a declaratory judgment entered under this section shall bar a subsequent action to enjoin enforcement of such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure. In the event the Attorney General affirmatively indicates that no objection will be made within the sixty-day period following receipt of a submission, the Attorney General may reserve the right to reexamine the submission if additional information comes to his attention during the remainder of the sixty-day period which would otherwise require objection in accordance with this section. Any action under this section shall be heard and determined by a court of three judges in accordance with

the provisions of section 2284 of Title 28 and any appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court.

§ 3. Number of members; enumeration of inhabitants.

The House of Representatives shall consist of one hundred and twenty-four members, to be apportioned among the several Counties according to the number of inhabitants contained in each. Each County shall constitute one election district. An enumeration of the inhabitants for this purpose shall be made in the year Nineteen hundred and One, and shall be made in the course of every tenth year thereafter, in such manner as shall be by law directed: *Provided,* That the General Assembly may at any time, in its discretion, adopt the immediately preceding United States Census as a true and correct enumeration of the inhabitants of the several Counties, and make the apportionment of Representatives among the several Counties, according to said enumeration: *Provided, further,* That until the apportionment which shall be made upon the next enumeration shall take effect, the representation of the several Counties as they now exist (including the County of Saluda established by ordinance) shall be as follows: Abbeville, 5; Aiken, 3; Anderson, 5; Barnwell, 5; Beaufort, 4; Berkeley, 4; Charleston, 9; Chester, 3; Chesterfield, 2; Clarendon, 3; Colleton, 4; Darlington, 3; Edgefield, 3; Fairfield, 3; Florence, 3; Georgetown, 2; Greenville, 5; Hampton, 2; Horry, 2; Kershaw, 2; Lancaster, 2; Laurens, 3; Lexington, 2; Marion, 3; Marlboro, 3; Newberry, 3; Oconee, 2; Orangeburg, 5; Pickens, 2; Richland, 4; Saluda, 2; Spartanburg, 6; Sumter, 5; Union, 3; Williamsburg, 3; York, 4; *Provided further,* That in the event other Counties are hereafter established then the General Assembly shall reapportion the Representatives between the Counties.

Supreme Court, U.S.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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(3) (2)

Nos. 92-155 and 92-219

STATEWIDE REAPPORTIONMENT ADVISORY COMMITTEE, et al.,

Appellants

v.

NICK THEODORE, et al.,

Appellees

CARROLL A. CAMPBELL, JR.,

Appellant

v.

NICK THEODORE, et al.,

Appellees

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA

MOTION TO DISMISS OR AFFIRM OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF SOUTH CAROLINA

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South Carolina State Conference of Branches of NAACP v. Riley, 533 F. Supp. 1178 (D.S.C. 1982).. 4

Appellee Democratic Party of South Carolina ("Democratic Party") submits this motion to dismiss the above-captioned appeals, or, in the alternative, to affirm summarily the judgment of the Court below.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

Pertinent constitutional and statutory provisions are included in the appendices to the jurisdictional statements filed by the Statewide Reapportionment Advisory Committee ("SRAC") (referred to herein as "App.") and by Carroll Campbell, Governor of South Carolina ("Governor"); other relevant provisions may be included in

the appendices to the motions to dismiss or affirm filed by other appellees.

INTRODUCTION

The Democratic Party was an intervenor and participated in the trial of the consolidated actions below. App. 8-9. The Democratic Party anticipates that the Lieutenant Governor, Speaker Sheheen, and the Senate of South Carolina will present the Court with extensive briefing as to why this appeal should be dismissed or, in the alternative, why the lower court's decision should be affirmed.

In this motion to dismiss or affirm, the Democratic Party sets forth three principal reasons why the appeals should be dismissed or the decision below should be affirmed: (1) the three-judge

District Court took extra steps to protect the voting rights of black South Carolinians, in difficult circumstances; (2) the District Court's decision provides for an interim plan only, a plan that this Court need not now review; (3) the District Court considered Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act in crafting its plan and thus addressed the concerns raised by the appellants in their jurisdictional statements.

ARGUMENT

1. The District Court protected the voting rights of black South Carolinians.

At the outset, it is important to recognize the point from which the District Court started. The districting plans in place as of 1990 were all plans that had been instituted by the federal

courts in the 1980's and/or precleared by the Justice Department under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. None had been successfully challenged under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.

The congressional districts in South Carolina were drawn in 1982 by the District Court as a result of litigation brought by the NAACP and were never challenged under Section 2. South Carolina State Conference of Branches of NAACP v. Riley, 533 F. Supp. 1178 (D.S.C. 1982). App. 5-6.

A reapportionment plan for the state Senate was adopted by the District Court in 1984, Graham v. South Carolina, C.A. No. 3:84-1430-15 (Order of July 31, 1984), appeal dismissed, 53 U.S.L.W. 3483 (Jan. 7. 1985). The Legislature thereafter adopted a reapportionment plan, and it was precleared under Section

5 by the Justice Department. App. 5-6. The NAACP later brought a challenge to that plan under Section 2, but ultimately dismissed that action with prejudice. NAACP v. South Carolina, C.A. No. 3:84-2865-8 (D.S.C. Order of May 29, 1986). A Section 2 challenge was brought in 1988 to contest a special election in State Senate District 32; after a trial, the District Court found that black voters in that district had an equal opportunity to elect representatives, including the senator, of their choice and found no Section 2 violation. NAACP v. South Carolina Democratic Party, C.A. No. 3:88-2492-2 (D.S.C., Order of February 29, 1989), aff'd mem., 898 F.2d 146 (4th Cir. 1990).

A plan redistricting the state House was adopted by the Legislature in 1981, and it was precleared by the Justice

Department under Section 5. It was never challenged under Section 2. App. 6.

At the same time, during the 1980's, the black percentage of South Carolina's total population declined from 30.38% to 29.82%. App. 65. South Carolina's population shifted from urban and rural areas, where most of the black population resides, to suburban and resort areas. App. 66. Many of the majority black districts under the existing plans had declined dramatically in population or were much smaller than the ideal district size under the 1990 census. See App. 65-66 and n. 62; App. 70-71 and n. 69.

Despite the demographic changes, the District Court increased the number of majority black districts over those present under the plans created by the District Court or approved by the Justice Department during the 1980's. The

District Court drew a majority black congressional district, the first such district in recent South Carolina history. The Court refused to follow the disruptive and confusing plans offered by the appellants, drew its own majority black district while attempting to avoid disruptions of communities of interest and county lines, and successfully created a majority black district. App. 82-84. It is noteworthy that, despite the fact the Court rejected their plans, the appellants do not appear to direct their appeals at that aspect of the District Court's decision.

The District Court followed a similar course in drawing the state Senate and the state House districts. The Court rejected aspects of the plans offered by the appellants, which created serpentine, distended districts that

split small municipalities and stretched long distances or wound through several counties. At the same time, as compared with the plans established in the 1980's, the District Court created one additional Senate district with a black majority population and three additional Senate districts with a black majority voting age population. App. 67. In the state House, the District Court created two additional districts with a black majority population and three additional districts with a black majority voting age population. App. 72.

Finally, the District Court took these steps despite extensive evidence that, during the 1980's, black voters in South Carolina had had a great deal of success in electing candidates of their choice and had enjoyed a growing opportunity to participate in the

electoral process. Contrary to the suggestion of the SRAC, SRAC Juris. St. at 6, its evidence and that of the Republican Party and the Governor were extensively rebutted.

On cross-examination, experts for the plaintiffs had to admit that majority white electorates in South Carolina had elected a black sheriff, a black solicitor (South Carolina's equivalent of a district attorney), and numerous black county officeholders and school board members. Tr. of Dr. Ruoff's Testimony at 72-92, 95-96, 99 (February 19, 1992); Tr. of Dr. Ruoff's Testimony at 83 (February 27, 1992). Black state senators had been elected with substantial white support, while some white state senators had been elected in majority black districts with substantial black support and had admittedly been

extremely responsive to black concerns. Tr. of Dr. Arrington's Testimony at 20, 51 (February 21, 1992); NAACP v. Democratic Party, supra; Tr. of Dr. Ruoff's Testimony at 64-67 (February 19, 1992). A black state senator had overwhelmingly won the Democratic nomination for governor in 1990 against a white state senator in a primary electorate that was 57% white. The black senator had carried several majority white counties in the very areas where the plaintiffs were contending that blacks did not have an equal opportunity to participate in the electoral process. Tr. of Dr. Arrington's Testimony at 178-181, 232-234 (February 27, 1992); GOP Exhibit 94 at 83 and 85 (1990-1991 Annual Report of S.C. Election Commission); Democratic Party Exhibit 267; Tr. of Mr.

Ellisor's Testimony at 40-41 (February 25, 1992).

The plaintiff's expert also had to concede that the makeup of primary electorates resulted in black voters having substantial impact upon the outcomes of Democratic primaries and general elections, even when black citizens made up only 20 percent of the population. Tr. of Dr. Loewen's Testimony at 133-136 (February 19, 1992). This fact is particularly significant, because many of the contested areas were located in heavily Democratic areas.

Indeed, the evidence indicated that in some contested areas, the plaintiffs were complaining about polarization in partisan terms, rather than in racial terms. Tr. of Dr. Arrington's Testimony at 69-72 (February 21, 1992). In fact, in one contested area, the SRAC's expert

admitted, a black candidate who was a Republican got a majority of the white vote but a minority of the black vote, while a white candidate who was a Democrat received a majority of the black vote but a minority of the white vote. Tr. of Dr. Ruoff's Testimony at 84-86 (February 19, 1992).

At the same time, the direct evidence presented by the plaintiffs' experts was conspicuously weak. Some of the experts were ignorant of the facts of numerous elections in South Carolina. E.g., Tr. of Dr. Loewen's Testimony at 73-75, 130-132 (February 19, 1992); Tr. of Dr. Arrington's Testimony at 63, 69, 71 (February 21, 1992); Tr. of Dr. Ruoff's Testimony at 74-78 (February 27, 1992). One expert based his analysis almost entirely on elections that occurred prior to 1980; he based his

conclusion concerning racial polarization in the 1980's on elections in three state senate districts in 1984. Two of those seats were later won by black candidates who defeated white candidates, and one of those seats was the subject of a Section 2 challenge where the District Court expressly found that there was no Section 2 violation and that blacks in that district had an equal opportunity to elect representatives of their choice. Tr. of Dr. Loewen's Testimony at 73-75 (February 19, 1992); NAACP v. Democratic Party, supra; Tr. of Dr. Ruoff's Testimony at 65-66 (February 19, 1992); Tr. of Mr. River's Testimony at 147-148 (February 27, 1988). Another expert was extremely selective in his choice of elections; for example, he chose only 12 local primaries during the entire decade on which to base his conclusions, and 6

of those were located in only 3 districts. Tr. of Dr. Arrington's Testimony at 66-67 (February 21, 1992).

The selectivity of his approach was underscored by the fact that he based conclusions on a study of the outcome of the 1990 gubernatorial general election. That was an election in which the Democratic nominee, a black state senator, was challenging Gov. Carroll Campbell, an incumbent with high standing in the polls, millions of dollars in campaign funds, and the active support of the President. Tr. of Dr. Arrington's Testimony at 61 (February 21, 1992). At the same time, the expert did not consider the results of the Democratic primary, where the black Democratic nominee had overwhelmingly defeated another state senator, who was white, in a primary electorate that was 57% white.

Tr. of Dr. Arrington's Testimony at 68-69 (February 21, 1992). As one of the Judges commented during the trial concerning this testimony: "I have serious questions with his basis or his selectivity in statistics." Tr. of Dr. Arrington's Testimony at 179 (February 27, 1992).

Further, the evident weakness of the plaintiffs' evidence was underscored by the fact that the SRAC strenuously opposed the admission into evidence of an exhibit that presented a study of numerous elections in South Carolina -- an exhibit prepared by the SRAC's own expert and presented with an exhibit sticker to the defendants by the SRAC itself. Tr. of Dr. Ruoff's Testimony at 68-69, 93-95 (February 19, 1992). The elections surveyed by the SRAC expert included many where black candidates had

won in majority white districts or where white candidates had attracted sizeable black support. That exhibit, along with the admissions of the plaintiffs' experts on cross-examination, undermined the plaintiffs' claims that black voters in South Carolina during the 1980's and 1990's could participate equally in the electoral process only when extensively gerrymandered, supermajority black districts were created.

In sum, the District Court went further than the evidence required in order to design districting plans that recognized and furthered the voting rights of black South Carolinians. The appellants' only complaint is that the District Court did not adopt wholesale their extreme plans containing districts that were gerrymandered with only the appellants' aims in mind.

2. Review by this Court now is premature and unnecessary, because the District Court adopted only an interim plan.

The District Court's decision put in place only an interim plan. It is subject to change by the Legislature, and any legislative plan will be subject to Section 5 review. As explained above, in 1984 the Legislature adopted a state Senate plan that was reviewed under Section 5 after a court-ordered interim plan had been issued.

As important, an interested party with standing is free to bring an appropriate Section 2 challenge to the interim plan after the 1992 elections. Democratic and Republican primaries have been held under the new plan, and the general election is only a month away. The District Court was careful to provide that its Order did not have res judicata

effect. App. 42. Any appropriate Section 2 challenge in the future will have the benefit of complete discovery, the results of the 1992 elections, and a trial presenting extensive evidence under Section 2 in light of actual election returns. Review by this Court now is not only a waste of this Court's resources, it would be premature until a full Section 2 challenge is before the Court.

3. The District Court took Section 2 into account.

In fact, the District Court spent a substantial portion of its opinion explaining Section 2 concerns and detailing how it took them into account. App. 31-57. The District Court was faced with the exigencies of crafting an interim redistricting plan in time for summer primaries and a fall general

election. In fact, the Court had already postponed the filing dates, which had been scheduled for March and April, until June and the primary date, which had been scheduled for early June, until August 25. Because of the legislative timetable and the Governor's veto, the Court had very little time to deal with the complexities of redrawing the entire state for all three plans. Nevertheless, the Court expressly drew its plan to comply with the basic requirements of Section 2. App. 45-47; 56-57. The Court merely recognized the limitations of time and the unavoidable fact that it had to apply Section 2 in designing electoral maps that had not yet been put in place, rather than in reviewing an existing electoral map with the benefit of actual election results and a history of political campaigns.

In reality, the appellants are complaining that the Court gave interested parties two chances to present Section 2 issues to the federal courts. The District Court let the appellants present all the evidence they brought forward that bore on Section 2; none of the appellants' proffered evidence was excluded. The Court considered all that evidence in drawing the interim plans. In a subsequent Section 2 challenge, appropriate parties also can present whatever admissible evidence they may want a Court to consider. The District Court has done everything possible to ensure that reapportionment in South Carolina has the maximum possible review under Section 2.

CONCLUSION

There are no substantial issues presented by these appeals. The District Court protected the voting rights of black South Carolinians; the District Court fashioned interim plans only, plans that are subject to subsequent judicial challenge and/or legislative revision; and the District Court applied Section 2 in designing its plans. Any further action by this Court now would be unnecessarily disruptive and waste the time and resources of this Court and the litigants.

Therefore, the Democratic Party asks that the Court dismiss the appeals or, in the alternative, summarily affirm the District Court's judgment.

Respectfully submitted,

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

(4) (3)

Nos. 92-155 and 92-219

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IN THE

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OCTOBER TERM, 1992

STATEWIDE REAPPORTIONMENT ADVISORY COMMITTEE, *et al.*,

Appellants,

v.

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Appellees.

CARROLL A. CAMPBELL, JR.,

Appellant,

v.

NICK THEODORE, *et al.*,

Appellees.

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina

---

MOTION OF APPELLEE LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR NICK THEODORE TO DISMISS OR AFFIRM

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October 1992

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QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Is this appeal from the three-judge district court's order fashioning interim redistricting plans moot when the election for which the plans were fashioned has taken place and the state legislature has an opportunity to enact its own plans in the two to four years before the next elections take place?

2. Should this Court summarily affirm the district court's interim redistricting plans for a state legislature when (a) the plans previously in effect were approved by the Justice Department and the courts as consistent with the Voting Rights Act and (b) although the black percentage of the state's population has declined since the previous plans were approved, the district court's plans enhance the opportunity for black citizens to participate in the political process and elect representatives of their choice by increasing the number of black majority districts as well as the concentration of black citizens within many of those districts?

3. Did the district court abuse its discretion in formulating, in time for impending elections, interim redistricting plans for a state legislature that (a) contain only *de minimis* variation from population equality, (b) do not diminish, and in fact enhance, minority voting opportunity from the plans previously in effect, (c) apply the substantive standards of both Sections 2 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act, and (d) honor well-established state policies of respecting county lines and political subdivisions, preserving communities of interest through geographical compactness and contiguity, and maintaining constituent-representative relations?

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IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1992

Nos. 92-155 and 92-219

STATEWIDE REAPPORTIONMENT ADVISORY COMMITTEE, *et al.*,

Appellants,

v.

NICK THEODORE, *et al.*,

Appellees.

CARROLL A. CAMPBELL, JR.,

Appellant,

v.

NICK THEODORE, *et al.*,

Appellees.

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina

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MOTION OF APPELLEE LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR NICK THEODORE TO DISMISS OR AFFIRM

Appellee Nick Theodore, Lieutenant Governor of the State of South Carolina ("Lieutenant Governor"), submits this motion to dismiss the above-captioned appeals or, in the alternative, to affirm summarily the judgment of the court below.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

Pertinent constitutional and statutory provisions are included in the appendices to the jurisdictional statements filed by the Statewide Reapportionment Advisory Com-

mittee ("SRAC") and by Carroll Campbell, the Governor of South Carolina ("Governor"). (The appendix to SRAC's Jurisdictional Statement is referred to herein as "App.")

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. *Introduction*

These cases are appeals from the order of a three-judge district court implementing judicially-fashioned, interim redistricting plans for the South Carolina General Assembly. The 1990 census revealed that South Carolina's existing legislative districts no longer were constitutionally permissible under the "one-person, one-vote" principle. The General Assembly embarked on the task of redistricting, but the political process became deadlocked. The three-judge district court concluded that, as a result of the legislative impasse, "no plans could be enacted and properly precleared through the United States Department of Justice in time to hold regularly scheduled elections." App. 14. In order to assure that constitutional elections can be held in 1992—when the entire General Assembly is up for re-election—the three-judge court, rejecting the various plans proposed by the parties, formulated and imposed its own redistricting plans "as an interim remedy." App. 12.

B. *The Legislative Districts Existing In 1990*

The South Carolina General Assembly is divided into a 46-member Senate and a 124-member House of Representatives ("House"). Senators are elected to four-year terms and House members are elected to two-year terms. S.C. Const. art. III, §§ 2, 3, 6. The General Assembly was last redistricted in the wake of the 1980 census.

The existing boundaries of the House districts were enacted into law by the General Assembly in 1981 and were precleared by the Justice Department under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1988) ("Act"), in time for the 1982 House election. The 1981 House redistricting plan has never been challenged under Section 2 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1988), and re-

mained in effect through the most recent House election in 1990. App. 70.

In 1983 the General Assembly enacted a Senate redistricting plan, and the State of South Carolina filed a declaratory judgment action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia seeking preclearance under Section 5. *South Carolina v. United States*, 589 F. Supp. 757 (D.D.C. 1984). When it became apparent that the District of Columbia court could not act in time for the 1984 Senate election, a three-judge district court in South Carolina formulated and imposed an interim redistricting plan. *Graham v. South Carolina*, Civ. No. 3:84-1430-15 (D.S.C. July 31, 1984), *appeal dismissed for lack of jurisdiction sub nom., NAACP v. Daniel*, 469 U.S. 1101 (1985). Subsequent to the court's order, the General Assembly adopted and the Governor signed into law a legislative redistricting plan for the Senate. This plan was then precleared by the Justice Department. Accordingly, the three-judge court vacated its interim plan and the legislative plan went into effect. *Id.*, Order filed August 13, 1984. In November 1984, an action was filed challenging the legislatively-enacted Senate plan under Section 2 on a state-wide basis; the plaintiffs consented, however, to dismissal of the complaint with prejudice. *NAACP v. South Carolina*, Civ. No. 3:84-2865-8 (D.S.C. May 29, 1986).[1] The 1984 Senate plan thus remained in effect through the most recent Senate election in 1988.[2]

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[1] In addition, a Section 2 action was instituted challenging a special election in one of the black majority Senate districts established in the 1984 legislative plan. After a full bench trial, the district court ruled that Section 2 had not been violated, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed. *NAACP v. South Carolina Democratic Party*, Civ. No. 3:88-2492-2 (D.S.C. Feb. 29, 1989), *aff'd mem.*, 898 F.2d 146 (5th Cir. 1990).

[2] In March 1982, a three-judge district court drew interim Congressional districts in time for the 1982 election. *South Carolina State Conf. of Branches of NAACP v. Riley*, 533 F. Supp. 1178 (D.S.C. 1982). The General Assembly never passed its own plan and the court's plan remained in effect for subsequent congressional elections through 1990. App. 6.

At the time the 1984 Senate plan was put into effect, the majority of total population ("TOP") in ten of the 46 Senate districts was black, with those majorities ranging from 50.23% to 63.24% of total population. The majority of voting age population ("VAP") in seven of those Senate districts was black, ranging from 50.53% to 59.15%. Under the 1981 House plan, 26 of the 124 legislative districts had black majorities of total population (ranging from 50.12% to 73.64%), and 20 districts had black majorities of voting age population (ranging from 51.23% to 68.88%). App. 27-28 n.34.

C. *The Redistricting Process After The 1990 Census*

The 1990 census, issued in March 1991, reflected an increase in South Carolina's total population from 1980 to 1990, as well as a shifting of population within the state. App. 6. The total number of black South Carolinians increased, but the black percentage of total population decreased from 30.38% in 1980 to 29.82% in 1990. App. 65. The black percentage of voting age population also decreased, from 27.3% to 26.9%. SRAC Juris. St. at 5. The ten black majority Senate districts experienced a net loss in population due to these demographic changes. App. 65-66. The number of black majority TOP House districts decreased, for the same reasons, from its original 26 to 24, although the number of black majority VAP districts increased from 20 to 21. App. 71.[3] The district court found that these "demographic changes in South Carolina's majority black districts are wholly unrelated to the representation provided" or other racial issues. App. 66. Rather, "the changes are indicative of a general movement away from urban and rural areas to suburban and resort areas." *Id.*

The 1990 census also demonstrated that the House and Senate districts had become unconstitutionally mal-

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[3] The term "black majority TOP district" refers to a district where the majority of the total population is black. The term "black majority VAP district" refers to a district where the majority of the voting age population is black.

apportioned. Using 1990 census data, the 1984 Senate plan was shown to have a total deviation from the ideal population of 63.15%, and the 1981 House plan a total deviation of 113.86%. The 1982 Congressional plan had a total deviation of 8.33%. App. 6 & n. 13. Accordingly, the General Assembly began an effort to pass redistricting legislation. It was unable to do so during the 1990-91 Legislative Session, which adjourned *sine die* on June 6, 1991. App. 7.

D. *Proceedings In The District Court*

On October 4, 1991, the Republican Party filed a complaint alleging deadlock in the South Carolina General Assembly and requesting the court to reapportion the South Carolina Senate, House, and Congressional districts. *Burton v. Sheheen*, Civ. No. 3:91-2983-1 (D.S.C.). On October 31, 1991, SRAC filed a similar complaint. *SRAC v. Campbell*, Civ. No. 3:91-3310-1 (D.S.C.).[4] A three-judge court was designated pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (1988), and the cases were consolidated.[5]

Motions were filed, claiming that judicial intervention was not yet warranted because the General Assembly might yet successfully enact redistricting plans when the

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[4] The defendants in these cases included the Governor, Lieutenant Governor (who is President of the Senate), the Speaker of the House, and the Executive Director of the Election Commission. The state Senate, the Democratic Party and various individuals (in private and governmental capacities) were subsequently permitted to intervene as parties or participate as *amicus curiae*.

[5] A third case, *Blanton v. Campbell*, Civ. No. 2:91-3635-1 (D.S.C.), primarily involved allegations that the South Carolina county delegation system of government violated the United States Constitution and the Voting Rights Act. That case was consolidated with the other two. *See* App. 9 & n.20. The issues not disposed of by the three-judge court were deconsolidated by the court in its May 1, 1992 order and assigned to a single district judge for resolution. Issues regarding the county delegation process are not involved in the instant appeals.

legislature reconvened in January 1992. App. 10. In fact, upon reconvening, the General Assembly did pass House and Senate redistricting plans. On January 29, 1992, however, the Governor vetoed both plans, and the vetoes were sustained. App. 10-11. The court then set the case for trial beginning February 18, 1992. App. 11.

At trial, the parties stipulated that population shifts as reflected by the 1990 census had resulted in unconstitutional malapportionment of the existing districts. All parties agreed that as a result of such malapportionment, those plans should not and could not be implemented for the upcoming elections. Instead, the parties presented their own proposed plans. Confronted with the complexity of the parties' computer-generated plans and the likelihood of being required to draw its own plans, the court appointed as technical advisor to the court the Director of the Division of Research and Statistical Services of the State Budget and Control Board.

The court received evidence in three phases relating, respectively, to the Senate, House, and Congressional plans. In order to expedite the proceeding, expert testimony received in one trial was allowed to be incorporated by reference in subsequent trials. During the first day of testimony, the court expressed concern over the relevance of the evidence being presented by SRAC and the Republican Party relating principally to the history of discriminatory voting practices in South Carolina. The court requested the parties to address the relevance of Section 2 to the issues in the case. Nonetheless, the court heard or admitted evidence on all the points on which plaintiffs wished to introduce evidence.

The facts on which the court based its conclusion were extensive and vigorously disputed by the parties in live testimony, including conflicting and hotly contested expert testimony. Although SRAC contends that "[t]he evidence of political cohesiveness and racial block voting was extensive, and was unrebutted," SRAC Juris. St. at 6, in fact, the testimony of plaintiffs' "experts" was

shown on cross examination to be highly selective and misleading. One of their statistical experts admitted, for example, that his analysis ended with elections in 1984 and that he was unaware of the many examples cited to him of black candidates' successes in elections after that year. Tr. at 10, 73-77 (testimony of James W. Loewen, Feb. 19, 1992). Moreover, his testimony regarding Senate district was based largely on multi-member districts, since 1984 was the first year in which Senate elections made use of single-member districts. *Id.* at 58-59. Another of plaintiffs' statistician's data were shown to be misleading in the use of selective rounding of numbers to arrive at nonexistent and meaningless distinctions among the plans. Tr. at 46-47, 54-55 (testimony of Theodore S. Arrington, Feb. 21, 1992). He too admitted that his figures did not reflect the many examples of black electoral success that undermined his conclusions. *Id.* at 63-69. In fact, the evidence was replete with instances of black electoral successes, including successes in majority white districts, as well as instances of white electoral successes in majority black districts.[6] The court made clear from the bench that even if it treated Section 2 in the manner urged by SRAC and the Republican Party, the proof offered by their experts fell far short of meeting their burden.

E. *The District Court's Analysis*

The three-judge court concluded that none of the redistricting plans proposed by the parties "fully comports with the objectives and criteria which should be incorporated in a judicially approved plan." App. 12. The court thus drew its own plans "as an interim remedy." *Id.* In fashioning its plans, the court observed that redistricting is, "first and foremost, a state legislative responsibility rather than a federal judicial task." App. 13. The court thus recognized that it "possesses no distinctive mandate to com-

[6] A more detailed discussion of the evidence relating to black electoral successes and expert testimony, including examples of the inadequacies of appellants' expert witness' testimony, is contained in the Motion To Dismiss or Affirm filed in this case by the Democratic Party of South Carolina.

promise potentially conflicting state redistricting policies in the people's name," and that it must therefore try to achieve the goal of population equality with only *de minimis* variation. App. 20. For the same reason, the court ruled that "in fashioning interim relief where state political actors have failed to produce redistricting plans, this court . . . 'should follow the policies and preferences of the State . . . whenever adherence to state policy does not detract from the requirements of the Federal Constitution.'" App. 14 (quoting *White v. Weiser*, 412 U.S. 783, 795 (1973)).

In formulating its interim plans, the court gave principal consideration to the requirements and standards of the Voting Rights Act. The court noted that Section 5 and its preclearance requirement did not directly apply because the court was drawing its own plans. The court recognized, however, that it must consider whether its plans have a discriminatory or "retrogressive" effect, *i.e.*, whether the plans cause a diminution in minority voting opportunity from what it had been under the previous plans. App. 26. In making this determination, the court applied the case law and Justice Department regulations under Section 5. *See* App. 25-31, 39-42.[7]

The court also considered Section 2 of the Act. The court held that while it was not required to "completely graft the tests and requirements of § 2, including the searching evidentiary requirements," to its formulation of an interim plan, it nonetheless should adopt a plan that "comport[s] with the standards and guidelines of § 2," including those set out in *Thornburg v. Gingles*, 478 U.S.

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[7] For example, the district court looked to the principles developed in *City of Lockhart v. United States*, 460 U.S. 125 (1983); *Upham v. Seamon*, 456 U.S. 37 (1982); *McDaniel v. Sanchez*, 452 U.S. 130 (1981); *Wise v. Lipscomb*, 437 U.S. 535 (1978); *Beer v. United States*, 425 U.S. 130 (1976); *Kirkpatrick v. Preisler*, 394 U.S. 526 (1969); various other Supreme Court and lower court cases; and the Justice Department preclearance regulations, 28 C.F.R. Part 51 (1991).

30 (1986), and its lower court progeny. App. 38. *See* App. 31-57. The court explained that,

> with the goal of providing minorities with an equal opportunity to elect the representatives of their choice in mind, we have analyzed the proposed plans as well as the plans we adopt today based on the following factors: 1) the extent to which the plans proposed and the plans adopted are consistent with the retrogression standard set forth in *Beer* and *City of Lockhart*; 2) the extent to which reasonable [sic] compact and contiguous majority black districts were and could be drawn; 3) the extent to which the minority group is politically cohesive; 4) the extent to which racially polarized voting patterns exist; 5) the extent to which the lines which have been drawn limit the number of majority-black single-member districts in light of the expressed state policies of the State of South Carolina. . . . This approach allows the court to formulate a plan which is consistent not only with the provisions of § 5, but insures that the court's plan will not violate the threshold requirements for liability under § 2.

App. 46-47.

Finally, the court emphasized that "[u]nlike the parties," it "is not free to impose a particular political or racial agenda upon the state. The court must, as a court of equity, remedy the constitutional deficiencies of the current plan with due deference for state policies." App. 75 (footnote omitted). The court thus formulated a redistricting plan that it found

> achieves the proper balance between drawing districts of equal population, recognizing concentrations of black voters, and giving effect to current state policy respecting the redistricting process and avoiding the "political thicket" that arises in pitting large numbers of incumbents against one another.

Id.

F. *The District Court's Interim Plans*

1. *Senate.* The court's plan for Senate districts has a total population deviation of 1.95%, which the court

found to be *de minimis*. App. 61. Looking to the state policy of respecting county lines, the court's plan contains only 30 "excess" county-line cuts.[8] Similarly, the court's plan splits only 49 precinct lines, thereby minimizing voter confusion and administrative inconvenience. App. 63-64.

The court's plan demonstrably improves minority political opportunity in light of the intervening population shifts. Even though the black percentage of total population and voting age population had decreased in South Carolina during the previous decade, the interim plan *increases* the number of black majority TOP and VAP districts:

	Court Plan	1984 Plan/ 1980 Census Data	1984 Plan/ 1990 Census Data
Black Majority TOP Districts	11	10	10
Black Majority VAP Districts	10	7	9

Similarly, black population concentrations—in terms of black percentage of both TOP and VAP—increase in most of those districts. *See* App. 66-68.

The court rejected all the plans proposed by the parties, including the Governor, the Lieutenant Governor, SRAC, the Republican Party and the Senate. The court found, for example, that the plans proposed by the Governor and Republican Party, while having insignificantly lower population deviations than the court's plan, did not respect county lines (52 and 56 excess cuts versus 30 under the court's plan) or precinct lines (122 and 144 cuts versus 49 under the court's plan). App. 61-64. One Republican-proposed district, for example, stretched for 100 miles, cutting into seven counties, and included disparate urban and rural communities. App. 63-64. Thus, the court found that its plan achieved compactness and contiguity and protected the state's established communi-

[8] "Excess" county cuts are those which are not necessary to meet population equality requirements. *See* App. 62-63.

ties of interest better than the other proposed plans. App. 63.

2. *House.* The court's House redistricting plan has a total population deviation of 1.98%. App. 72. Again, the plan increases the number of black majority districts, despite the decrease in relative black population:

	Court Plan	1981 Plan/ 1980 Census Data	1981 Plan/ 1990 Census Data
Black Majority TOP Districts	28	26	24
Black Majority VAP Districts	23	20	21

The percentage black TOP and VAP majorities under the court's interim plan are higher in many districts than under the 1981 plan. App. 71. The court's plan honors state policy by limiting the number of excess county cuts to 20. App. 73.

Again, the court rejected all party-proposed plans. In particular, the court rejected SRAC's, the Republican Party's and the Governor's proposed House plans because, while those plans created a greater number of black majority districts, they did so by "throw[ing] all consideration of state policy of recognizing county lines to the wind," *id.*, and by flouting the requirements of compactness and contiguity. One SRAC-proposed district, for example, "[w]ith no apparent purpose other than capturing as many black persons . . . as possible . . . starts near the northwestern corner of [Horry] county and runs in a thin, snaking line back and forth across the county, ending at the southern end of the county." App. 78. One Republican-proposed district was composed of "fractions of three counties and three towns," with "no demonstrated cohesiveness." App. 77. The court found that appellants "seek[] the imprimatur of the court upon the elimination of house incumbents to suit the sponsoring party's political purpose, *i.e.*, the Republican Party and the Governor appear to seek to eliminate

Democrats and the SRAC appears to seek to eliminate incumbents because of their race." App. 74.

3. *Congress.* The court's interim plan for South Carolina's six Congressional districts has a total population deviation of zero, and splits only 13 counties. App. 81, 84. The plan also creates a black majority district, unlike the old 1982 plan. App. 82-83. The court's Congressional plan is not being challenged in the present appeals.

ARGUMENT

I. THE APPEALS SHOULD BE DISMISSED AS MOOT BECAUSE THE ELECTION WILL HAVE TAKEN PLACE BEFORE THIS COURT CAN REVIEW THE CASE

These appeals are from an interim order establishing legislative districts for the purpose of the 1992 elections and until the South Carolina legislature adopts approved redistricting plans. The primary election was conducted on August 25, 1992, using the district court's redistricting plans. The general election is scheduled for November 3, 1992. Significantly, the appellants have not sought to stay the election or to expedite these appeals. If the Court were to note probable jurisdiction, briefing and argument in the case would not be completed until well into 1993, and the case would not likely be decided until the Spring of 1993. Under such circumstances, where the requested relief would be moot when rendered, dismissal is appropriate.

1. The district court clearly intended its plans to function solely as interim measures, stating that "[i]t is our hope that the General Assembly and the Governor will work together and fashion acceptable plans. In the interim, these are the plans for the South Carolina Senate, House of Representatives and the United States Congressional Districts." App. 85-86. Because the disputed plans are designed only for two elections, one past and one to occur even before briefing in this case is complete, this Court should not expend its limited resources crafting a decision that may have no practical effect. This Court

in the past, when faced with the necessity of deciding appeals regarding an election after the disputed election has been conducted, has concluded that the issue is moot and dismissed the cases. *See, e.g., Harris v. City of Birmingham*, 112 S. Ct. 2896 (1992) (mem.), *vacating as moot, Greene County Racing Comm'n v. City of Birmingham*, 772 F. Supp. 1207 (1991); *Watkins v. Mabus*, 112 S. Ct. 412 (1991) (mem.) *aff'g in part, vacating as moot in part*, 771 F. Supp. 789 (S.D. Miss.); *Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers*, 440 U.S. 173, 187-88 (1979).

This is not a case where it is "reasonable to expect that the same controversy will recur between these two parties, yet evade meaningful judicial review." *Meyer v. Grant*, 486 U.S. 414, 417 n.2 (1988). *See DeFunis v. Odegaard*, 416 U.S. 312, 318-19 (1974). If history is any guide, South Carolina may well enact legislative plans, which would be subject to challenge under Sections 2 and 5 of the Act. In 1984, for example, shortly after the district court imposed an interim redistricting plan for the Senate, the General Assembly enacted a plan for the Senate, which the Governor promptly signed and the Justice Department precleared. *See* p. 3, *supra*. If legislative plans are implemented, they will replace the district court's interim plans at issue in this case, and this Court's review of the interim plans will have been futile and of no practical consequence: an advisory opinion. Those legislative plans, of course, would be subject to challenge under Section 2—as, indeed, the 1984 legislative Senate plan was challenged (albeit unsuccessfully) under Section 2. *See* p. 3, *supra*.

Alternatively, if it becomes apparent as the 1994 House elections and 1996 Senate elections approach that the political process remains deadlocked, a timely challenge can then be brought to the district court's plans, which at that time will no longer be "interim." Such a challenge would have the benefit of concrete, district-by-district evidence derived from the 1992 election regarding racial polarization, political cohesiveness and other Section 2

factors. *See Gingles*, 478 U.S. at 59, 80 (analysis of vote dilution must be district specific). At the present time, by contrast, the evidence on these issues necessarily is abstract and speculative.

If the legislature enacts its own plans, or if any voting rights deficiency in the district court's plans emerges from the 1992 election, "there is no reason to suppose" that a future Section 2 challenge to redistricting in South Carolina "will not come with relative speed to this Court." *DeFunis*, 416 U.S. at 319.

2. In addition to the usual constitutional and prudential concerns that are raised by a claim of mootness, another factor should play an important role in the Court's decision. This Court has "repeatedly held that redistricting and reapportioning legislative bodies is a legislative task which the federal courts should make every effort not to pre-empt." *Wise*, 437 U.S. at 539 (citing *Connor v. Finch*, 431 U.S. 407, 414-15 (1977)); *see also McDaniel*, 452 U.S. at 138; *Chapman v. Meier*, 420 U.S. 1, 27 (1975). Although the district court found it necessary to impose court-ordered redistricting plans for the 1992 election, it noted that "this court was called upon to perform a task that all concede is most properly a legislative one." App. 85.

Therefore, the General Assembly, as newly constituted after the November election, and the Governor should be accorded the opportunity to draft constitutional redistricting plans, as they did in 1984 subsequent to the court's imposition of an interim plan. Certainly this Court, in the absence of a request from appellants for exigent relief, should avoid the "political thicket" of the redistricting process unless and until it must.

II. THE JUDGMENT BELOW SHOULD BE AFFIRMED BECAUSE THE APPEAL PRESENTS NO SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES

Apart from the procedural reasons to dismiss, it is apparent that plenary review is unwarranted on the facts presented, and that affirmance on the merits would be

appropriate. The district court's interim plans raise no significant issues of racial voting equity—the interest at the core of Voting Rights Act litigation. In fact, the district court's plans so clearly protect minority voting rights that this Court should endeavor to dispose of these appeals before November 3 so as to remove from the election any cloud of the claims of racial unfairness.

Under this Court's precedents, the district court's interim plans must be viewed against South Carolina's districting plans in effect immediately prior to the implementation of the court's plans. *City of Lockhart*, 460 U.S. at 132, 134; *see Beer*, 425 U.S. at 141-42; *Perkins v. Matthews*, 400 U.S. 379, 394 (1971); *see also* 28 C.F.R. § 51.54(b)(1) (1991). The three-judge court's plans in this case *increase* the voting strength of South Carolina's black population compared to the districting plans previously in effect—plans that were federally approved as consistent with the Voting Rights Act under the 1980 census figures.[9] Given that the number of blacks as a percentage of South Carolina's total and voting age population has declined since the previous plans were implemented, *see* p. 4, *supra*, it cannot credibly be argued that the court's interim plans violate the Act.

The Senate and House districting plans implemented after the 1980 census were found, at the time of implementation, to comply with the Constitution and the Voting Rights Act. The 1981 House plan and 1984 Senate plan both were precleared by the Department as consistent with Section 5. The Justice Department said, in approv-

[9] The effectiveness of the district court's interim plans in protecting minority electoral opportunities was confirmed in the June primary elections. Black candidates were elected in 18 House districts, and 15 of these candidates are running unopposed in the November elections. Black candidates were elected in 7 Senate districts, and 6 of these candidates are running unopposed. Office of the Clerk, South Carolina House of Representatives, *Blacks Offering for Election to the General Assembly* (1992-93). Presently, there are 14 blacks serving in the House and 6 serving in the Senate. Office of the Clerk, South Carolina House of Representatives, *Legislative Black Caucus* (Feb. 1, 1992).

ing the Senate plan, that the plan "will afford to black citizens a fair opportunity to participate in the political process and elect candidates of their choice to office." Letter from Department of Justice dated August 10, 1984 (attached to order of August 13, 1984 in *Graham*). This language, of course, tracks the requirements of Section 2. No successful Section 2 judicial challenges have been made to these state-wide plans in the decade they have been in effect. To the contrary: the only two Section 2 challenges to the Senate plan were decidedly unsuccessful, one having been abandoned by the plaintiffs and one having been rejected by the courts. *See* p. 3 & n.1, *supra*.

Against this background of districting plans that had been established as lawful under the 1980 census, the three-judge court created interim plans that enhanced minority voting opportunity despite the population shifts that reduced the minority proportion of the state's population. Yet, the district court's interim plans increase, as compared to the prior plans, both the number of majority-black TOP and VAP Senate and House districts, *see* pp. 10-11, *supra*, and the average minority concentration of the Senate districts.[10]

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[10] The district court's Senate plan enhances black population concentrations in the black majority Senate districts. Based on comparison with 1980 census data, the proportion of blacks as a percentage of total population and as a percentage of voting age population increases under the district court's plan in *each* of the ten "original" black majority TOP districts, and the average TOP and VAP percentages increase from 56.41% to 59.45% TOP, and from 52.39% to 55.35% VAP. App. 68. Based on comparison with 1990 census data, the percentages of black total population increase in six of the ten "original" districts, and the overall average TOP and VAP percentages increase under the interim plan from 57.66% to 59.45% TOP, and from 53.76% to 55.35% VAP. App. 68. The increase in concentration, moreover, is not achieved at the cost of significantly reducing the size of black majorities in other districts. In three of the remaining districts, black TOP and VAP percentages decrease under the interim plan by concededly insignificant amounts (Districts 7, 39 and 40); in one district (District 42), black TOP decreases by 3.68% to 59.60% and black VAP decreases by 2.59% to 54.43%. App. 68. However, in each of these districts except District 40, the incumbent is black. App. 27 n.34.

A reapportionment plan that increases black voting strength as compared to an approved and lawful prior plan, particularly in light of declining proportions of total black population and voting age population within the state, cannot dilute or abridge the right to vote. As the Court observed in *Beer*, 425 U.S. at 141, "reapportionment that enhances the position of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise can hardly have the 'effect' of diluting or abridging the right to vote on account of race within the meaning" of Section 5. *See also City of Lockhart*, 460 U.S. at 135-36. The appellants' claims that the district court may have utilized standards or procedures that in certain subtle and technical ways allegedly are incorrect, therefore, essentially is academic. Such claims do not present a case deserving of plenary review.

Shorn of their spurious references to Voting Rights Act issues that may be presented in other cases but are not presented here (*see* pp. 22-23, *infra*), the essence of the appellants' complaint is that the district court should have adopted "better" plans, that is, plans that advanced one or another of the particular policies favored by the appellants, whose redistricting plans were not adopted by the court. This complaint is misdirected. As noted above, *see* p. 14, *supra*, redistricting is first and foremost a legislative task, which the courts should "make every effort not to pre-empt." *Wise*, 437 U.S. at 539. The court may not make decisions concerning "basic political policy," as these are the responsibility of the state legislature. *Seastrunk v. Burns*, 772 F.2d 143, 151 (5th Cir. 1985). The court below properly refused to be drawn into the role of a three-member super legislature.

III. THE JUDGMENT BELOW SHOULD BE AFFIRMED BECAUSE THE DISTRICT COURT APPLIED WELL-ESTABLISHED LEGAL CRITERIA AND DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN FORMULATING INTERIM REDISTRICTING PLANS

When a state legislature fails to establish a constitutional redistricting plan, a district court may, within

broad constitutional limits, formulate its own interim plan, as the court below did. *See Wise*, 437 U.S. at 540; *Connor*, 431 U.S. at 415; *White v. Weiser*, 412 U.S. at 794-95; *Ely v. Klahr*, 403 U.S. 108, 114-15 (1971). In reviewing such a plan, "[t]he essential question . . . is whether the District Court properly exercised its equitable discretion in reconciling the requirements of the Constitution with the goals of state political policy." *Connor*, 431 U.S. at 414. The exercise of that discretion is reversible only if it is abused. *See, e.g., East Carroll Parish Sch. Bd. v. Marshall*, 424 U.S. 636, 639 (1976); *Hecht Co. v. Bowles*, 321 U.S. 321, 328 (1944). Far from abusing its discretion, the court below painstakingly laid out the governing principles and carefully and thoughtfully applied them to the facts before it.

A. The District Court's Interim Redistricting Plans Are Consistent With Well-Established Legal Criteria

As this Court noted 15 years ago, "'[i]t can hardly be said that this Court has given no guidance of general applicability to a court confronted with the need to devise a legislative reapportionment plan when the state legislature has failed.'" *Connor*, 431 U.S. at 414; *see Seamon*, 456 U.S. at 41 (quoting *White v. Weiser*, 412 U.S. at 794-95). These principles are even better delineated today. In exercising its discretion to fashion a court-ordered redistricting plan, the district court should seek to devise a plan that minimizes deviation from the one person, one vote ideal. *Chapman v. Meier*, 420 U.S. at 26-27. The district court also should strive for racial fairness: the court-ordered plan must not be racially discriminatory in purpose or effect, *McDaniel*, 452 U.S. at 148, and it may not be retrogressive or dilutive in its effect on minority voting rights. *City of Lockhart*, 460 U.S. at 134; *Beer* 425 U.S. at 141. Equally important, in light of the federalism concerns inherent in court-ordered redistricting, a court-ordered plan must "follow the policies and preferences of the State . . . whenever adherence to state policy does not detract from the requirements of the Federal Constitution" and the Voting

Rights Act. *White v. Weiser*, 412 U.S. at 795; *see Seamon*, 456 U.S. at 41-43; *Whitcomb v. Chavis*, 403 U.S. 124, 160 (1970).

In rejecting the plans proposed by the parties and in fashioning its own interim plans, the district court properly applied these relevant legal principles. The court below declined to adopt party-proposed plans that it found were politically or racially motivated, and instead implemented plans that meet the constitutional objective of population equality, comply with the standards of the Voting Rights Act, and respect the policies of South Carolina to the extent not inconsistent with these other goals.

1. The district court crafted plans that are valid under the Equal Protection Clause since they provide for only *de minimis* population variance between districts. *See, e.g., Karcher v. Daggett*, 462 U.S. 725, 740 (1983). The appellants do not argue otherwise.[11]

2. The district court's plans also properly assure racial fairness. In formulating a redistricting plan, a district court is required to "follow the appropriate Section 5 standards, including the body of administrative and judicial precedents developed in Section 5 cases." *McDaniel*, 452 U.S. at 149 (quoting S. Rep. No. 94-295, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1975), *reprinted in* 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 774, 785). The court below did exactly as the law requires.[12]

[11] The district court's plan for the South Carolina Senate results in a total deviation range of 1.95 percent (App. 61); for the House, a range of 1.98 percent (App. 72); and for the Congress, a range of 0.0 percent (App. 81).

[12] In an effort to distract this Court, appellants wrench out of context the district court's references to the action before it as "Section 5 proceedings." SRAC Juris St. at 9; Gov. Juris. St. at 6. *See* App. 38. Appellants protest that this case was not brought under Section 5, and thus argue that the court below misunderstood what it was doing. This argument is a red herring. From the context of the district court's lengthy opinion, it is clear that the court understood and meant simply that it was applying Section 5 *standards*, as the law requires, not that the case was a formal Sec-

The essence of a Section 5 inquiry is a determination whether implementation of voting-procedure changes "would lead to a retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise." *Beer*, 425 U.S. at 141. The district court's interim plans do not simply avoid retrogression, but actually improve the opportunity for black citizens to elect representatives of their choice in both houses of the General Assembly. *See* p. 16, *supra*. A plan that enhances minority opportunity with respect to the effective exercise of the electoral franchise, as the district court's plans do, is not retrogressive within the meaning of Section 5. *Beer*, 425 U.S. at 141; *see also City of Lockhart*, 460 U.S. at 134 & n.10.

3. The district court recognized that it was required to follow the "policies and preferences" of the state, as expressed in the South Carolina Constitution and statutes and in the plans proposed by the state legislature, to the extent these were not inconsistent with other federal constitutional and statutory obligations. App. 14; *see Seamon*, 456 U.S. at 43; *White v. Weiser*, 412 U.S. at 795. The court found that South Carolina's strongest electoral policy is that of "maintaining the integrity of county boundaries in the redistricting process." App. 15-16. In addition, the court considered other legitimate state policies, including maintaining other "political subdivision lines, compactness, contiguity, recognition of historical boundaries, and protection of constituent representative relations." App. 62. *See also Connor*, 431 U.S. at 419; *Chapman v. Meier*, 420 U.S. at 22-23; *Karcher v. Daggett*, 462 U.S. at 740; *Swann v. Adams*, 385 U.S. 440, 444 (1967). As our description above of the district court opinion makes clear, the district court took all these factors into account. *See* pp. 7-12, *supra*.

The appellants take issue with the district court for giving too much deference to state policies. As shown

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tion 5 challenge to a plan that has not been pre-cleared. *See* App. 25. As discussed in the text, the court also applied Section 2 standards.

above, however, the court properly applied the principles of the Constitution and Voting Rights Act, including the critical principle that the court-ordered plans *must* adhere as closely as possible to the policies of the state. The court found that, unlike its own plans, the plans proposed by the appellants failed to "strike[] the proper balance between the various interests arising in this type of proceeding, including equality of population in districts, racial fairness, and maintenance of . . . South Carolina's political subdivisions and communities of interest." App. 69-70.

To maintain county boundaries, political subdivisions and geographical compactness and contiguity, the district court's Senate and House plans have far fewer excess county-line and precinct-line cuts than the plans proposed by SRAC, the Governor or the Republican Party. *See* App. 63-64; pp. 10-11, *supra*.[13] The district court found that its Senate plan allowed for more compact and contiguous districts than the appellants' plans, which the court considered overly violative of the state's political boundaries. App. 63. Similarly, the House plans proposed by the appellants "throw[] all consideration of the state policy of recognizing county lines to the wind." App. 73.

[13] The Governor's and Republican Party's Senate plans, for example, made 52 and 56 excess county-line cuts, respectively, while the court's made only 30; the Governor's Senate plan split 122 precinct lines and the Republican Party's split 144, while the court's plan splits only 49. App. 63-64. Similarly, the district court's House plan contains only 20 excess cuts in county lines, whereas the Governor's House plan made 38 and SRAC's House plan made 48 excess cuts in county lines. App. 73-74. Further, under the court's plan, only 29 House districts lie in 2 counties, 7 lie in 3 counties, and 2 lie in 4 counties. App. 73. The Governor's plan had 33 districts lying in 2 counties, 12 lying in 3 counties, 1 lying in 4 counties, and 1 lying in 5 counties. App. 74. Worse yet, SRAC's plan called for 34 districts to lie in 2 counties, 9 to lie in 3 counties, 6 to lie in 4 counties, and 3 to lie in 5 counties. App. 74. Appellants try to minimize before this court the importance of these factors, but one of SRAC's own expert witnesses testified below to the problem of disenfranchisement of voters caused by fragmentation, especially among blacks. Tr. at 30-32 (testimony of Theodore S. Arrington, Feb. 21, 1992).

The court found that the Governor's plan called for "splintering and splicing" of towns and counties, App. 78, and SRAC's plan split communities of interest to draw lines based solely on skin color. App. 78-79. The district court concluded that the appellants' plans fail "to suggest even a casual observance of South Carolina's traditional and legitimate policies." App. 65. Clearly, the district court's plans—which properly recognize that fragmentation of districts undermines the ability of constituencies to organize and increases voter confusion, App. 16 n.29—most adequately respected the policies of the state.[14]

Not surprisingly, there is an explanation for the line-drawing performed by the appellants: politics. The Republican Governor's Senate plan, for example, pitted ten incumbent Democratic senators against one another. App. 65 n.61. Regarding the proposed House plans, the district court observed that "the Republican Party and the Governor appear to seek to eliminate Democrats and the SRAC appears to seek to eliminate incumbents because of their race." App. 74. Promotion of such political or racial agendas are not properly advocated by the courts. Courts fashioning redistricting plans must act " 'circumspectly, and in a manner "free from any taint of arbitrariness or discrimination." ' " App. 14 (quoting *Connor*, 431 U.S. at 415 (quoting *Roman v. Sincock*, 377 U.S. 695, 710 (1964))). The district court was not free to impose its own political agenda, but was required to adhere to the guidelines laid down by this Court, which, as explained above, it carefully and reasonably did.

B. The District Court Properly Applied Section 2 In Fashioning Its Interim Plans

Appellants' principal objection to the district court's plans raises an issue not presented on this record: whether and to what extent a court-ordered interim plan must comply in all respects with Section 2. Appellants assert

[14] Further, the district court found SRAC's Senate plan, with a population deviation of 2.74%, to be "pushing the outer limits of the *de minimis* standard." App. 61 n.58.

that the court below, in fashioning interim plans, was required, but declined, to apply Section 2 as it has been interpreted by this and other courts in challenges to specific, existing election plans and practices. As we show below, even assuming that Section 2 applies to a court-ordered interim plan, the district court properly analyzed its plans under Section 2. It is thus not necessary to reach the question posed by appellants.

1. According to SRAC, the district court "did not undertake a meaningful analysis of minority vote dilution under Section 2 and *Thornburg v. Gingles*, . . . [but] [i]nstead, it applied the Section 5 retrogression standard of *Beer v. United States*." SRAC Juris. St. at 18. Similarly, the Governor complains that "the court below applied a 'retrogression' standard which purported to satisfy Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act." Gov. Juris. St. at 5. These assertions are simply wrong.

The district court's Order shows that, when considering the proposed plans and developing its own redistricting plans, the court carefully reviewed and applied Section 2, paying particular attention to this Court's decision in *Gingles*. Starting with the text of Section 2, the court noted that "Congress amended § 2 in 1982 to include a 'results,' or 'effects,' test to determine if racial vote dilution has occurred." App. 33. The district court observed this Court's admonition in *Gingles* that "'[t]he essence of a § 2 claim is that a certain electoral law, practice, or structure interacts with social and historical conditions to cause an inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by black and white voters to elect their preferred representatives.'" *Id.* (quoting *Gingles*, 478 U.S. at 47). Following *Gingles*, the district court considered the "'typical' factors which may be relevant to, and probative of, a § 2 claim," known as the "'Senate factors,'" App. 34 (quoting *Gingles*, 478 U.S. at 36-37). Having laid out the factors and principles underlying a Section 2 analysis as described in *Gingles*, App. 31-38, the district court then devoted approximately 20 pages to discussing how those factors and principles would be applied to provide

an appropriate remedy in this case, involving as it does single-member districts, App. at 38-57, and then another 27 pages applying those principles, App. 58-85. Unquestionably, the court tested its plans under the requirements of Section 2. *See* pp. 8-9, *supra*.

2. The appellants attempt to make much of the district court's statement that it would not "completely [incorporate] the tests and requirements of § 2" into this case. App. 38. The Governor complains, for example, that

> [t]he court below never articulated which "tests and requirements" it refused to apply. . . . Presumably, the court below was referring to the three-pronged *Gingles* test (a minority group must be sufficiently numerically large and geographically compact to constitute a single member district, be politically cohesive, and be otherwise unable to nominate and elect its preferred candidates due to white racial bloc voting) and the seven ["Senate factors"].

Gov. Juris. St. at 12 n.9. But the district court explicitly stated that it considered, *inter alia*:

> . . . 2) the extent to which reasonable [sic] compact and contiguous majority black districts were and could be drawn; 3) the extent to which the minority group is politically cohesive; 4) the extent to which racially polarized voting patterns exist . . . [and to the extent relevant the seven] Senate factors.

App. 46. Indeed, in his statement, the Governor appears to concede that the district court analyzed these factors. Gov. Juris. St. at 6. Thus, the district court did precisely what the Governor, in claiming that a proper Section 2 analysis had not been conducted, presumed the district court had not done.[15]

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[15] Appellants claim that the incorporation into Section 5 of Section 2, including all its procedural and evidentiary requirements, was effected by footnote 31 to the Senate Report, which states that "[i]n light of the amendments to § 2, it is intended that a § 5 objection follow if a new voting procedure itself so discriminates as to violate section 2." If anything, the footnote merely states that a violation of Section 2 establishes a violation of Section 5. Further, as the district court held, App. 45, it is highly doubtful

Furthermore, a reading of the district court's Order makes clear that the Section 2 "tests and requirements" the court declined to adopt were not the *substantive* standards of the statute, but rather all the procedural and evidentiary requirements set forth in *Gingles*, which was a challenge to an *existing* multi-member plan. The court below simply recognized that not all of those requirements could be applied wholesale to single member districts or to a case where the court was being asked to apply Section 2 in fashioning its own interim plans within a limited time prior to election.

The district court recognized, for example, that rules developed in challenges to specific, implemented plans may not work where the court is fashioning a new plan. The court noted that "in the context of this case, in which no less than five plans have been submitted for each political body, the burden of proof becomes more complex, especially if the whole of the results test is injected into the proceeding." App. 41. It can hardly have been an abuse of discretion, therefore, for the district court not to have adopted the precise rules governing burden of proof set out in *Gingles*.[16]

Similarly, no abuse of discretion is evident in the district court's judgment that time did not permit as "searching" a factual analysis as some courts engage in when addressing a Section 2 challenge to an existing plan or election practice.[17] The district court explained that the

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that Congress intended to amend Section 5 through a footnote to a report on Section 2. Similarly, the Justice Department regulation on which appellants rely—28 C.F.R. § 51.55(b)(2) (1991)—simply calls for Section 5 analyses of plans to consider the substantive standards of Section 2, as the court below did.

[16] As the legislative history of the 1982 amendment makes clear, "there is no requirement that any particular number of factors be proved, or that a majority of them point one way or the other." S. Rep. No. 97-417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1982), *reprinted in* 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 207.

[17] The district court also expressed concern about making a "blanket rule" that in cases of this type all the requirements of a

"filing dates and primaries ha[d] already been postponed once," and that imposing a full Section 2 evidentiary burden as to "each proposed plan in this case would have been staggering and would likely still be ongoing." App. 44. If courts faced with the exigent circumstances of impending elections were required to engage in protracted proceedings and make lengthy factual findings, their ability to rule expeditiously would be undermined. The appellants' rigid view of Section 2 evidentiary requirements is not consistent with the flexibility normally accorded a court when fashioning equitable relief in exigent circumstances. *See, e.g., Seamon*, 456 U.S. at 44.

Appellants were not prejudiced by the procedure they now attack. During the three-week trial, the district court allowed ample opportunity for submission of evidence that might assist in its Section 2 analysis. The district court admitted *all* the documentary evidence submitted by the parties, and permitted SRAC's and the Governor's witnesses to testify regarding the history of discrimination in South Carolina and any other Section 2 factor they wished to address. Indeed, in its jurisdictional statement, SRAC notes that the "SRAC and *Burton* plaintiffs submitted substantial evidence of the factors deemed probative of minority vote dilution identified in *Thornburg v. Gingles* . . . and the ['Senate factors']." SRAC Juris. St. at 5. SRAC goes on to discuss the evidence submitted relevant to the "Senate factors," including expert witness testimony, statistical analyses, and other documentary evidence. *Id.* at 5-8. It is hard to imagine, and the appellants fail to make clear, what the district court could have done to make its analysis more "meaningful." [18]

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formal Section 2 inquiry apply, for fear that after its implementation, the plan would then be protected from a subsequent Section 2 challenge by the principles of *res judicata*. App. 42.

[18] Indeed, in a recently filed petition for a writ of certiorari seeking review of a court-ordered plan, the petitioners cited the South Carolina district court's handling of this issue as exemplary. *See* Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, at 12-13, *Loeper v. Mitchell*, No. 91-2015 (filed June 8, 1992).

3. Stripped of its rhetorical baggage, the essence of appellants' claim is that Section 2 required the district court to create a greater number of black majority districts and to gerrymander those districts such that they contain black super majorities of at least 57% TOP. SRAC Juris. St. at 20, 25-26; Gov. Juris. St. at 19-20. No constitutional or statutory basis exists for either contention, as the district court correctly held. In exercising its discretion, the court was not bound by rigid requirements regarding numbers and percentages. It was, rather, required to act reasonably to formulate districts that were non-discriminatory, non-retrogressive and non-dilutive, and that honored state policies.

There is no constitutional or statutory requirement to maximize the number of majority-black districts. Certainly Section 5 imposes no such requirement.[19] Neither does Section 2. In enacting the 1982 amendment to the Voting Rights Act, Congress sought to change the result of this Court's holding in *Mobile v. Bolden*, 446 U.S. 55 (1980), that Section 2 required a showing of discriminatory intent. The 1982 amendments were intended simply to "'restore the pre-*Mobile* [*v. Bolden*] legal standard which governed cases challenging election systems or practices as an illegal dilution of the minority vote.'" principally the standards set forth in *White v. Regester*, 412 U.S. 755 (1973), and its progeny. *Chisom v. Roemer*, 111 S. Ct. 2354, 2363 n.21 (1991) (quoting S. Rep. No. 97-

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[19] *See City of Lockhart*, 460 U.S. at 134; *Beer*, 425 U.S. at 140-41; *Perkins*, 400 U.S. 379; *Terrazas v. Slagle*, 789 F. Supp. 828 (W.D. Tex. 1991), *aff'd mem. sub nom., Richards v. Terrazas*, 112 S. Ct. 3019 (1992); *Turner v. Arkansas*, 784 F. Supp. 553, 573 (E.D. Ark. 1991) (the Voting Rights Act "is not violated by a state legislature simply because that legislature does not enact a districting plan that maximizes black political power or influence"), *aff'd mem.*, 112 S. Ct. 2296 (1992); *Watkins v. Mabus*, 771 F. Supp. at 805; *Mississippi v. United States*, 490 F. Supp. 569, 582 (D.D.C. 1979) ("No state or political subdivision is required to search for ways to maximize the number of black voting age population districts."), *aff'd mem.*, 444 U.S. 1050 (1980).

417 at 270. "Cases decided prior to the 1982 amendment to the Voting Rights Act uniformly hold that states are not required to seek out ways to maximize the number of black majority districts." *Watkins v. Mabus*, 771 F. Supp. at 806; *see Jordan v. Winter*, 604 F. Supp. 807, 814 (N.D. Miss.), *aff'd mem. sub nom., Mississippi Republican Executive Comm. v. Brooks*, 469 U.S. 1002 (1984). As the court below explained, appellants' approach serves as a

> "racial ratchet," which presumes that the plan offering the greatest number of black majority districts is, for that reason alone and regardless of all other considerations, the benchmark against which all other plans must be measured. Such an approach enshrines the notion that the Voting Rights Act insures proportional representation by race, a proposition that flies squarely in the face of case law and statute.

App. 30-31.

This is not to say that redistricting plans that have as a goal the maximization of black-majority districts cannot be implemented. In this case, the legislature remains free to enact a plan that, consistent with legal requirements, advances any legitimate political policy, including, perhaps, the creation of a greater number of "safe" minority districts. The district court, however, was not required—or even permitted—to make such a policy choice.

Appellants also are wrong in contending that the district court's plans are invalid because all black majority districts do not contain at least 57% black TOP. This Court's decisions do not require the creation of super-majority districts. In fact, in *United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey*, 430 U.S. 144, 162 (1977), a plurality of this Court specifically declined to set such an arbitrary number against which to test a plan's validity. The decision below is fully consistent with the cases decided pre-*Bolden*.[20]

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[20] Both federal and state courts have approved plans characterizing as minority-opportunity districts those districts containing black majorities of slightly over 50%. In *Jordan v. Winter*, for example, this Court affirmed a district court judgment devising an interim

Appellants lose sight of the fact that under the district court's plans, blacks in most black majority districts have significantly more than a "bare" majority. In the Senate plan, for example, seven of the eleven black majority TOP districts have black majorities ranging from 58.91% to 68.51%, and all but one district have majorities of over 54%. App. 68. The remaining district, which also had a black majority of less than 54% under the 1984 plan, has a black incumbent Senator who has been re-elected. The district court's finding that these percentages will provide effective representation given the facts of this case is not clearly erroneous or an abuse of discretion. If the 1992 elections reveal that in certain districts blacks are unable effectively to participate in the electoral process and elect

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plan that created a Congressional district with a 52.83% black VAP and rejected an alternative plan containing a 60% majority. The district court concluded that "52.83% is sufficient to overcome the effects of past discrimination and racial bloc voting" and would "afford black citizens an equal opportunity to participate in the political process." 604 F. Supp. at 814. As Justice Stevens noted in his concurrence to the summary affirmance, the 52.83% district provided a "remedy that established at least one district in which black persons represented an *effective majority* of the eligible voters." 469 U.S. at 1005, n.4 (emphasis added). *See also Ewing v. Monroe County*, 740 F. Supp. 417, 426 (N.D. Miss. 1990) ("a range of 51-55% black voting age population is sufficient to enable blacks to elect candidates of their choice"); *James v. City of Sarasota*, 611 F. Supp. 25 (M.D. Fla. 1985) (plurality black VAP sufficient under Section 2); *Mellow v. Mitchell*, No. J-57-1992, at 9, 11 (Pa. Mar. 26, 1992) ("no legal requirement . . . that a district have a 65% African-American total population to satisfy Section 2"; finding that 52.4% black TOP "would henceforth give African-Americans the opportunity to elect candidates of their choice"), *petition for cert. filed*, 60 U.S.L.W. 3881 (June 8, 1992) (No. 91-2015). To be sure, certain district courts have found that the facts before them called for the creation of super-majority districts. *See, e.g., Ketchum v. Byrne*, 740 F.2d 1398, 1413-15 (7th Cir. 1984), *cert. denied*, 471 U.S. 1135 (1985); *Emison v. Growe*, 782 F. Supp. 427, 440-41 (D. Minn.), *prob. juris. noted*, 112 S. Ct. 1557 (1992); *Neal v. Coleburn*, 689 F. Supp. 1426, 1437-38 (E.D. Va. 1988). These cases, however, simply used super-majority percentages as "flexible and practical guidelines," *Neal*, 689 F. Supp. at 1438, to be considered in the "particular circumstances" of the facts of the cases. *Ketchum*, 740 F.2d at 1413.

representatives of their choice, and a Section 2 challenge is made, the court then can consider whether in particular districts and under a particular set of facts a supermajority is the required remedy.

CONCLUSION

This Court should dismiss the appeals as moot or summarily affirm the judgment below.

Respectfully submitted,

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OCTOBER TERM, 1992

STATEWIDE REAPPORTIONMENT ADVISORY COMMITTEE, *et al.*,

Appellants,

v.

NICK THEODORE, *et al.*,

Appellees.

CARROLL A. CAMPBELL, JR., GOVERNOR OF SOUTH CAROLINA,

Appellant,

v.

NICK THEODORE, *et al.*,

Appellees.

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina

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MOTION TO DISMISS OR AFFIRM

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QUESTIONS PRESENTED

(1) Did the court below properly determine that the plan it drew for the South Carolina Senate did not have a discriminatory effect under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act by applying the retrogression test announced by this Court in *Beer* v. *United States*, 425 U.S. 130 (1976), and *City of Lockhart* v. *United States*, 460 U.S. 125 (1983)?

(2) Did the court below, in fashioning its redistricting plan for the South Carolina Senate, give adequate consideration to Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act when it designed a plan so as not to violate the threshold requirements for liability under Section 2 established by this Court in *Thornburg* v. *Gingles*, 478 U.S. 30 (1986)?

(3) Did the court below properly determine that, in fashioning its plan for the South Carolina Senate, it was not required to maximize minority voting strength?

(3) Assuming *arguendo* that maximization is required, did the court below, in fashioning its plan for the South Carolina Senate, create the maximum number of districts in which black voters have the potential to elect a candidate of their choice, as defined by *Thornburg* v. *Gingles*, 478 U.S. 30 (1986), and other cases interpreting Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act?

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IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1992

No. 92-155

STATEWIDE REAPPORTIONMENT ADVISORY COMMITTEE, *et al.*,

Appellants,

v.

NICK THEODORE, *et al.*,

Appellees.

No. 92-219

CARROLL A. CAMPBELL, JR., GOVERNOR OF SOUTH CAROLINA,

Appellant,

v.

NICK THEODORE, *et al.*,

Appellees.

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina

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MOTION TO DISMISS OR AFFIRM

INTRODUCTION

In this case, Plaintiffs-Appellants Statewide Reapportionment Advisory Committee, *et al.* ("SRAC") and Defendant-Cross-Appellant Carroll A. Campbell, Jr., the Governor of South Carolina (collectively, "Appellants"), appeal the order of a three-judge court which issued an injunction redistricting the South Carolina Senate and House of Representatives and the State's six Congressional districts.[1] Appellants argue that the three-

[1] Because the Governor was named as a defendant below, he is a cross-appellant in this Court; however, he seeks much the same

judge court failed to give adequate consideration to the requirements of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973, which prohibits voting laws that result in discrimination against blacks and other protected minority groups by denying them an equal opportunity "to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice." Appellant SRAC claims further that the court consequently failed to maximize the number of black majority districts, as supposedly mandated by Section 2. Because Appellants' arguments are without merit, Appellee South Carolina Senate ("the Senate") moves that the appeal be dismissed or, in the alternative, that the judgment of the three-judge court be affirmed.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

South Carolina's General Assembly is composed of a House and a Senate. *Burton v. Sheheen*, No. 3:91-2983-1 (D.S.C. May 1, 1992) (to be reported at 793 F. Supp. 1329) (three-judge court), reproduced in Appendix to SRAC Jurisdictional Statement ("SRAC App.") 4. The Senate has 46 members, who are elected from single-member districts. SRAC Jurisdictional Statement ("SRAC J.S.") 12.

The Senate was last reapportioned in 1984. After a three-judge court adopted an interim redistricting plan with nine black majority districts and held that this plan satisfied Section 2, *Graham v. South Carolina*, No. 3:84-1430-15 (D.S.C. July 31, 1984) (copy lodged with this Court), the General Assembly passed a plan that created ten black majority districts. SRAC App. 5, 27 n.34. Of these ten districts, seven had a black majority voting age population ("VAP"). SRAC App. 27 n.34. The Gov-

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relief as the SRAC. Appellants do not challenge the three-judge court's proposed Congressional districts, but rather only the plans for the Senate and House. The Senate will address only those arguments relating to the three-judge court's plan for the Senate.

ernor signed the plan into law, and the United States Attorney General "precleared" it pursuant to Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c.[2]

Following the 1990 census, which revealed that the districts drawn in 1984 had become substantially unequal in population, the Senate set about the task of redistricting. The Senate Judiciary Committee's seven-member Subcommittee on Redistricting and Reapportionment (which included one black member and two Republicans) held extensive public hearings, in order to obtain the views of citizens and interested groups regarding redistricting. The Subcommittee also adopted a set of neutral criteria to guide it in formulating redistricting plans. These criteria included drawing districts of equal population (the "one person, one vote" rule) and complying with the Voting Rights Act. Following the hearings, the Senate passed a redistricting plan for itself and a Congressional redistricting plan. The plans were introduced in the House, but the House was unable to act on them before the General Assembly's statutorily mandated *sine die* adjournment date of June 6, 1991. S.C. Code Ann. § 2-1-180 (Law. Co-op. 1986).

On October 4, 1991, Michael Burton, the Executive Director of the South Carolina Republican Party, brought an action challenging the continued use of the 1984 Senate districts, as well as the Congressional and House districts drawn after the 1980 census. *Burton v. Sheheen*, No. 3:91-2983-1 (D.S.C. filed Oct. 4, 1991). The complaint alleged that these districts violated the one person, one vote rule and Section 2. The complaint further

[2] Section 5 requires certain jurisdictions, including South Carolina, to obtain prior approval, known as "preclearance," of changes in laws, practices, or procedures affecting voting. *See Georgia v. United States*, 411 U.S. 526 (1973) (holding that Section 5 applies to redistricting plans). To obtain preclearance, such jurisdictions must prove either to the United States Attorney General or to a three-judge district court in the District of Columbia that the proposed change has neither a discriminatory purpose nor a discriminatory effect. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c.

alleged that the General Assembly was deadlocked on the issue of redistricting and that judicial action to implement redistricting plans was therefore necessary. The complaint sought declaratory relief, an injunction against the further use of these districts, and an order implementing Congressional and State legislative redistricting plans to be offered by plaintiffs. The Senate moved to intervene pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 24, and the motion was granted on November 13, 1991.

On October 31, 1991, the SRAC brought its own redistricting suit, *Statewide Reapportionment Advisory Committee v. Campbell*, No. 3:91-3310-1 (D.S.C. filed Oct. 31, 1991), making substantially the same allegations as the *Burton* plaintiffs.[3] The two suits were consolidated for trial before a three-judge panel, consisting of Circuit Judge Clyde Hamilton, Chief District Judge Falcon Hawkins, and District Judge G. Ross Anderson, Jr., that had been appointed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2284.

After the General Assembly reconvened on January 14, 1992, it moved quickly on reapportionment and passed a plan for the Senate on January 29, 1992. The Governor vetoed the plan and the veto was sustained. With respect to Congressional redistricting, the House and Senate passed separate plans. A conference committee was appointed, but was unable to reach agreement. As a consequence of the apparent impasse, the three-judge court undertook to devise its own Congressional and State legislative redistricting plans.

II. THE TRIAL

The trial commenced on February 19, 1992, and continued through March 6. At the outset, all parties stipulated that the existing Congressional and State legislative districts (*i.e.*, those adopted following the 1980

[3] While neither complaint asserted Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act as a basis for jurisdiction, the SRAC concedes that it contended below that "any plan adopted by the court must comply with Sections 2 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act." SRAC J.S. 5.

census) were malapportioned and could no longer be used. SRAC App. 3 n.2. The stipulation obviated the need for the court to reach the claim that these districts also violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. SRAC App. 3 n.2. Rather, given this threshold stipulation, the court's task was to implement a plan that remedied the one person, one vote violation while complying with all other legal requirements, including the Voting Rights Act.

The court's task was a massive one, which had to be undertaken in the face of tight time constraints. Primary elections were scheduled for June 9, 1992, as required by S.C. Code Ann. § 7-13-40 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991), and State legislative and Congressional candidates were required by law to file notices of candidacy by March 30 and April 30, 1992, respectively, S.C. Code Ann. § 7-11-210 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991). To alleviate some of the time pressure, the court postponed the primary until August 25 and the filing deadlines until June 25. SRAC App. 86 n.79. Even with this delay, the court still faced a substantial task, which was made even more difficult by the fact that the parties offered nine proposed plans for Congress, five for the House, and five for the Senate.[4] During the three weeks of hearings, the court heard lay and expert testimony from numerous witnesses and received hundreds of exhibits totalling in the thousands of pages.

The SRAC advocated a plan for the Senate that its drafter freely admitted was designed to maximize numerically black representation. Senate Appendix ("Sen. App.") (attached hereto) 16a, 17a-18a, 22a. Contending that a district generally had to be 58% black in total population in order to give blacks an equal opportunity to elect candidates of their choice, Sen. App. 17a,

[4] Senate plans were offered by the SRAC, the Governor, the Senate, the Lieutenant Governor, and the *Burton* plaintiffs (on behalf of the Republican Party). SRAC J.S. 12. Because only the SRAC and the Governor have appealed, only their plans will be addressed in this brief.

the SRAC drew as many districts as possible that exceeded this percentage. The SRAC plan for the Senate contained a total of 14 black majority districts, of which 12 had a black VAP majority. *See* SRAC J.S. 12 (chart comparing the various plans for the Senate).

Like the plan ultimately drawn by the three-judge court (which is depicted at Sen. App. 41a), the SRAC plan (which is depicted at Sen. App. 42a) placed eleven black majority districts in areas with naturally occurring, compact, and contiguous black population concentrations. Unlike the court's plan, however, the SRAC plan drew three additional black majority districts by stringing together scattered pockets of minority population with no community of interest. The SRAC plan included a district in the Savannah Valley (SRAC District 10) which stretched for almost 100 miles beginning in Anderson County[5] and extending through six other counties along the Georgia border; a district winding northward from the suburbs of Columbia in the central part of the State all the way to Spartanburg County near the North Carolina border (SRAC District 15); and a district created by roping minority concentrations from Georgetown, Horry, Marion, and Williamsburg Counties in the eastern part of the State (SRAC District 34).[6]

[5] A county map of South Carolina is included in the Appendix to the Governor's Jurisdictional Statement 43.

[6] In order to make this district an "open" one (*i.e.*, without an incumbent), the SRAC plan put two white incumbents together in an adjacent district. The drafter of the SRAC plan, Dr. John Ruoff, admitted that he would not have paired these two incumbents if they had been black. Sen. App. 39a. While conceding that whites could represent blacks and that both these incumbents represented districts with "pretty solid" black majorities, Dr. Ruoff explained that he was not seeking to protect existing black majority districts but rather to protect existing black majority districts that were electing blacks. Sen. App. 24a-25a.

The Governor advocated a plan (which is depicted at Sen. App. 43a) that contained two more black majority districts than in the three-judge court's plan (Governor's Districts 10 and 34) in roughly the same areas as SRAC Districts 10 and 34. The Governor's plan pitted ten Democratic Senators against each other. SRAC App. 65 n.61.

Appellants argued that the creation of the additional black majority districts was justified (and, in fact, required) because of allegedly extensive racial bloc voting in South Carolina.[7] At the urging of the court, the parties stipulated that "since 1984 there is evidence of racially polarized voting in South Carolina." SRAC App. 56. The SRAC and the *Burton* plaintiffs also offered expert testimony that voting in South Carolina is highly polarized along racial lines. The SRAC is wrong, however, to characterize this evidence as "unrebutted." SRAC J.S. 6. Counsel for the Senate, the Lieutenant Governor, and the South Carolina Democratic Party demonstrated through cross-examination that the evidence of racial bloc voting in the three additional districts that the SRAC and/or the Governor sought to create was simply inadequate.[8]

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[7] In *Thornburg v. Gingles*, 478 U.S. 30, 53 n.21 (1986), this Court defined racial bloc voting as a consistent relationship between the race of the voter and the way he or she votes.

[8] With respect to those districts, the *Burton* plaintiffs' expert Dr. Theodore Arrington admitted that he had analyzed only one election, the 1990 general election for Governor, in which State Senator Theo Mitchell, who is black, lost to Carroll Campbell, a highly popular white incumbent. Sen. App. 1a. As the court properly found, "the testimony regarding the strength of polarization exhibited in some races, such as the 1990 governor's race, was minimized by factors such as incumbency." SRAC App. 56. Moreover, for some reason, Dr. Arrington did not analyze the 1990 Democratic primary for Governor, in which Senator Mitchell beat a white opponent. Sen. App. 5a.

Dr. James Loewen, who testified as an expert for the SRAC, analyzed no elections after 1984. SRAC J.S. 6-7. He made no study

Even assuming that the plaintiffs had offered credible evidence of racial bloc voting (or, alternatively, that the parties' general stipulation sufficed to prove the existence of bloc voting in the particular areas under dispute), there was still substantial evidence that the additional black majority districts proposed by the SRAC and by the Governor were "illusory," in that they would not have resulted in the election of additional black Senators. Both plans sought to draw the additional districts by ignoring county lines, traditional communities of interest and naturally occurring compact areas of minority strength. Instead, they roped together diverse areas of minority population without regard to any other factor.

For example, the three-judge court found that the *Burton* plaintiffs' proposed District 10, which is highly similar to District 10 in both the SRAC and the Governor's proposed plans, "cuts into seven counties to garner black voters, and consolidates three insular and historical communities of interest." SRAC App. 63-64. The court described this district as "a particularly egregious example of the Governor's and the Republican Party's disregard for county lines and communities of interest . . . [because] the urbanites of Anderson County would be grouped with the rural communities of Abbeville County [and] the pulpwood farmers of McCormick County would

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of blacks who have been successful in winning election to the General Assembly, was unaware that certain of the districts he did analyze were now represented by blacks, and performed no analysis of any of the plans that were offered to the three-judge court. Sen. App. 13a-15a.

Dr. John Ruoff, another one of the SRAC's experts, agreed with Drs. Arrington and Loewen that racial polarization existed. Yet he performed no analysis of whether voting was polarized in the proposed Savannah Valley district. Sen. App. 35a. With regard to the proposed District 34, he did no analysis of elections in Georgetown County and further admitted that the black community in Williamsburg County was able to elect candidates of its choice despite polarized voting. Sen. App. 33a-35a, 36a. He also admitted to numerous examples of successful black candidacies in cities within the proposed district north of Columbia. Sen. App. 28a-33a.

share representation with the industrial workers of Aiken County." SRAC App. 63-64; *see also* Sen. App. 6a-7a (Testimony of Michael Couick, Director of Research and Attorney for the Senate Judiciary Committee) (District 10, as drawn by the SRAC, the Governor, and the *Burton* plaintiffs, was not an electable minority district due to a combination of factors, including a high number of split precincts, an unacceptable geographic stretch, a lack of unified communities of interest, and the lack of a core existing district).

Similarly, the district proposed by the SRAC north of Columbia (District 15) lacked a community of interest. This proposed district was created by fracturing a compact, cohesive, predominantly black area into two districts (Districts 15 and 17) and splitting precincts and adding disparate groups of black voters with no community of interest to increase the black percentage of the population. *See* Sen. App. 11a-12a.[9]

The majority black districts proposed by the SRAC and the Governor in the eastern part of the State likewise disrupted existing communities of interest and diluted black voting strength in adjacent districts. SRAC District 34 fractured Williamsburg County, a black majority county, into four separate districts, and neighboring Georgetown County, which also has significant black population, into three districts. In so doing, the SRAC split Williamsburg County's cohesive black majority, which has successfully elected numerous black officials. These significant changes to existing political boundaries in order to create an additional majority black district in District 34 also had the effect of fracturing the black population in two adjacent effective black majority districts, raising considerable doubt as to whether any of the three resulting districts would provide sufficient electoral opportunities to black voters. *See* Sen. App. 9a-11a.

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[9] The Governor did not even include this district in his proposed plan.

District 34 in the Governor's plan created a black majority by borrowing black population from neighboring District 30, another black majority district. To make up for the lost population, District 30 had to pick up black voters from Dillon County. Because these voters have a low turnout, however, the Senate, with the support of the black incumbent in District 30, opposed putting them in the district, fearing that they would impair its electability. Sen. App. 10a.

In addition, the additional black majority districts in the SRAC plan and the Governor's plan contained numerous split precincts, which further impaired minority electability in these districts. Though Appellants claimed that splitting precincts was necessary to create the additional black majority districts, the three-judge court heard extensive testimony that split precincts cause enormous confusion among voters, who frequently do not know the district in which they are supposed to be voting. *E.g.*, Sen. App. 6a-7a, 23a. This confusion decreases turnout, which impacts disproportionately on minority voting strength. Sen. App. 2a-5a.

In sum, the evidence showed that, because the additional black majority districts cut through counties and other communities of interest, joined disparate areas without common geographic or social ties, and split precincts, these districts were not effective, electable black majority districts.

ARGUMENT

I. THE THREE-JUDGE COURT PROPERLY HELD THAT ITS PLANS DID NOT HAVE A DISCRIMINATORY EFFECT UNDER SECTION 5 OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT

The court below rejected each of the plans proffered by the parties and drew its own plans instead.[10] The three-judge court's plan for the Senate contains eleven districts with black population majorities, an increase of one over the plan passed by the General Assembly and precleared by the Department of Justice in 1984. SRAC App. 68. Ten of these districts have black VAP majorities. SRAC App. 68.

In reaching this result, the court recognized that its remedial plan must be racially fair. The court observed that, under *McDaniel v. Sanchez*, 452 U.S. 130 (1981), it was not required to obtain Section 5 preclearance for its plan. SRAC App. 25. The court also recognized, however, that, in fashioning relief, it "must be cognizant of § 5 concerns that voting changes have neither the 'purpose . . . [nor] the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote' on the basis of race." SRAC App. 25.[11]

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[10] The three-judge court's plan for the Senate had a deviation of only 1.95% between the population of the largest and smallest districts. SRAC App. 61. The court rejected plans offered by the Senate and Lieutenant Governor for having too high a deviation. SRAC App. 61-62 n.58. Relying on the State's policy of preserving county boundaries in redistricting, the court rejected plans offered by the SRAC, the Governor, and the *Burton* plaintiffs for splitting more counties than necessary to comply with the one person, one vote rule. SRAC App. 61-63 & n.58. The court's rulings on the one person, one vote issues are not challenged here.

[11] Appellants contend that the court erred in stating that this case arose under Section 5. SRAC J.S. 22; Governor's Jurisdictional Statement ("Gov. J.S.") 3. As the SRAC admits, however, its position below was that "any plan adopted by the court must comply with" Section 5 (as well as Section 2). SRAC J.S. 5. More important, the issue here is not whether this case arose under Section 5 as opposed to Section 2 but rather whether the court gave suffi-

With respect to purpose, the court stated: "We take it as a given that this court, in fashioning its remedy, is not acting with a racially discriminatory purpose." SRAC App. 25. As for discriminatory effect, the court below employed the "retrogression" test of *Beer v. United States*, 425 U.S. 130 (1976), and *City of Lockhart v. United States*, 460 U.S. 125 (1983), and held that its plans did not have a discriminatory effect under Section 5 because they increased minority voting strength from what it had been under the previous redistricting plans. SRAC App. 25-31, 65-67.

Citing *Wilkes County, Ga. v. United States*, 450 F. Supp. 1171 (D.D.C.), *aff'd mem.*, 439 U.S. 999 (1978), the SRAC argues that, in deciding the retrogression issue, the three-judge court should have compared its plans to those proffered by the parties rather than to the pre-existing plans. SRAC J.S. 18 n.23. As the court observed, however, this approach conflicts with this Court's decisions in *Beer* and *City of Lockhart*. SRAC App. 30 & n.35.

In *Beer*, this Court held that the 1970 redistricting plan for the New Orleans City Council did not have a discriminatory effect under Section 5 because the plan did not diminish black voting strength. 425 U.S. at 141-42. In reaching this conclusion, the Court engaged in a simple comparison of the 1970 plan and its predecessor:

> Under the apportionment of 1961 none of the five councilmanic districts had a clear Negro majority of registered voters . . . . Under [the 1970 plan], by contrast, Negroes will constitute a majority of the population in two of the five districts and a clear majority of the registered voters in one of them. . . . It was therefore error for the District Court to conclude that [the 1970 plan] "will . . .

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cient consideration to the requirements of *both* sections in fashioning its plans. As we demonstrate, a fair reading of the court's opinion shows that it did.

> have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color" within the meaning of § 5 of the Voting Rights Act.

Id. Similarly, in *City of Lockhart*, in determining whether changes to the city's charter were retrogressive, the Court compared the new system to "the practices in use in Lockhart prior to the new charter." 460 U.S. at 133. In light of these cases, the three-judge court here was clearly correct in rejecting the SRAC's claim that the appropriate comparison is between the court's redistricting plans and those proposed by the parties.[12]

II. THE THREE-JUDGE COURT GAVE MORE THAN ADEQUATE CONSIDERATION TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION 2

Both the SRAC and the Governor contend that, in drawing redistricting plans, the three-judge court failed to give adequate consideration to the requirements of Section 2 and that the decision below conflicts with the opinions of

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[12] The court below also was correct in holding that *Wilkes County* does not control the present case. In *Wilkes County*, the county sought preclearance for a change from unequally populated single-member districts to at-large elections. Though the county claimed that the change was necessary to cure the malapportionment, the court found that the county had acted with a discriminatory purpose in making the change shortly after blacks began registering to vote in substantial numbers. 450 F. Supp. at 1175-76. Applying *Beer*, the court also found that, when "compared to the use of the existing election districts," the use of at-large elections also produced a discriminatory effect under Section 5 by "reducing the influence of blacks in elections." *Id.* at 1178. Either of these findings was sufficient to deny preclearance, because Section 5 requires the absence of both discriminatory purpose and discriminatory effect. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c. Consequently, the court's additional finding that at-large elections had a discriminatory effect as compared to "options for properly apportioned single-member district plans," 450 F. Supp. at 1178, is *dicta*; and whatever its applicability may be to cases involving changes from single-member districts to at-large elections, it is not controlling in the present case, which does not involve such a change.

this Court and others. SRAC J.S. 18, 22-25; Gov. J.S. 8-13. Neither contention is correct.

The court recognized that "[i]t would be incongruous . . . to adopt a plan which did not comport with the standards and guidelines of § 2." SRAC App. 38. Consequently, the court stated that it would be "guided by the admonition in [*Thornburg v.*] *Gingles* [,478 U.S. 30 (1986),] that a determination [under Section 2] of 'whether the political processes are "equally open" depends on a searching practical evaluation of the "past and present reality." ' " SRAC App. 45 (citations omitted). The court went on to state that "since it would be anomalous for this court to adopt a plan which immediately lends itself to an attack under § 2, our analysis should ensure that the threshold requirements of a § 2 action cannot be established under the adopted plan." SRAC App. 45. Accordingly, in conducting its analysis, the court considered, *inter alia*, (1) "the extent to which reasonable compact and contiguous majority black districts were and could be drawn"; (2) "the extent to which the minority group is politically cohesive"; and (3) "the extent to which racially polarized voting patterns exist." SRAC App. 46.

These three factors are taken almost verbatim from the leading Section 2 case, *Thornburg v. Gingles*, 478 U.S. 30, 50-51 (1986), in which this Court held that they were "necessary preconditions" for any challenge to multimember districts. *Id.* at 50; SRAC App. 36 n.37.[13] Although *Gingles* left open the question of whether these preconditions are applicable outside the context of multimember districts, 478 U.S. at 47 n.12, the court below, in accordance with other decisions on this issue, applied them to the single-member districts at issue here.[14] Thus, draw-

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[13] The Governor is thus wrong to imply (Gov. J.S. 12 n.9) that the court below disregarded *Gingles*.

[14] SRAC App. 46; *see, e.g., Nash v. Blunt*, No. 91-0840-CV-W-2, 1992 WL 165162, at *5, *12 (W.D. Mo. July 15, 1992); *Jeffers v. Clinton*, 730 F. Supp. 196, 205 (E.D. Ark. 1989), *aff'd mem.*, 111

ing single-member districts with these preconditions in mind "insure[d] that the court's plan will not violate the threshold requirements for liability under § 2," SRAC App. 47, and (contrary to the Governor's suggestion, Gov. J.S. 12 n.9) made it unnecessary for the court to consider the other evidentiary factors identified in the legislative history of Section 2 (such as a history of racial discrimination, socio-economic disparities between blacks and whites, and success of minority candidates). *See Brewer v. Ham*, 876 F.2d 448, 451, 453 (5th Cir. 1989) (Section 2 challenge fails because plaintiffs failed to prove first *Gingles* precondition); *McNeil v. Springfield Park District*, 851 F.2d 937, 943-44, 947 (7th Cir. 1988) (same), *cert. denied*, 490 U.S. 1031 (1989).[15]

The SRAC argues that the decision of the court below conflicts with other cases holding that court-ordered plans must comply with Section 2. SRAC J.S. 24. By applying the teaching of *Gingles*, however, the three-judge court did address the Section 2 preconditions. Moreover, despite

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S. Ct. 662 (1991); *McDaniels v. Mehfoud*, 702 F. Supp. 588, 589, 592-94 (E.D. Va. 1988); *Wilson v. Eu*, 823 P.2d 545, 565 (Cal. 1992).

[15] Conducting a more detailed Section 2 analysis was not only unnecessary but also impractical in view of the time constraints the court faced. As the court noted, the absence of valid redistricting plans had already necessitated one postponement of the primaries, and the court quite properly felt that it had to implement a plan as soon as possible in order to avoid further delays and allow elections to take place in a timely fashion. SRAC App. 44. Under similar circumstances, the court in *Watkins v. Mabus*, 771 F. Supp. 789 (S.D. Miss.) (per curiam), *aff'd in part and vacated in part on other grounds*, 112 S. Ct. 412 (1991), refused altogether to consider the claims of black voters that the interim redistricting plan adopted by the court violated Section 2. *Id.* at 802-05; *see also Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc. v. Gantt*, Nos. CV-92-1521 (SJ), CV-92-1776(SJ), 1992 WL 174491 (E.D.N.Y. July 10, 1992) (denying motion to enjoin enforcement of redistricting plan alleged to violate Section 2). *See generally Upham v. Seamon*, 456 U.S. 37, 44 (1982) (per curiam).

what the Governor claims, Gov. J.S. 8-13, the analysis used by the court below is consistent with that undertaken by courts in other recent redistricting cases. For example, just as the court here sought to design a plan that "will not violate the threshold requirements for liability under § 2," SRAC App. 47, the court-appointed special masters who drew the plans in *Wilson v. Eu*, 823 P.2d 545 (Cal. 1992), sought to "avoid section 2 challenges to our new districts by eliminating the possibility of a minority group's proving any one of the three [*Gingles*] prerequisites." 823 P.2d at 565. And, like the court here, the court in *DeGrandy v. Wetherell*, No. TCA 92-40015-WS, No. 92-40131 (N.D. Fla. May 29, 1992) (to be reported at 794 F. Supp. 1076 (copy lodged with this Court), recognized its obligation to "consider in crafting the redistricting plan the [S]ection 2 requirement of ensuring that the plan does not dilute the votes of racial or language minorities." *DeGrandy*, slip op. at 7.[16]

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[16] The cases cited by the Governor involving redistricting in Arizona, New York, Texas, and Illinois have likewise relied on the *Gingles* preconditions to guide their choice of redistricting plans. *See Arizonans for Fair Representation v. Symington*, No. CIV 92-256-PHX-SMM, slip op. at 5, 9-11 (D. Ariz. Apr. 30, 1992) (copy lodged with this Court); *Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc. v. Gantt*, Nos. CV-92-1521(SJ), CV-92-1776(SJ), 1992 WL 152982, at *12 (E.D.N.Y. June 26, 1992) (per curiam); *Terrazas v. Slagle*, 789 F. Supp. 828, 833 (W.D. Tex. 1991), *aff'd mem. sub nom. Richards v. Terrazas*, 112 S. Ct. 3019 (1992); *Hastert v. State Bd. of Elections*, 777 F. Supp. 634, 648-50 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (examining totality of circumstances, but only after determining that plaintiffs had satisfied the three *Gingles* preconditions).

While the court in *Emison v. Growe*, 782 F. Supp. 427, 435-36 (D. Minn. 1992), refused to apply such preconditions, that opinion provoked a strong dissent, and this Court has noted probable jurisdiction. 112 S. Ct. 1557 (1992). Significantly, the Solicitor General has argued that the *Emison* court erred by failing to apply the *Gingles* preconditions. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 8-16, *Growe v. Emison*, No. 91-1420 (U.S. May 29, 1992). In the remaining cases cited by the Governor, the parties either did not raise Section 2 issues or entered into stipulations that obviated the need to consider Section 2.

In short, though the court concluded that a plenary Section 2 review was unwarranted, SRAC App. 44, the court did not reject the applicability of Section 2. To the contrary, consistent with both *Gingles* and lower court decisions, the court analyzed the plans it drew and those proposed by the parties "with the goal of providing minorities with an equal opportunity to elect the representatives of their choice in mind." SRAC App. 46. This is exactly what Section 2 requires. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (Section 2 is violated when members of a protected minority group "have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice").[17]

III. THE THREE-JUDGE COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT, IN DRAWING REDISTRICTING PLANS, IT WAS NOT REQUIRED TO MAXIMIZE MINORITY VOTING STRENGTH

The SRAC's primary argument is that, as construed in *Gingles*, Section 2 required the three-judge court to maximize black voting strength. In the SRAC's view, *Gingles* holds that Section 2 is violated whenever an alternative plan exists that creates more black majority districts than the plan adopted (or drawn) by the court and there is evidence of legally significant racial bloc voting. SRAC J.S. 20; *see also* Gov. J.S. 18-19. The SRAC thus unabashedly argues that *Gingles* requires drawing the maximum possible number of black majority districts whenever such polarized voting patterns exist.

The problem for the SRAC, of course, is that neither the language of Section 2 nor the holding of *Gingles* requires any such thing. Section 2 itself says nothing that would mandate maximization of minority voting strength. By its terms, the statute guarantees protected minorities

[17] Because the court below did in fact give more than adequate consideration to the requirements of Section 2, this Court need not reach the Governor's argument that the court erred by failing to incorporate Section 2 standards into its Section 5 analysis. Gov. J.S. 14-18.

only an equal "opportunity . . . to elect representatives of their choice," 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b), not a maximum number of districts with black majorities.[18] Section 2(b)'s express disclaimer of any right to proportional representation (a system designed to maximize the electoral power of minority voters) further undercuts the SRAC's argument. Indeed, had the court below adopted the SRAC plan, it would have run afoul of the disclaimer, because that plan created 13 allegedly "electable" black majority districts out of a total of 46 (28.2%), Sen. App. 40a, in a State that has a black VAP of 26.9%, SRAC J.S. 5.

Similarly, nothing in *Gingles* requires maximization. *Gingles* holds merely that the ability to create compact black majority districts, minority political cohesiveness, and white bloc voting are "necessary preconditions" to a successful Section 2 claim. 478 U.S. at 50-51. The opinion does not, however, hold that these preconditions are themselves sufficient to establish a Section 2 claim.[19] Nor does

[18] The relevant language of Section 2 is taken directly from this Court's decision in *White v. Regester*, 412 U.S. 755, 766 (1973), and the legislative history makes clear that the 1982 amendment to Section 2 "codifies the holding in *White*, thus making clear the legislative intent to incorporate that precedent and [the] extensive case law which developed around it, into the application of Section 2." S. Rep. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (1982), *reprinted in* 1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 177, 210. Significantly, the cases construing *White* unanimously rejected maximization. *See, e.g., United States v. Board of Supervisors*, 571 F.2d 951, 955 (5th Cir. 1978); *David v. Garrison*, 553 F.2d 923, 927, 930-31 (5th Cir. 1977); *Major v. Iberville Parish School Bd.*, 536 F.2d 101, 104 (5th Cir. 1976); *Nevett v. Sides*, 533 F.2d 1361, 1365 (5th Cir. 1976), *cert. denied*, 446 U.S. 951 (1980); *see also Voting Rights Act Vol. 1: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary*, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. ("Senate Hearings") 1204-09, 1216-26 (1982) (prepared statement of Frank Parker, Director, Voting Rights Project, Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights under Law) (discussing the cases cited above and others applying *White*).

[19] These preconditions concern the ability of protected minorities "to elect representatives of their choice." *Gingles*, 478 U.S. at 50. A violation of Section 2, however, requires not only an unequal

Gingles hold that any plan that fails to create the maximum possible number of black majority districts violates Section 2 if racial bloc voting reaches legally significant levels.

No doubt realizing as much, the SRAC relies on Justice O'Connor's opinion concurring in the judgment in *Gingles*. That opinion, however, actually disagreed with the majority's analysis and explicitly stated that the majority "does not acknowledge . . . expressly" that its holding "results in the creation of a right to a form of proportional representation in favor of all geographically and politically cohesive minority groups that are large enough to constitute majorities if concentrated within one or more single-member districts." 478 U.S. at 85 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). Under these circumstances, Justice O'Connor's opinion can hardly be said to support a right to a plan that maximizes minority voting strength.

The error in the SRAC's position is further demonstrated by the consistent views of lower federal courts that neither Section 2 nor *Gingles* requires the creation of the largest possible number of black majority seats in State or local governing bodies.[20] The Solicitor General has like-

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opportunity to elect such representatives but also an unequal opportunity "to participate in the political process." 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b). *See Chisom v. Roemer*, 111 S. Ct. 2354, 2365 (1991) (all Section 2 claims must allege "an abridgement of the opportunity to participate in the political process *and* to elect representatives of one's choice") (emphasis in original). Thus, demonstrating the existence of the preconditions, without more, would not establish a violation of Section 2. The failure to prove the preconditions, however, obviates the need for any further inquiry under the statute. *See* Argument II, *supra*.

[20] *See Nash*, 1992 WL 165162, at *5-*6 ("We reject [the maximization] argument for a variety of reasons, foremost of which is the lack of any language in the Act to support this position"); *Quilter v. Voinovich*, No. 5:91CV-2219, 1992 WL 114748, at *5 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 31, 1992) ("We conclude that nothing in § 2 of the Voting Rights Act, *Gingles*, *supra*, or *Armour [v. Ohio*, 775 F. Supp. 1044 (N.D. Ohio 1991),] mandates the drawing of majority-minority

wise stated that "[n]othing in the Voting Rights Act requires state or local jurisdictions to maximize the number of majority-minority districts . . . ." Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants at 12, *Voinovich v. Quilter*, No. 91-1618 (U.S. filed July 31, 1992). Thus, contrary to the SRAC's claims, the three-judge court's opinion does not contravene the language of Section 2 or this Court's decision in *Gingles*.

Moreover, the three-judge court's opinion is consistent with the legislative history of Section 2. Although the SRAC contends that the legislative history approved the use of black majority districts as a remedy for minority vote dilution, SRAC J.S. 21-22, the issue here is not whether such districts are an appropriate Section 2 remedy. The issue is whether the three-judge court was obliged to draw the maximum possible number of black majority districts. Nothing in the legislative history supports such a requirement. Indeed, when the SRAC's counsel testified before Congress in support of the bill that eventually became Section 2, he expressly stated, in an effort to rebut the claims of opponents of the bill, that it was "erroneous[]" to describe amended Section 2 as involving a "requirement of 'maximization' of minority political strength." Senate Hearings, *supra* note 18, at 386-87 (prepared statement of Laughlin McDonald). In short, the legislative history provides no more support for the SRAC's arguments than the statutory language or the case law.

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districts wherever there is a concentration of Black voters"); *Turner v. Arkansas*, 784 F. Supp. 553, 573 (E.D. Ark. 1991) (Section 2 "is not violated by a state legislature simply because that legislature does not enact a districting plan that maximizes black political power or influence"), *aff'd mem.*, 112 S. Ct. 2296 (1992); *Watkins v. Mabus*, 771 F. Supp. at 805-06 (dictum) ("It is doubtful whether *Gingles* held, as plaintiffs suggest, that the amended Voting Rights Act § 2 requires that states go beyond the requirement of non-discrimination in order to create as many non-white majority districts as possible.").

IV. ASSUMING *ARGUENDO* THAT MAXIMIZATION IS REQUIRED, THE THREE-JUDGE COURT SHOULD STILL BE AFFIRMED BECAUSE IT CREATED THE MAXIMUM NUMBER OF TRULY ELECTABLE DISTRICTS

Even if Section 2 required drawing the maximum number of majority black districts (which it does not), the three-judge court's decision should still be affirmed because its plan contains the maximum number of districts that meet Section 2's criteria. Under Section 2, "[u]nless minority voters possess the *potential* to elect representatives in the absence of the challenged structure or practice, they cannot claim to have been injured by that structure or practice." *Gingles*, 478 U.S. at 50 n.17 (emphasis in original). Thus, unless Appellants can show that they had the potential to elect candidates of their choice in the additional districts that they contend the court should have drawn, they cannot prevail.

Whether a particular plan provides minority voters the requisite potential to elect their chosen candidates is peculiarly dependent on the facts of each case, and making this determination requires an "intensely local appraisal of the design and impact" of the plan. *White v. Regester*, 412 U.S. 755, 769 (1973); *see Gingles*, 478 U.S. at 79; *Rogers v. Lodge*, 458 U.S. 613, 622 (1982). Appellate courts review the trial court's determinations using a "clearly-erroneous" standard and give deference to the local judges who heard the evidence. *Gingles*, 478 U.S. at 79.[21] The court below did not err when it declined to draw the three additional majority black Senate districts advocated by the SRAC and the two additional majority black Senate districts advocated by the Governor, because the evidence showed that these districts were not truly electable.

Under the *Gingles* preconditions discussed in Argument II, *supra*, to make out a Section 2 claim, minority voters

[21] This standard applies both to findings regarding the *Gingles* preconditions and to the ultimate finding of vote dilution. *Gingles*, 478 U.S. at 79.

must show, *inter alia*, that their group is "sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district." *Gingles*, 478 U.S. at 50. Otherwise, they cannot prove that the challenged districting plan impairs their ability to elect candidates of their choice. *Id.* Though the SRAC claims that a district must have at least 57% black total population to be electable, SRAC J.S. 8, this approach is inconsistent with the case law, which has recognized that the concentration of black voters required to satisfy Section 2 will vary from district to district depending upon the circumstances.[22] Appellants' approach is also inconsistent with the evidence, which showed that black candidates have been elected in districts that were less than 57% black and white candidates have been elected in districts that exceeded this figure.[23] In short, whether a district can elect a black candidate depends not just on percentages but also on the presence of an incumbent in the district, the district's compactness, and other factors.

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[22] *See, e.g., Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc. v. Gantt*, 1992 WL 152982, at *7 ("the Supreme Court has declined to adopt bright-line formulae for determining whether the VAP percentage of a minority group in a district is so low that a court should suspect dilution of minority voting strength"); *Nash*, 1992 WL 165162, at *10 ("The precise number [of minority voters required for an effective minority district] is a question of fact that may differ depending upon the circumstances."); *Ewing v. Monroe County, Miss.*, 740 F. Supp. 417, 426 (N.D. Miss. 1990) (noting that range of 51-55% black VAP sufficient due to prior minority candidates' success in districts with less than 50% black VAP).

[23] Since 1984, Senator Theo Mitchell, who is black, has been continuously elected from Senate District 7 with a total black population of 50.23% and a black VAP of 45.31%. *See* SRAC App. 68. McKinley Washington, who is also black, was elected in Senate District 45, which is only 54.6% black in total population. Sen. App. 18a-20a. By contrast, Yancey McGill and John Land, both of whom are white, represent Senate District 32, which is 58.15% black, and Senate District 36, which is 63.24% black, respectively. Sen. App. 24a.

Appellants claim that the three-judge court ignored these factors and simply held that any district with more than 50% black VAP was sufficient to provide black voters with the opportunities required under Section 2. SRAC J.S. 25; Gov. J.S. 20-21. In fact, the three-judge court expressly noted that "beyond the use of voting age population, we have considered other factors, such as the presence of an incumbent in a district, in formulating our plans." SRAC App. 49. The court explained that, in a district with a black incumbent, "black voter turnout will be greater than if there is no incumbent running, which will, in turn be greater than if a white incumbent were running." SRAC App. 50.

The SRAC also complains that the three-judge court "refused to consider . . . extensive evidence of racial bloc voting," evidence that the SRAC claims showed that a district with a 50.1% black VAP would not satisfy Section 2. SRAC J.S. 25. To the contrary, the three-judge court did consider the expert testimony offered by plaintiffs and concluded that "the extent to which voting is polarized in South Carolina remains an open question and will certainly vary from locality to locality." SRAC App. 56. In view of *Gingles*' requirement that evidence of racially polarized voting must be district-specific, 478 U.S. at 59 n.28, and the deficiencies in the expert testimony, *see supra* p. 7 and note 8, the court's finding was unquestionably correct. The court nonetheless accepted the parties' stipulation that "since 1984 there is evidence of racially polarized voting in South Carolina." SRAC App. 56. The three-judge court's decision not to draw all of the majority black Senate districts advocated by Appellants was not based on a lack of evidence of racial bloc voting, but rather on evidence demonstrating that the proposed districts were not sufficiently compact, as required by *Gingles*, 478 U.S. at 50.

In determining whether a district is compact under *Gingles*, courts take a "functional" approach, rather than

relying on the shapes of the districts.[24] Under a functional approach, "a district is sufficiently geographically compact if it allows for effective representation," *Dillard v. Baldwin County Bd. of Educ.*, 686 F. Supp. 1459, 1466 (M.D. Ala. 1988), *i.e.*, if the citizens within the district are able "to relate to each other and their representatives" and the representatives are able "to relate effectively to their constituency." *Wilson*, 823 P.2d at 574. In addition, "the functional aspect of geographical compactness takes into account the presence or absence of a sense of community made possible by open lines of access and communication." *Id.* at 549. "If a district is so spread out that no sense of community exists, then that district is not sufficiently compact." *DeGrandy*, slip op. at 18.[25]

In keeping with the functional approach to compactness, the three-judge court recognized that "the color of

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[24] *See generally DeGrandy v. Wetherell*, No. TCA 92-40015-WS, No. 92-40131, slip op. at 8 ("[T]he proper focus of any geographic compactness analysis is upon the size and relative concentration of the minority population, rather than upon the size or shape of the district."); *Dillard v. Baldwin County Bd. of Educ.*, 686 F. Supp. 1459, 1465-66 (M.D. Ala. 1988) ("By compactness, [*Gingles*] does not mean that a proposed district must meet . . . some aesthetic absolute, such as symmetry or attractiveness."); *Wilson*, 823 P.2d at 574 ("Compactness does not refer to geometric shapes . . . ."). The functional approach to compactness is consistent with both the legislative history of Section 2 and Justice Brennan's opinion in *Gingles*. 478 U.S. at 48 n.15.

[25] The compactness requirement becomes more important in the case of single-member districts than in the case of multi-member districts or at-large elections. The reason is that, when plaintiffs challenging a multi-member district ask the court to divide it into single-member districts, the proposed districts by definition will always be smaller in area and therefore no less compact than the multi-member districts they replace. By contrast, when plaintiffs challenge a single-member districting plan and ask the court to draw different single-member districts, there is no similar limitation. The proposed districts may stretch all over the State and therefore may be substantially less compact than the districts they replace. In such a situation, the court must take particular care to observe *Gingles*' compactness requirement.

one's skin, in and of itself, does not create a community of interest. Rather, a community's views on crime, employment, education, police brutality, urban sprawl, or urban blight may be just as indicative of a community of interest as whether the members of the community are predominantly black or white . . . ." SRAC App. 54-55 (footnote omitted); *see Wilson*, 823 P.2d at 574-75 (functional compactness "speaks to relationships that are facilitated by shared interests"); *see also* Sen. App. 8a (Senate criteria for drawing districts meant to promote "districts where the people that are in the district will have . . . a collective sense [that] they're a district and they know the issues that are going on that affect that district").

Appellants apparently believe that, so long as it is physically possible to draw a district that is at least 57% black, Section 2 requires that district to be included in any court-drawn plan, regardless of whether it is functionally compact. Such an approach runs directly contrary to the geographical compactness mandate of *Gingles*. 478 U.S. at 50. As the court observed in *Watkins v. Mabus*, 771 F. Supp. at 805, "*Gingles* does not interpret § 2 of the Voting Rights Act to require the creation of majority non-white districts that are not geographically compact." *See also Wilson*, 823 P.2d at 566 ("[S]ection 2 need not control formulation of plans where minority voters are not, functionally, geographically compact").

Contrary to the SRAC's claim that its evidence of compactness was "conceded by the parties and the court," SRAC J.S. 6 n.6, the evidence demonstrated that the additional districts advocated by the SRAC and the Governor did not meet *Gingles*' compactness requirement. As discussed above, the Savannah Valley district (District 10) strung together disparate communities of interest in seven different counties. *See supra* pp. 8-9. The district proposed by the SRAC north of Columbia (District 15) fractured a compact predominantly black area into two dis-

tricts (Districts 15 and 17) and, by splitting precincts, added disparate groups of black voters with no community of interest to increase the black percentage of the population in both districts. *See supra* p. 9. The majority black districts proposed by the SRAC and the Governor in eastern South Carolina likewise disrupted existing communities of interest and diluted black voting strength in adjacent districts. *See supra* pp. 9-10.

Appellants complain that, in determining not to draw additional majority black districts, the three-judge court improperly deferred to "the state policy of recognizing county lines." SRAC J.S. 28; Gov. J.S. 22-25.[26] Contrary to Appellants' claims that the preservation of county lines somehow runs counter to the policies underlying Section 2, courts have held the preservation of political boundaries, such as county lines, promotes the creation of districts encompassing communities of interest, in conformity with the compactness requirement of *Gingles*. As the special masters who drew reapportionment plans for the California Supreme Court explained, preservation of the "geographical integrity of any city, county, or city and county" when drawing legislative districts (as required by that State's Constitution) is entirely compatible with Section 2.

> [U]se of [the California constitutional] criteria reinforces the [Voting Rights] Act's guarantee to minority groups to have an equal opportunity "to participate in the political process." . . . [P]olitical effectiveness can be enhanced by membership and

[26] Appellants' argument cannot be that the three-judge court refused altogether to break county lines in order to enhance minority voting strength, as the court did precisely that in fashioning a majority black Congressional district. SRAC App. 84 & n.78. What Appellants are really contending is that the court should have crossed even more county lines in order to create additional black majority districts in the Senate and the House. This is, essentially, a rehashing of Appellants' maximization argument and should be rejected as such. *See* Argument III, *supra*.

> participation in community affairs: candidates for public office can be recruited and nurtured, local media may be better utilized . . . [and] grassroots organizing and campaigning are more viable.

Wilson, 823 P.2d at 574-75 (citation omitted).[27] Here, by minimizing cuts across county lines, the three-judge court's plan for the Senate served both state policy and the requirement of "racial fairness." SRAC App. 70.[28]

The SRAC's argument that the three-judge court "chose to honor 'South Carolina's traditional and legitimate policies' of protecting incumbents," SRAC J.S. 28, rather than apply the principles embodied in Section 2, is equally

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[27] *See Arizonans for Fair Representation v. Symington*, No. CIV 92-256-PHX-SMM, slip op. at 11-12, 15; *Magnolia Bar Ass'n, Inc. v. Lee*, No. J90-0413(B), slip op. at 29-30 (S.D. Miss. July 15, 1992) (to be reported at 793 F. Supp. 1386) (copy lodged with this Court); *see also Connor v. Finch*, 431 U.S. 407, 430 (1977) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (noting in the context of a challenge on racial fairness grounds to a court-ordered redistricting plan that "[w]here there is an established policy of respecting political or natural boundaries in districting, then I believe that a court may best avoid any appearance of partisanship by using those boundaries as much as possible in its districting"). *Cf. Good v. Austin*, No. 91-CV-74754DT, 1992 WL 173862, at *5 (E.D. & W.D. Mich. July 28, 1992); *Prosser v. Elections Bd.*, 793 F. Supp. 859, 866 (W.D. Wis. 1992); *Wesch v. Hunt*, 785 F. Supp. 1491, 1498 (S.D. Ala.), *aff'd mem. sub nom. Camp v. Wesch*, 112 S. Ct. 1926 (1992); *Carstens v. Lamm*, 543 F. Supp. 68, 88 (D. Colo. 1982) ("[P]olitical subdivisions should remain undivided whenever possible because the sense of community derived from established governmental units tends to foster effective representation.").

[28] The three-judge court also noted that its plan minimized the number of split precinct lines. While recognizing that this was "primarily an issue which effects administrative convenience, splitting precincts also has the effect of confusing both voters and potential voters; thus, in some instances, serving to abridge the right to vote or to have their vote counted." SRAC App. 64. Each of the additional majority black districts proposed by the SRAC and the Governor contained split precincts, and the testimony at trial showed that such splits adversely affect black turnout, *see* Sen. App. 2a-5a, thus reducing the "electability" of these districts.

unavailing. In fact, the three-judge court expressly stated that "[a]lthough protecting constituent-representative relations may be a legitimate concern for a legislative body fashioning a plan, this court must act circumspectly and without taint of arbitrariness." SRAC App. 64 (citations omitted). Accordingly, the three-judge court's apolitical treatment of the incumbency issue was entirely proper.[29]

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[29] For example, the court looked at the extent to which the placement of more than one incumbent in a given district indicated "apparent partisan considerations." SRAC App. 65; *id.* at 65 n.61 (criticizing Governor's plan for Senate because it paired ten Democratic incumbents); *see Prosser*, 793 F. Supp. at 871 (noting that court-drawn plan was less partisan than plans submitted by parties because it pitted the least number of incumbents against each other). The court also considered incumbency to determine what impact the race of the incumbent would have on "the effectiveness of the black voting age population." SRAC App. 49-50. The court observed that, to satisfy Section 2, a smaller percentage of black voters was required in a district with a black incumbent than in an open district or one with a white incumbent. SRAC App. 49-50; *see Nash*, 1992 WL 165162, at *10 (noting that determining the requisite minority population size is a multi-factor inquiry).

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the appeal and the cross-appeal should be dismissed or, in the alternative, the judgment of the three-judge court should be affirmed.

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Respectfully submitted,

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APPENDIX

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APPENDIX

ARRINGTON—CROSS

* * * *

[Arrington Trial Transcript, p. 27] Q. (By Mr. Howe, counsel for the Senate): And when we look at your report you make some reference to the studies that you have done, you chose as the benchmark for racial polarization in the state the race between Campbell and Theo Mitchell?

A. I did. Simply because it was a statewide race which we could apply to a number of different districts.

Q. And from your perspective, from your analysis, that's the one race you used on these senatorial districts [i.e., the three black majority districts], isn't it?

A. It the only one I used on those three, I did look at a number of other—a number of other Senate races and several [28] House races.

Q. But on the three that you are talking about where the Republicans are creating these districts?

A. That's correct.

Q. You only used that race?

A. I only used that race.

Q. One race?

A. That's correct.

Q. You say in your report these figures are fragmentary and are less than totally reliable, don't you?

A. Yes, the court would not want to base conclusions about racial polarization solely from the data that I presented here. I was well aware that Dr. Loewen was going to come and present information, and since that time I have also seen a very extensive body of incomplete but nevertheless persuasive evidence about racial polarization from Dr. Ruoff's analysis.

Q. Well, when you wrote this, what you wrote a week ago?

A. Uh-huh.

Q. What you were saying when you said that was, "I got some information, but I don't want you to base any

of your decisions on it because it is fragmentary and less than totally reliable?

A. Yes, and when I wrote that a week ago you will notice there is several references to Loewen in that, I knew the Loewen data would be presented.

* * * *

[30] Q. (By Mr. Howe, counsel for the Senate): You worked at the local level in local politics?

A. I have.

Q. I think we all consider that in the trenches?

A. In the trenches.

Q. No doubt about it?

A. No doubt about it.

Q. And that's being there on election day and that sort of thing?

A. Yes, I was the chairman of the Mecklenburg County Board of Elections for six years and a member of that board for 12, so that's very much in the trenches.

Q. You familiar with the problems associated with splitting precincts?

A. Yes.

Q. That does create problems on election day?

A. Yes.

Q. And those problems are burdensome, not only the top, say the chairman level where you are, but particularly burdensome on the people in the [polls], aren't they?

A. They are.

Q. Voters who come often have small amounts of time set aside to vote and can be easily frustrated [into] sort of giving [31] up their franchise, can't they?

A. That's correct.

Q. And if the lines are too long or they are having to try to locate themselves on a map, any little frustration like that can significantly lower voter participation, can't it?

A. Yes.

Q. And that should be avoided, shouldn't it?

A. Should be avoided.

Q. And you would see and agree with me that the splitting of precincts on election day in the face of the individual going to the [polls] to vote can be and often is very inhibiting?

A. Yes.

Q. And should be avoided if it possibly can?

A. Should be avoided if you can avoid it without committing a greater violation.

Q. Where I'm heading is this, if you have been helping with that county you have been a part of some get-out-the-vote movement, haven't you, encouraging people to register, encouraging people to participate—

A. Oh, yes, absolutely, sure, absolutely.

Q. Sure. I mean that's when you have ads and say, you know, "exercise your right," and that's not directed Democrat or Republican, it's "doggone it, get out there and vote?"

A. Our experience in similar situations in Mecklenburg County is that when you are faced with a situation where [32] you have a split precinct, you have to go to extraordinary lengths to prepare for the problems it's going to cause, but it can be handled.

Q. But splitting precincts causes and requires some extraordinary lengths to try to deal with it, to use your language?

A. There's no question that that is true.

JUDGE HAMILTON: Mr. Glenn, Mr. Holleman.

MR. GLENN: Yes, sir, I didn't knew he's through.

MR. HOWE: I'm sorry.

CROSS EXAMINATION

BY MR. GLENN (counsel for the Lieutenant Governor):

Q. Yes, doctor, just on that very subject matter that Mr. Howe was just questioning you, who is more likely to be disadvantaged by the confusion of—that arises according to your testimony from splitting precincts, black voter[s] or white voter[s]?

A. Black voter[s].

Q. So, the consideration given to avoiding splitting precincts comports with the Voting Rights Act of 1965, does it not?

A. Taken all by itself, yes, sir. Now, I can explain it. Sure, if you take any one element like that, absolutely —if for example somebody specifically went through and split or otherwise created confusion in black precincts and not in [33] white precincts that would be a clear violation of the Voting Rights Act, no question about it.

You simply have to balance many different interests here. The first interest in drawing districts is the constitutional one, one person one vote, that will require splitting some precincts. The second requirement is a federal statutory requirement, the Voting Rights Act, and unfortunately that will require splitting some more.

The election commissions will simply have to adjust to that if the court decides you have to split some precincts to follow the Voting Rights Act, and I think you do.

Q. Providing meaningful access to the political process to exercise the franchise is part of the—for citizens of all races, and to protect the minority race is part of the design of the Voting Rights Act; is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. And voter confusion as a result of splitting precincts is more likely to deny access to a black voter than a white voter?

A. Yes. But again, the denial that comes from fracturing black majorities and putting them in districts where they cannot conceivably be an important influence in that district is a much greater denial than a little bit of confusion on election day.

Q. So, what we have to do is a balancing between the [34] legitimate non-discriminatory state interest in the election process?

A. Yes, you have to balance them, you have to figure out which are the most important.

Q. And unfortunately we have now come to the point where we have laid that at the feet of three judges that

constitute this court to do that balancing, is that where we are in this litigation?

A. Yes.

* * * *

[68] BY MR. HOLLEMAN: (counsel for the South Carolina Democratic Party):

Q. . . . you have made a point of benchmark of the governor's race in the general election in 1990, but you do not have the Democratic primary for governor in 1990, do you?

A. No, I don't.

Q. Which was a statewide race, correct?

A. That's correct.

Q. With a black and white candidate?

A. That's correct.

Q. Both of which were state senators, correct?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you know that the information for that primary is published in the Annual Report of the South Carolina Election Commission?

A. By precinct.

Q. No, by county?

A. I knew it was published by county.

[69] Q. And do you also know—

A. I do not do—I'm sorry, I did not do county by county analysis, I rely on precincts.

Q. Do you also know that the electorate in that primary was approximately 57 percent white?

A. If you say so, I did not know that.

Q. Do you also know that Senator Mitchell won that primary by substantial margin?

A. That I did know.

Q. And that might be a benchmark election too; might it not?

A. It would indeed.

* * * *

COUICK—DIRECT

* * * *

[Couick Trial Transcript, p. 150] Q (By Mr. Howe, counsel for the Senate): Now, as—when the plans were

exchanged in December and subsequently, there have been additional areas that have been pointed to as [prospective] minority/majority districts?

A (By Mr. Couick, Director of Research for the Senate Judiciary Committee): Yes, sir.

Q I would like to go through those with you and we'll start with what we will call the Savannah Valley. Which number is that? Is that ten?

A Yes, sir, that's ten in most of the plans—in all the plans that's ten, yes, sir.

Q Now, did the [Senate Judiciary Committee's] Subcommittee [on Reapportionment] create a [151] majority/minority at ten?

A No, sir, they did not.

Q Why not?

A In all three—there are three plans, as best of my memory, that have a District 10 in them. I believe it's the S.R.A.C. proposal, we kind of call SRAC. The Governor and the Republican Party all have a District 10. All of them are a little bit different. The Republican Party and the Governor's are more black than the S.R.A.C.'s.

Q That doesn't come as any great surprise to anybody.

A We found—or the Subcommittee found based upon staff's review that particularly with the Republican party and the Governor's proposal, there were a number of precincts that were split in the particular district. And they were split mainly in minority precincts that would only add to the voter confusion that we had heard a good bit of testimony about at the [Subcommittee's hearing on] criteria [for drawing redistricting plans] . . . and at other times.

Q Let's digress one second on that. Was there testimony at the Subcommittee hearings specifically on the problems associated with voter precinct splits?

A Yes, sir. It came from almost every quarter in that—committee meetings in particular, we heard from

[152] not only people that you've heard about this week, but we also heard from folks like Senator Joe Wilson saying that there [was] confusion that was caused by precinct splits.

Q In addition to that, did you do some research by calling the Democratic and Republican parties?

A I personally did not do that, but I requested my staff who gave me a report back to call the Democratic Party, the Republican Party and to the State Election Commission, and ask for a recent history of election protests and what most of those precincts—I mean protests involved, and particularly had there been any protests that involved split precincts. And the response that came back was most definitely yes. In fact, most protests that—where there were split precincts within the district had some relationship to the splits.

Q Was it determined—I'm going to go back to 10. Was it determined that the various proposals for District 10 did in fact violate the Senate criteria?

A Yes, sir. For several reasons, we never were able to determine that an electable district could be drawn in that area. We took into account the great geographic stretch of the districts. And that wasn't the determining factor, but when you combine that with [153] the number of split precincts that the splits occurred mainly in heavily black precincts, that there were no unified communities of interest throughout that district, and there was no core of an existing district that that district was built upon, we determined it was going to be hard for that district to be electable at that percentage drawn.

Q Now, let's talk about these districts and I'm not going to do this on each of these districts, I promise.

We agree that the first criteria is equal—one man one vote, and the second one is the Voting Rights Act?

A Yes, sir.

Q How did that play—I mean, do you go to two and then stop? How—contiguity, communities of interest, constituent consistency, precinct boundaries, etc., how are those—and compactness, how do they play together, how

did the Subcommittee play them together in the decision making mix?

A The criteria that the Subcommittee adopted are fairly neutral criteria. I think that if you look at other states and other submissions by the Republican Party and others, they're meant to build good districts, good electable districts, districts where [154] the people that are in the district will have an idea of a collective sense, they're a district and they know the issues that are going on that affect that district.

They're able not only to elect a representative from a cohesive compact district, but they are able to affect that representative once he's elected and offer him comments and have kind of a core sense of issues they're interested in that he'll have to respond to.

Q What I'm getting at is several people have said that you come to the Voting Rights Act, you apply maximization and you don't go further. Is that how the Subcommittee did it?

A No, sir. As I was getting to, those neutral criteria that were meant to create electable districts for any type of the 46 senatorial districts have the same impact in a minority district, a black majority electable district, whatever you care to determine.

It was meant to make those districts where they could be electable, where like communities of interest would be something that would be an asset or an added asset to that district. That if you had a district that was nominally a black district, if it was in a community of interest or in several communities of interests that were related, that would make it a higher quality district in terms of the black representative [155] that was elected being able to participate effectively in the legislative process and also in terms of the folks from where he was elected being able to have input in important and quality input into what he did.

Q What did the Subcommittee determine about the proposed minority/majority district in that area?

A That it was not elect[able].

Q Now, what did it determine as it related to the criteria?

A As to each criteria?

Q Just generally.

A In consideration of black majority, [putative] black majority districts, the Subcommittee never divorced the Voting Rights Act compliance with the other criteria. We never really got to the point of considering the other criteria. Those were not important.

They wanted if possible to draw a black district if it met the first two in terms of equal population and Voting Rights Act compliance, but they viewed the other criteria to have an impact on that Voting Rights Act compliance.

So to the extent that you didn't have a compact district, or it wasn't cohesive or there were no communities of interest, no core district, they didn't go beyond that point. So, they felt like if it did not [156] comply with those first two criteria, it was not electable.

Q When you look—one of the next areas of concern was Georgetown [County] as a prospective district. What district number was—

A Thirty-four, I believe in most plans have denominated that District 34.

Q And did the Republicans, Governor and the N.A.A.C.P. [SRAC] propose a district there?

A In fact, I believe the Lieutenant Governor proposed a district in that area as well.

They all are a good bit different. The Lieutenant Governor tends to take the Senate plan and extend it and adjust some of the other districts beside it.

The N.A.A.C.P.'s way of drawing the district is to shift over Districts 32 and 36 and take part of the black population in Williamsburg County in order to draw District 34.

I believe the Governor and the Republican Party had a little bit different iteration where they pushed District 30 up into Dillon County, and then used some of

the population left over from that shift in order to draw the District 34.

Q What did the Subcommittee determine in that area?

A The determinations on those—on those plans were [157] a little bit different than District 10, because there were so many different ways of trying to draw District 34.

As to the Republican Party, and I could be mistaken that both were alike, but I believe the Republican Party and the Governor were very similar. In terms of their using the black population in Dillon County for District 30, we had ample testimony from Senator Gilbert [the black incumbent in District 30] that that was not a type of population that would give him what he called an electable district.

That—for that reason, you were merely taking one district, District 30, and making it unelectable in order to try to achieve an electable district in District 34. So, it's kind of a trade-off. And I feel that to some degree, the District 34 [in the Governor's plan] was not as electable as the District 30 that was drawn by the Senate.

In terms of the Lieutenant Governor['s] proposal, the V.A.P. is fairly low on that district. I don't believe that it would be an electable district for a number of reasons, including that one reason is it stretches essentially from outside Dillon County down almost into Charleston.

Q And in trying to create a minority district in [158] that area, what did it do to Williamsburg County?

A Well—and that was kind of the approach taken by the N.A.A.C.P. They shifted over and divided Williamsburg County into 4 different districts. And by doing that, they fracture what's kind of already a cohesive core of a[n] [existing] district [District 32] in order to draw that District [34].

And they shifted over also into Clarendon County in District 36, and they kind of—I believe the Subcommittee view, from my understanding of the Subcommittee view, by doing that, they took what were two very highly elect-

able black districts [Districts 32 and 36], and by fracturing every one of them, all three of them, they left open the question whether any of them were electable or not.

Q Now, the next would be up in the Fairfield area [north of Columbia].

A Yes, sir.

Q Now, the Senate added the eleventh district in the Fairfield area, and I believe several of the plans proposed an additional district in that area.

A Yes, sir.

Q And what was the Subcommittee's position on that?

A Mr. Howe, once again, all these plans are a little bit different. The Lieutenant Governor only drew one district in the Fairfield area. That district had a [159] lower V.A.P. than that drawn by the Senate. And for that reason, the Subcommittee felt like that we—the Subcommittee had done a better job of establishing an electable district within the confines of that compact area. In addition, the Lieutenant Governor['s] District, I believe, goes over and takes part of Spartanburg. It still has a lower V.A.P.

And I'm not looking at either the Republican or the Governor's [actually the SRAC's] plans, but the best of my memory is both of them draw two districts that are essentially divided by a line somewhat parallel to I-77. And that that—you can essentially take one district on the right of I-77 that runs from Rock Hill to Lancaster to Camden down into Columbia, taking part of an existing district, District 19, currently occupied by Senator Kay Patterson [who is black]. That's one district out of that area.

They draw another district [District 15] that starts in Fairfield County, runs up, I believe both of them or one of them goes into Newberry, then into—these are cities, City of Newberry, City of Union, and then over into Spartanburg before coming back into the City of Rock Hill, the City of York, and in fact I believe one may go into the City of Gaffney for a small black population.

Q Did the Subcommittee believe it was possible to be [160] true to the criteria and draw two minority districts in that area?

A No, sir. And with the last plans I described that draw two districts, the Subcommittee's view was you had essentially a core district there that could be drawn that was compact and cohesive, a black area. That by doing what these other parties had done, you had fractured that cohesive compact district in two and drawn two districts [Districts 15 and 17] that were highly unlikely to be . . . electable because of the disparity, geographic and in terms of the—how the folks kind of thought of their communities of interest. You would put disparate groups together.

* * * *

[164] Q (By Mr. Howe): Have you run an analysis of the plan other—plans of other submissions involving precinct splits?

A (By Mr. Couick): Yes, sir.

Q And how many does the Governor's plan as amended split?

A The Governor's plan as provided to staff on 12/23/91 as amended most recently contains 122 split precincts.

Q And how about the Republican Party?

A As—it was a proposal made on 12/23/91 as recently amended to include some cleanup, I believe it was back earlier in the year, included 145 splits.

[165] Q And how about the [SRAC]?

A Their submission of 12/23/91 included 65 splits.

* * * *

We have also done an analysis of the total voting population with each of those splits as well.

Q (By Mr. Howe) What does that show us?

A That if you look at the Governor's plan for the Senate, and this one is the same plan I was just describing, its population within the split precincts is 290,730 people. That's approximately 8.4 percent of the total

population of the state. Of these precincts, there are 35—excuse me, 34½ percent black population.

If you look at the Republican—excuse me, the [166] S.R.A.C., N.A.A.C.P., the total number of population within their split precincts is 170,534. That's roughly five percent of the total state population. Of those precincts split, the population is 26.7 percent black.

* * * *

LOEWEN—CROSS

* * * *

[Loewen Trial Transcript, p. 73] Q. (By Mr. Holleman, counsel for the South Carolina Democratic Party): Okay. And as Mr. Howe asked you, I believe you said you were not aware that District 30 later elected a black senator, is that correct, in 1988?

A. That's correct.

Q. Are you aware that that black senator was elected in a runoff after having finished second in the first race?

A. I am not.

Q. And as to district 45, I believe you also said you were [74] not aware that it later elected a black senator, Senator McKinley Washington; is that correct?

A. In general, just to avoid any drawn out questions, I'm not prepared to testify about any election after 1984 or any candidates after that date.

Q. So, I guess then you are not aware that Senator Washington received approximately 60 percent of the vote, both in the democratic primary runoff and in the general election against white candidates?

A. That's correct.

Q. And looking at District 32, if I could for just a minute, I believe that is the district that includes Williamsburg County, which has been represented by Senator Frank McGill and his son Yancey McGill—are you aware of that fact?

A. No, sir.

Q. You are not aware. But I guess as you see your numbers show that Senator McGill, if you will assume

with me for the moment that was the candidate, received almost 50 percent of the black vote, correct?

A. Yes.

Q. And are you also aware, since I see you have analyzed prior Williamsburg County elections, that if not all, virtually all of the county wide elected officials in Williamsburg County, except for Senator McGill, are black?

A. I do not now remember that, but it's—I don't contest [75] it.

Q. Including, for example, the Sheriff and the Treasurer of Williamsburg County?

A. Okay. If you say so, I believe you.

Q. And that Senator McGill was the only county wide elected white official in that county?

A. Could be.

Q. So, I guess when we look at the three senate districts you have analyzed for 1984 and forward, we find two districts which have since elected, if you assume for the moment these facts are true, black senators, and one district in which 50—the senator who happened to have been white got 50 percent of the black vote, and the other county wide elected officials are black.

Would you say that these, assuming those facts, would you say then that these are districts where the black population of those districts are well able to elect candidates of their choice?

A. Based on what you told me has happened since '84, that seems to be a reasonable statement.

Q. And those are the only districts you have analyzed from '84 forward?

A. Yes.

* * * *

[88] Q. (By Mr. Hunter, counsel for the Governor): Okay. Have you made a study of blacks that have been successful in their elections to the general assembly of South Carolina?

A. No.

* * * *

[101] Q. (By Mr. Hunter): Assume the court should find that it needed to draw remedial districts to assist black communities to have equal opportunity to elect candidates of their choice to the legislature, how would you advise the court or the drafters with regard to the number of seats that should be in any one plan?

A. I would probably look at the various plans—

JUDGE HAMILTON: Now wait a minute, if I understood your question, the number of seats that should be in the Senate plan, the House plan, or the congressional plan is not determined by this court.

MR. HUNTER: The number of minority remedial seats, Your Honor—

[102] JUDGE HAMILTON: Well, that's not what you said. All right.

BY MR. HUNTER:

Q. I'm sorry. The number of remedial seats that should be included in the plan, not the gross total number of seats.

A. Generally, I have been in a position of—when I have been looking at plans, I have been looking at plans already drawn. I have, in a few cases, drawn—been commissioned and involved in drawing my own plans. But generally I would look at the two plans—let's say—I think you mentioned 11 and 14?

Q. 11-let's say 11 and 15.

A. 11 and 15, excuse me. And I would first want to advise the court as to whether I thought all 11 seats were in fact reasonably winnable by minorities, or all 15 seats were reasonably winnable, and I would no that through the analysis that I have already mentioned to you.

JUDGE HAMILTON: Have you done that with respect to any plan that is going to come before this court?

THE WITNESS: No, sir, I have not looked at any plan, no plan has been provided me.

* * * *

LOEWEN—RECROSS

[128] Q. (By Mr. Holleman): Did I understand you to say in response to questions from over here that a—in your opinion a black population of 50 to 65 percent in South Carolina makes an electable black district?

A. Depending on the part of the state and it's electoral history, yes.

* * * *

RUOFF—DIRECT

* * * *

[Ruoff Trial Transcript, p. 8] Q. (By Mr. McDonald, counsel for the SRAC):

What were you asked to do in this case?

A. I was principally asked to assist in drawing maps for the House of South Carolina, House of Representatives, the South Carolina Senate, and the United States Congress.

Q. Now, what criteria did you use in drawing the maps that you drew?

A. The first criteria that we used was to try to build the largest number of districts in which African American citizens would have an equal opportunity, at least an equal opportunity to be elected.

In doing that we pay particular attention to insuring that those districts which currently have African American incumbents, that those districts were solidified, made sure that they were in good shape for reelection.

Secondly, that additional districts which were either currently a majority of African Americans but not really electable, not really districts in which African Americans had an equal opportunity to be elected, could be strengthened and buttressed to provide greater opportunity.

And then to, as much as possible, try to build the influence districts where African American citizens could have some influence on the—on the incumbents when they were elected who presumably would be white incumbents. We also—

Q. Let me stop you there if I may because I want to ask you about one of the earlier criteria that you

indicated that you [9] used. How—how do you define a district, as far as the Senate is concerned, which provides minorities an equal opportunity to elect a candidate of choice?

A. Well, there is—there is no absolutely precise definition. Our general rule of thumb was based on looking at the historical reality of where have black senators been elected, and taking that as a benchmark, seeing that in general the break point was at just about 58 percent.

In districts that were more than 58 percent, with one exception, with two exceptions, African Americans were —were elected, and generally below 58 percent African Americans were not elected. There were one or two exceptions to that.

So that for example in Greenville County, Senate District 7, which is just about an even 50/50 district, it has been Senator Theo Mitchell, an African American, has been elected in that district.

* * * *

[13] BY MR. McDONALD (counsel for the SRAC):

Q. Now, did you give any credence to the prior existing lines in drawing the plan for the Senate that you drew?

A. In general we did not. We did—as a general proposition we did not pay attention to incumbency where—where we were not particularly concerned about building a black district.

I think that on the whole we tried to sort of generally make it in the same area that the existing district was, although I don't think that when you start squeezing in the black opportunity districts that you can very closely do that.

Q. Now, did you attempt to draw the maximum possible number of districts that were majority black for the Senate?

A. The original exercise was to draw the maximum number to see that was possible, after that we then step back and said, "what are the best districts that we can

draw that will produce a fair plan, rather than the maximum number of majority districts?"

It turned out that the number happened to be the same, but they ended up being somewhat different, although they are not the same in our House plan.

Q. Okay. Now, did you take into account in any way whether or not the districts would have open seats, that is seats with no incumbents in them?

A. Particularly where we were trying to create districts [14] that would have black majorities that would be opportunity districts, we tried to create as many of those open seats as possible, oftentimes by putting white incumbents in districts together.

Q. You indicated, I believe, that you attempted to maintain the black majority districts that existed?

A. Yes.

Q. Why was that a concern?

A. Well, first of all to avoid losing what African American citizens already had. And so it was important to us that those districts, that we make sure that those districts were in good shape.

Q. Now, did you take into consideration the incumbency of non-minority members?

A. No.

Q. And why not?

A. We did not think that that was an important issue in terms of—of the interests of a African-American citizens in South Carolina.

* * * *

[15] Q. (BY MR. McDONALD, counsel for the SRAC): Dr. Ruoff, let me hand you Exhibit 111, which I think there has been no objection to, and ask you to explain briefly what that document is.

A. This—this document is a—on the first page it shows the existing senatorial districts and on the second page—and although it's not identified as such on here, I believe I recognize this as coming from the state statis-

tical abstract published by the budget and control board.

It also gives the Senate district numbers, total population, black population, percent black, the over 18 population black, over 18 percent black, over 18, and the percent variance—variation in the 1984 Senate plan.

Q. Now, did you consult that data in making your determination about what constitutes a district that would provide blacks an equal opportunity to elect a candidate of their choice?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. And in what way did you take that data into account?

A. Well, in looking at—in looking at this information, as well as taking into account racial polarization data, which we were aware, we wanted to see what's the real number it takes to get blacks elected, what are those districts in which [16] blacks can get elected and how black are they?

And in looking at that it was—it was fairly clear to us that those districts were generally 58 percent or higher.

Q. And do you know the blacks who are elected in those various districts?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, you indicated that generally blacks got elected in the—

MR. HUNTER (counsel for the Governor): Your Honor?

JUDGE HAMILTON: Yes, Mr. Hunter.

MR. HUNTER: I think it would be helpful if the witness would indicate 58 percent of what?

THE WITNESS: Population, total population.

JUDGE HAMILTON: VAP?

THE WITNESS: No, sir, total population.

JUDGE HAMILTON: Total population?

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.

MR. HUNTER: He's saying total pop is what I understand?

JUDGE HAMILTON: That's correct.

BY MR. McDONALD:

Q. Can you identify with respect to individual districts and, their racial composition, where that general rule did not apply?

[17] A. Certainly does not apply with respect to Senate District 7 which was a 50.23[% black] district, population.

JUDGE ANDERSON: Is that Theo Mitchell's district?

THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honor. And also with respect to Senate District number 45, McKinley Washington's district, which was a 54.60[% black district] in the 1980 census.

BY MR. McDONALD:

Q. Are those the only two exceptions to the general proposition?

A. Yes.

Q. What is the racial composition of the other senatorial districts which elected blacks?

A. Okay. Senate District 19, which is Senator Kay Patterson's district, was 58.75; Senate District 30, which is currently Senator Frank Gilbert is the Senator, is 59.30; Senate District 39, which is Senator John Matthews is the incumbent, 59.18; and Senate District number 42 in which Herbert Fielding is a Senator is 59.13.

Q. And that exhausts the number of Senate—

A. There are currently six black Senators, yes.

MR. McDONALD: We would move the introduction into evidence at this time of Exhibit 111.

JUDGE HAMILTON: Without objection.

THE CLERK: Plaintiffs SRAC Exhibit 111 in evidence.

* * * *

[29] A. (By DR. RUOFF): There is also created a new black majority district, an opportunity district in District 34, which includes Marion County, a piece of Horry County, a chunk of Williamsburg County, and some of Georgetown County. And that District 34 is 61.86 percent black.

One of the other things that we sought to do in drawing our plans was to increase the involvement of African-Americans generally in the political process by trying to make sure that, particularly in these low country [Coastal] districts, there would be black representation as much as we could get on as many delegations as we could get it, given the South Carolina practice of having the legislative delegation make many of the important decisions that affect African-Americans.

BY MR. McDONALD:

Q. More precisely, Dr. Ruoff, how would you go about trying to effectuate that concern?

A. Well, for example, Senator Matthews' district includes a piece of Orangeburg County, Dorchester County, Colleton County, Hampton County, Allendale County, and Bamberg County, as well as Barnwell County. Rather than—as for example, the Republican Plan that essentially cuts him off right here and also reduces the number of counties in which Senator McKinley Washington would be on the delegation, if—assuming he were reelected, or whichever person were reelected.

[30] Q. Are there any other examples of how you attempted to do that, that is to maximize black participation in the affairs of the county delegations?

A. Those are a couple of the places where we are most conscious of it, but it also goes to the question of whether we would have, as a general proposition, tried to reduce the number of counties that a—that a black—that an opportunity district might be. And our general inclination was to say that better to draw an opportunity district in more counties rather than in less.

Q. You used the phrase opportunity district, are you referring to a district in which minorities have an equal chance to elect a representative of their choice or something else?

A. That is exactly what we are referring to.

* * * *

[44] Q. (BY MR. HOWE, counsel for the Senate): When you started off drawing I think you told us that the first thing you wanted to do was to protect the existing minority majority districts?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And once you decided where those were, at that point, after that, the lines became of no moment, the existing lines?

A. Well, the existing lines were not particularly of moment. As a general proposition, after we dealt with building the black districts we wanted to build, the opportunity districts, we generally followed what was in the Senate's Plan, not precisely by any means.

And once you start—you know, when you do cookie cutter and you built pieces and areas and then you start filling in the in between, it's impossible to just take any other plan and just say, "well, okay, let's lay it on."

Q. But you have been very frank with us that your interest, [45] your motivation has been maximizing black representation?

A. Yes.

Q. And so what you did was, you started off without this overlay, you started off with this just colored map under it and then you—

A. No, sir. No sir. I mean, we never used a thematic map as the base for our drawing. We happened to have other computer capabilities that give us the same effect. In fact, our system is a little better in terms of that because we can see population density but—

Q. What I'm getting at is, is that you would have taken and drawn in the black majority districts?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And had in mind, "how can be enhance those, how can we make those stronger?"

A. (Nods head in the affirmative).

Q. Then you would have looked at concentrations of black population and drawn districts for those?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And the rest you followed the Senate Plan because the white folks could draw those about any way they wanted to?

A. Well, it's all—it's really more that it's just a lot easier to follow something that is already sitting there.

Q. Okay. Well, what was sitting there, there were several plans sitting there, weren't there? There wasn't just the [46] Senate's?

A. There was also—I think we had seen a Republican plan at that point. I think those are the only two other plans that I had seen.

Q. So, to the extent that the Senate is involved, y'all deferred towards the Senate Plan on the remaining lines that didn't interrupt with your lines?

A. As a general proposition, yes.

Q. Now, you mentioned that one of the things y'all tried to do—if not completely, at least minimize, was splitting precincts?

A. Yes.

Q. And that's something to be avoided if possible?

A. The ideal is not to split precincts unless you have to, and in some places we felt you had to.

Q. But that's why you talked about in terms of being able to get—get the variance down to zero, that you would have to split so many precincts it sort of wasn't worth—it wasn't a good idea?

A. I mean, that's—that definitely is one of the reasons not to try to go down to a zero variance.

Q. On balance, the tradeoff isn't worth it because splitting precincts does cause confusion and does have burdens at the polls on voting day?

A. Definitely so.

[47] Q. Now, as I understand your definition and some previous people's definition, what this is all about is trying to have the black community have some of their

representatives in the various community—in the various bodies, ours being the senate—

A. Yes, sir.

Q. —Officials, are elected officials of their choice?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. They really don't necessarily have to be black, do they?

A. No, sir.

Q. Nobody is proposing that, from a racial perspective, what we are looking for is the majority minority districts so that even under the polarization theory that whoever is up there is really up there speaking the black community's side of issues?

A. Right, and is more important than speaking—I mean, is chosen by black people.

Q. Now, in this state two of those are white?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And they have particularly high black percentages in their districts, don't they?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Who am I talking about?

A. Senator Yancey McGill and Senator John Land.

Q. And what are their percentages?

A. Let me dig around here a moment.

[48] Q. I'm supposed to give you this, I think this—

A. I found it.

Q. You got it?

A. Senator Land's percentage in the 1980 before redistricting was 63.24 and Senator McGill's was 58.15.

Q. Those are pretty solid minority majorities?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And is it fair based on looking at that that both of those gentlemen in fact are the chosen representatives of the black community?

A. No, sir.

Q. And—

A. I have done specific analysis in District 32 which show that while there is substantial black support for

Senator McGill, that only 41 percent of the black population voted for him in the special election in which he was elected.

Q. And so in spite of your first criteria, which you testified was your first criteria, and that is preserving black minority majority districts that already exist, and you have stated that as your first criteria, you then choose to abandon that criteria and to stick these two districts together, don't you?

A. Well—

Q. And to run these two white incumbents against each other?

A. We did that, but the first criteria was not to protect [49] exising black majority districts but existing majority districts in which blacks were being elected.

Q. That's—that doesn't strike you as a little prejudicial?

A. No, sir.

Q. Okay. The Aiken District y'all propose is Number 10?

A. The—Number 10 includes a piece of Aiken, yes, sir.

Q. That's the Aiken to Anderson District?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And I think you testified already that you don't even contend that to be a particularly compact district, do you?

A. Well, it certainly is not the most compact—

Q. It's not as compact as you would like it to be?

A. I don't think it's as compact as anyone would like it to be, given other circumstances in terms of where the black population lives in the State of South Carolina and how you need to draw lines to accomplish building districts in which African-Americans have an equal opportunity to elect representatives of their choice.

Q. Assuming they don't elect white representatives, because if you are going to do that then you have to change the whole Plan?

A. No, sir, I specifically already testified that in fact Yancey McGill was not the choice of the black community in Williamsburg County, and I have not done an analysis of Senator Land. I suspect we would find that although he has a [50] comparatively large black vote in his district, that it is not a majority black vote when—in a contest against a black candidate.

Q. Now, do you know how many precincts you split to create [SRAC District] 10?

A. I have not counted that up.

Q. Would you disagree with me that it was six precincts that involved 10,324 people, 72 percent of which were black?

A. That's—I'm—six precents probably sounds about right.

Q. How about 10,324 people, 72 percent of which are black?

A. That could be. I mean, it doesn't sound way off to me.

Q. Well, for the court's background, that's very normal information from the computer?

A. Sure.

Q. I mean, it's pretty amazing but you can sit down and move that little mouse around and figure that stuff out pretty quickly, can't you?

A. Not using a mouse.

Q. However you do it.

A. But you can figure it out pretty quickly.

Q. Georgetown is District 34?

A. Part of Georgetown is District 34.

Q. That's where you all propose to create another minority district?

A. Yes, sir.

[51] Q. And is District 32 next to that?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Now would you disagree with me that you split three precincts in District 32 involving 3,642 voters, 81 percent of which are black?

A. That could be, yes.

Q. And then in 34 you split two precincts involving 1,591 voters, 85 percent of which are black?

A. When you are saying the 85 percent figure, I'm not clear on whether you are saying after we split it that the precinct was 85 percent in that district, or that it was 85 percent—they were 85 percent before they were split.

Q. I'm saying that of that 1,591 people, 81 percent of those people are black that you affected.

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Now, if you don't create the Georgetown District, Williamsburg County as a community of interest is left intact, isn't it?

A. It is possible to draw it intact, yes.

Q. If you don't create the 34th District, if you follow the Senate Plan and don't create that minority district, isn't Williamsburg County as a community of interest kept intact?

A. I don't recall whether all of Williamsburg is in—I mean, certainly the bulk of it is, but I don't recall whether all of it is.

[52] Q. And I'm not thinking so much about county lines but the community of interest of Williamsburg would be left intact. If you create District 34, Williamsburg County under your plan is cut into four separate districts, isn't it?

A. I belive that may be true, yes.

Q. And Georgetown, the community of Georgetown is cut into three separate districts to create 34, isn't it?

A. 34 and 33—is there a piece of 32 in there?

Q. Look and see, I have been so advised.

A. Yes, there is around the Andrews area.

Q. And so it's not just the pebble in the water when we say, "gee, let's put a minority district in Georgetown and call it 34," the pebble causes ripples, doesn't it?

A. Every change you make causes ripples.

Q. No doubt about it. And the ripples of 34 involve precinct divisions?

A. Some.

Q. Cutting the community of interest of Williamsburg into four districts and cutting the community of interest in Georgetown into three, those are just some of the ripples, aren't they?

A. It cuts Williamsburg into four, it cuts Georgetown into three.

Q. And it dramatically changes Districts 36 of Land and 32 of McGill, doesn't it?

[53] A. Yes.

* * * *

[70] BY MR. HOLLEMAN (counsel for the South Carolina Democratic Party):

Q. Now, I believe, for example you said if I recall, that your conclusion as to one of the upstate districts that has been drawn as a majority black district [District 15], that there was racial polarization based on your study of the Town of Gaffney [which is located in that proposed district]?

A. That was one of the pieces that went in, yes.

Q. Now, if I could just look at that study for a minute with you—and I believe that is the only study you did in connection with that one district?

A. Actually no, because I have also done analysis of Union which is—

Q. Union, all right, we will get to that, Union is in here too. The Town of Union and the Town of Gaffney. All right, let's assume for a minute the Town of Gaffney is relevant to [71] the entire Senate district.

A. Yes.

Q. Now, as I understand it if you read across here you have got the race of the candidate for the City of Gaffney, that says black, it's the first group. You have got the race they run for, school board?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Then you have got the year, you have got the name of the candidate—and I'm going to skip over the ecological numbers, I'm just going to get to hard numbers—then you have got the percentage of the blacks who voted —who voted for that candidate, correct?

A. No, the percent who went to the polls that day. They may not have voted in that election.

Q. Okay. So, you've got the percent of the voters who went to the polls that day—

A. Yes.

Q. —who voted for that candidate?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. And then you've got the percentage of the whites who went to the polls that day who voted for that candidate?

A. Yes.

Q. And then you got the total absolute number of votes that person got?

A. Yes, sir.

[72] Q. Okay. Now, I may be reading it wrong but let's look at '84 for—you go with '80 and '82 and go back to '74, but let's look at '88.

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Now, is this an at-large school board election in Gaffney?

A. I believe it was.

Q. All right. You know that Gaffney is a majority white town?

A. Yes.

Q. All right. Could you tell me who was the largest vote getter in the 1988 Gaffney school board election of either race?

A. I'm having trouble reading my copy so it might be Green, but I believe it is the black candidate.

Q. Mr. Roseman, right?

A. Yes, although that is a fairly common phenomenon that you encounter when you have—there's a couple of reasons for it, one of which is that there is a whole lot of white candidates so that the white vote gets severely split. The other phenomenon that you see is that, of course, the black voters cast almost all their votes that were cast for Roseman—

Q. All right. Well, let me—

A. And so frequently what happens is, there will be one black candidate in a—in an at-large situation that the white [73] community is prepared to support at some level, although almost never at a majority level, and you will see that even though Roseman has been three times elected in this study, that only once did he get a majority of the white vote.

Q. In 1984 Mr. Roseman got 52 percent of the white vote?

A. That's right. That's right.

Q. So, had only whites been voting he would have been elected?

A. Yes.

Q. And let's just follow this through a little bit more, in 1988 Mr. Roseman got 62 percent of the blacks who voted for him, right?

A. Yes.

Q. And 43 percent of the whites?

A. Yes.

Q. A bi-racial coalition?

A. Well, he got the votes from both sides of the aisle, yes.

Q. All right. And then if you turn over to look at your white candidate in that same election, is not the second highest vote getter in '88—

A. I think it's Green at the bottom.

Q. Mr.—no, let's see, okay, is Mr. Green—and Mr. Green got what—he's a white candidate, right?

A. Yes.

Q. What percentage of the black vote did he get?

[74] A. 65.

Q. He got 65 percent of the black vote?

A. Yes.

Q. Mr. Roseman got 62. And then what percentage of the white vote did he get?

A. 38.

Q. So, for the number 2 candidate, a higher percentage of the black people voted for him than the white people; is that correct?

A. In this one candidacy, yes.

Q. All right. Let's look at the third candidate. Let's see, who—

A. Mostetler.

Q. Mostetler. Now, Mr. Mostetler got 34 percent of the black vote and 41 percent of the white vote; is that right?

A. Yes, that's correct.

Q. Sort of equal, another bi-racial coalition, correct?

A. Well, it's not exactly equal but there is clearly votes from both communities there, although you need to recognize that blacks only had one opportunity to vote for blacks in that election—

Q. Well, now, if I look back at your list you have got three black candidates listed Copeland, Goodelock and Roseman (phonetic)?

A. That's correct, I'm sorry.

[75] Q. So, the blacks had several opportunities?

A. Right.

Q. And in fact they only voted 50 percent of the time for Mr. Copeland and Goodelock who were black, but voted 65 percent of the time for Mr. Green, who was white?

A. Yes, and that occasionally will happen. I mean, it is not our position that black folks are not—cannot vote for white folks and that they are not entitled to make their choice a white person, the question—

Q. They can elect—

MR. McDONALD: I object, let the witness finish.

MR. HOLLEMAN: Okay.

A. The question is, who is the candidate of choice of the black community? If you look, for example, at Republican primary data in—or Republican general—general election data for county council in Richland County, there is a black candidate, Gus Roberts—

BY MR. HOLLEMAN:

Q. I will ask you about that in a minute, but I would like to focus on one thing at a time, if I can, since you said Gaffney was your key to concluding, along with Union, that one district was racially polarized, let's focus on this. Not only do the blacks vote for the white candidate, but the whites are voting for the black candidate?

A. In that particular situation, yes.

[76] Q. And then if we look at 1984 again with Mr. Roseman, who apparently was the only black candidate for school board that year, he got, as you said before, over half the white vote. And again he was the top vote getter for the City of Gaffney; is that correct?

A. Where are we at?

Q. Your chart, Mr. Roseman in 1984, 52 percent of the white vote; is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. And he was the top vote getter again?

A. Probably, yes.

* * * *

[79] Q. All right. Then, if we look at the City of Union [which is also part of the SRAC's District 15] in the 1986 city council race which you have picked out—now, the way I read that, Mr. Glenn, a black candidate—City of Union by the way is majority white; is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. Mr. Glenn, a white candidate—I mean, a black candidate [80] was a leading vote getter for city council with 870 votes?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, one thing I don't understand is you have him getting 114 percent of the black, how did Mr. Glenn manage that?

A. One of a few things happened. One of the problems in doing an analysis of a place like Union is that you only have a small handful of precinct and so that

makes it a little more difficult—well, it makes it considerably more difficult to be very precise in your estimates, and also if upon occasion—if the relationship is not absolutely a straight line but somehow curves, then you will overestimate.

Q. Okay. Let's look at—I'm just sort of going through your data here, as I tried to last evening, look at Kershaw County?

A. Although I would point out to you while Mr. Glenn got basically all the black vote, he only got 22 percent of the white vote.

Q. But the black voters in the City of Union were able to elect the candidate of their choice?

A. In that election, yes.

Q. In a majority white—

A. Yes.

Q. —City?

A. Yes.

* * * *

[87] Q. [By Mr. Holleman, counsel for the South Carolina Democratic Party]: All right. Now, if we could turn for a minute to Williamsburg County because that is involving one of the senate districts here [District 34].

If you look at your data, it's correct to say that in general for county offices you have racial block voting, correct?

A. Highly polarized.

Q. Correct. But what makes this peculiar for a Voting [88] Rights Act case to make this point is that when you have block voting in Williamsburg County, the black candidate wins?

A. Yes.

Q. In fact, they win the Sheriff and Coroner—I mean, Probate Judge and Treasurer of Williamsburg County?

A. Yes.

Q. But there is an example—an exception?

A. Yes.

Q. And that is the McGills, correct?

A. Well, except that the McGills are not the candidate of choice of the black community, but the vote is split, and as a result the candidate who gets the majority—generally gets the majority of the black vote does not get—does not win the election.

Q. Well, when you say Mr. McGill and his father were not the choice of the black community, you are saying that he was—he was the choice, however, of 40 to 50 percent of the black communiyt, he and his father?

A. Yes.

Q. Correct?

A. Yes.

Q. And these statistics show that if the black community wants to vote as a block to elect somebody in Williamsburg County, they can do it and they have done it over and over and over again?

[89] A. No doubt about it.

Q. But for the Senate, when Mr. McGill is running against Mr. Pasley or Mr. Richardson, Mr. McGill or his father win?

A. That has been the experience, yes.

Q. And isn't the lesson from this not that a black senator can't be elected from this district, but that Mr. Pasley and Mr. Richardson can't beat Mr.—either of the McGills?

A. I think that that's true. But that doesn't mean that another black candidate couldn't.

Q. Might be able to beat them, that's right. If a better black candidate ran who maybe wasn't from Hemingway, was from Kingstree, he might be able to win. Isn't that a fact?

A. Yes.

Q. And in fact in Williamsburg County, the Democratic County Chairman is black and has been for some time; is that right?

A. I don't know who the Chair is now, Ken Kennedy used to be.

Q. Used to be. In fact, he was just elected to the House when Mr. Gordon's seat became open due to his conviction?

A. Yes.

Q. And Mr. Kennedy is black?

A. Yes.

Q. And his predecessor was Mrs. Selma Connors who was black, correct?

A. Could be.

[90] Q. And isn't it true that the vast majority of poll workers in the democratic primary in Williamsburg County are black?

A. I have—

Q. You don't know that?

A. I don't know it for a fact, it wouldn't surprise me in the least, but I don't know it for a fact.

Q. I guess my point is some people might look at Williamsburg County and say, "this is a poor county, poor black population affected by discrimination," correct?

A. Yes.

Q. That would be your conclusion socioeconomically, correct?

A. Yes.

Q. But at the same time this very same socioeconomically deprived black community is well able to exercise political clout when and where it wants to, correct?

A. It has been able to, yes.

* * * *

[93] Q. (By Mr. Holleman, counsel for the South Carolina Democratic Party): Now, let's—I would like to talk with you for a minute about the specific districts you have talked about. You mentioned this Savannah River District?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And I believe you said your conclusion as to racial polarization there is not based on any of your analysis, you didn't analyze any—

A. I haven't analyzed any communities there, no, sir.

[99] Q. (By Mr. Holleman, counsel for the South Carolina Democratic Party): Now, in Georgetown County is another one of these areas you said you assumed was racially polarized, correct?

A. I don't believe that I testified to that but—

Q. Do you?

A. It would be consistent with the other things I have looked at on South Carolina.

Q. But you have not done any study of any areas of Georgetown County?

A. No.

Q. Now, I believe—are you aware of a Mr. Ralph Wilson who won the solicitor's race in Georgetown and Horry Counties this past time?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And he is black, correct?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And he won the democratic primary and the general election, correct?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And the solicitorial district he ran in was, what, 30 percent black?

A. Yes.

Q. Includes that area?

A. (Nods head in the affirmative).

* * * *

[64] Q. (By Mr. Holleman, counsel for the South Carolina Democratic Party): Now, given the standard that you were using as I heard it described to Mr. Howe this morning, the standard you looked at is the percentage you thought that was necessary for a district to elect a black senator; is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. And you said that number was 58 percent?

A. As a general proposition, yes, but, I mean, clearly there are a couple of exceptions.

Q. And you base that because you said historically most of the black senators who were elected were elected from districts that had 58 percent or more?

A. Yes.

Q. And by most you meant four of six?

A. Right, there haven't been a lot.

Q. Which meant two of six, one-third were elected from districts less than that as of the 1984 census?

A. Yes.

Q. And as of the 1990 census, in fact, isn't it true that Senator Kay Patterson's district has declined 56 percent?

A. I have not seen those, I have not done analysis. I know they exist, but I have not seen it.

Q. Well, if you assume with me that is a demographic fact [65] which can be checked, that would then mean half of the sitting black senators now represent districts that have below 58 percent in black population?

A. If that's true, yes.

Q. And I believe under the 1984 census, or the 1984 redistricting, there were four districts that had 50 to 58 percent of black population, correct?

A. I'd have to look at that.

Q. Two of those elected—have elected black senators, one being Senator Theo Mitchell and one being Senator McKinley Washington?

A. Yes.

Q. In fact, Senator Theo Mitchell's district as of 1990 has only 48 percent black voting age population?

A. That's about right, yes.

Q. And he has been elected twice to the state senate from that district; is that correct?

A. That's true, although Dr. Loewen's testimony showed that, you know, upstate districts are less polarized.

Q. I think he even assumed there wasn't a black senator from Greenville County, didn't he?

A. I don't recall him making that assumption.

Q. All right. Then also if you look at Senator McKinley Washington who is not from an upstate county?

A. No.

[66] Q. His black voting age population is 50.8 percent, isn't that right, today?

A. That could be.

Q. And then of the other two districts that had 50 to 58 percent, they elected Senator Marshal Williams and Senator Isadore Lourie, correct?

A. Yes.

Q. And I believe as you said you have been active in the political process of South Carolina, particularly the midlands, that's a correct statement, is it not?

A. Yes.

Q. And don't you know from your own experience that Senator Lourie is a senator who has attracted a great deal of support from the black community?

A. He has historically had considerable black support, yes.

Q. And in fact he's been a senator who has been viewed as extremely responsive to the needs and desires of the black community?

A. Senator Lourie is basically a good guy, yes.

Q. Okay. And in fact both Senator Lourie and Senator Williams and these other senators were elected from districts that were precleared by the Justice Department under the 1984 plan, correct?

A. I believe so. I'm not sure.

Q. Now, in fact, if we look at Senator McKinley Washington, [67] are you aware of the fact also that he received 60 percent of the vote in the democratic primary?

A. I have not looked at his primary vote total.

Q. Are you aware he was running against, I believe, Mullins McLeod, the brother of the retiring incumbent senator?

A. Yes.

Q. Who had once run for Congress himself, I believe?

A. I—it's my vague recollection that that's true.

Q. And then if we look at the districts that met in 1984 at least your criteria of above 58 percent, we find of those, two of them elected white senators?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And I believe although you said that Senator McGill only got 40 percent, Yancey McGill, of the black vote, his father at one time got almost 50 percent, or 50 percent, did he not?

A. In one race he got right at 50 percent of the black vote.

Q. And I think that was in the 1984 race, was it not? Do you remember?

A. I have got it here.

Q. I believe if you look at the last page of your—

A. Right, that's where I'm looking at, that's 1984.

* * * *

[98] Q. (By Mr. Holleman, counsel for the South Carolina Democratic Party): And then as to this district down here with Senator McGill and Senator Land, what you have done is you have moved one of them from a black majority seat and put them both in a neighboring black minority seat?

A. Yes.

Q. Would you have done that if they had been black senators?

A. No.

Q. You did it purely because they are white senators?

A. And because it allowed us to create an open seat in which a black candidate could be elected.

Q. But if there had been a black senator there you wouldn't have tried to create an open seat?

A. No.

* * * *

[34] Q. Now, just give me the gross comparison under the various plans that you have analyzed. How many districts are created which provide in your opinion an equal opportunity to the minority community to elect candidates of choice?

A. We believe that our plan has 13 of those districts, that the Senate passed plan has nine, that the Lieutenant Governor's plan has seven, that the Governor's plan has 12, and that the Republican Party's plan has 13.

* * * *


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
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
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Nos. 92-155 and 92-219

Supreme
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In The

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1992

STATEWIDE REAPPORTIONMENT ADVISORY COMMITTEE, et al.,

Appellants,

v.

NICK THEODORE, et al.,

Appellees.

CARROLL A. CAMPBELL, JR., GOVERNOR OF SOUTH CAROLINA,

Appellant,

v.

NICK THEODORE, et al.,

Appellees.

On Appeal From The United States District Court For The District Of South Carolina

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I. This Case Is not Moot

The appellees contend in their motions to dismiss or affirm that the court ordered plans in this case are merely "interim" and for that reason should not be reviewed by this Court. They argue that the court ordered plans might become moot in the event the general assembly and governor enact new legislative plans. *See, e.g.*, Motion of Appellee Lieutenant Governor Nick Theodore to Dismiss or Affirm, p. 12.

1. First, while the three judge court expressed its "hope" that the general assembly and the governor would fashion acceptable permanent plans, App. 85, it clearly intended that the court ordered plans would be permanent in the absence of legislative action. According to the three judge court, the court ordered plans

> shall be the lawful election districts for each of those bodies for the general elections scheduled in 1992, and for all subsequent elections until redistricting plans for those bodies are lawfully enacted by the South Carolina General Assembly, signed by the Governor, and approved by the United States Department of Justice pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1973c.

App. 86.

Second, there is no assurance that the court ordered plans will not become permanent through inaction of the legislature. Third, given the legislative deadlock in this case, there is no reason to believe the general assembly and the governor could enact legislative plans even if they attempted to do so.

Fourth, experience has shown that in South Carolina once elections are held under a court ordered plan there is little or no incentive for incumbents to replace it with a legislative plan. That is not surprising since incumbents could hardly be expected voluntarily to change the districting system under which they were elected to office. In *South Carolina State Conference of Branches of NAACP v.*

Riley, 533 F.Supp. 1178 (D.S.C. 1982), for example, the three judge court drew an "interim" plan for the 1982 congressional elections. Elections were held under the plan and the general assembly never enacted a replacement. The interim plan became the permanent plan and remained in effect through 1990.[1]

Fifth, under the standard of mootness argued for by the appellees no court ordered plan could ever by challenged – either in the district court or on appeal – for the general assembly and the governor always have it within their power to enact a substitute legislative plan. This Court has never applied such a concept of mootness in election cases and has frequently reviewed "interim" court ordered plans. *See, e.g., Jordan v. Winter*, 541 F.Supp. 1135 (N.D.Miss. 1982), *vacated and remanded sub nom. Winter v. Brooks*, 461 U.S. 921 (1983); *Upham v. Seamon*, 456 U.S. 37 (1982).

2. This Court has held that "[t]he burden of demonstrating mootness 'is a heavy one.' " *County of Los Angeles v. Davis*, 440 U.S. 625, 631 (1979), *quoting United States v. W.T. Grant Co.*, 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953). A case is moot only when it can be said with assurance that "there is no reasonable expectation" that the alleged violation will recur, and "interim relief or events have completely and irrevocably eradicated the effects of the alleged violation." 440 U.S. at 631. Neither condition is satisfied here.

It cannot be said with assurance that there is no reasonable expectation that the court ordered plans will

---

[1] Graham v. South Carolina, Civ. No. 3:84-1430-15 (D.S.C. July 31, 1984), cited by appellees, is not to the contrary. There a three judge court imposed an interim plan for the 1984 state senate elections. Literally within days of the court's decision the general assembly enacted a legislative plan which was precleared by the Attorney General and used in the pending election. The three judge court vacated its interim plan and it never went into effect. Order filed August 13, 1984.

be used in future elections. Indeed, the reasonable expectation is that they will be. In addition, even if the general assembly and the governor were to enact permanent legislative plans, interim use of the court ordered plans would have continuing effects. One of those effects would be the establishment of a discriminatory benchmark, *i.e.*, the court ordered plans themselves, for determining whether the legislative plans were retrogressive under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c. *See, Mississippi v. Smith*, 541 F.Supp. 1329, 1333 (D.D.C. 1982) (an intervening court ordered plan is the proper benchmark for determining retrogression under Section 5), *appeal dismissed*, 461 U.S. 912 (1983).

3. SRAC's challenge is not limited to a particular election but to the plans adopted by the three judge court. The issues presented in this case, and their effects, will persist as the court ordered plans "are applied in future elections." *Storer v. Brown*, 415 U.S. 724, 737 n.8 (1974). Thus, this case presents a classic example of a controversy that is "capable of repetition, yet evading review," *Rosario v. Rockefeller*, 410 U.S. 752, 765 n.5 (1973), *Dunn v. Blumstein*, 405 U.S. 330, 333 n.2 (1972), and is not moot.

4. In the unlikely event that the general assembly and the governor were to enact and preclear new legislative districting, it would be appropriate at that time to consider the issue of mootness. Until then "[t]he normal rule in a civil case is that we judge it in accordance with the law as it exists at the time of our decision." *Tully v. Mobile Oil Corp.*, 455 U.S. 245, 247 (1982).

II. The Issues in this Case Should Be Resolved Now and without Unnecessary Delay

The appellees argue that this appeal should be dismissed or affirmed because SRAC can always file another law suit after the 1992 elections are over. Motion to Dismiss or Affirm of the Democratic Party of South Carolina,

p. 17; Motion of Appellee Lieutenant Governor Nick Theodore to Dismiss or Affirm, p. 14. The argument is directly contrary to the stated intent of Congress that minorities should not bear the burdens of inertia and delay in litigation and that voting rights disputes be disposed of quickly, comprehensively, and finally.

Responding to the "insidious and pervasive evil" of discrimination in voting, Congress enacted the stringent remedial provisions of the Voting Rights Act "to shift the advantage of time and inertia from the perpetrators of the evil to its victims." *South Carolina v. Katzenbach*, 383 U.S. 301, 309, 328 (1966). In the legislative history of the 1965 Act, as well as the 1970, 1975 and 1982 extensions, Congress repeatedly expressed its intent "that voting restraints on account of race or color should be removed as quickly as possible in order to 'open the door to the exercise of constitutional rights conferred almost a century ago.' " *NAACP v. New York*, 413 U.S. 345, 354 (1973), *quoting* H.R. Rep. No. 439, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1965). *Also see*, 2 S.Rep. No. 417, 97th Cong, 2d Sess. 5 (1982) ("[o]verall, Congress hoped by passage of the Voting Rights Act to create a set of mechanisms for dealing with continuing voting discrimination, not step by step, but comprehensively and finally"); *Briscoe v. Bell*, 432 U.S. 404, 410 (1977) (the Voting Rights Act "implements Congress' intention to eradicate the blight of voting discrimination *with all possible speed*") (emphasis added).

Given the clear and unambiguous intent of Congress that voting rights disputes be resolved promptly and that the door to minority political participation be opened as quickly as possible, there is no basis for dismissing or affirming this appeal and requiring SRAC to file another law suit after the 1992 elections have been held. Such a course is nothing more than a prescription for the delay, or denial, of equal voting rights and the multiplication of litigation.

The appellees' argument that SRAC can more effectively challenge the court ordered plans after the 1992 elections and that the opinion of the three judge court "did not have res judicata effect" lacks candor. Motion to Dismiss or Affirm of the Democratic Party of South Carolina, pp. 17-8. While SRAC, or anyone else, could file a Section 2 law suit after the 1992 elections the defendants, in the event this appeal were dismissed or affirmed, would surely argue that the Section 2 issues had previously been considered and decided adversely to the plaintiffs by the three judge court here and that further challenge was practically, if not legally, foreclosed. Indeed, that is the very argument that the appellees make *in this case. See, e.g.*, Motion of Appellee Lieutenant Governor Nick Theodore to Dismiss or Affirm, p. 23 ("the district court properly analyzed its plans under Section 2"). The appellees' argument that SRAC would be in a better position to challenge the court ordered redistricting if this appeal were dismissed or affirmed cannot be credited.

III. The Three Judge Court Failed to Make Adequate Section 2 Findings; the Appeal Cannot Be Affirmed

The appellees, as noted *supra*, argue that the three judge court correctly applied Section 2 standards in this case. There are two major flaws in the appellees' argument.

First, the three judge court itself disavowed that it conducted a complete Section 2 analysis. As the opinion unequivocally states, "the court decided against conducting a full § 2 inquiry." App. 44. Second, even assuming the three judge court did what it said it did not do, it made no, or grossly inadequate, Section 2 findings of fact making meaningful judicial review impossible.

The three judge court made no specific findings concerning the extent to which blacks were politically cohesive, the extent and legal significance of racial bloc voting;

by whites,[2] nor the extent of minority office holding as provided for by *Thornburg v. Gingles*, 478 U.S. 30, 50-1 (1986). It also made no specific findings regarding the other factors identified in the legislative history as probative of minority vote dilution, such as the extent of any history of official discrimination, the use of enhancing devices, and the socio-economic status of blacks.[3] In the absence of such findings it is impossible to know the basis of the court's decision, or for this Court to review that decision.

One of the basic purposes of the requirement of Rule 52(a), F.R.Civ.P., that a court sitting without a jury "shall find the facts specially" is to facilitate review by affording the appellate court "a clear understanding of the ground or basis of the decision of the trial court." 9 C. Wright & A. Miller, *Federal Practice and Procedure:* Civil § 2571 at 679 (1971). The rule has special application in voting cases. According to the Fifth Circuit, which had a leading role in developing the jurisprudence Congress incorporated into the 1982 amendment of Section 2, S.Rep. No. 417, *supra*, at 32, "[p]erhaps in no other area of the law is as much specificity in reasoning and fact finding required, as shown by our frequent remands of voting dilution cases to district courts." *Cross v. Baxter*, 604 F.2d 875, 879 (5th Cir. 1979). *Accord, Nevett v. Sides*, 533 F.2d 1361, 1365 (5th Cir. 1976) (an appellate court cannot affirm a trial court's determination of vote dilution "without findings of fact to fit proper standards").

---

[2] The three judge court held only that the extent to which voting is racially polarized "remains an open question," and that "the parties' stipulation that since 1984 there is evidence of racially polarized voting in South Caroina is sufficient for our analysis of the plans." App. 56.

[3] Appellee South Carolina Senate admits the failure of the court to treat these factors but argues that it was "unnecessary" to consider them. Motion to Dismiss or Affirm, p. 15.

This Court has similarly required a high degree of specificity in reasoning and fact finding in Section 2 cases. In evaluating a vote dilution claim

> the trial court is to consider the 'totality of the circumstances' and to determine, based "upon a searching practical evaluation of the 'past and present reality,' " . . . whether the political process is equally open to minority voters. " 'This determination is peculiarly dependent upon the facts of each case,' " . . . and requires and 'intensely local appraisal of the design and impact' of the contested electoral mechanism.

Thornburg v. Gingles, supra, 478 U.S. at 79. If the three judge court conducted such an analysis in this case, something it expressly disavowed, it failed utterly to indicate how it had done so.[4] Consequently, it is impossible for this Court meaningfully to review the decision of the district court for error, and dismissal or affirmance would be inappropriate.

The appellees try themselves to supply the missing Section 2 analysis in this case, but their attempts are unavailing. Appellee Sheheen, for example, says that SRAC "presented Section 2 testimony and evidence to the Court and the Court utilized this information in the drawing of its plans." Motion to Dismiss or Affirm of Robert J. Sheehen, pp. 15-6. SRAC did indeed present Section 2 testimony and evidence, but since the three judge court "decided against conducting a full § 2 inquiry," App. 44, it is impossible to say if, or how, the court utilized the information.

Appellees also analyze the evidence of polarized voting and argue that it was "simply inadequate." Motion to

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[4] Compare, for example, the detailed Section 2 findings of the district court in Gingles v. Edmisten, 590 F.Supp. 345, 357-75 (E.D.N.C. 1984), aff'd sub nom. Thornburg v. Gingles, supra, with the non-findings of the district court in this case.

Dismiss or Affirm of the South Carolina Senate, p. 7. The problem with the appellees' argument is that it is not the analysis of the parties but the analysis of the district court that would be subject to review in this case, an analysis the district court failed to make.

IV. The Issues Are Substantial

It is clear from the appellees' motions to dismiss or affirm that this case presents issues of substantial importance involving the application of Section 2 to court ordered redistricting and that there is a conflict among the decisions of lower courts. One of the central questions presented is whether – in a jurisdiction where voting is racially polarized and blacks lack the equal opportunity to participate in the political process and elect candidates of their choice – a court is obligated to create reasonably compact and contiguous majority black districts where it is possible to do so. SRAC believes the answer, based upon the legislative history of Section 2 and *Thornburg v. Gingles, supra,* is "yes." *See also, Garza v. County of Los Angeles,* 918 F.2d 763, 776 (9th Cir. 1990) ("[t]he deliberate construction of minority controlled voting districts is exactly what the Voting Rights Act authorizes"). The three judge court and the appellees believe the answer is "no," and that to create majority black districts under the circumstances described above is to apply a "racial ratchet," App. 30-1, or unfairly "maximize" the number of majority black districts. Motion of Appellee Lieutenant Governor Nick Theodore to Dismiss or Affirm, p. 27.

SRAC has never claimed, as the appellees wrongly charge, that it is entitled to some form of proportional representation or to a redistricting plan that provides the greatest possible number of majority black districts. Its contention, rather, is that where there is proof that voting is racially polarized and that blacks lack the equal opportunity to elect candidates of their choice they are entitled

to reasonably compact and contiguous majority black districts where they can be drawn. *See, e.g., Mississippi Republican Executive Committee v. Brooks,* 469 U.S. 1002, 1004 (1984) (the creation of a majority black congressional district was not based upon "an entitlement to some form of proportional representation" but "on specific findings of fact describing the impairment – or 'dilution' if you will – of the voting strength of the black minority") (concurring opinion of J. Stevens). If, for example, blacks were not politically cohesive, or if whites did not vote as a bloc, or if blacks enjoyed sustained and significant electoral success, a court would have no duty to create *any* majority black districts. *Thornburg v. Gingles, supra,* 478 U.S. at 77.

The extent to which a court in court ordered redistricting is required to conduct a Section 2 analysis and create majority black voting districts are issues which permeate voting rights litigation and over which the lower courts are obviously divided. The resolution of these issues is of the greatest importance to redistricting and minority voting rights.

Conclusion

For these reasons the Court should note probable jurisdiction of this appeal.

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Nos. 92-219 and 92-155

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I. Substantial Questions Are Presented.

In each separate Motion to Dismiss or Affirm filed in this case, the Appellees have underscored the substantial nature of the questions presented. Both the Appellants and the Appellees agree on the fundamental principles of law established by this Court which must guide a district court in fashioning its own legislative redistricting plans: none of the parties have questioned or challenged this Court's recognition that a lower federal court must meet "higher standards" in drafting redistricting plans than a legislative body. Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 26 (1975), and that, when devising and imposing a remedy, the lower court must "allay suspicions and avoid the creation of concerns that might lead to new constitutional challenges." Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 425 (1977).[1] In addition, the Appellees have specifically recognized the duty of a

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[1] This admonition in Connor is intended to prompt a district court into settling all of the potential legal issues when it imposes its remedy, rather than engendering subsequent related cases which attack the original remedy. Connor is part of a consistent line of cases promulgated by this Court emphasizing the stricter standards for federal courts when redistricting a state, instead of the much less rigorous standards used to judge legislatively enacted plans. Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695, 710 (1964) (Court-ordered plans should be "free from any taint or arbitrariness or discrimination."); Connor v. Johnson, 402 U.S. 690, 692 (1971) ("[W]hen district courts are forced to fashion apportionment plans, single member districts are preferable . . .") Connor v. Williams, 404 U.S. 549, 550 (1972) (confirming the holding in Connor v. Johnson.) Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 26 (1975) ("A court-ordered plan must be held to a higher standard than at State's own plan.") Connor v. Finch applies these higher standards to minority vote dilution as well as the one person, one vote principle. 431 U.S. 407, 421-26 (1977).

federal district court to insure racial fairness in drawing a redistricting plan. See Motion to Dismiss or Affirm of Lieutenant Governor Nick Theodore at 18 ("The district court also should strive for racial fairness: the court-ordered plan must not be racially discriminatory in purpose or effect . . ."); Motion to Dismiss or Affirm of Speaker Robert J. Sheheen at 6 ("Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act prohibits the implementation of a redistricting plan that results in the dilution of minority voting strength.").

As to the facts, the parties agree that the court below was presented with alternative redistricting plans. Motion to Dismiss or Affirm of Lieutenant Governor Nick Theodore at 6; Motion to Dismiss or Affirm of Speaker Robert J. Sheheen at 22-23; Motion to Dismiss or Affirm of the South Carolina Senate at 11; Motion to Dismiss or Affirm of the Democratic Party of South Carolina at 7. For example, in contrast to the court's plan, one of the alternative Senate plans provided three more districts in which minority voters would have constituted a majority of the total population.[2] Similarly, one of the alternative State House plans created eight more minority districts than the court's plan.[3]

---

[2] Governor Campbell and the Republican Party submitted separate Senate plans which provided for 13 and 14 districts, respectively, which had a majority black population; the court's plan contained only 11 such districts. See SRAC Jurisdictional Statement at 12. Even at this reduced number of districts, some of the court's districts will not result in the election of the candidates of choice of minority voters. See p. 8, infra.

[3] The alternative House plans submitted by the Governor and the Republican Party contained 35 and 36 districts respectively which had a majority black population; the court's plan contained

Finally, there is agreement among the parties that, in crafting its remedy, a district court must engage in a Section 2 remedial analysis. Motion to Dismiss or Affirm of Lieutenant Governor Nick Theodore at 22-23; Motion to Dismiss or Affirm of Speaker Robert J. Sheheen at 11; Motion to Dismiss or Affirm of the South Carolina Senate at 14; Motion to Dismiss or Affirm of the Democratic Party of South Carolina at 18. In this regard, the parties differ only as to the standard necessary to achieve racial fairness.

Despite these areas of agreement, the Appellees uniformly claim that no substantial question is now presented and that the court below applied the proper standards for court-drawn plans. The Appellees, however, seek support for this position by relying upon cases involving the less rigorous standards applied to legislatively drawn plans, not the higher standards required of federal courts.

The higher standards have been imposed on the district courts not only to prevent federal constitutional and statutory defects, but also in order to protect the judiciary's legitimacy by eliminating the possibility of reasonable charges of discriminatory or political arbitrariness. This Court has recently recognized the importance of protecting judicial credibility and legitimacy from such charges:

> The Court's power lies . . . in its legitimacy, a product of substance and perception that shows itself in the people's acceptance of the Judiciary as fit to determine what the Nation's law means and to declare what it demands . . . The Court must take

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only 28 such districts. See SRAC Jurisdictional Statement at 15.

> care to speak and act in ways that allow people to accept its decisions on the terms the Court claims for them, as grounded truly in principle, not as compromises with social and political pressures having, as such, no bearing on the principled choices that the Court is obliged to make.

Planned Parenthood v. Casey, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 2814 (1992). See also Mitchell v. W.T. Grant, 416 U.S. 600, 636 (1974) (Stewart, J. dissenting). Thus, these higher standards are intended to protect courts from the appearance of politicization when venturing into the "political thicket."

The higher standards for the court-ordered plans require a district court to gather and analyze evidence under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. See Brooks v. Winter, 461 U.S. 921 (1983). This is a prudent and logical way to "allay suspicions" and prevent new constitutional challenges. Connor, 431 U.S. at 425. By substituting its own standards, the court below failed to meet the necessary requirements for court drawn plans. This failure raises substantial questions for review.

II. The District Court Should Comply Fully With The Requirements Of Section 2 Of The Voting Rights Act.

As discussed in the Motion of Appellee State Senate, the court below neither rejected the applicability of Section 2 nor did it provide a complete Section 2 analysis. Motion to Dismiss or Affirm of the South Carolina Senate at 17. Such a position, lacking a structured approach to Section 2, invites careful examination of the relationship between Section 2 and court drawn plans.

In the present case, despite requests to the contrary, the court below failed to grant relief to cohesive minority communities. This error, if uncorrected, may be repeated by other lower courts, thus frustrating the intent of Congress to eliminate racial discrimination in voting.

Sufficient evidence of racial bloc voting was before the court below to conduct Section 2 remedial hearings. That the evidence was questioned does not mean that it was rebutted by direct evidence from the Appellees. It is now clear that questions concerning the proper tests and standards which should be used by a court in drafting a redistricting plan are subject to recurrence, as a brief historical review of South Carolina's redistricting process will reveal. See Graham v. State of South Carolina, Civil Action No. 3:84-1430-15 (D.S.C., July 31, 1984); South Carolina State Conf. of Branches of the NAACP v. Riley, 533 F. Supp. 1178 (D.S.C. 1982), aff'd, 459 U.S. 1025 (1982).

Contrary to appellees' assertions, the Appellant does not seek "maximization" of minority districts.[4] The Appellant does seek fairly drawn legislative plans in which compact, cohesive minority communities have the opportunity to elect candidates of choice in accordance with the requirements of the Voting Rights Act.

The Appellees, in their Motions to Affirm or Dismiss, cite a number of cases for the proposition that the Voting Rights Act requires far less than the maximization

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[4] In fact, the remedial plans proffered by Governor Campbell at trial provided for fewer minority districts than some of the other proposals presented. See SRAC Jurisdictional Statement at 12, 15.

of minority voting strength; however, the cases principally relied upon by appellees concern what are permissible legislative plans, not court-ordered plans which are subject to far stricter standards.

In McDaniel v. Sanchez, 452 U.S. 130 (1981), this Court noted the distinction between legislative and court ordered plans. Legislative plans are those which express the policy choices of the state. Id. at 152. See also Wise v. Lipscomb, 437 U.S. 535 (1978); Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73 (1966). As such, they are subject to preclearance under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, even if drawn in response to a court order. Court drawn plans, on the other hand, are not subject to preclearance, but are subject to higher standards to protect the court's credibility, as explained above. Connor v. Johnson, 402 U.S. 690 (1971); Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407 (1977).

III. The District Court Must Provide Legislative Plans Which Do Not Fragment Minority Communities Of Interest.

The issue remains as to whether a court meets its burden of racial fairness if a court drawn plan does not fully and completely eviscerate racial dilution in voting wherever it exists. It is self-evident that there are several geographically compact areas of the state in which the court failed to include in its remedy. See Governor Campbell's Jurisdictional Statement at App. 22-43. Where such failures exist, a plan cannot be deemed racially fair under Connor v. Finch, despite the court's reservation of the right of the parties to lodge a Section 2 challenge in the future.

Contrary to the assertions of the Appellees and the district court, the redistricting scheme produced by the district court not only failed to "allay suspicions," it unnecessarily created them. The court below erred by raising policies of incumbent protection[5] and county line integrity[6] to the level of the protections of the Voting Rights Act.

The Appellees allege that the court drew as many effective minority districts as could be drawn. This contention is simply insupportable in light of the alternative plans submitted by the parties. The districts drawn in the court-ordered redistricting scheme consistently minimize the size of the minority community in order to protest white incumbents. As a result, the court actually reduced

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[5] Incumbent protection is a tenuous state policy which is not embodied in any state statute or the constitution. The court below, despite its disclaimer, continued this policy by preserving core areas of prior districts and avoiding the pairing of incumbents. See SRAC Appendix 64-65. Courts have found that protection of incumbents may be an excuse for the perpetuation of discriminatory plans. See Garza v. Los Angeles County, 918 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 681 (1991).

[6] In one person, one vote cases, this Court has recognized preservation of county lines as a legitimate state interest if consistently applied. Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315 (1973). Such a state interest is not paramount, however. As indicated in the legislative history accompanying the 1982 amendments to Section 2, "even a consistently applied practice premised on a racially neutral policy would not negate a plaintiff's showing through other factors that the challenged practice denies minorities fair access to the process." S. Rep. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 29 n.117 (1982).

the ability of the minority community to elect candidates of their choice in the 21st and 40th Senate districts. [7] Can it be coincidental that the current white incumbents in these seats which the district court describes as minority seats are the Majority Leader and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate? The plans offered by the plaintiffs and the Governor demonstrate that this retrogression was unnecessary, because those plans created additional districts in which minorities would have an opportunity to elect candidates of their choice.[8]

This Court recently requested the opinion of the Solicitor General of the United States in the pending case of Figures v. Hunt, 91-1992, (October 6, 1992, order). Both Figures and the present case involve the delicate

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[7] In another court ordered district (Senate District 17 which contains 51.62% black voting age population), the candidate of choice of the minority community was defeated in the recent primary election.

[8] The lower court claims to have drawn 11 minority Senate seats; however, the court consistently failed to include adjacent minority communities in its minority districts. Four of the areas encompassed by new districts (21, 40, 36 and 32) have consistently failed to elect a candidate of the minority community's choice. In reality, the district court has only drawn seven districts where the minority community can elect a candidate of choice, not the 11 claimed by the court and the appellees. This is only one more than the current number of districts capable of electing a candidate of the minority community's choice. (The Senate claims its 1984 scheme had 10 districts capable of electing a candidate of the minority community's choice but, in fact, only six are actually capable of electing a candidate of the minority community's choice because they also fragment the minority community in the same four districts.)

situation created when a state avoids Section 5 preclearance by having a court impose a remedial plan.

In fact, the redistricting scheme involved in the case at bar is more egregious than the plan in Figures and is factually distinguishable from Figures on that basis. Moreover, the parties in Figures stipulated the 1990 census and the circumstances in Alabama required the creation of one minority district of 65 percent minority population or more. Late in the trial, the appellees in Figures submitted a two-minority district plan with 59.33 percent and 61.98 percent in minority population. The trial court honored the stipulation and ordered a single district plan with a district of 65 percent.

In South Carolina, no such stipulation was made. The plaintiffs provided ample evidence that minority voting strength was being diluted by fragmenting minority communities of interest in an effort to protect white incumbents. In this effort, the district court went so far as to retrogress unnecessarily two Senate districts which have almost enough black voting strength to elect candidates of the minority community's choice; the court's configuration has the effect of protecting key white incumbents.

IV. The Issues Presented Are Not Moot.

The issues presented in this case are not mooted by the passage of time nor are they made less substantial because of its nature as a remedial order. As was evident during the trial of this case, the use of highly sophisticated, computer-generated district maps also produces illustrative data to demonstrate the outcome of past races in proposed districts. The ability to consider this type of data is particularly useful in determining the potential impact of

racial bloc voting on proposed districts. The claim that minority groups cannot challenge a discriminatory electoral system because no election has been conducted is both logically fallacious and legally insupportable. In fact, in every remedial proceeding, courts must evaluate the legal sufficiency of proposed plans before a court-ordered plan is tested in an election. See SRAC Brief Opposing Motions to Dismiss or Affirm at 1-5.

V. Conclusion.

Based on the foregoing, the Court should note probable jurisdiction.

Respectfully submitted,

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FILING AND MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that on this 3rd day of November, 1992, I filed 40 copies of a Brief Opposing Motions to Dismiss or Affirm with the Clerk's Office of the Supreme Court of the United States and further certify that I mailed via first class mail this same date from Richmond, Virginia the required copies to opposing counsel.

The necessary filing and mailing was performed in accordance with the instructions given me by counsel in this case.

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Nos. 92-155 and 92-219

In the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1992

STATEWIDE REAPPORTIONMENT ADVISORY COMMITTEE, ET AL., APPELLANTS

v.

NICK THEODORE, ET AL.

CARROLL A. CAMPBELL, JR., GOVERNOR OF SOUTH CAROLINA, APPELLANT

v.

NICK THEODORE, ET AL.

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES AS AMICUS CURIAE

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QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the district court gave adequate consideration to the requirements of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. 1973, in imposing redistricting plans for use in congressional and state legislative elections in South Carolina.

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ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES AS AMICUS CURIAE

This brief is filed in response to the Court's invitation to the Solicitor General to express the views of the United States.

STATEMENT

1. South Carolina's General Assembly consists of a Senate and a House of Representatives. Statewide Reapportionment Advisory Committee, et al. (SRAC) J.S. App. 4; S.C. Const. Art. III, § 1. The 46 members of the Senate and the 124 members of the House are elected from single-member districts. SRAC J.S. App. 4; S.C.

Const. Art. III, §§ 3, 6. In addition, South Carolina is entitled to six Representatives in the United States House of Representatives. SRAC J.S. App. 5.

The 1990 census revealed that South Carolina's legislative and congressional districts were malapportioned. See, *e.g.*, SRAC J.S. App. 6 & n.13. The South Carolina General Assembly considered new districting plans to cure the malapportionment, but was unable to agree on such plans before the adjournment of the 1991 legislative session. *Id.* at 6-7.

2. In October 1991, Michael Burton, the Executive Director of the South Carolina Republican Party, and other South Carolina voters (the Burton plaintiffs) sued various state officials, alleging that South Carolina's then-existing election districts violated the one-person, one-vote requirement of the United States Constitution. App., *infra*, 2a, 5a-8a (Burton complaint). See, *e.g.*, *Reynolds* v. *Sims*, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964) (state legislative districts); *Wesberry* v. *Sanders*, 376 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1964) (congressional districts). The complaint also alleged violations of the prohibition in Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. 1973, against vote dilution on account of race.[1] App., *infra*, 2a, 8a-10a. Finally, the Burton plaintiffs alleged that the General Assembly would not be able to pass redistricting plans and have them precleared in accordance with Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 1973c, in time to hold the 1992 primary elections. App., *infra*, 5a-7a. The complaint sought an injunction against the State's use of the existing election districts and asked the court to adopt new plans for the 1992 elections. *Id.* at 11a-12a.

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[1] Section 2 prohibits practices that deny or abridge voting rights on account of race; in particular, it prohibits political processes that afford members of a protected class "less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the electoral process and to elect representatives of their choice." 42 U.S.C. 1973(b).

A three-judge district court was convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2284(a).

A separate group of plaintiffs, including the Statewide Reapportionment Advisory Committee (an unincorporated private association), the South Carolina NAACP, and several individual black voters, filed a similar lawsuit alleging that the existing election districts violated both the U.S. Constitution and Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. App., *infra*, 13a-24a. The court consolidated the SRAC and Burton lawsuits, and it permitted the South Carolina Senate, the Democratic Party of South Carolina, and various others to intervene as defendants. SRAC J.S. App. 8-9.

The General Assembly reconvened in January 1992. It adopted redistricting plans for the state Senate and House, but did not agree on a congressional redistricting plan. SRAC J.S. App. 10-11. Cross-appellant Governor Campbell, a defendant below, vetoed both state redistricting plans on the ground that they failed to create sufficient numbers of effective minority districts and thereby violated the Voting Rights Act. Campbell J.S. App. 8-21. Both vetoes were sustained. SRAC J.S. App. 11.

After the vetoes, the district court decided that judicial intervention was unavoidable. SRAC J.S. App. 14. Because all parties stipulated that the State's existing electoral districts were unconstitutionally apportioned under one-person, one-vote principles, the court found it unnecessary to consider whether they also violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. *Id.* at 3 n.2. The three-week trial focused instead on the parties' various redistricting proposals and the development of an appropriate judicial remedy. *Id.* at 11-12. In that context, however, the plaintiffs presented considerable evidence relevant to the question whether particular proposed plans or districts complied with the mandates of Section 2. That evidence included expert testimony on the extent of racially polarized voting in South Carolina, see *id.* at 56

n.49, as well as other evidence relating to the factors enumerated by this Court in *Thornburg* v. *Gingles*, 478 U.S. 30 (1986). In addition, the parties stipulated that "since 1984 there is evidence of racially polarized voting in South Carolina." SRAC J.S. App. 56.

3. On May 1, 1992, the district court announced that it was not adopting any of the redistricting plans proposed by the parties, but rather had drawn its own plans. SRAC J.S. App. 12. The court directed that its plans were to be used for the 1992 elections and for all subsequent elections until the State enacted plans that were approved under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. *Id.* at 86.

Although both the Burton plaintiffs and the SRAC plaintiffs challenged South Carolina's existing electoral districts under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (as well as under the Constitution), App., *infra*, 8a, 13a, neither asserted a cause of action under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. The district court nevertheless began its analysis by stating that the proceedings "ar[ose] under" Section 5, SRAC J.S. App. 13, and by setting out three principles that it considered applicable to a Section 5 analysis.

First, the court concluded that, to the extent consistent with federal law, it should honor the State's own "policies and preferences." SRAC J.S. App. 14 (quoting *White* v. *Weiser*, 412 U.S. 783, 795 (1973)). Based on the South Carolina Constitution and the history of the State's past redistricting efforts, the court identified a "preeminent" state policy of "maintaining the integrity of county boundaries in the redistricting process." SRAC J.S. App. 15-16. Second, the court concluded that it was bound by "stringent equal population requirements" in imposing a congressional redistricting plan, *id.* at 17, but that its plans for the state legislature might reflect "de minimis" variations in district populations. *Id.* at 24. Third, the court held that its plans must not be "retrogressive"—

that is, there must be no "diminution in minority opportunity from what it had been under an earlier plan." *Id.* at 25-26 (citing *Beer* v. *United States*, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976), and *City of Lockhart* v. *United States*, 460 U.S. 125 (1983)).

While thus viewing this case as "a § 5 proceeding," the district court recognized that "[i]t would be incongruous for the court to adopt a plan which did not comport with the standards and guidelines of § 2." SRAC J.S. App. 38. The court held, however, that "complete adoption" of Section 2 standards was "unwarranted," for three reasons. *Id.* at 38-39. First, the court cited "fundamental differences" between Section 2 and Section 5, see *id.* at 39-42, noting in particular that a typical Section 2 plaintiff is "attacking an existing practice," whereas in these proceedings, the court was "operating more in the nature of a forum" and considering five or more proposed districting plans for each of three legislative bodies. *Id.* at 41 (emphasis omitted). Second, the court stated that it did not have time to conduct the "strenuous" fact-finding that would be required for a full Section 2 challenge to each of the proposed plans before adopting plans for use in the 1992 elections. *Id.* at 43-44. Finally, the court found a "lack of legislative or judicial guidance" requiring "a blanket rule that § 2 guidelines should be infused into § 5." *Id.* at 44.

For these reasons, although the court rehearsed all of the factors relevant to finding a violation of Section 2 identified by this Court in *Gingles*, see SRAC J.S. App. 33-38, it ultimately chose to evaluate various plans only against the three threshold factors for Section 2 liability identified in *Gingles*,[2] as well as several additional factors identified by the court itself (SRAC J.S. App. 46):

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[2] "First, the minority group must be able to demonstrate that it is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district. * * * Second, the minority group must be able to show that it is politically cohesive. * * *

> 1) the extent to which the plans * * * are consistent with the retrogression standard set forth in *Beer* and *City of Lockhart* [3]; 2) the extent to which reasonable compact and contiguous majority black districts were and could be drawn; 3) the extent to which the minority group is politically cohesive; 4) the extent to which racially polarized voting patterns exist; [and] 5) the extent to which the lines which have been drawn limit the number of majority-black single-member districts in light of the expressed state policies of the State of South Carolina.

In applying those factors, the district court stated that its analysis "should ensure that the [*Gingles*] threshold requirements of a § 2 action cannot be established under the adopted plan[s]." SRAC J.S. App. 45. The court did not, however, determine "the extent to which voting is polarized in South Carolina" generally or in particular proposed districts; instead, the court concluded that the degree of racially polarized voting "remains an open question and will certainly vary from locality to locality." *Id.* at 56. In determining that it had created a sufficient number of "black opportunity districts"—*i.e.*, districts in which black citizens could be presumed to have the ability to elect the candidate of their choice—the court defined such a district as one with a black voting-age population "greater than 50 percent," *id.* at 48, and gave considerable weight to the goal of preserving county and precinct lines. It did not address the plaintiffs' arguments that because of specific conditions in South Carolina or in particular proposed districts, a black voting-age popula-

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Third, the minority must be able to demonstrate that the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it * * * usually to defeat the minority's preferred candidate." *Gingles*, 478 U.S. at 50-51.

[3] See *Beer* v. *United States*, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976), and *City of Lockhart* v. *United States*, 460 U.S. 125 (1983), applying the non-retrogression principle in Section 5 cases.

tion of 57% or more was needed for black voters to have a realistic opportunity to elect their chosen candidates. See, *e.g.*, *id.* at 25-26. Nor did the court specifically consider whether the dictates of Section 2 should override any contrary state policy in drawing particular districts.

4. a. Applying these principles to South Carolina's Senate districts, the court devised a plan that provided for ten districts (21.7% of the total of 46 districts) in which blacks constituted more than 50% of the voting-age population.[4] SRAC J.S. App. 67. Because, using 1990 census figures, blacks constituted more than 50% of the voting age population in only nine of the existing districts, the court concluded that its plan was not retrogressive in violation of Section 5. *Id.* at 67. Blacks made up less than 65% of the voting age population in each of the Senate districts under the court's plan, and less than 55% in five out of the ten. *Id.* at 68. The plans proposed by the Governor and the Burton plaintiffs had smaller total population deviations and more majority black districts, but the court rejected both plans because, in its view, they crossed too many precinct and county lines. SRAC J.S. 12; SRAC J.S. App. 61-65. The court also criticized those plans for creating districts in which the "only cognizable community of interest * * * is the black race," *id* at 64, and for reflecting "apparent partisan considerations" by pitting Democratic incumbents against one another. *Id.* at 65.

b. The court's plan for the state House districts resulted in 23 out of 124 districts (18.5%) in which blacks constituted more than 50% of the voting-age population. SRAC J.S. App. 72. The court found that its plan was not retrogressive because the existing plan, using 1990 census figures, contained only 21 such districts. *Ibid.* The court noted that four of the plans submitted by the parties also resulted in de minimis population

[4] According to the 1990 census, South Carolina's voting-age population is 26.9% black. See SRAC J.S. App. 88.

variations and created more black majority districts.[5] *Id.* at 73. But the court rejected those plans because, in its view, all of them called for "excess" cuts in county lines and three of the four unduly pitted incumbents against one another. *Id.* at 73-75.

At the same time, the court concluded that its plan for the House of Representatives "contain[ed] no obvious violations of § 2," because it recognized "those concentrations of black population in the state that are sufficiently large and geographically compact to form a majority in a single member district." SRAC J.S. App. 76. The court rejected the parties' plans calling for more majority black districts as attempts to "achieve proportional representation on the basis of race," without proper deference to "traditional state political units such as the county." *Id.* at 76-77. It also criticized some of the parties' proposed districts because of their "bizarre" shapes and because they lacked "any distinct communities of interest, apart from race, which would demonstrate district cohesiveness." *Id.* at 79. The court concluded that its plan, with fewer majority black districts, struck "the proper balance between the various interests arising in this type of proceeding, including equality of population in districts, racial fairness, and maintenance of the state's political subdivisions and communities of interest." *Ibid.*

c. The court's congressional districting plan achieved population equality. SRAC J.S. App. 80-81. Because all of the parties proposed plans having one majority black district, the court likewise drew one such district (out of six), with a 57.9% black voting-age population. The court did not decide whether such a district was legally required. *Id.* at 82-83. The court determined that its plan was not retrogressive for purposes of Section 5 because the then-existing plan had no black

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[5] The Republican plan created 36 majority black districts, the Governor's plan 35, and SRAC's plan 32. SRAC J.S. App. 76, 78.

majority district. *Id.* at 82. The court drew a congressional district encompassing the "general concentration of black population," preferring its plan to others that split fewer counties because the others showed a higher population deviation. *Id.* at 83-84.

DISCUSSION

The district court misunderstood the nature of the action before it. That error led the court to give inadequate consideration to, and to make inadequate findings concerning, allegations and evidence of violations of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. We take no position at this time as to whether the redistricting plans adopted by the court would in fact violate Section 2 if applied to elections held subsequent to 1992. Because we believe that review by this Court would be premature on the present record, we suggest that the Court remand the case and direct the district court to consider in detail (and to make appropriate findings and conclusions with respect to) objections raised by any party on the ground that the court's plans do not comply fully with the requirements of Section 2.

1. The district court erred in viewing this litigation as arising under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. Section 5 requires that changes in election practices proposed by a covered jurisdiction be "precleared," either through submission to the Attorney General or through a declaratory judgment action filed by the jurisdiction in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. 42 U.S.C. 1973c. See generally *Allen* v. *State Bd. of Elections,* 393 U.S. 544, 558-560 (1969). This litigation, by contrast, involved challenges brought by private plaintiffs against the responsible authorities of a covered jurisdiction, alleging that its existing election districts violated both Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and the United States Constitution.

To be sure, because all parties to the litigation conceded the invalidity of the then-existing districting plans

under one-person, one-vote principles, the district court was not required to consider Section 2 challenges to specific existing electoral districts. The court instead properly focused on the nature of the new plans that should be put in place. In that setting, it was appropriate for the court to consider Section 5's general principle that electoral changes may not have the purpose or effect of denying or abridging voting rights on account of race. See SRAC J.S. App. 25; *McDaniel* v. *Sanchez*, 452 U.S. 130, 148-149 (1981). Nevertheless, the court's primary task was to fashion a remedy that would not itself violate the legal standards that the plaintiffs had sued to enforce. Contrary to the court's view, discharging that task required the court to ensure that the plans it adopted complied in all respects with the requirements of Section 2.

Two of the three reasons given by the district court for failing to undertake a complete Section 2 analysis stem directly from its misconception of the proceeding as one arising under Section 5. For example, any perceived differences between Section 5 and Section 2 litigation, see SRAC J.S. App. 39-42, are irrelevant to the question of what standards should be applied in fashioning an appropriate remedy in a case in which Section 5 is not even directly at issue, Section 2 violations have been alleged, and liability is conceded on constitutional grounds.[6] Likewise, the "lack of a clear legislative intent

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[6] Similarly, the district court's concerns about rendering an "advisory" opinion or "impair[ing] the duality of remedies currently afforded aggrieved parties under principles of *res judicata* or separation of powers," SRAC J.S. App. 42, can hardly be avoided by labeling as a Section 5 proceeding a suit that was clearly brought under Section 2 and the Constitution. It seems clear in this case that any such concerns could best be avoided by resolving all of the parties' claims under Section 2 with respect to the districting plans imposed by the court. The controversy is live and properly before the court; one definitive judgment and one remedy are necessary, and should suffice.

or judicial interpretation that the results test of § 2 should be completely imported into § 5," SRAC J.S. App. 39, is not a relevant concern in a case arising under Section 2 and the Constitution.

The court's final reason for refusing to undertake a full Section 2 inquiry—the imminence of the 1992 elections—was relevant only insofar as those elections were concerned. Although a court should always strive to ensure that any plan it imposes complies with Section 2, it has reasonable latitude in devising an interim remedy when it is confronted with tight time constraints. *Mahan* v. *Howell*, 410 U.S. 315, 332-333 (1973); *Upham* v. *Seamon*, 456 U.S. 37, 44 (1982); *Reynolds* v. *Sims*, 377 U.S. at 585-587. The same time constraints do not apply, however, with respect to districts imposed for use in subsequent elections. Given the legislative deadlock after the 1990 census that necessitated the court's intervention in this case in the first place, see generally SRAC J.S. App. 5-12, the court's so-called "interim" plans, *id.* at 85-86, may well remain in place for the next ten years. To the extent that they do, the district court is obligated to subject them to a full Section 2 analysis.[7]

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[7] Appellee Theodore, the Lieutenant Governor of South Carolina, argues that these cases should be dismissed as moot because the 1992 elections have been held and the General Assembly may enact redistricting plans applicable to future elections. Theodore Mot. to Dismiss or Affirm 12-14. The district court's order applies, however, to all subsequent South Carolina elections unless and until the General Assembly enacts alternative plans that are successfully cleared under Section 5. SRAC J.S. App. 86. None of the cases appellee cites involved an order explicitly applicable to future elections. In *Watkins* v. *Mabus*, 112 S. Ct. 412, aff'g in part and vacating in part 771 F. Supp. 789 (S.D. Miss. 1991), for example, the district court's order provided an interim remedy and a procedure for devising plans for subsequent elections; only the interim remedy aspect of the case was found moot. 112 S. Ct. at 412. Appellee admits that the court-ordered congressional redistricting plan imposed after the 1980 census remained in effect for eight years. Theodore Mot. to Dismiss or Affirm 3 n.2. In any event, we suggest

2. The district court purported to apply the three fundamental requirements identified in *Gingles*—size and compactness of minority concentrations, minority political cohesiveness, and majority bloc voting [8]—so as to "insur[e] that the court's plan [would] not violate the threshold requirements for liability under § 2." SRAC J.S. App. 45-47. Properly applied, that approach might be an appropriate way for a court to avoid an unnecessarily extensive Section 2 inquiry. If, for example, the court had found that voting in South Carolina elections was not racially polarized, any Section 2 claim would have been destined to failure under *Gingles*, and there would have been little point in taking other evidence or making other findings relevant to such a claim.[9] In fact, however, the court made no such dispositive finding with respect to any of the *Gingles* threshold requirements.

a. The parties agree that the court had before it substantial evidence relevant to the factors identified in *Gingles* as probative of minority vote dilution in viola-

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remand of the case to the district court for precisely the sort of "concrete, district-by-district" review of the court's plans under Section 2 that appellee acknowledges (*id.* at 13) would be appropriate if the plans are to be utilized in future elections, using not only the current record but, if helpful, "evidence derived from the 1992 election regarding racial polarization, political cohesiveness and other Section 2 factors." *Id.* at 13-14. Should predictions of state legislative action be fulfilled while that review is in progress, the district court could terminate its review of the court-ordered plans as moot at that time. See, *e.g.*, SRAC J.S. App. 85-86.

[8] The term "polarization" tends to subsume the technically separate *Gingles* inquiries into minority cohesiveness and majority bloc voting. See, *e.g.*, *Gingles*, 478 U.S. at 56. Like the district court, we treat the two questions together. See SRAC J.S. App. 55.

[9] We agree with the court below that the three "necessary preconditions" identified in *Gingles*, 478 U.S. at 50-51, are "threshold requirements" for imposing a Section 2 remedy. See SRAC J.S. App. 36 & n.37. This is true in the context of both single-member and multi-member districts. See *Growe* v. *Emison*, 113 S. Ct. 1075, 1084 (1993); *Voinovich* v. *Quilter*, 113 S. Ct. 1149, 1157 (1993).

tion of Section 2. See Theodore Mot. to Dismiss or Affirm 26; SRAC J.S. 5-8; Sheheen Mot. to Dismiss or Affirm 14-15; Senate Mot. to Dismiss or Affirm 7-8. That evidence included expert testimony on the history of discrimination in South Carolina and expert statistical testimony on the extent of racially polarized voting. The parties also stipulated that there was racially polarized voting in South Carolina, but they disagreed on the extent and the effect of the polarization. See SRAC J.S. App. 56; Theodore Mot. to Dismiss or Affirm 26, 28-30; Senate Mot. to Dismiss or Affirm 7-8.

Presented with this evidence, and despite its declared intention to preclude establishment of the *Gingles* threshold factors with respect to its plans, the district court explicitly refused to resolve the issue of polarized voting. The court stated that "the extent to which voting is polarized in South Carolina remains an open question and will certainly vary from locality to locality," and it accepted as "sufficient for [its] analysis" the parties' general stipulation that there is evidence of racially polarized voting in South Carolina. SRAC J.S. App. 56. Although we agree with the Senate appellees that evidence of racial polarization or other factors would have to be more localized and specific to support creating or rejecting a challenged electoral district on Section 2 grounds, see Senate Mot. to Dismiss or Affirm 7-8 & n.8, the district court neither made specific findings rejecting the evidence of polarization in particular districts nor found as a general matter that polarization was not present. The court simply failed to address all relevant aspects of that crucial question, which goes to the heart of whether the plans it imposed comply with Section 2.

b. Similarly, the district court did not respond adequately to the question whether additional compact and contiguous districts with black majorities could and should have been created in disputed areas to avoid dilution of black voting strength in violation of Section 2. To be

sure, the court touched on those issues in discussing its plans. See SRAC J.S. App. 63-64 (discussing lack of "community of interest" in Senate District 10 proposed by Governor and state Republican Party); *id.* at 75-79 (concluding that court's House plan strikes appropriate balance between minority representation and other factors for purposes of Section 2, "given the nature of this proceeding"); *id.* at 82-85 (discussing Section 2 concerns and the creation of a majority-black congressional district). But the court's treatment of those issues was both legally flawed and insufficiently detailed to provide an adequate basis for appellate review.

i. Because the court did not determine the extent of racial bloc voting or consider the existence of historic barriers to minority participation in the electoral process in South Carolina, there was no basis for the court's finding that any district in which blacks constitute more than 50% of the voting age population may be considered a "black opportunity district." SRAC J.S. App. 48. Whether black voters have a realistic opportunity to elect their chosen candidates in any given district is a function of the circumstances prevailing in that district. *E.g., Jeffers* v. *Clinton,* 730 F. Supp. 196, 204-217 (E.D. Ark. 1989) (three-judge court), aff'd mem., 111 S. Ct. 662 (1991). Where access to the political process is limited by present discrimination or the present effects of past discrimination, a bare majority of the voting age population may not afford blacks a realistic opportunity to elect representatives of their choice. See, *e.g., Jeffers* v. *Clinton,* 756 F. Supp. 1195, 1198-1199 (E.D. Ark. 1990) (three-judge court); *Ketchum* v. *Byrne,* 740 F.2d 1398, 1410-1416 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1135 (1985); *Zimmer* v. *McKeithen,* 485 F.2d 1297, 1302-1304 (5th Cir. 1973), aff'd per curiam *sub nom. East Carroll Parish School Bd.* v. *Marshall,* 424 U.S. 636 (1976).

Based on evidence of polarization and historic patterns of voter registration and turnout in South Carolina, the plaintiffs in this case argued that a district should have a black voting-age population of at least 57% in order for black voters to have a realistic chance of electing their preferred candidates. SRAC J.S. 8; Campbell J.S. 21. The district court did not address that argument or justify its 50% figure in light of the "totality of the circumstances" in South Carolina or in any particular electoral district.[10] See SRAC J.S. App. 48. We think it was incumbent on the district court to resolve specific challenges to particular districts on the ground that they contained an insufficient majority of black voters, both to ensure in the first instance that its plans comply with the principles of Section 2 and to provide this Court with an adequate basis for appellate review.[11]

ii. The court also appears to have accorded undue deference to "state policy" in formulating its plans, placing

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[10] Although it is not clear from the court's discussion, the court may have based its 50% figure on the Fourth Circuit's conclusion that a particular North Carolina electoral district with a 51.8% black voting age population could be considered an opportunity district. See SRAC J.S. App. 48 (citing *McGhee* v. *Granville County*, 860 F.2d 110 (4th Cir. 1988)). It would not, of course, be appropriate to adopt particularized findings relevant to a specific district in North Carolina as a general standard applicable throughout South Carolina.

[11] In rejecting the notion (which we do not understand appellants to urge) that it should apply a bright-line "65 percent rule" in judging effective minority voting strength, the court did state that in formulating its plans it had used voting-age population figures and had taken specific account of "other factors" that might otherwise have justified a supermajority requirement. SRAC J.S. App. 48-50. But the court's discussion dealt only with the possible effect of incumbents on black voter turnout, and it did so only in cursory fashion. *Id.* at 49-50. The opinion includes no particularized consideration of historical voting patterns, election results, or other data to support treating identified districts as black "opportunity districts" in the face of plaintiffs' challenge to that characterization.

primary emphasis on preserving county and precinct lines. SRAC J.S. App. 13-16. While state policy is one factor to be considered under the "totality of the circumstances" test for determining compliance with Section 2, *Houston Lawyers' Ass'n* v. *Attorney General,* 111 S. Ct. 2376, 2381 (1991), the court's deference here was unjustified for two reasons.

First, it is not clear that preservation of county or precinct lines is an important or consistent state policy. Certainly it was not, in this case, a policy embodied in an official redistricting plan forged through the State's political process. See, *e.g., White* v. *Weiser,* 412 U.S. at 795-796 (quoted at SRAC J.S. App. 14-15). See also SRAC J.S. App. 16-17 (noting that the redistricting proposals submitted by various state officers or legislative bodies were not entitled to deference as state policy). That policy was instead deduced by the district court from the state Constitution and from a "historical analysis of the redistricting efforts of the South Carolina Senate." *Id.* at 15. The most recent source cited by the court was a plan enacted in 1972, *id.* at 15-16; the court did not analyze the extent to which county or precinct lines were preserved in the plans adopted after the 1980 census. See also Campbell J.S. App. 18-19 (Governor's veto message, questioning policy of not splitting precinct lines); *Jeffers* v. *Clinton,* 730 F. Supp. at 214-215 (even "fairly strong policies" carry little weight if not consistently applied); *Houston Lawyers' Ass'n,* 111 S. Ct. at 2381 (rejecting reliance on "trivial or illusory" state interests).[12]

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[12] In contrast to its deference to the supposed state policy of preserving political boundaries, the court announced that it would give no preference to incumbents because that was not a "legitimate concern" for a court to take into account in fashioning a plan. SRAC J.S. App. 64-65, 75. The court nonetheless severely criticized various of the parties' proposals for protecting or attempting to eliminate incumbents on partisan grounds, *id.* at 65 & n.61, 74-75,

Second, as this Court recognized in *Houston Lawyers' Ass'n*, the State's interest "is merely one factor to be considered in evaluating the 'totality of circumstances,'" and "that interest does not automatically, and in every case, outweigh proof of racial vote dilution." 111 S. Ct. at 2381. At least in formulating its plans for the General Assembly, the district court's opinion indicates that the court was guided almost entirely by concern for following political boundaries, see SRAC J.S. App. 62-78; it did not consider that state policy, such as it may be, as just one factor to be weighed under the totality of the circumstances. That error was compounded by the court's misconception that it was not required to grapple fully in this case with the requirements of Section 2. See, *e.g.*, *id.* at 79 (expressing court's conclusion that its plan for the state House of Representatives satisfies the Voting Rights Act "given the nature of this proceeding"). Instead, in each disputed instance, the court should have evaluated what it viewed as the State's policy preferences in light of the extent of racial polarization in the locality involved and the existence of a black population capable of forming a majority in a compact and contiguous district.[13] Once again, the court's failure to conduct such

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and ultimately declared that its plan was best in "avoiding the 'political thicket' that arises in pitting large numbers of incumbents against one another." *Id.* at 75. If there is in fact a consistent state policy of protecting incumbents, the court may consider it in fashioning a plan. See, *e.g.*, *Jeffers* v. *Clinton*, 730 F. Supp. at 214-215. To do so, however, the court must find such a policy based on specific evidence or legal sources, and must evaluate its application to ensure that protecting incumbents (of whatever political party) does not dilute minority voting strength in violation of Section 2. See *Garza* v. *County of Los Angeles*, 918 F.2d 763, 771 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 681 (1991).

[13] The district court rejected plans creating more black-majority districts with the general statement that they did so "without regard to any interest but race and without the clear necessity which justifies a § 2 remedy." SRAC J.S. App. 76. But the court could not adequately support its conclusion that the proposed districts

a district-by-district evaluation both calls into question the validity of its plans under Section 2 and renders orderly appellate review of those plans (and the legal and factual conclusions on which they are based) unnecessarily difficult.

3. We believe that under the circumstances of this case the district court erred in failing to consider thoroughly whether its remedial redistricting plans comply fully with Section 2. In formulating such plans, a court is obligated to "exercise its traditional equitable powers to fashion the relief so that it * * * fully provides equal opportunity for minority citizens to participate and to elect candidates of their choice." S. Rep. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1982). See generally *Wise* v. *Lipscomb*, 437 U.S. 535, 541 (1978); *Connor* v. *Finch*, 431 U.S. 407, 415 (1977).

Given the time constraints that the court faced at the time, we do not question its decision to impose its plans in their current form for purposes of the 1992 elections. But because the court's "interim" plans may as a practical matter remain in place for the next decade, we think that the court was required to afford all parties the opportunity to present specific Section 2 objections before imposing those plans for use in future elections. The court should have received and reviewed evidence concerning each challenged district, considered that evidence in light of all of the relevant factors enumerated in *Gingles*, and included in its opinion specific, reviewable findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect to each such district's compliance with federal law. Such a process would be fair to the parties, present the district court with a judicially manageable task, take advantage of the district court's considerable familiarity with the specific facts

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were unjustified without considering the totality of the circumstances in each disputed area, 42 U.S.C. 1973(b), in light of all the considerations enumerated by this Court in *Gingles*.

and arguments in this case, and properly assist this Court in its appellate review.

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the district court should be vacated and the case should be remanded with instructions to the district court to determine whether its plans, to the extent they are applicable to post-1992 elections, comply in all respects with Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.

Respectfully submitted.

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MAY 1993

APPENDIX A

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
COLUMBIA DIVISION

Civil Action No. 3-91-2983-1
(Three-Judge Court Requested)

MICHAEL G. BURTON as Executive Director and on behalf of the Republican Party, WILLIAM P. COLLINS, III, EARL COPELAND, WILLIAM PATRICK FLACK, FRANK E. GIBSON, III, NANCY D. HAWK, and GUS ROBERTS, PLAINTIFFS

v.

ROBERT J. SHEHEEN, in his representative capacity as Speaker of the South Carolina House of Representatives, NICK THEODORE, in his representative capacity as presiding officer of the South Carolina Senate, JAMES B. ELLISOR, in his representative capacity as Executive Director of the State Election Commission and CARROLL A. CAMPBELL, JR. in his representative capacity as the Governor of South Carolina, DEFENDANTS

[Filed Oct. 4, 1991]

COMPLAINT

(Declaratory Judgment; Equitable Relief Sought)

A. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

1. Plaintiffs request that this Court draw a reapportionment plan for the General Assembly of the state of South Carolina and for the Congressional

delegation of the state of South Carolina for the 1992 elections. This action is necessary because the South Carolina Senate and the South Carolina House of Representatives in General Assembly have failed by means of the legislative process to produce a reapportionment plan for either the General Assembly or the Congressional delegation. That process is deadlocked. Without this court's action, rights secured to the people of South Carolina pursuant to Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution of the United States, the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments of the Constitution of the United States and pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section § 1973 *et seq.* and 1983 will be violated as the House and Senate districts of the South Carolina General Assembly and the Congressional districts are no longer apportioned according to the principle of one person one vote. This court's intervention is necessary in order to have a plan in place for the election process in 1992.

B. JURISDICTION

2. Jurisdiction is conferred on this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1331 and 1343 and 28 U.S.C. 2201.

3. A three-judge district court is required pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2284(a) because this action challenges the constitutionality of the apportionment of statewide legislative bodies and of Congressional districts.

(b) Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2284(b)(2) notice of this action has been given to the Governor and the Attorney General of the State of South Carolina by sending each via certified mail a copy of this complaint.

C. THE PARTIES

4. Michael Burton is a registered voter of the State of South Carolina residing in Columbia, SC, and is the executive director of the State Republican Party. He submitted on behalf the Republican Party a plan for reapportionment of the South Carolina Senate.

5. William P. Collins, III is a registered voter of South Carolina, residing in Chapin and is under-represented in the State House and Senate (Districts 85 and 23) because of population changes such that the South Carolina House and Senate are no longer apportioned on the basis of one person one vote.

6. Earl Copeland is a registered voter of the State of South Carolina, residing in Hanahan, and is under-represented in the State House and Senate (Districts 99 and 38) because of population changes such that the South Carolina House and Senate are no longer apportioned on the basis of the one person one vote.

7. William Patrick Flack is a registered voter of the State of South Carolina, residing in Anderson, and further is a member of the black population of South Carolina which is under-represented in the State Senate, House of Representatives, and in the Congressional delegation within the state.

8. Frank E. Gibson, III, is a registered voter of the State of South Carolina, residing in Beaufort, and is under-represented in the State House and Senate (Districts 124 and 46) because of population changes such that the South Carolina House and Senate are no longer apportioned on the basis of one man one vote.

9. Nancy D. Hawk is a registered voter of the State of South Carolina, residing in Charleston (1st

Congressional District), and is under-represented in the Congress of the United States because of population changes such that the South Carolina Congressional districts are no longer apportioned on the basis of one person one vote.

10. Gus Roberts is a registered voter of the State of South Carolina, residing in Columbia, and further is a member of the black population of South Carolina which is under-represented in the State Senate, House of Representatives, and in the Congressional delegation within the state.

11. The defendants are sued in their representative capacity as officers of the State of South Carolina and its legislature in Richland County at Columbia.

12. Robert J. Sheheen is sued in his representative capacity as Speaker of the State House of Representatives, an arm of the South Carolina General Assembly which together with the South Carolina Senate has failed to adopt a reapportionment plan for submission to the Governor.

13. Defendant Nick Theodore is the Lt. Governor of the State of South Carolina and the presiding officer of the State Senate, an arm of the South Carolina General Assembly which together with the South Carolina House of Representatives has failed to adopt a reapportionment plan for submission to the Governor.

14. James B. Ellisor is sued in his representative capacity as the Executive Director of the State Election Commission and the state officer charged with carrying out elections.

15. Carroll A. Campbell, Jr. is sued in his representative capacity as the Governor of the State of South Carolina, the constitutional officer of the state

to whom the General Assembly failed to present a reapportionment plan.

FOR A FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

D. One Person One Vote

16. There has been a significant shift in population among the South Carolina Senate districts, the South Carolina House of Representatives districts, and the South Carolina Congressional districts, as is disclosed by the 1990 decennial census.

17. The South Carolina Senate and House of Representatives in General Assembly and the Congressional districts of South Carolina are no longer apportioned according to the principle of one man one vote, as required by the United States Constitution.

18. The South Carolina General Assembly has not produced for signature of the Governor a plan for the reapportionment of the State Senate, the State House Representatives, or the Congressional districts within South Carolina and is in adjournment until January 1992.

19. The reapportionment process is deadlocked in that neither the South Carolina House or Senate has adopted each others plans for its own chamber and for Congress and the Governor has advised he will veto those plans if they were presented to him.

20. The General Assembly will not reconvene until January 1992 thereby ensuring that a reapportionment plan will not be timely adopted with the result that citizens will not reasonably know within which district they may run for office or who their candidates will be, the boundaries of the districts and who the inhabitants of the districts will be.

21. Candidates for the South Carolina Senate and the South Carolina House of Representatives must file their notices of candidacy and pledge by March 30, 1992 in order to take part in primary elections as nominees of a political party for the State Senate or House of Representatives, all pursuant to 1976 South Carolina Code § 7-11-210.

22. Candidates as members of Congress must file their notices of candidacy and pledge by April 30, 1992 in order to take part in a primary election as a members of a political party for such seat, all pursuant to 1976 South Carolina Code § 7-11-210.

23. Two weeks prior to the dates set out in the two paragraphs above, advertisements in newspapers trigger the filing periods for the offices set forth above, pursuant to 1976 South Carolina Code § 7-13-45.

24. 1976 South Carolina Code § 7-13-40 requires that the political parties utilizing primary elections hold their primary elections on the second Tuesday in June, i.e. June 9, 1992.

25. Citizens of South Carolina who will participate as electors in the above primaries must register to vote no later than 30 days prior to that primary date, i.e. May 9, 1992.

26. South Carolina is a jurisdiction covered by Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c.

27. Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c prohibits the enforcement in South Carolina of any legislative reapportionment plan which has not first been approved by a declaratory judgment action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia *or* has

been submitted to the Attorney General of the United States and was the subject of no objection within a sixty (60) day period following information, thereby extending for another sixty days the time before a plan may be implemented.

28. It is unreasonable to rely upon any reapportionment plan produced through the South Carolina legislative process being adopted such that at least sixty (60) days will elapse following final approval of the plan before the electorial process begins, the minimum time required for Justice Department preclearance.

29. The present apportionment of the South Columbia Senate and the South Carolina House of Representatives as described above results in plaintiffs being under represented, does not comply with the one person one vote principle for legislative apportionment, and denies plaintiffs their right to equal protection under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.

30. The present apportionment of South Carolina's Congressional districts results in over representation and under representation and is therefore in violation of Article I § 2 of the Constitution of the United States, providing in part that members of the House of Representatives be chosen "by the People of the several states" requiring as nearly as practicable that such person's vote in a Congressional district be equal.

31. Given the requirements of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended, and the statutory frame work for elections in South Carolina, it is clear that without the intervention of the court in reapportioning South Carolina that elections will not be held in a manner which will fairly permit seriously contested elections as there will be insufficient time to recruit

qualified candidates within new district lines, thereby giving incumbents unfair advantage and causing irreparable harm to plaintiffs and others.

32. Plaintiffs' votes are and will be diluted in individual districts as are the votes of other voters across the state if the court does not intervene expeditiously so as to reapportion the state on a timely basis; an untimely reapportionment will so favor incumbents so as to put challengers at an unfair disadvantage, thus causing plaintiffs, voters and candidate alike to suffer harm and irreparable damage.

FOR A SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

E. VIOLATION OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965, AS AMENDED.

33. The plaintiffs reallege paragraphs 1 through 28 as if restated here verbatim.

34. The present apportionment of the South Carolina Senate, of the South Carolina House of Representatives, and of the Congressional districts in South Carolina is in violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1973, in that the black citizens of South Carolina, a protected class under the statute, have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice.

35. The South Carolina Senate has 10 black majority districts out of 46; the South Carolina House of Representatives has 27 black majority districts out of 124; there is no black majority district among the six Congressional districts in South Carolina.

36. The distribution of population throughout the state of South Carolina permits the creation of 14

black majority Senate districts rather tha[n] 10, 35 majority black House districts rather than 27, and 1 black Congressional district rather than none.

37. In the South Carolina House of Representatives the distribution of the black population would permit the creation of 35 black majority districts with black percentage populations as follows:

Districts over 60%—	20
Districts between 55-60%—	11
Districts between 50-55%—	4

38. The creation of such House districts would increase the opportunity of blacks to participate in the political process and elect representatives of their choice either by electing candidates expressing wholly their own views or electing candidates with whom they would have very significant influence.

39. The distribution of the population in South Carolina would permit the creation of 14 black majority Senate districts with black percentage populations as follows:

Districts over 60%—	8
Districts between 55-60%—	5
Districts between 50-55%—	1

40. The creation of such Senate districts would increase the opportunity of blacks to participate in the political process and elect representatives of their choice either by electing candidates expressing wholly their own views or electing candidates with whom they would have very significant influence.

41. The distribution of population in South Carolina would permit the creation of at least 1 black-majority Congressional district with a black percentage population approximating 65%.

42. The creation of such Congressional district would increase the opportunity of blacks to participate in the political process and elect representatives of their choice either by electing candidates expressing wholly their own views or electing candidates with whom they would have very significant influence.

43. The present apportionment of the South Carolina Senate, of the House of Representatives and of the Congressional districts is in violation of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended, because the effect of the present system is to under represent blacks in the South Carolina General Assembly and in the South Carolina Congressional delegation.

44. The geographical compactness of the black population is sufficient to create the districts described above.

45. There is among the minority population of South Carolina a political cohesion making such districts possible.

46. There is in South Carolina a history of bloc voting by the majority population which continues to this day.

47. Failure to apportion the South Carolina House, Senate and Congressional districts according to the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended, will cause irreparable harm to black plaintiffs and will cause irreparable harm to plaintiffs generally as compliance with the act is necessary for a lawful reapportionment under which to conduct elections in 1992.

Wherefore, plaintiffs pray

1. That the court find and declare:

   a. That the present apportionment of the South Carolina Senate and House of Representatives is in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitu-

tion and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in that the districts are not fair and equal, as practicable;

b. That the present apportionment of the South Carolina Congressional districts is in violation of Article I, § 2 of the United States Constitution in that the districts are not fair and equal, as practicable;

c. That the present apportionment of the South Carolina Senate and House of Representatives is in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1973 et seq. and the Fifteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution;

d. That the present apportionment of the South Carolina Congressional districts is in violation of Article I, § 2 of the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1973; and

e. That the legislative process in South Carolina is at an impasse and that without the court's intervention reapportionment will not occur so as to be available to provide to the citizenry time within which it is practicable to recruit candidates, declare as candidates, and campaign with knowledge of district boundaries, all to the irreparable harm of plaintiffs.

2. That the court adopt and impose on defendants:

a. An Injunction prohibiting the use of the present South Carolina Senate, House and Congressional district lines for the 1992 elections;

b. A reapportionment plan for the South Carolina Senate and House of Representatives;

c. A reapportionment plan for the South Carolina Congressional districts;

d. A reapportionment plan for the General Assembly and Congressional districts which complies with the requirements of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended, with such plan creating 35 black majority seats in the House, 14 black majority seats in the Senate; and 1 black Congressional district.

3. That the court impose such reapportionment plan by December 31, 1992.

4. That court award to plaintiffs reasonable attorney's fees and costs as provided by 42 U.S.C. § 1988 et seq.

5. That the court grant such other and further relief as the court may deem just and proper.

Oct. 3, 1991

SINKLER & BOYD, P.A.

By: /s/ Thomas R. Gottshall
THOMAS R. GOTTSHALL
Federal I.D. No. 2406

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APPENDIX B

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
COLUMBIA DIVISION

Civil Action No. 3:91-3310-1
(Three-Judge Court Requested)

STATEWIDE REAPPORTIONMENT ADVISORY COMMITTEE, DR. WILLIAM GIBSON, BISHOP FREDERICK CALHOUN JAMES, REV. HERBERT WILLIAMS, WILLIE B. OWENS, and SOUTH CAROLINA STATE CONFERENCE OF THE NAACP BRANCHES, Plaintiffs

vs.

CARROLL A. CAMPBELL, JR., in his official capacity as Governor of South Carolina; NICK THEODORE, in his official capacity as Lieutenant Governor and presiding officer of the South Carolina Senate; ROBERT J. SHEHEEN, in his official capacity as Speaker of the South Carolina House of Representatives; and, JAMES B. ELLISOR, in his official capacity as Executive Director of the South Carolina State Election Commission, Defendants

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[Filed Oct. 31, 1991]

COMPLAINT

I. *The Nature of the Case*

1. This is an action to enforce Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973, the

First, Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution of the United States, and Article III, Section 3 of the Constitution of South Carolina. Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief against continued use of the existing congressional and legislative districts in South Carolina on the grounds that they are malapportioned on the basis of population and dilute minority voting strength. Plaintiffs also seek court ordered, interim redistricting plans on the ground that the General Assembly has failed to apportion the state's congressional and legislative districts following the 1990 Census, and there is not enough time prior to the next elections for the General Assembly to redistrict and comply with the preclearance provisions of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c.

II. *Jurisdiction*

2. Plaintiffs invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(a)(4), and 2201, this suit being authorized by 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973j(f) and 1983. A three judge court is required by 28 U.S.C. § 2284(a) to hear plaintiffs' challenge to the constitutionality of the apportionment of the state's congressional and legislative districts.

III. *Parties*

3. Plaintiff Statewide Reapportionment Advisory Committee (SRAC) is an unincorporated association of private individuals and organizations in South Carolina. Its goals include insuring that elections are held for Congress and the General Assembly in a timely manner, and in conformity with the Voting Rights Act and the Constitution of the United States.

SRAC sues on its own behalf and on behalf of its members.

4. Plaintiffs Dr. William Gibson, Bishop Frederick Calhoun James, Rev. Herbert Williams and Willie B. Owens, are black, or African-American, residents and registered voters of South Carolina. They desire to participate in the electoral and political processes of South Carolina in a timely manner and on an equal basis with white residents.

5. The personal plaintiffs reside in congressional and legislative districts which are malapportioned on the basis of population, and some of the plaintiffs reside in areas where black majority congressional and legislative districts can be drawn.

6. Plaintiff South Carolina State Conference of the NAACP Branches (NAACP) is an organization composed of the county branches of the NAACP in South Carolina. The NAACP is a membership organization whose goals include securing the equal treatment of blacks and other citizens in the electorate without regard to race or color. The NAACP sues on its own behalf, and on behalf of its branches and members.

7. Defendant Carroll A. Campbell, Jr. is a resident of South Carolina and is the chief executive officer and Governor of South Carolina. He may on extraordinary occasions convene the General Assembly in extra session, and has the duty of signing or vetoing bills which have passed the General Assembly before they become law. He is sued in his official capacity.

8. Defendant Nick Theodore is a resident of South Carolina and is the Lieutenant Governor of South Carolina. He is the President of the Senate, ex officio, one of two branches of the General Assembly in which

is vested the legislative power of the state. He is sued in his official capacity.

9. Defendant Robert J. Sheheen is a resident of South Carolina and is the Speaker of the House of Representatives, one of two branches of the General Assembly in which is vested the legislative power of the state. He is sued in his official capacity.

10. James B. Ellisor is a resident of South Carolina and is the Executive Director of the State Election Commission, which has general supervisory authority over elections in the state. He is sued in his official capacity.

IV. *Facts*

11. The General Assembly has the duty under state and federal law (S.C. Constitution, Art. III, § 3; U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 2) of reapportioning congressional and legislative districts in South Carolina every ten years based upon a true and correct enumeration of inhabitants.

12. Based upon the 1990 Census, the existing congressional districts in South Carolina contain a total deviation from ideal district size of 8.3%, and are malapportioned on the basis of population in violation of Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution.

13. Based upon the 1990 Census, the existing districts for the House of Representatives contain a total deviation from idea district size of 113.9%, and are malapportioned on the basis of population in violation of the one person, one vote principle of the Fourteenth Amendment.

14. Based upon the 1990 Census, the existing districts for the Senate are malapportioned on the basis of population in violation of the one person, one vote principle of the Fourteenth Amendment.

15. Despite the malapportionment of existing congressional and legislative districts, the General Assembly considered but failed to enact any redistricting plans at its last (1991) legislative session.

16. The General Assembly, which is in adjournment until January 14, 1992, is at an impasse as far as reapportionment is concerned because of disagreement between the House of Representativs and the Senate over congressional and legislative district boundaries.

17. The Governor has stated publicly that he would veto any of the redistricting plans considered by the General Assembly during its 1991 regular session, and has refused to convene the General Assembly in extra session to consider and enact congressional and legislative redistricting.

18. Primary elections for Congress and the General Assembly are scheduled for June 9, 1992, and the general election is scheduled for November 10, 1992.

19. Candidates in the primary elections for the House of Representatives and Senate must file their notices of candidacy and pledge by 12:00 o'clock noon, March 30, 1992 (S.C. Code § 7-11-210).

20. Candidates in the primary elections for Congress must file their notices of candidacy and pledge by 12:00 o'clock noon, April 30, 1992 (*Id.*).

21. Two weeks before the filing period begins—on March 15, 1991 for general assembly elections and April 15, 1991 for congressional elections—party officials are required to place an advertisement in a newspaper of general circulation notifying the public of the dates of the filing period, the offices which may be filed for, and the manner in which filing may be made (S.C. Code § 7-13-45).

22. South Carolina is covered by the provisions of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c, with the result that no congressional or legislative redistricting plan enacted by the General Assembly and signed into law by the Governor can be implemented unless and until it is precleared, either administratively by the Attorney General or judicially by the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia.

23. The Attorney General has a period of sixty (60) days from the date a submission is deemed complete within which to object, and may extend the preclearance period for an additional sixty (60) if he requests additional information.

24. The Subcommittee on Reapportionment and Redistricting of the Senate Judiciary Committee issued a time line for reapportionment which contemplated that congressional and legislative redistricting plans be submitted for preclearance no later than November, 1991 in order to provide adequate time for Section 5 review.

25. Given the impasse over congressional and legislative redistricting in the General Assembly, the Governor's refusal to call a special legislative session to consider and enact redistricting, the Governor's statement that he would veto the redistricting that was being considered by the General Assembly, and the requirement of Section 5 preclearance, it is a virtual certainty that the state will not be able to enact and implement congressional and legislative redistricting in compliance with the Voting Rights Act and the Constitution prior to the next elections in 1992.

26. Blacks in South Carolina are sufficiently numerous and geographically compact that they would

constitute a majority in one or more single-member districts for Congress and both houses of the General Assembly.

27. Under the existing apportionment, all of the state's congressional districts are majority white, although it is possible to draw at least one reasonably compact and contiguous congressional district that contains a majority of black residents.

28. Under the existing apportionment, there are ten (10) out of forty-six (46) senate districts that contain a majority of black residents, although it is possible to draw at least fourteen (14) reasonably compact and contiguous senate districts that contain a majority of black residents.

29. Under the existing apportionment, there are twenty-seven (27) out of 124 house districts that contain a majority of black residents, although it is possible to draw thirty-seven (37) or thirty-eight (38) reasonably compact and contiguous house districts that contain a majority of black residents.

30. Blacks in South Carolina are politically cohesive, in that they tend to vote as a bloc, have common socio-economic characteristics and have organized themselves collectively for political activity.

31. Candidates for elective office preferred by blacks in South Carolina are usually defeated by the white majority voting as a bloc.

32. Historically, black residents of South Carolina have been subject to private as well as official discrimination on the basis of race, including discrimination in attempting to exercise their right of franchise and to participate equally with white residents in the political processes.

33. Black residents of South Carolina bear the effects of discrimination on the basis of race in educa-

tion, housing, employment, and health services which have resulted in a lower socio-economic status which hinders their ability to participate effectively in the political process.

34. Voting in South Carolina is racially polarized.

35. The existing congressional and legislative districting in South Carolina dilutes the voting strength of blacks.

36. The use of a majority vote requirement in primary elections for Congress and the General Assembly enhances the opportunity for discrimination and further dilutes minority voting strength.

37. Because of the existing discriminatory districting for Congress and the General Assembly, black residents of South Carolina have been discouraged from running for office.

38. No black has ever been elected to Congress from South Carolina in modern times, and blacks have been elected to the General Assembly primarily from districts in which members of their race were the majority.

39. Blacks in South Carolina have less opportunity than white residents to participate in the political processes and to elect candidates of their choice.

40. The policy underlying the existing congressional and legislative districting in South Carolina is tenuous.

41. The purpose and result of the existing congressional and legislative districting in South Carolina is to deny or abridge the right of black residents to vote on the basis of race or color.

42. If the existing congressional and legislative districting are used in the 1992 elections, or if the state postpones or delays the elections because of its

inability to enact redistricting and comply with the preclearance requirements of Section 5, plaintiffs will be seriously injured and their right to vote will be diluted or denied.

43. Plaintiffs have brought this action at the present time to insure that the issues presented herein may be considered in a timely manner, and that any remedies for the denial of plaintiffs' rights, including interim, court ordered elections, may be implemented in an orderly fashion with a minimum of disruption to candidates and voters, and to the electoral process.

44. The defendants' actions complained of herein are under color of law of the State of South Carolina.

First Cause of Action

45. The defendants' actions in using and maintaining the existing congressional and legislative districts in South Carolina, which are malapportioned on the basis of population and result in the denial or abridgment of the right to vote on the basis of race or color, deny plaintiffs' rights guaranteed by Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973, and the First, Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution of the United States.

Second Cause of Action

46. The existing congressional and legislative districts in South Carolina were enacted and are being maintained with the racially discriminatory purpose of diluting the voting strength of black residents of South Carolina in violation of plaintiffs' rights guaranteed by Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, and the

First, Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments of the Constitution of the United States.

Third Cause of Action

47. The refusal or failure of defendants to reapportion congressional and legislative districts in South Carolina based upon a true and correct enumeration of inhabitants denies plaintiffs' rights guaranteed by the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution of the United States, and Article III, Section 3 of the Constitution of South Carolina.

V. *Equitable Relief*

48. A real and actual controversy exists between the parties. Plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law other than this action for declaratory and injunctive relief. Plaintiffs are suffering irreparable injury as a result of the violations complained of herein and that injury will continue unless declared unlawful and enjoined by this Court.

WHEREFORE, plaintiffs respectfully pray that this Court:

(1) take jurisdiction of this case;

(2) enter a declaratory judgment that the use of the existing congressional and legislative districts in South Carolina violates Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973, the First, Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments and Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution of the United States, and Article III, Section 3 of the Constitution of South Carolina, and enter a permanent injunction against their further use;

(3) enter a declaratory judgment that the refusal or failure of the defendants to reapportion congressional and legislative districts in South Carolina based upon a true and correct enumeration of inhabitants, violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendments and Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution of the United States, and Article III, Section 3 of the Constitution of South Carolina and enter a permanent injunction enjoining defendants from failing promptly and immediately to reapportion congressional and legislative districts in accordance with Sections 2 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973 and 1973c, and the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States;

(4) implement interim, court ordered congressional and legislative redistricting to insure that the 1992 primary and general elections are held as scheduled;

(5) award plaintiffs the cost of this action together with their reasonable attorney's fees; and,

(6) retain jurisdiction of this action and grant plaintiffs any further relief which may in the discretion of this Court be necessary and proper to ensure that timely and lawful procedures are used in elections in South Carolina for Congress and the General Assembly.

Respectfully submitted,

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Nos. 92-155 and 92-219

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1992

STATEWIDE REAPPORTIONMENT ADVISORY COMMITTEE, *et al.*,
Appellants,
v.
NICK THEODORE, *et al.*,
Appellees.

CARROLL A. CAMPBELL, JR.,
GOVERNOR OF SOUTH CAROLINA,
Appellant,
v.
NICK THEODORE, *et al.*,
Appellees.

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina

SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF IN RESPONSE TO THE BRIEF OF THE UNITED STATES

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Appellant,

v.

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Appellees.

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina

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SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF IN RESPONSE TO THE BRIEF OF THE UNITED STATES

Pursuant to Sup. Ct. R. 18.9, Appellee South Carolina State Senate ("Senate") files this supplemental brief to address the recently filed *amicus curiae* brief of the United States ("U.S. Br.").

1. At the outset, the Senate notes that the United States concedes several key points made in the Senate's Motion to Dismiss or Affirm ("Sen. Br."):

a. The Senate pointed out in its opening brief that all the parties stipulated that the existing districting plans (*i.e.*, those developed after the 1980 census) violated the one person, one vote rule. Sen. Br. at 4-5. The United States agrees with the Senate that, in light of this stipulation, there was no need for the court to consider the additional claim of the Statewide Reapportionment Advisory Committee ("SRAC") that they violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973. U.S. Br. at 9-10. Rather, the three-judge court "properly focused on the nature of the new plans that should be put in place." *Id.* at 10. This concession is significant, because the SRAC has argued that the existing plans violated Section 2 and the court therefore had the obligation to remedy this violation by drawing more districts with black majorities.

b. The United States also agrees that, when the three-judge court decided on new redistricting plans, "it was appropriate for the court to consider" the principles contained in Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c, which prohibits changes in election law that have the purpose or effect of denying or abridging voting rights on account of race. *Id.* at 10.

c. The United States does not address the three-judge court's treatment of the Section 5 issues, but rather limits its brief to the lower court's application of Section 2. On this latter issue, the United States (like the Senate) "agree[s] with the court below that the three 'necessary preconditions' identified in [*Thornburg* v.] *Gingles*, 478 U.S. [30,] 50-51 [(1986)], are 'threshold requirements' for imposing a Section 2 remedy." *Id.* at 12 n. 9.[1] Furthermore,

[1] These preconditions are (1) that the minority group must be sufficiently numerous and compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district; (2) that the minority group must be politically cohesive; and (3) that the group's preferred candidates must usually lose elections because of bloc voting by whites. *Gingles*, 478 U.S. at 50-51.

the United States (again, like the Senate) states that, if these three preconditions are not satisfied, a district court need not engage in any further analysis. *Id.* at 12. *See generally INS v. Bagamasbad*, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) ("As a general rule courts and agencies are not required to make findings on issues the decision of which is unnecessary to the results they reach.").

d. With respect to the issue of the existence of racially polarized voting, which subsumes two of the three *Gingles* preconditions (minority political cohesiveness and white bloc voting), U.S. Br. at 12 n.8, the United States "agree[s] with the Senate appellees that evidence of racial polarization or other factors would have to be more localized and specific to support creating or rejecting a challenged electoral district on Section 2 grounds." *Id.* at 13.[2]

e. Finally, the United States agrees with the Senate that the three-judge court had the right to order use of its plans for the 1992 elections because of the time pressure it faced. *Id.* at 11, 18.

2. The Senate parts company with the United States, however, on the question of whether the three-judge court's plans should be used for future elections. The United States argues that they should not. In doing so, it relies on some (but not all) of the arguments raised by Appellants.

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[2] The United States goes on, however, to argue that the court failed to make "specific findings rejecting the evidence of polarization in particular districts." *Id.* The Senate addresses this argument in Point 2.a., *infra*. As to the remaining *Gingles* precondition (compactness), the United States argues that the three-judge court "did not respond adequately to the question whether additional compact and contiguous districts with black majorities could and should have been created." U.S. Br. at 13. The supposed flaws in the three-judge court's treatment of this question, however, appear to the United States to be the court's failure to determine the extent of racially polarized voting and its allegedly undue deference to the State's policy of preserving county lines in districting. *Id.* at 14-18. The Senate discusses these issues in Points 2.b.-2.d., *infra*.

The United States does not argue for the creation of additional black majority districts or subscribe to the SRAC's position that Section 2 requires maximization of minority voting strength.[3] Instead, the United States's brief focuses primarily on the argument (also made by the SRAC and the Governor) that the three-judge court failed to give adequate consideration to the requirements of Section 2. The Senate discussed this argument in some detail in its Motion to Dismiss or Affirm, Sen. Br. at 13-17, and will not reiterate its position at length, but rather will attempt to respond to the flaws in the *amicus* brief.

a. The United States argues that "the district court explicitly refused to resolve the issue of polarized voting," U.S. Br. at 13, citing the court's statement that " 'the extent to which voting is polarized in South Carolina remains an open question.' " *Id.* (quoting SRAC J.S. App. 56). To say that the existence of racial bloc voting is an open question is not, as the United States claims, tantamount to refusing to decide the issue. Rather, given that the burden of proof was on those seeking to justify the creation of additional black majority districts, *Gingles*, 478 U.S. at 50-51, and the extensive (if unpersuasive) evidence Appellants offered on this issue, the court's statement is tantamount to saying that these parties failed to meet their burden.

b. The United States contends that, because of what it views as the three-judge court's inadequate treatment of the polarized voting issue, "there was no basis for the court's finding that any district in which blacks constitute

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[3] *See* U.S. Br. at 9 ("We take no position at this time as to whether the redistricting plans adopted by the court would in fact violate Section 2 if applied to elections held subsequent to 1992."). As the Senate has noted, however, the Solicitor General has previously stated that "[n]othing in the Voting Rights Act requires state or local jurisdictions to maximize the number of majority-minority districts . . . ." Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants at 12, *Voinovich v. Quilter*, No. 91-1618 (U.S. filed July 31, 1992).

more than 50% of the voting age population may be considered a 'black opportunity district.'" U.S. Br. at 14 (quoting SRAC J.S. App. 48). The court did not, however, simply adopt a 50% figure. Instead, it explicitly stated that it had considered other factors besides voting age population ("VAP"), such as the presence of an incumbent in a given district, in formulating the plans. Sen. Br. at 23.[4]

c. The United States similarly contends that the three-judge court gave short shrift to plaintiffs' argument that "a district should have a black *voting-age* population of at least 57% in order for black voters to have a realistic chance of electing their preferred candidates." U.S. Br. at 15 (emphasis added). In fact, the plaintiffs contended that a district had to have a *total* population that was more than 57% black to give black voters such an opportunity. Sen. Br. App. at 19a. The difference is a significant one, because a district with a 57% black total population will have a voting age population that is only 52-53% black—a figure strikingly close to the 50.1% figure for which the United States claims the court had no basis.

d. The United States argues that, in derogation of Section 2, the district court gave undue deference to the State's interest in drawing redistricting plans that preserved county lines. *See* U.S. Br. at 15-16. This argument completely ignores the Senate's contention that adherence to county lines is entirely consistent with Section 2. *See* Sen. Br. at 26-27.

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[4] The United States complains in a footnote that the three-judge court's consideration of these other factors was inadequate because it did not include a "particularized consideration of historical voting patterns, election results, or other data to support treating identified districts as 'black opportunity districts' in the face of plaintiffs' challenge to that characterization." U.S. Br. at 15 n.11. Plaintiffs' challenge, however, was not so much to the court's characterization of certain districts as black opportunity districts as it was to the court's failure to draw additional districts with black VAP majorities.

e. Summarizing its arguments, the United States contends that the three-judge court should have (i) "received and reviewed evidence concerning each challengd district," (ii) "considered that evidence in light of . . . *Gingles*," and (iii) made "specific, reviewable findings of fact and conclusions of law." U.S. Br. at 18. Each of these three claims is without merit.

First, the United States shares the parties' view that "the court had before it substantial evidence relevant to the factors identified in *Gingles* as probative of minority vote dilution in violation of Section 2." U.S. Br. at 12-13. Moreover, Appellants, who were represented by experienced counsel, had ample opportunities to offer district-specific evidence regarding the merits of the additional black VAP majority districts that they proposed. Indeed, they availed themselves of these opportunities and offered expert testimony in an effort to convince the three-judge court that Section 2 required the creation of their proposed districts, and the court admitted this evidence. There is thus no basis for arguing that the court should have received more evidence.[5]

Second, as we have shown, the three-judge court considered this evidence in light of *Gingles*. It applied the three *Gingles* preconditions and found Appellants' proof lacking.

Third, as we have also shown, the three-judge court made the necessary findings and conclusions. Furthermore, the United States' contrary argument ignores the fact that this Court may always examine the record to determine whether the evidence supports the decision below. *Sampson v. Murray*, 415 U.S. 61, 87 n.58 (1974). Our opening brief demonstrated that the record here contains more than enough evidence to sustain the three-judge court's judgment. Sen. Br. at 21-28.

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[5] For the same reason, there is no basis for suggesting that, on remand, the three-judge court should give all parties an additional opportunity to offer evidence on the various Section 2 factors as they apply to pre-1992 elections.

f. The *amicus* brief asks this Court to vacate the judgment and remand the case to the district court. In particular, the United States suggests that this Court "direct the district court to consider in detail . . . *objections raised by any party* on the ground that the court's plans do not comply fully with the requirements of Section 2." U.S. Br. at 9 (emphasis added).[6] This form of relief is different from that sought by the Appellants, who asked only that the Court note probable jurisdiction.

g. Moreover, the remand the United States seeks would not be an appropriate form of relief in any event because it would lead to piecemeal litigation. As noted above, the United States takes no position at this time as to whether the three-judge court should draw additional districts with black VAP majorities. All the United States seeks is a remand with instructions to the court to consider whether its plans comply in all respects with Section 2. U.S. Br. at 19.

Such a remand, however, would leave unanswered the critical question in this case—whether the three-judge court should have created the maximum possible number of districts with black VAP majorities—and would deprive the trial judges of this Court's guidance on this key issue. If the three-judge court then reaffirmed its prior plans, which create less than the maximum possible number of districts with black VAP majorities, the Appellants would undoubtedly appeal again, and once more raise the maximization issue. Conversely, if (contrary

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[6] We do not read this suggestion to encompass congressional redistricting, as the Appellants have raised no objections to it. Sen. Br. at 2 n.1. Even if the United States intends for its objections to be directed to the Congressional as well as the State legislative redistricting, we would note that the Court "do[es] not ordinarily address issues raised only by *amici*." *Kamen* v. *Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc.*, 111 S. Ct. 1711, 1717 n.4 (1991); *see United Parcel Serv., Inc.* v. *Mitchell*, 451 U.S. 56, 60 n.2 (1981); *Bell* v. *Wolfish*, 441 U.S. 520, 531 n.13 (1979); *Knetsch* v. *United States*, 364 U.S. 361, 370 (1960).

to the statutory language, the legislative history, and the case law) the three-judge court did maximize the number of black majority VAP districts, the Appellees would seek review in this Court. Thus, the inevitable result of the relief the Untied States requests would be another appeal and a concommitant waste of judicial resources.

In short, if there were to be a remand, the proper course would be for this Court to decide the maximization question first, in order better to guide the three-judge court in its consideration of the issues on remand. Indeed, in light of the importance of the question not only to this case but to many other redistricting cases at the congressional, state legislative, and local levels that are pending or will arise in the coming years, this Court should give the question plenary consideration, including full briefing and oral argument. The sounder disposition of this case, however, would be to affirm the judgment below on the ground that, for the reasons stated above and in the Motion to Dismiss or Affirm, the three-judge court ruled correctly on the record before it.

Respectfully submitted,

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92-1924

No. 92-155

Supreme Court, U.S.
FILED
OCT 1 1992

In The

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1992

STATEWIDE REAPPORTIONMENT ADVISORY COMMITTEE, ET AL,

APPELLANTS.

vs.

NICK THEODORE, ET AL,

APPELLEES.

CARROLL A. CAMPBELL, JR., GOVERNOR OF SOUTH CAROLINA,

APPELLANT,

vs.

NICK THEODORE, ET AL,

APPELLEES.

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA (THREE-JUDGE COURT)

MOTION TO DISMISS OR AFFIRM

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QUESTIONS PRESENTED

I. Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act is a results test that can only accurately measure the results of a plan once it has been implemented.

II. The Three-Judge Court applied the standards of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act to the Court ordered redistricting plans.

III. The Three-Judge Court ordered redistricting plans that comply with the Section 2 remedy.

IV. The Three-Judge Court correctly incorporated appropriate state policies in drawing the Court redistricting plans.

V. Section 5 standards of the Voting Rights Act were appropriately applied by the Three-Judge Court in fashioning its Court ordered redistricting plans.

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS

In the case of Statewide Reapportionment Advisory Committee v. Sheheen, C.A. No. 3:91-3310-1, the Appellants are the Statewide Reapportionment Advisory Committee, D. William Gibson, Bishop Frederick Calhoun James, Rev. Herbert Williams, Willie B. Owens, and South Carolina State Conference of the NAACP Branches. The appellees are Nick Theodore, Lieutenant Governor of South Carolina, Robert J. Sheheen, Speaker of the South Carolina House of Representatives, and James B. Ellisor, the then Executive Director of the South Carolina State Election Commission who were named Defendants in this case and the Intervenors Robin Tallon, Neil A. Vander Linden, Forrest E. Ott, Phillip T. Jones, Ann Y. Hart, Peggy A. Dufek, Gwendolyn L. Grooms, the South Carolina Senate and the South Carolina Democratic Party. Governor Campbell was a Defendant below but is a cross Appellant in this

appeal.

The Statewide Reapportionment Advisory Committee case was consolidated with the case of Burton v. Sheheen, C. A. No. 3:91-2983-1, which had already been filed. The Plaintiffs were Michael G. Burton, as Executive Director and on behalf of the Republican Party, William P. Collins, III, Earl Copeland, William Patrick Flack, Frank E. Gibson, III, Nancy D. Hawk, and Gus Roberts. Kimberly T. Burch was a plaintiff-intervenor. The defendants were Robert J. Sheheen, Nick Theodore, James B. Ellisor, and Carroll A. Campbell, Jr. The defendant-intervenors were Robin Tallon, Neil A. Vander Linden, Forrest E. Ott, Philip T. Jones, Ann Y. Hart, Peggy A. Dufek, Gwendolyn L. Grooms, the South Carolina Senate, and the Democratic Party of South Carolina. Katharine I. Butler was amicus curiae.

In the consolidated case of Blanton v.

Campbell, C.A. No. 3:91-3635-1, the plaintiffs were Bufort Blanton, Neil A. Vander Linden, Forrest E. Ott, Ann Y. Hart, Peggy A. Dufek, and Vincent Johnson. The defendants were Carroll A. Campbell, Jr., Nick Theodore, Robert J. Sheheen, James B. Ellisor, Dorchester County Legislative Delegation, State of South Carolina, Sherry Martschink, Stephen E. Gonzales, Annette Young, Sandra S. Wofford, George H. Bailey, John W. Matthews, Jr., Michael T. Rose, and the South Carolina Senate.

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No. _____

In The

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October Term, 1992

STATEWIDE REAPPORTIONMENT ADVISORY COMMITTEE, ET AL,

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vs.

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CARROLL A. CAMPBELL, JR., GOVERNOR OF SOUTH CAROLINA,

APPELLANT,

vs.

NICK THEODORE, ET AL,

APPELLEES.

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA (THREE-JUDGE COURT)

MOTION TO DISMISS OR AFFIRM

MOTION OF APPELLEE TO DISMISS OR AFFIRM

The Appellee, Robert J. Sheheen, Speaker of the South Carolina House of Representatives, moves the Court to either dismiss

the Appeal filed by the Statewide Reapportionment Advisory Committee and the Cross-Appeal of the Honorable Carroll A. Campbell, Governor of the State of South Carolina or in the alternative to affirm the judgment of the Three-Judge Court which redistricted the South Carolina House, South Carolina Senate and Congressional Districts.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The constitutional provisions involved in this appeal are the First, Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment and Article I, Section 2 of the United States Constitution, and Article III, Section 3 of the South Carolina Constitution. The statutory provisions involved in this appeal are Sections 2 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act as codified in 42 U.S.C. 1973 and 1973(c). All these provisions, except Article I, Section 2 of the United States Constitution, are set out in the Appendix to the Statewide Reap-

portionment Advisory Committee's Jurisdictional Statement at pages 478 through 485. Article I, Section 2 of the United States Constitution is set out in the Appendix to this Motion. App. 1-3, infra.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On October 4, 1991, a case entitled Burton v. Sheheen was instituted in the District Court of the District of South Carolina. The case alleged that the existing South Carolina Senate, House and Congressional plans were malapportioned, that the Legislature and the Governor were deadlocked, and that the Court should draw interim plans. A Three-Judge Court was designated. On October 31, 1991, the Statewide Reapportionment Advisory Committee (SRAC) filed a separate suit basically alleging the same grounds raised in the Burton case and requesting the same relief, SRAC v. Campbell. These two cases were consolidated for trial on November 13, 1991.

A third case was then filed which primarily raised the issue of the constitutionality of County Legislative Delegations, Blanton v. Campbell. This case also was consolidated with the Burton and SRAC case. The issues in Blanton were bifurcated before trial and none of the issues raised in the Blanton case is at issue on appeal.

The Court allowed the South Carolina Senate, the South Carolina Democratic Party, Congressman Robin A. Tallon, Representative Kimberly Burch and individual Defendants Neil A. Vander Linden, Forrest E. Ott, Philip T. Jones, Ann Y. Hart, Peggy A. Dufek and Gwendolyn L. Grooms to intervene in the suit. Kimberly Burch was dismissed by consent prior to the trial.

After the cases were filed in October, Robert J. Sheheen, Speaker of the South Carolina House of Representatives, along with the Senate, moved to dismiss the proceedings on the grounds that the case had

been brought prematurely as there was reason to believe the process was not yet deadlocked and sufficient time remained for the Legislature to draw the plan and receive preclearance prior to the elections. The Legislature reconvened January 14, 1992. On January 23, 1992, the House and Senate adopted and ratified redistricting plans for both the House and Senate and submitted them to the Governor. On January 29, 1992, Republican Governor Carroll Campbell vetoed the plans. On February 5, 1992, the House was unable to override the Governor's veto on the House remap plan, falling four votes short of the necessary two-thirds vote to override. Congressional plans which had been passed in different forms by the House and Senate, became stalled in a Conference Committee. At that point the process finally became deadlocked. Thereafter, the parties withdrew their Motions to Dismiss and agreed not only that the existing dis-

tricts were malapportioned following the 1990 census, but that if timely elections were to be held, the Court would have to implement interim plans. The trial began February 18, 1992, and was concluded on March 6, 1992. An Order was issued on May 1, 1992. The Court's Order redistricted the South Carolina House, South Carolina Senate, and the Congressional Districts. It is from this Order that the Appeal by SRAC and a Cross-Appeal by the Governor has been made.

I.

SECTION 2 OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT IS A RESULTS TEST THAT CAN ONLY ACCURATELY MEASURE THE RESULTS OF A PLAN ONCE IT HAS BEEN IMPLEMENTED.

Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act prohibits the implementation of a redistricting plan that results in the dilution of minority voting strength. As a practical matter it is difficult, if not impossible, for a court to consider whether a particular

plan meets Section 2 criteria unless and until that plan has been implemented and elections have been held under the plan. Section 2 judgment of a prospective redistricting plan would be educated guesswork at best, as reliable and relevant data is unavailable to evaluate future election results under the proposed boundaries. Election history and data from races held under former plans with different demographic and geographic makeups could be the only guide for a court to utilize while making its prospective determination of whether a Section 2 violation would occur.

In Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986), the Court stated that

> [t]he essence of a §2 claim is that a certain electoral law, practice or structure interacts with social and historical conditions to cause an inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by black and white voters to elect their preferred representatives.

Gingles at 47.

A Section 2 case, therefore, is a test of an existing situation against the social and historic context. With a court drawn plan, there is no "existing" situation with which to gauge the result of the implementation of the plan. See, De Grandy v. Wetherell, TCA 92-40015-WS, at 14 (N.D. Fla. May 29, 1992).

The Court further noted in Gingles that Section 2 had been amended to reflect, inter alia, the "right questions" that should be brought in a Section 2 lawsuit. Specifically

> [t]he 'right' question as the Report emphasizes repeatedly, is whether 'as a result of the challenged practice or structure plaintiffs do not have an equal opportunity to participate in the political processes and to elect candidates of their choice.' [cite omitted]
>
> In order to answer this question, a court must assess the impact of the contested structure or practice on minority electorial opportunities 'on the basis of objective factors.' [Cite omitted] [Emphasis added]

Gingles, 478 U.S. at 44.

The Three-Judge Court quoting portions of the above-cited language likewise stated that

> [i]t is important to remember ... that §2 involves a challenge to the effects or intent of a specific plan and the crucial aspect of the proceeding is the determination of liability. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 44 (quoting Senate Report at 27). [Emphasis in original]

SRAC Appendix 41.

Obviously, as the Three-Judge Court found

> ... a §2 plaintiff is attacking an existing practice and a plan being challenged under §5 must be advocated .... [Emphasis in original]

SRAC Appendix 41.

No party defended the existing plans, nor suggested the continued use of these plans. All parties were in agreement that demographic changes documented by the 1990 census dictated redistricting. Given that agreement by the parties, the application of Section 2 to the existing plan was moot.

The Court then had to determine if it would choose a plan from the various plans submitted by each party or fashion its own interim plan. In doing the latter, the Court took into consideration the appropriate Section 2 factors.

Under Section 2 criteria, the only true test of the Court drawn redistricting plans could occur after elections have been held and a new action is brought in Federal District Court. The right of these parties, or other non-parties, to exercise the option of post election litigation challenging the new plans on a Section 2 basis is not prejudiced by the lower court's Order.

In fact as the Three-Judge Court found, if it had

> ... completely graft[ed] the requirements of Section 2 into Section 5, the court would impair the duality of remedies currently afforded aggrieved parties under principles of res judicata or separation of powers.

SRAC Appendix 42.

II.

THE THREE JUDGE COURT APPLIED THE STANDARDS OF SECTION 2 OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT TO THE COURT ORDERED RE-DISTRICTING PLANS.

Faced with the task of redistricting the State House, State Senate and Congress, the Court did not ignore Section 2 in the drawing of these plans. Although a total adoption of the tests and requirements of Section 2 was not made, the standards of Section 2 were utilized in formulating the plans drafted by the Court. The Court in fact stated that "[i]t would be incongruous for the court to adopt a plan which did not comport with the standards and guidelines of §2". SRAC Appendix 38. The Court went on to state that

> ... since it would be anomalous for this court to adopt a plan which immediately lends itself to an attack under §2, our analysis should ensure that the threshold requirements of a §2 action cannot be established under the adopted plan.

SRAC Appendix 45.

In Gingles, the United States Supreme Court addressed the requirements of the revised Section 2 standards. The Gingles case arose in the context of a lawsuit regarding the multimember redistricting [1] plan drawn for the North Carolina State Senate. The Supreme Court held that Plaintiffs bringing a Section 2 case must be able to meet all parts of a three-fold threshold test. The minority group had to be:

> ... sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single member district ... the minority group must be able to show that it is politically cohesive ... [and] the minority must be able to demonstrate that the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it - in the absence of special circumstances ... usually to defeat the minority's preferred candidate.

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[1] In the present case the Court redistricted already existing single member districts. The South Carolina House has been elected from single-member districts since 1974, and the South Carolina Senate since 1984.

Gingles at 50-51.

Each element must be present in order for the suit to be maintained. See, McNeil v. Springfield Park Dist., 851 F.2d. 937 (7th Cir. 1988) cert. den, 490 U.S. 1031 (1989); Monroe v. City of Woodville, 881 F.2d. 1327 (5th Cir. 1989) mod. 897 F.2d 763 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. den. 911 S.Ct. 71 (1990). If this threshold has been met, however, the Court

> ... is to consider the 'totality of the circumstances' and to determine, based 'upon a searching practical evaluation of the "past and present reality," '[cite omitted] whether the political process is equally open to minority voters. '"This determination is peculiarly dependent upon the facts of each case"' [cites omitted] ... and requires 'an intensely local appraisal of the design and impact' of the contested electoral mechanisms. [Cite omitted].

Gingles, at 79.

As a guideline for implementing a Section 2 review, this Court in Gingles cited the Senate Report findings of the typical relevant factors in a Section 2

case. The cited list includes such factors as the history of voting related discrimination, the extent of racial polarization in voting, utilization by the state of voting practices that increase the opportunity for discrimination, exclusion of minorities from candidate slating, the extent to which minorities bear the effects of past discrimination, the use of overt or subtle racial appeals in political campaigns, and the extent to which minorities had won election to public office. Gingles, at 44-45. The Senate Report also emphasized, though, that the list was not exhaustive nor did any particular group of factors have to be proven. Gingles, at 45.

Of these factors the SRAC Appellants admit that

> SRAC and the Burton plaintiffs submitted substantial evidence of the factors deemed probative of minority vote dilution identified in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 37, 45 (1986), and the Senate Report that accompanied the 1982 amendment of Section 2, to wit:

> (1) that blacks were geographically compact; [fn. cite omitted] (2) that blacks were politically cohesive; (3) that voting was racially polarized; (4) that there was a history of official discrimination in the state that touched the rights of blacks to participate in the electoral process; [fn. cite omitted] (5) the depressed socioeconomic status of minorities; [fn. cite omitted] (6) the extent to which minorities had been elected in congressional and legislative contests; [fn. cite omitted] and (7) the use of voting practices, such as a majority vote requirement for primary elections, that may enhance the opportunity for discrimination against the minority group.

SRAC Jurisdictional Statement 5-6.

They also state that they presented testimony as to political cohesiveness and racial block voting. [2] SRAC Jurisdictional Statement 6. See also, Order, SRAC Appendix 55-56.

The Appellants, therefore, presented Section 2 testimony and evidence to the

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[2] It was stipulated that there was evidence of racial political voting in South Carolina since 1984. SRAC Appendix 56.

Court and the Court utilized this information in the drawing of its plans.

III.

THE THREE-JUDGE COURT ORDERED REDISTRICTING PLANS COMPLY WITH THE SECTION 2 REMEDY.

There is no bright line test as to what constitutes a Section 2 remedy in every case; therefore; the appropriate Section 2 remedy must be decided case by case. Overton v. City of Austin, 871 F.2d 529 (5th Cir. 1989). A Section 2 remedy must be formulated to address and alleviate the problems proven in each case. In Jordan v. Winter, 604 F. Supp. 807, 813 (N.D. Miss. 1984) aff'd 469 U.S. 1002 (1984) the Court on remand stated that

> [i]n devising a plan to replace our prior plan for the impending election, we recognized the obligation to: (1) achieve the least possible deviation from the one person, one vote ideal, [cite omitted] (2) design a plan that is not racially discriminatory in either purpose or effect, [cite omitted] and (3) adhere to the state's policies except to the

> extent such policies are violative of either the Constitution or the Voting Rights Act [cite omitted].

And in U.S. v. Dallas County Commission., 850 F.2d 1433, 1437-38 (11th Cir. 1988), reh. den. 858 F.2d 746 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. den. 490 U.S. 1030 (1989) the Court stated that

> '[i]t is clear that any proposal to remedy a Section 2 violation must itself conform with Section 2.' Dillard v. Crenshaw County, 831 F.2d 246, 249 (11th Cir. 1987) (citing Edge v. Sumter County School District, 775 F.2d 1509, 1510 (11th Cir. 1985). This principle coincides with the legislative intent that when devising election plans to remedy Section 2 violations, federal courts 'should exercise ... traditional equitable powers to fashion the relief so that it completely remedies the prior dilution of minority voting strength and fully provides equal opportunity for minority citizens to participate and to elect candidates of their choice.' S.Rep. No. 417 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 31, reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Adm. News 177, 208.

The Three-Judge Court's plan meets the criteria set out above for remedying a Section 2 violation. The Court went to

great lengths to conform its plan as nearly as possible to the one person, one vote criteria, allowing for variations only insofar as to accommodate relevant and appropriate state policy. [3] Specifically the Court found that its plan for the House had a total deviation of 1.98 percent, a de minimis deviation, "therefore, the constitutional requirement of one man, one vote implicit in the Fourteenth Amendment is satisfied." SRAC Appendix 72. The Court further found that the plan was not retrogressive, as it created twenty-three (23) districts with a majority black voting age population as opposed to twenty (20) black voting age population districts under the 1981 plan when drawn. A total of twenty-eight (28) districts with black total population majorities are included in the Court

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[3] That consideration did not apply to Congressional Districts where the Court, following mathematical exactness as a criteria, arrived at a zero percent deviation. SRAC Appendix 17, 81-82.

drawn House plan, as opposed to the twenty-six (26) districts drawn in 1981 and the twenty-four (24) which existed under the 1990 census. SRAC Appendix 71-72. The Three-Judge Court stated it "looked to the voting age population as the measure of opportunity to elect the candidate of one's choice". SRAC Appendix 48. Voting age population is the same standard utilized in other cases in establishing a remedy for a Section 2 violation. See, McNeil, supra at 945; Romero v. City of Pomona, 665 F.Supp. 853, 864 (C.D. Cal. 1987) aff'd 883 F.2d 1418 (9th Cir. 1989).

A Section 2 remedy does not impose an affirmative duty to maximize the number of minority districts. As was noted in Watkins v. Mabus, 771 F.Supp. 789, 806 (S.D. Miss. 1991) aff'd in part, vac in part 112 S.Ct. 412 (1992)

> [i]t is doubtful whether Gingles held, ... that the amended Voting Rights §2 requires that states go beyond the requirement of non-dis-

> crimination in order to create as many non-white majority districts as possible. See, e.g., Jeffers v. Clinton, 730 F.Supp. 196, 217 (E.D. Ark. 1989) (three judge court), aff'd mem., 111 S.Ct. 662 (1991) ('We are not holding that law requires the creation of any particular number of majority-black districts.')

See also, State of Mississippi v. U.S., 490 F.Supp. 569, 582 (DDC 1979) aff'd mem 444 U.S. 1050 (1980).

The Three-Judge Court stated that it was

> ... guided by the decision in Jeffers v. Clinton, 730 F.Supp. 196, 205 (E.D. Ark. 1989), aff'd, 111 S.Ct. 662 (1991):
>
> > We agree that Thornburg and Smith cannot be automatically applied to the single member context. Dilution may be much more obvious in a case like Smith, where a potential majority of black voters was submerged in a two-member district. But the basic principle is the same. If lines are drawn that limit the number of majority-black single-member districts, and reasonably compact and con-

tiguous majority-black districts could have been drawn, and if racial cohesiveness in voting is so great that, as a practical matter, black voters' preferences for black candidates are frustrated by this system of apportionment, the outlines of a section 2 theory are made out.

Therefore, with the goal of providing minorities with an equal opportunity to elect the representatives of their choice in mind, we have analyzed the proposed plans as well as the plans we adopt today based on the following factors: 1) the extent to which the plans proposed and the plans adopted are consistent with the retrogression standard set forth in Beer and City of Lockhart; 2) the extent to which reasonable compact and contiguous majority black districts were and could be drawn; 3) the extent to which the minority group is politically cohesive; 4) the extent to which racially polarized voting patterns exist; 5)

> the extent to which the lines which have been drawn limit the number of majority-black single-member districts in light of the expressed state policies of the State of South Carolina. The Senate factors may be applied to the extent that they aid the court in its determination of these factors. This approach allows the court to formulate a plan which is consistent not only with the provisions of § 5, but insures that the court's plan will not violate the threshold requirements for liability under §2.

SRAC Appendix 45-47. See also, Wilson v. Eu, 823 P.2d 545, 565 (Cal. 1992).

The SRAC Appellants and Governor Campbell on Cross-Appeal assert that their plan should have been the measuring standard for the Court's plan. SRAC Jurisdictional Statement 20, Campbell Jurisdictional Statement 19. However, the Court detailed the problems with the plans presented by the parties as: excessively cutting county lines

and disregarding communities of interest, pitting political party incumbents against each other, and drawing plans only with regard to race or political affiliation. SRAC Appendix 63-64, 74-78, 80, 85.

The plans presented by the Appellants appeared to be seeking proportional representation. Indeed the Court noted that the plan presented by the Republican Party for the House was

> ... an attempt to achieve proportional representation on the basis of race, a result specifically not dictated by any federal or state law.

SRAC Appendix 56. [4]

Of course, Section 2 does not authorize the goal of proportional representation and expressly states that

> [n]othing in this section establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in num-

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[4] The Republican Party is not an Appellant in this case, however, the drafter of the Cross-Appellant Governor's plans and the Republican Party's plans was the same individual. SRAC Appendix 78, fn 75.

> bers equal to their proportion in the population.

42 U.S.C. §1973.

The Court concluded that it was

> ... satisfied that its plan satisfies the requirements of the Voting Rights Act. The court's plan strikes the proper balance between the various interests arising in this type of proceeding, including equality of population in districts, racial fairness, and maintenance of the state's political subdivisions and communities of interest.

SRAC Appendix 79 [5] See also, SRAC Appendix 75. The Court specifically stated it had "... reviewed the Court's plan and conclude[d] that it contains no obvious violation of §2." SRAC Appendix 76.

The plan created by the Three-Judge Court, therefore, complied with a Section 2 remedy. Although the Three-Judge Court stated it was not obliged to conduct an indepth Section 2 review, it proceeded to in

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[5] This same indepth review was also followed by the Court for the Senate and Congress. SRAC Appendix 58-70, 79-85.

fact allow Section 2 testimony as to the Gingles listed factors and incorporated these findings in its subsequent plans.

IV

THE THREE-JUDGE COURT CORRECTLY INCORPORATED APPROPRIATE STATE POLICY IN DRAWING THE COURT ORDERED REDISTRICTING PLANS.

The Appellants argue that the Court should not have followed state policies in the drawing of its plans. SRAC Jurisdiction Statement 28, Campbell Jurisdictional Statement 22-25. However, that argument disregards the clear precedent of this Court that states that a court in implementing its own redistricting plans must follow state policy unless to follow that state policy would violate applicable constitutional or statutory standards or provisions. White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 794-795 (1973); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 160-161 (1971); Upham v. Seamon, 456 U.S. 37, 41-42 (1982). See also, Wesch v. Hunt, 785

F.Supp. 1491, 1498 (SD Ala. 1992) aff'd 112 S.Ct. 1926 (1992) pet. for cert. filed (U.S. June 5, 1992); Terrazas v. Slagle, 789 F.Supp. 828, 838 (W.D. Tex 1991) aff'd 66 U.S.L.W. 3870, 3878 (U.S. June 29, 1992); Emison v Growe, 782 F.Supp. 427, 447-448 (D. Minn. 1992) prob. juris. noted 112 S.Ct. 1557 (1992).

V.
SECTION 5 STANDARDS OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT WERE APPROPRIATELY APPLIED BY THE THREE-JUDGE COURT IN FASHIONING ITS COURT ORDERED REDISTRICTING PLANS.

The Appellants contend that the Court erroneously applied Section 5 standards as Section 5 only applies to the question of preclearance of a change by the courts or the Justice Department. SRAC Jurisdictional Statement 22-23. This argument disregards the years of precedent in reapportionment and redistricting cases which hold that Section 5 standards are the appropriate standards for a court to apply in fashioning

a plan. In McDaniel v. Sanchez, 452 U.S. 130 (1981) the court quoted from the 1975 Senate Committee Report on the bill that extended the life of the Voting Rights Act which stated that

> '... in fashioning the plan, the court should follow the appropriate Section 5 standards, including the body of administrative and judicial precedents developed in Section 5 cases.' Senate Report, at 18-19. [fn. cite omitted]

Sanchez at 149.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons the Appeal of SRAC and the Cross-Appeal of Governor Campbell should be dismissed or in the alternative, the Three-Judge Court's Order below should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,

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APPENDIX

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Article I, §2 1

Article I, §2 of the United States Constitution

House of Representatives; how constituted; power of impeachment.

The House of Representatives shall be composed of members chosen every second year by the people of the several states, and the electors in each state shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the state legislature.

No person shall be a representative who shall not have attained to the age of twenty-five years, and been seven years a citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an inhabitant of that state in which he shall be chosen.

Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several states which may be included within this Union, according to their respective numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole number of free persons, including those bound to service for a term of years, and

excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other persons. The actual enumeration shall be made within three years after the first meeting of the Congress of the United States, and within every subsequent term of ten years, in such manner as they shall by law direct. The number of representatives shall not exceed one for every thirty thousand, but each state shall have at least one representative; and until such enumeration shall be made, the State of New Hampshire shall be entitled to choose three, Massachusetts eight, Rhode Island and Providence Plantations one, Connecticut five, New York six, New Jersery four, Pennsylvania eight, Delaware one, Maryland six, Virginia ten, North Carolina five, South Carolina five and Georgia three.

When vacancies happen in the represen tation from any state, the executive authority thereof shall issue writs of election to

fill such vacancies.

The House of Representatives shall choose their speaker and other officers; and shall have the sole power of impeachment.